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OPSOMMING 
 
In hierdie studie word Wolfgang Huber se konsep „kommunikatiewe vryheid‟ krities 
geëvalueer. Daar word geargumenteer dat kommunikatiewe vryheid klassieke 
Protestantse vryheidsbegrippe herartikuleer ten einde ‟n kritiese interaksie met 
moderniteit te fasiliteer. 
 
Dat kommunikatiewe vryheid nie ‟n poging is om ‟n nuwe vryheidskonsep te 
ontwikkel nie, maar dat dit getrou bly aan die Reformasie se herontdekking van 
Christelike vryheid, word geïllustreer aan die hand van die belang van Paulus en 
Martin Luther se vryheidsbegrippe vir die konsep. Daar word ook aangedui tot watter 
mate die tradisie van die Belydende Kerk in Duitsland bydra tot Huber se 
kommunikatiewe vryheid deur die invloed van Dietrich Bonhoeffer en Heinz Eduard 
Tödt te ondersoek. 
 
Die basiese teologiese bewegings van die konsep dui op die ooreenstemming 
daarvan met klassieke Protestantse begrippe van vryheid. Huber ontwikkel veral drie 
teologiese dimensies van kommunikatiewe vryheid. In ‟n eerste plek het die konsep 
‟n onvervreembare dimensie, aangesien dit deur God se inisiatief gekonstitueer word 
en nie van menslike vermoëns afhang nie. Terselfdertyd het kommunikatiewe 
vryheid ‟n persoonlike dimensie. Die vryheid wat deur God gekonstitueer is, kan 
slegs in tussenmenslike verhoudings gerealiseer word. Die persoonlike dimensie van 
kommunikatiewe vryheid impliseer dat menslike individualiteit en sosialiteit nie 
geskei kan word nie. Huber integreer ook die realiteit van sonde in die konsep van 
kommunikatiewe vryheid deur daaraan daaraan uitdrukking te gee dat vryheid altyd 
slegs voorlopig gerealiseer word. Huber ontwikkel die voorlopige karakter van die 
realisering van vryheid egter nie as rede tot apatie nie, maar as ‟n oproep tot 
hoopvolle aksie, aangesien dit die waarnemingsvermoë vir bronne van onvryheid 
verskerp. 
 
In die daaropvolgende afdelings word die implikasies van hierdie basiese teologiese 
bewegings ontwikkel as kommunikatiewe vryheid se kritiese interaksie met 
moderniteit.  
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In Hoofstuk 2 word die mate waartoe kommunikatiewe vryheid as bevestiging van 
moderniteit dien, ondersoek. Kommunikatiewe vryheid se bevestiging van die 
sentrale rol van die individu en van moderne samelewings se institusionele 
raamwerk – veral sekularisasie, demokrasie en pluralisasie – dien as basis vir die 
ondersoek. In Hoofstuk 3 word ondersoek ingestel na hoe kommunikatiewe vryheid 
bydra tot die vernuwing van moderniteit, met spesifieke klem op die kritiek daarvan 
op die moderne vertroue in vooruitgang, die oproep tot geregtigheid en die belang 
van dialoog. Die studie word afgesluit met enkele opmerkings rakende 
kommunikatiewe vryheid se interaksie met moderniteit vanuit ‟n Suid-Afrikaanse 
perspektief.  
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ABSTRACT 
 
This study is a critical evaluation of the concept „communicative freedom‟ in the work 
of the theologian Wolfgang Huber. It is argued that his rearticulation of the 
Reformation‟s understanding of freedom is a critical engagement of modernity. 
Communicative freedom is therefore developed as a critical Christian concept of 
freedom. 
 
It is shown how Huber‟s concept of communicative freedom is to be understood as a 
contemporary expression of classic Protestant views of freedom. In terms of the 
concept‟s content it is shown to stay true to some of the Reformation‟s basic 
theological convictions. Huber understands the concept to consist of three 
dimensions. It is inalienable as it is constituted by God and is therefore not the result 
of human achievements or abilities. The freedom that is constituted by God‟s 
initiative can be realised only in interpersonal relationships and therefore its 
inalienable dimension forms the basis of its personal dimension. Communicative 
freedom does not separate human individuality and sociality from one another but 
emphasises their shared origin. Lastly the reality of sin is incorporated into the 
concept by recognising the provisional nature of freedom‟s realisation. It is shown 
that this self-critical character of communicative freedom does not imply resignation 
but that Huber develops it as a call to action. 
 
It is argued that Huber does not articulate this Christian understanding of freedom as 
a goal in itself, but as a means by which to engage modernity. The implications of 
these theological dimensions of communicative freedom are then developed as both 
Huber‟s critical affirmation of the modernist project as well as his contribution to 
modernity‟s renewal. 
 
Communicative freedom serves as critical affirmation of modernity by the way in 
which it engages the role of the individual and the role society plays in enabling 
different individuals to co-exist. This concept is shown to enable the responsible 
realisation of freedom in the context of secularisation, democracy and pluralism. 
Communicative freedom also contributes to the renewal of modernity, namely by 
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means of its reinterpretation of progress, the way it contributes to the restoration of a 
comprehensive form of justice and its focus on the importance of dialogue. The 
dissertation concludes with some comments concerning the engagement of 
modernity by communicative freedom from a South African perspective. 
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INTRODUCTORY REMARKS  
 
This study is an investigation into the place and role of communicative freedom in 
the work of the German theologian Wolfgang Huber. In this introductory section 
Wolfgang Huber will be introduced and the relevance of freedom within which 
context this study is conducted will be sketched. This will form the background for 
introducing the aim of this study and the method by means of which it will be 
reached. 
 
 
1. WOLFGANG HUBER 
 
Wolfgang Huber is one of the world‟s foremost public theologians, as his high regard 
in German society,1 his excellence in the academy2 and his profound influence in the 
Evangelical Church in Germany (EKD) illustrate. As a highly respected public figure, 
an honorary professor in Berlin, bishop of the EKD in Berlin-Brandenburg-Silesian 
Upper Lusatia and chairperson of the EKD‟s council he not only develops his 
academic theology but he also publicly practises it. His involvement in public life, 
especially in questions regarding social cohesion, integration of minorities, religious 
tolerance, bioethics, legal ethics and political ethics, signifies the contextuality and 
scope of his theology.  
 
He has published extensively on a wide range of theological themes. His most 
important publications include Kirche und Öffentlichkeit (1973), Menschenrechte: 
Perspektiven einer menschlichen Welt (1977, written with Heinz Eduard Tödt), 
Kirche (1979), Der Streit um die Wahrheit und die Fähigkeit zum Frieden: vier Kapitel 
ökumenische Theologie (1980), Folgen christlicher Freiheit: Ethik und Theorie der 
                                                             
1
 Huber is quoted often in newspapers and magazines and from time to time appears on German 
television. 
2
 Huber studied at the universities of Heidelberg, Göttingen and Tübingen, worked as a minister in 
Württemberg, was appointed at the Forschungsstätte der Evangelischen Studiengemeinschaft in 
Heidelberg (1968) and became its director in 1973. In 1980 he was appointed as Professor of Social 
Ethics at the University of Marburg, and in 1984 he became Professor of Systematic Theology at the 
University of Heidelberg. Since 1994 he has been the bishop of the EKD in Berlin-Brandenburg-
Silesian Upper Lusatia, and in 2003 he was chosen as the chairperson of the EKD‟s council. 
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Kirche im Horizont der Barmer theologischen Erklärung (1983), Protestantismus und 
Protest (1987), Konflikt und Konsens: Studien zur Ethik der Verantwortung (1990), 
Die tägliche Gewalt: gegen den Ausverkauf der Menschenwürde (1993), 
Gerechtigkeit und Recht (1996), Kirche in der Zeitenwende: gesellschaftlicher 
Wandel und Erneuerung der Kirche (1999) and more recently the essays Das Ende 
der Person? Zur Spannung zwischen Ethik und Gentechnologie (2001), 
Rechtfertigung und Recht: Über die christlichen Wurzeln der europäischen 
Rechtskultur (2001) and his more popularly written book Der christliche Glaube 
(2008). Apart from his responsibilities as bishop, academic and eminent public 
figure, and the publications listed above, Huber continues to deliver an astounding 
number of speeches, lectures, columns and sermons each year.3   
 
His theology and public involvement are grounded in the conviction that Christianity 
is the religion that advocates life-enabling freedom (e.g. Huber, 1990a:135–157).4 
Huber (1992a:115) uses the concept „communicative freedom‟, which he 
encountered in the work of the philosopher Michael Theunissen in the late 1970s 
(Huber, 1985:9), to denote his understanding of freedom. 
 
Huber (1996c:61) understands communicative freedom to be a rearticulation of the 
Reformation‟s rediscovery of freedom, as is also clear in his extensive use of Martin 
Luther‟s theology to substantiate the concept.5 Huber (1991:672) is of the opinion 
                                                             
3
 Cf. Bibliography. 
4
 Freedom is an important theme in virtually all of Huber‟s most important books. In Menschenrechte: 
Perspektiven einer menschlichen Welt (co-written with Heinz Eduard Tödt, 1977) the connection 
between freedom and human dignity is developed as point of connection between Christianity and 
modern theories of human rights; in Folgen christlicher Freiheit: Ethik und Theorie der Kirche im 
Horizont der Barmer theologischen Erklärung (2
nd
 ed., 1985) especially the implications freedom has 
for ethics and ecclesiology are developed; in Protestantismus und Protest (1987) the public and 
political implications of the Reformation‟s understanding of freedom are investigated; in Konflikt und 
Konsens. Studien zur Ethik der Verantwortung (1990) Huber develops his characteristic connection 
between freedom and responsibility further; in Die tägliche Gewalt: gegen den Ausverkauf der 
Menschenwürde (1993) the realisation of freedom in a global context and the necessity of global 
responsibility and dialogue are important emhpases; in Gerechtigkeit und Recht. Grundlinien 
christlicher Rechtsethik (1996) human dignity as point of connection between freedom and justice is 
developed as one the book‟s important themes; in Kirche in der Zeitenwende: gesellschaftlicher 
Wandel und Erneuerung der Kirche (1999) the implications of freedom for the current (German) 
context are investigated; and in Rechtfertigung und Recht: über die christlichen Wurzeln der 
europäischen Rechtskultur (2001) the Reformation‟s focus on the inalienable freedom of all people 
forms the basis for Huber‟s discussion of the European juridical system. Freedom furthermore forms 
an element of many speeches and sermons Huber delivers. 
5
 Cf. e.g. Kirche in der Zeitenwende (1999), and the published version of his inaugural lecture at the 
Humboldt University in Berlin, “Christliche Freiheit in der freiheitlichen Gesellschaft” (1996c). In a 
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that the Reformation used Christian resources in such a way as to articulate a 
concept of freedom that connects individuality with sociality and freedom with 
responsibility and takes the freedom of conscience seriously (Huber & Graf, 
1991:672). The basis of this comprehensive concept is God‟s gracious bestowal of 
freedom by means of the justification of the sinner (Huber, 2001h). 
 
Communicative freedom is at the same time a critical concept, and can be 
understood as engaging modernity (cf. Huber, 1990d:57–65; 2004c; 2007b). The 
contribution that Christianity, and Protestantism in particular, made to the 
development of modernity (cf. Huber, 1990d:32–33; 1996b:246ff; 2001h:12ff; 
2008b:40ff) as well as its current position in modern societies6 (cf. e.g. Huber, 
1990c:11–26; 1994a:167–172; 1999:44–66; 2005e) require its interaction with 
modernity. Huber (cf. e.g. 1994a:167–172) regards the discourse on freedom as one 
of the primary ways by means of which this interaction can take place.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
great number of lectures and speeches Huber employs Luther‟s work on freedom as an important 
element of his argument. Cf. the breadth of topics in following speeches in which Huber uses the 
Reformation and specifically Luther to substantiate his argument on freedom: “Evangelisch im 21. 
Jahrhundert” (2007b), “Der Mensch ist zur Arbeit geboren wie der Vogel zum Fliegen. Hat das 
protestantische Arbeitsethos noch eine Zukunft?” (2007j), “Glaube und Vernunft” (2007t), 
“Gemeinschaft gestalten – Evangelisches Profil in Europa” (2006i), “Von der Freiheit der Kinder 
Gottes – Plädoyer für eine selbstbewusste Kirche” (2006r), “Evangelisch – profiliert – wertvoll” 
(2006t), “Lesen lernen – Zur Wiederentdeckung einer kulturellen Grundkompetenz aus evangelischer 
Perspektive” (2006z), “Die Herausforderungen für die Theologie in einem pluralistischen Europa aus 
ökumenischer Perspektive - Eine evangelische Stellungnahme” (2006dd), “Beheimatung im Eigenen 
– Respekt vor dem Anderen. Zum kulturellen Auftrag der Medien” (2005c), “Der Auftrag der Kirchen in 
einem Zusammenwachsenden Europa” (2005d), “Der Zukunft auf der Spur” (2005k), “Unvereinbare 
Gegensätze? Scharia und säkulare Recht” (2005q), “In deinem Licht schauen wir das Licht – Quellen 
und Perspektiven christlicher Spiritualität” (2005s), “Der Beruf zur Politik – Zwanzig Jahre 
Demokratiedenkschrift der EKD” (2005w), “Demokratie wagen – Der Protestantismus im politischen 
Wandel 1965 – 1985” (2005bb), “Protestantismus – Abgesang oder Zukunftsmodell?” (2004c), “Die 
Tugend des Glaubens” (2004i), “Europa als Wertegemeinschaft – Seine christlichen Grundlagen 
Gestern, Heute, Morgen” (2001b), “Unantastbare Menschenwürde – Gilt sie von Anfang an?” (2001e) 
and “Die Rolle der Kirchen als intermediärer Institutionen in der Gesellschaft” (2000a). 
6
 Modern societies are understood as those societies profoundly influenced by modernity, especially 
in their institutional structures. According to Beck et al. (2001:20–21) these societies can be described 
in terms of the six characteristics of classic modernity, namely (a) states are demarcated by a specific 
notion of geographical boundaries; (b) the individual has central importance in society, as the 
institutionalisation of rights and duties indicates; (c) capitalism, in whichever form, is the primary 
system by means of which the economy is organised; (d) resources from nature are used to fuel 
societal progress; (e) society is organised and its progress planned by means of a scientific 
rationality; and (f) these societies are characterised by functional differentiation. In this regard it 
should also be noted, however, that a revision of „classic modernity‟ is taking place and that modern 
societies are also those societies challenged by a further five processes (Beck et al., 2001:22–24), 
namely (a) globalisation; (b) further individualisation; (c) the gender revolution; (d) the change of the 
employment structure and; (e) the political implications of the ecological crisis.  
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2. FREEDOM IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
This dissertation is also written within a context where the concept of freedom is of 
burning relevance, namely South Africa. The struggle against apartheid was 
characterised by the theme of liberation from oppressive and dehumanising political 
power as the Freedom Charter (Kliptown, 1955) shows. As one of the foundational 
documents of the struggle for liberation this document articulates the search for 
freedom for all as the primary aim of the fight against the political structures of the 
time. 
 
Before continuing with its 10 programmatic statements7 the preamble of the 
Freedom Charter formulates the country‟s predicament in terms of a number of 
unfreedoms and societal injustices8 and regards the creation of a “democratic state, 
based on the will of all the people” as the guarantor of freedom. The preamble 
concludes by setting societal freedom as an important aim of the struggle movement: 
“These freedoms we will fight for, side by side, throughout our lives, until we have 
won our liberty” (Freedom Charter, 1955). 
 
However, despite South Africa‟s relatively stable transition and a number of years of 
democratic rule, the search for freedom for all is still relevant. An already 
beleaguered President Thabo Mbeki (2006) articulated the continued need for a 
discourse on freedom in the Nelson Mandela Memorial Lecture he delivered at the 
University of the Witwatersrand in 2006: 
 
                                                             
7
 These statements are the following: “The people shall govern!”, “All national groups shall have equal 
rights!”, “The people shall share in the country‟s wealth!”, “The land shall be shared among those who 
work it!”, “All shall be equal before the law!”, “All shall enjoy equal human rights!”, “There shall be 
work and security!”, “The doors of learning and culture shall be opened!”, “There shall be houses, 
security and comfort!” and “There shall be peace and friendship!”. 
8
 “We, the People of South Africa, declare for all our country and the world to know: that South Africa 
belongs to all who live in it, black and white, and that no government can justly claim authority unless 
it is based on the will of all the people; that our people have been robbed of their birthright to land, 
liberty and peace by a form of government founded on injustice and inequality; that our country will 
never be prosperous or free until all our people live in brotherhood, enjoying equal rights and 
opportunities; that only a democratic state, based on the will of all the people, can secure to all their 
birthright without distinction of colour, race, sex or belief; and therefore, we, the people of South 
Africa, black and white together equals, countrymen and brothers adopt this Freedom Charter; and 
we pledge ourselves to strive together, sparing neither strength nor courage, until the democratic 
changes here set out have been won.” 
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[T]he meaning of freedom has come to be defined not by the seemingly 
ethereal and therefore intangible gift of liberty, but by the designer labels 
on the clothes we wear, the cars we drive, the spaciousness of our 
houses and our yards, their geographic location, the company we keep 
and what we do as part of that company. 
 
In this speech he articulates societal concern over whether it is indeed possible to 
relate individual freedom with the betterment of society, and he hereby implicitly 
articulates the tension between the struggle for a free society and maintaining 
freedom in a society where every individual is guaranteed certain rights and 
freedoms. He then continues by stating that regaining the connection between the 
free individual and a free society is necessary for ensuring the humane and peaceful 
co-existence of a diversity of people, especially in the context of a world 
characterised by inequality:  
 
The conflicts we see today and have seen in many parts of the world 
should themselves communicate the daily message to us that the 
construction of cohesive human society concerns much more than the 
attainment of high economic growth rates, important as this objective is. ... 
Indeed, as we South Africans grapple with our own challenges, billions of 
the poor and the marginalised across the globe see the world ever 
evolving into a more sinister, cold and bitter place: this is the world that is 
gradually defined by increasing racism, xenophobia, ethnic animosity, 
religious conflicts, and the scourge of terrorism (Mbeki, 2006:12). 
 
As freedom and the struggle for a comprehensive and constructive understanding 
thereof is also of relevance in the South African society, this study is therefore 
written with the South African context in mind. It is the researcher‟s conviction that 
investigating the role of communicative freedom in the work of an influential theorist 
like Huber can be of great assistance for a better understanding of the challenges 
and possible ways forward in the southern African context.  
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3. AIM OF THE STUDY 
 
The primary aim of this research project is to investigate the place and role of 
communicative freedom in the theology of Wolfgang Huber. As Huber develops 
communicative freedom as a critical concept (cf. e.g. Huber, 1990c:11–26; 
1994a:167–172; 1999:44–66; 2005e) it is the view of the researcher that 
investigating the way in which the theological content of the concept engages its 
socio-historical context serves as meaningful interpretative instrument by means of 
which to structure the concept and place it within Huber‟s theology. However, it is the 
researcher‟s firm conviction that the temptation to present a critique of Huber‟s social 
ethics as such should be withstood. A number of reasons can be given. Most notably 
the reader should be reminded that Huber‟s theological project has not been 
concluded yet and that a complete overview of his work is not available. Added to 
this, Huber might just still want to systematise or contribute meaningfully to his own 
social ethics – and he will theoretically soon have more time to do so – which will 
make a critique of his social ethics as a whole redundant quicker than any 
researcher would like his work to be superceded. Another reason is that the style of 
criticism that is adopted in this study is wilfully meant to be constructive, i.e. to 
critique Huber in the way in which it is systematised and by means of the argument 
that is constructed. In a few places the researcher regarded it as necessary to 
engage Huber head-on with a counter-opinion, but mostly the style that is adopted is 
that of constructive criticism. “Constructive” is therefore also understood in the sense 
of constructing what is understood as Huber‟s most important contriution to the 
discourse on freedom in contexts other than Germany. Furthermore, this mode of 
criticism is meant to complement the conscious attempt at engaging a theological 
project that is still developing. 
 
The research project will therefore consist of two movements. In a first movement 
(Chapter 1) the concept‟s significant theological sources will be investigated. It is 
argued that understanding the way in which Huber utilises the apostle Paul, Martin 
Luther, Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Heinz Eduard Tödt substantiates Huber‟s claim 
(1996c:61) that communicative freedom is the rearticulation of the rediscovery of 
freedom by the Reformation and will allow one to place the concept in its theological 
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context. In the second movement (Chapter 2 and Chapter 3) the way in which 
communicative freedom engages modernity will be investigated. In Chapter 2, those 
dimensions of classic modernity that the concept affirms will be examined. The focus 
will be specifically on how it affirms the individual and modernity‟s structuring of 
human sociality. In Chapter 3, the contribution of communicative freedom to the 
renewal of modernity will be investigated. This will be done by investigating how 
communicative freedom engages progress, the tension between freedom and 
equality and finally how it can be realised in a diverse and integrated world. 
 
The secondary aim of this study is to present Huber‟s work on freedom in such a 
manner that its relevance for the context within which it is written, namely South 
Africa, is clear. Theoretically there are many ways in which Huber‟s current corpus of 
work can be engaged. The use of communicative freedom therefore does not only 
reflect the importance of freedom in his work, but is the expression of the 
researcher‟s view that this concept provides for the most meaningful way in which to 
relate his work to the South African context. The secondary aim will therefore not be 
reached by explicitly referring to the South African context, as it also does not fall 
within the parameters set by this study‟s thesis.  
 
As the South African society can broadly be described as a society that understands 
itself in modernist terms, the secondary aim will further be reached by developing 
communicative freedom as an engagement of modernity. The conclusion of the 
study will include some further areas of relevance for South Africa and it will include 
some critical remarks formulated from this perspective. The aim of these remarks is 
not meant to fulfil the study‟s secondary aim, but to address some broad, mostly 
conceptual, issues that emerged from the argument. Therefore the last section is 
also entitled “Some further remarks” as the argument itself has already been 
concluded. The main arena where the relevance of specific themes will be 
developed, however, is not the last section but the academic work that will result 
from this study. 
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4. METHOD OF RESEARCH 
 
The research will be conducted by means of studying Huber‟s written work and the 
speeches and sermons available to the researcher. In addition, extended contact 
with one of Huber‟s pre-eminent students, Prof. Dr Heinrich Bedford-Strohm 
(University of Bamberg), and with Huber himself serves as background for the study 
of his literature. 
 
As Huber‟s thought is still developing, and as he is expected to write even more 
prolifically after his retirement in 2009, it is important to note that this study is not an 
attempt at systematising and reviewing Huber‟s theology as such. Much rather 
should it be understood as an attempt born in the South African context to use one of 
Huber‟s central theological themes to contribute, in the first instance, to academic 
theology and, secondly, to the discourse on freedom in southern Africa. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
ARTICULATING FREEDOM ANEW 
The theological sources of communicative 
freedom 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Freedom is a key concept ... in the biblical witness. According to this 
witness, freedom is God‟s great gift to humankind. ... To protect the 
entrusted gift of freedom and to use the liberation from sin responsibly are 
God‟s purposes for humankind (Huber, 2007b).9 
 
With this statement made in his keynote address at the EKD‟s Future Congress held 
in Wittenberg in January 2007 and in his capacity as bishop, Wolfgang Huber 
(2007b) articulates two of his closely connected theological convictions: The Bible 
testifies to the central importance of freedom for human existence,10 and Christianity 
is the religion of freedom.11 As bishop of the EKD in Berlin-Brandenburg-Silesian 
Upper Lusatia and chairperson of the EKD‟s council he emphatically argues that the 
church and theology can only face the future when it stays true to its founding and 
sustaining core, namely its biblically grounded freedom. 
 
This programmatic statement can be understood as the convergence of the 
importance of freedom in German Protestantism with Huber‟s own theological 
convictions. His keynote address is to be read together with the EKD‟s 
memorandum, Kirche der Freiheit (EKD, 2006a), which preceded this Congress. The 
memorandum represents the way in which Christianity has developed as the religion 
                                                             
9
 “Freiheit ist ein Schlüsselbegriff ... des biblischen Zeugnisses. Diesem Zeugnis gemäß ist Freiheit 
die große Gabe Gottes an den Menschen. ... Die ihm als Geschenk anvertraute Freiheit zu bewahren, 
die in der Befreiung aus der Sünde erneuerte Freiheit verantwortlich zu gebrauchen, ist Gottes 
Auftrag an den Menschen.” 
10
 As will be shown in more detail later in this chapter, Huber reads Paul‟s work as primarily testifying 
to the freedom brought about by Christ and understands him to contribute to unlocking the Bible as 
the call to freedom (cf. e.g. Huber, 1996c:105; 1999:167175). 
11
 In this regard, see e.g. his article “Kirche als Raum und Anwalt der Freiheit” in Folgen christlicher 
Freiheit (Huber, 1985:205–216). Huber also describes Christian ethics in terms of freedom. Already in 
1979 he delivered the programmatic lecture “Freiheit und Institution. Sozialethik als Ethik 
kommunikativer Freiheit” in which he expounded his view on ethics (as mentioned by Huber himself in 
2007r). The conviction with which he describes Christianity as the religion of freedom has stayed the 
same. In the speech “Freiheit und soziale Verantwortung. Eine sozialethische Perspektive” (2007r) he 
delivered in Marburg in 2007 he stated, e.g.: “Freiheit ist ein Grundthema des christlichen Glaubens. 
Freilich ist der Freiheitsbegriff für die Theologie nicht nur im Verständnis des Menschen, sondern im 
Begriff Gottes verankert.” 
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of freedom in Germany but at the same time also reveals the theological 
correspondence between Huber‟s work and these developments in Germany.12  
 
As chairperson of the commission that was responsible for the memorandum (the 
so-called Perspektivkommission) Huber probably played a meaningful role in the 
document‟s composition. The document perceives itself to be the application of the 
founding freedom of Christianity to a challenging context.13 According to this 
document, societal realities and projected challenges should not to be seen as crises 
but should be embraced as chances to be church more faithfully (EKD, 
2006a:14ff),14 because Christians are free to rely on God‟s grace and they can 
therefore put their hope in God‟s comfort (EKD, 2006a:32).15 God‟s grace enables 
the responsible realisation of their inalienable freedom (EKD, 2006a:13).16 Echoes of 
Huber‟s theology of freedom are especially clear in the description of the realisation 
of freedom: It includes the willingness to take responsibility for oneself and for 
others. Freedom is not to be misunderstood as protecting oneself against the 
freedom of others but is the willingness to commit oneself to others (EKD, 2006a:13): 
“[The commitment out of freedom] becomes concrete in the willingness to broaden 
one‟s view, over and above one‟s own interests. It becomes concrete in the 
willingness to compromise and cooperate.”17 
 
                                                             
12
 In his keynote speech at the Future Congress he calls freedom the watchword to understand the 
form German Lutheranism should take on in the 21
st
 century (2007b). 
13
 In his introduction to the document Huber identifies the most significant of the challenges that face 
the church as demographic changes, financial losses, the late effects of fewer church members, 
relatively high levels of unemployment and increasing global competition (Kirche der Freiheit, 2006:7). 
It is estimated that the EKD‟s members will decrease from 26.2 million (2002) to 17.6 million (2030) 
(Kirche der Freiheit, 2006:22). 
14
 In Huber‟s view, Christianity should never shy away from societal realites by means of cultural 
pessimism  (e.g in 2008a) but reality should be interpreted level-headedly (cf. e.g. 1999:41–96, 181). 
In Prague in 2005, e.g., Huber delivered a speech with the theme “Zur Hoffnung eingeladen” (2005p) 
in which he refuted the possibility of hopelessness by describing Christian hope as the answer to the 
realisation of God‟s promises: “Unsere Hoffnung auf das Kommende ist die Antwort auf Gottes 
Verheißungen. Sie nimmt seine Versprechen ernst, sie nimmt Gott beim Wort. Darum ist das 
Gegenteil von Hoffnung auch nicht Mutlosigkeit, Ängstlichkeit oder Pessimismus, sondern eben 
Hoffnungslosigkeit.” 
15
 In 1985:216 Huber describes freedom as movement, and specifically the movement away from 
human attempts to constitute freedom to trust in God‟s sovereign constitution of freedom. 
16
 In 1990a:143–144 Huber states in terms of Bonhoeffer‟s theology that God‟s liberation compels 
Christians to make responsible use of their freedom by taking responsibility for others. 
17
 “Es wird konkret in der Bereitschaft zur Blickerweiterung über eigene Interessenlagen hinaus. Es 
wird konkret in der Bereitschaft zum Kompromiss und zur Kooperation.” 
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In this speech, Huber stresses the importance the concept of freedom has for 
Christianity and regards attending “the school of the beginnings”,18 i.e. the 
Reformation, as necessary for understanding its importance.  It is the argument of 
this chapter that attending the school of the beginnings is a theme that does not only 
characterise Huber‟s work as the bishop or the reaction of the Evangelical Church in 
Germany to its current challenges but that in developing the concept of 
communicative freedom, Huber aims at rearticulating the rediscovery of freedom by 
the Reformation anew.19 
 
The theologians Huber chooses to exemplify the Christian interpretation of freedom 
reveal his adherence to the classic Protestant sources. For Huber (1996c:105–106; 
1999:167ff; 2006r), the apostle Paul and Martin Luther are the „historical highlights‟ 
of this tradition. He understands Paul to have laid the foundation for understanding 
the role of freedom within Christianity, and he understands Luther‟s rediscovery of 
freedom in Paul‟s writings to be one of its most significant interpretations. It is 
therefore no coincidence that the EKD‟s Future Congress was held in Wittenberg. 
Indeed, when asking what it means to be a „church of freedom‟ it is important to once 
again place oneself “under Martin Luther‟s pulpit, he who preached ... in the 
Stadtkirche on the freedom of a Christian” (Huber, 2007b).20  
 
In this chapter significant theological sources that form the concept of communicative 
freedom will be investigated. As Huber‟s theology is still developing21 and because 
                                                             
18
 In his recent speeches Huber makes use of the concept “school of the beginnings” relatively often, 
and in speeches with as diverse themes as “In Verantwortung vor Gott und den Menschen” (2002a), 
“Hat der Glaube noch Zukunft?” (2003b), “Der christliche Glaube und die politische Kultur in Europa” 
(2004h), “Religion – Politik – Gewalt” (2005b), “Religionsfreiheit und Toleranz – Wie aktuell ist der 
Augsburger Religionsfriede?” (2005aa), “Nachfolge heute” (2006d), “Gemeinschaft gestalten – 
Evangeliches Profil in Europa” (2006i), “Die Religionen und der säkulare Staat” (2006)j, “Zukunft 
gestalten – Erwartungen an Religion und Glaube” (2006k), Die Herausforderungen für die Theologie 
in einem pluralistischen Europa aus ökumenischer Perspektive - Eine evangelische Stellungnahme” 
(2006dd) and “Dietrich Bonhoeffer – ein evangelischer Heiliger?” (2007k).  
19
 In Huber‟s important article “Protestantismus und die Ambivalenz der Moderne”, published in the 
book Religion der Freiheit. Protestantismus in der Moderne which was edited by Jürgen Moltmann, 
Huber strongly grounds the concept of communicative freedom in the understanding of freedom by 
the Reformation, and he does this in direct opposition to Moltmann‟s view (1990d:61). 
20
 “Wer im Jahre 2007 zu einem Zukunftskongress nach Wittenberg einlädt, der will mit den Vätern 
und Müttern der Reformation in die Zukunft gehen; er will erneut in die Schule der Anfänge gehen; er 
will sich unter die Kanzel Martin Luthers setzen, der hier in der Stadtkirche über die Freiheit eines 
Christenmenschen predigte ...” 
21
 As bishop, Huber himself is of the opinion that he is increasingly coming to terms with the „inside‟, 
or the essence, of theology (Huber, 2008d). 
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he refrains from systematising his work22 this is no attempt at a definitive 
identification of Huber‟s most important theological sources. The investigation will 
consistently be kept within the confines of the scope of this dissertation, namely the 
way in which the concept of communicative freedom functions in Huber‟s work and 
engages modernity. It is also not an attempt at engaging the the numerous debates 
regarding these theologians and themes within their work, as such attempts may well 
merit their own extensive studies. 
 
It should be noted, however, that Huber understands himself to be influenced by a 
number of different theological traditions.23 His dissertation on the Eucharist in the 
early church (1966) grounded him in the theology of the church fathers, and he still 
views this as an important point of orientation. Another significant influence is 
Bonhoeffer and the Confessing Church tradition. While still in school Huber was 
already fascinated by Bonhoeffer‟s Nachfolge (Huber, 2008d). During this time he 
was also confronted with Barth‟s work, but he continued to have a qualified 
acceptance of Barth‟s theology. In his own opinion, he was never as critical against 
the so-called liberal stream as Barth was and indeed supported viewpoints opposing 
Barth‟s on some occasions. This is mostly due to the fact that Huber was also the 
student of some „liberal‟ teachers, which gave him the opportunity to appreciate this 
side of the German theological spectrum (2008d). 
 
Of all his teachers Heinz Eduard Tödt arguably exerted the most significant influence 
on Huber. Tödt‟s use of the term „communicative freedom‟ (Schuhmacher, 2006:235; 
255–256), his development of human dignity (Schuhmacher, 2006:235–238) as 
basis for responsible actions (Schuhmacher, 2006:239–242; 290–291) and his 
extensive use of Bonhoeffer (Schuhmacher, 2006:168–209) may be the most 
important of a much wider range of theological themes and figures of thought Huber 
shares with him.  
                                                             
22
 Most of his important works were explicitly written within specific contexts, cf. e.g. Kirche in der 
Zeitenwende (written as response to the current-day challenges the church faces) and Folgen 
christlicher Freiheit (essays collected to commemorate the Barmen Theological Declaration). Even 
Gerechtigkeit und Recht and Rechtfertigung und Recht are focused on very specific contextual 
(although more academic) questions. Cf. also the contextuality of Protestantismus und Protest (1987), 
Friedensethik (1990b, co-written with H-R Reuter) and Die tägliche Gewalt: gegen den Ausverkauf 
der Menschenwürde (1993a). 
23
 The following paragraph is the result of a personal discussion with Huber on the 12
th
 of June 2008 
(2008d). 
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We shall now turn to the first main step in the dissertation‟s argument by 
investigating the theological location and the contours of the concept of 
communicative freedom. We shall do this by discussing some of the most important 
theologians whose work Huber employs in structuring communicative freedom. The 
emphases Huber places in his interpretation of these theologians‟ work and the 
implications of their work for the concept of communicative freedom will form the 
basis of our discussion. It will not be attempted to give an exhaustive account of 
each of these theologians‟ (mostly magisterial) work. 
 
 
2.  PAUL: THE ARCHETYPICAL INTERPRETER OF 
 FREEDOM 
 
When considering the theological sources of communicative freedom, it is clear that 
Huber aims to stay rooted in the Bible24 and its interpretation by the church as 
community of faith.25 Particularly important as biblical source for the concept of 
communicative freedom is the apostle Paul‟s archetypical exposition of Christian 
freedom. For Huber, Paul convincingly and immensely influentially expounded and 
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 Apart from Huber‟s regular unambiguous use of the Bible, it is noteworthy that in some of his 
important works he uses biblical formulas to structure his argument. The most recent example of this 
is certainly Der christliche Glaube (2008b). The book consists of three parts, namely „Faith‟, „Hope‟ 
and „Love‟, clearly using the triad originating from Romans 13:4. In another sense his rootedness in 
the Bible is also made clear by his insistence to often motivate his understanding of a concept in 
terms of the biblical testimony thereof. In this regard it may be noted that his explication of justice in 
Gerechtigkeit und Recht (1996b:146–183) is dependent on the section describing justice in both the 
Old and the New Testament (1996b:160–166). 
25
 Huber‟s decision to accept the position as bishop of Berlin-Brandenburg-Silesian Upper Lusatia and 
leaving the academic community of Heidelberg (in 1994) signifies his loyalty towards a theology 
based in the church. Apart from the many lectures he delivers and other responsibilities as 
chairperson of the council of the EKD, Huber continues to deliver a sermon virtually every Sunday of 
the year. On the EKD‟s website he articulates the importance of the church as community of faith for 
his theological project: “Auch wenn ich als Bischof in vielen Gremien sitze und von dort aus versuche, 
Entscheidungen im Kreis der Kirchenleitung oder des Diakonischen Rates zu treffen, liegt mir sehr 
viel an dem Kontakt mit den Menschen in den Gemeinden. Ihnen das Evangelium auszulegen, ist 
eine der schönsten Aufgaben meines Amtes, nahezu an jedem Sonntag und häufig auch während der 
Woche. An vielen Sonntagen des Jahres halte ich zwei Gottesdienste. Manchmal liegen die Orte sehr 
weit auseinander, wenn ich am Vormittag in der Uckermark bin und am Abend in Berlin. Wenn im 
Anschluss an den Gottesdienst noch ein wenig Zeit bleibt, kommt es oftmals zu sehr guten 
Gesprächen mit Gemeindegliedern. Die Erfahrungen aus diesen Begegnungen sind für mich eine 
wichtige Hilfe, wenn es in der Woche darum geht, den künftigen Weg unserer Kirche 
mitzubestimmen” (Evangelische Kirche Berlin-Brandenburg-schlesische Oberlausitz, 2008). 
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applied freedom as a concept central to the Christian gospel, and especially Luther‟s 
interpretation of Paul‟s view on freedom fulfils a central function in Huber‟s work.26 
Along with Luther, Huber designates Paul as a “historical highlight of the Christian 
understanding of freedom” and Paul‟s understanding of freedom – especially in his 
letter to the Galatians – forms the backbone of Huber‟s most important descriptions 
of communicative freedom (Huber, 1996c:105; 1999:169). Huber understands Paul 
to interpret the gospel as the „call to freedom‟, a theme Huber picks up in his own 
interpretation of the Bible (Huber, 1996c:105).27 
 
Huber understands Paul‟s exposition of freedom as the archetype of the biblical view 
on freedom. Apart from calling Paul a “historical highlight of the Christian 
                                                             
26
 Apart from Paul‟s view on freedom, Huber also makes use of Paul extensively concerning the 
implications of Christian ethics for responsible legal ethics. Cf. Gerechtigkeit und Recht (1996b), esp. 
92ff, 131ff, 163f, 172ff. 
27
 Huber does not use Paul in isolation from the Old Testament, but keeps Paul‟s work on freedom in 
line with its sources in Old Testament. In this regard Jeremy Punt‟s dissertation on freedom in Paul‟s 
theology (1999) assists in understanding Paul‟s sources and the way he utilised them in developing 
freedom. Punt (1999:250) shows that one of the most important traditions concerning freedom in the 
Old Testament is the exodus tradition, whereby YHWH is understood as the one who liberates his 
people from bondage. Freedom in the Old Testament therefore has slavery or imprisonment as an 
important background. Later, during and after Israel‟s exile, liberation from foreign powers markedly 
grew in importance. The influence of these foreign powers also led to some changes in the concept of 
freedom. The continued dominance by foreign powers, the continued absence of a temple and the 
growing influence of Greek philosophy led to freedom gaining a spiritual element (Punt, 1999:251). 
What was never abandoned, however, was Israel‟s belief in God‟s constitution of freedom, which also 
had political implications: Only YHWH can truly liberate his people, and only YHWH is their true 
leader. The Jewish viewpoint, and its belief in theocracy in particular, was in stark contrast to the 
democratising tendencies in Antiquity. However, the Greek word ἐ λευθερί α, the word mostly used to 
denote freedom, was used in different ways, which provided for some form of continuity between 
Judaist and Hellenist conceptions of freedom. Especially three meanings were in use, namely 
freedom as “the contrast with the bondage of a slave”, freedom as “democracy (free from tyranny, 
despotism)” and freedom as “independence of the state (free from external foes, foreigners)” (Schlier, 
as cited in Punt, 1999:252).  
Punt (1999:252–254) goes on to show that ἐ λευθερί α effectively encompassed both the individual 
and corporate elements of being human. Freedom from slavery was seen as the primary way of 
distinguishing Greeks from barbarians and was the only way in which humans could live their life to 
the full. Being free was also a prerequisite for partaking in communal life. Whilst individual freedom 
was necessary for positive self-conception, it was also necessary for the political, economic and 
cultural interaction of the individual (Punt, 1999:254). Punt can therefore state the following 
(1999:257): “This freedom/liberation was both on an individual and corporate/constitutional level a 
concrete political concept, not some free-floating state of affairs. ... Simply put: freedom/liberation was 
not so much being in a certain (political) position than not being in another (enslaved).” Paul 
integrated elements of both Greek Antiquity and the Jewish tradition into his articulation of freedom, 
as he also understood himself to inhabit both worlds. Although he, for example, did not promote the 
rigid theocracy that was present in the Old Testament but rather held to the Greeks‟ democratising 
tendencies, he continued to emphasise God‟s role in the liberation and dignity of his people. On the 
other hand he did not subscribe to the negative view on freedom (always freedom „from‟ something) 
that was very popular in Greek Antiquity but worked with a more comprehensive view on freedom. 
Possibly the strongest motivation for this was the fact that he believed freedom to be grounded in a 
sovereign act of God. God‟s sovereign constitution of freedom can therefore be seen as one of the 
strongest impulses from Paul‟s thought that Huber incorporates in his own thought. 
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understanding of freedom” Huber (1985:117) also implies in Folgen christlicher 
Freiheit that Paul‟s work on freedom is representative of that of the whole of the New 
Testament.28 Huber nonetheless engages Paul‟s work in an overt manner relatively 
infrequently. When he does discuss Paul‟s work on freedom, however, it becomes 
clear that it forms the basis for his understanding of freedom and that Paul‟s theology 
is implied whenever Huber discusses the meaning and implications of freedom. 
 
Although freedom is expounded in a number of different ways in the New Testament 
and indeed in Paul‟s work,29 Huber is of the opinion that one of its most important 
expositions can be found in Paul‟s letter to the Galatians (1985:11). In Galatians 
Huber (1985:117–119, 1996c:105) identifies four basic movements in Paul‟s 
understanding of freedom. These Pauline movements appear time and again in 
Huber‟s work, although he mostly does not refer to them as such. 
 
Firstly, freedom is bestowed by God and therefore it is not dependent on human 
achievements. Huber quotes Galatians 5:1 to illustrate this dimension, and in 
particular the first part of the verse: “For freedom Christ has set us free ...” (NRSV). 
For Huber (1985:117), the close connection Paul makes here between the work of 
Christ and the bestowal of freedom is of the utmost importance for a Christian 
understanding of freedom. Freedom is mediated only by Christ and Christ‟s work is 
therefore aimed at nothing less than enabling freedom. What this freedom Christ 
mediates entails is not expounded systematically in either Galatians or the rest of the 
Bible. It is rather described in terms of the bondages from which God liberates his 
people with the focus on the fact that it is God‟s initiative and not human abilities that 
constitute freedom. 
 
In accordance with a strong line of interpretation within the Lutheran tradition, Huber 
understands the freedom that is bestowed by Christ as having a fourfold character, 
                                                             
28
 In his article “Die Verbindlichkeit der Freiheit. Über das Verhältnis von Verbindlichkeit und Freiheit 
in der evangelischen Ethik” (1993b) Huber quotes Rendtorff to motivate his conviction that freedom is 
indeed the central concept in the New Testament: “Die zentrale Frage theologischer Ethik ist die 
[Frage] nach der Freiheit des Menschen, so wie sie das Kernstück christlicher Lehre seit dem NT ist 
...” (Huber 1993b:70). 
29
 Cf. e.g. Jones‟ discussion (1987:13ff) in “Freiheit” in den Briefen des Apostels Paulus. Eine 
historische, exegetische und religionsgeschichtliche Studie (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht). 
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namely liberation from the law, sin, self-deception and death (1985:117).30 Huber 
connects the liberation from each of these realities closely to one another. 
 
He understands law as the principal way through which humanity wants to justify 
itself before God. In Christ, God makes clear his sovereign decision to liberate 
humanity from its attempts to create and protect ultimate meaning. By freeing 
humanity from its attempts to achieve freedom on its own, humanity is liberated from 
the power of sin itself. This implies liberation from the deception that people can instil 
final meaning into their lives, a deception that turns human life into a lie. Lastly, by 
being liberated from the law, sin and deception humanity has no reason to fear death 
as it has no ultimate power over human existence anymore. As Paul understands 
freedom as grounded in the life, death and resurrection of Christ (Huber, 1985:117), 
not even political or personal experiences of oppression can annul freedom. God‟s 
bestowal of freedom is therefore the constitutive act of freeing His people, and it is 
grounded in Christ‟s resurrection as victory over deathly powers.  
 
Galatians 5:1 continues with “Stand firm [in this freedom]” (NRSV), which Huber 
understands to be a second characteristic of freedom. Christ does not only bestow 
freedom but He also empowers believers to be free. Particularly amidst experiences 
that may seem to contradict Christ‟s bestowal of freedom, Paul emphasises this 
second dimension of freedom.  Although intimately connected with the bestowal of 
freedom, this second characteristic recognises that the constitution of freedom is not 
to be equated with its realisation. God‟s gracious bestowal of freedom requires of 
believers to realise this freedom within specific socio-historical contexts. Rather than 
stifling criticism against oppression, such a conception of freedom enables critical 
interaction and proactive attempts at realising freedom (Huber, 1985:117). When 
noting that God also empowers to freedom, one therefore acknowledges the „critical 
potential‟ of Christian freedom. 
Thirdly, Huber identifies Paul‟s command that liberated Christians should not allow 
themselves to be submitted again to “a yoke of slavery” (Gal. 5:1) as the exhortation 
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 In Gerechtigkeit und Recht Huber (1996b:172) expresses the “Befreiung von den Mächten der 
Sünde, der Täuschung und des Todes” within an eschatological frame of reference and views this as 
the liberation that will be brought about when freedom is ultimately realised. This final realisation of 
freedom he connects with an eschatological vision for the consummation of justice, namely when “die 
Differenzen zwischen den Menschen ... ihre trennende Bedeutung [verlieren], ... [wo die Differenzen] 
als bereichernde Vielfalt zur Geltung kommen [können]”. 
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to freedom. God‟s bestowal of freedom does not simply enable its contextual 
realisation but also demands it in the face of continued challenges. The realisation of 
freedom is continuously endangered by the same powers from which believers are 
liberated, and most significantly from original sin (Huber, 1985:118). In Paul‟s 
theology the realisation of freedom is therefore never a static reality but is bestowed 
to enable a dynamic interaction in the centre of believers‟ contexts. As Paul also 
writes in Romans 8, Christian existence is always within the still fragmentary 
realisation of God‟s will for reality.  
 
Therefore, freedom is, fourthly, also promised. Huber understands Paul‟s theology to 
be permeated by an acute eschatological or even apocalyptical consciousness as he 
acknowledges throughout his work that freedom will not be fully realised in present 
times but that God will consummate freedom at the Last Judgement. This means 
that the realisation of freedom is always provisional and open to revision due to the 
ultimate promise by which it is orientated (Huber, 1985:118). 
 
Huber (1985:117-119) understands these four dimensions to form the basis of 
biblical freedom and definitive of Paul‟s understanding of freedom. However, one 
may be tempted to misunderstand these dimensions as implying an individualist 
understanding of freedom that legitimates a division between individual freedom 
constituted by God and realisation of freedom in community. Huber (1985:118) is of 
the opinion that this is not the case as Paul‟s work on freedom connects human 
individuality and sociality.   
 
Freedom reaches its boundary when the individual‟s inalienable freedom is used to 
justify separation from one‟s neighbour. Huber regards Galatians 5:13 as an apt 
illustration of how Paul delineates freedom: “For you were called to freedom, 
brothers and sisters; only do not use your freedom as an opportunity for self-
indulgence, but through love become slaves to one another.” According to Paul, 
freedom does not separate people from one another but can only be realised in 
community (Huber, 1999:169). Freedom is therefore not restricted by forgoing one‟s 
rights, but forgoing one‟s rights is indeed the articulation of real freedom. This 
impulse in Paul‟s theology is of paramount importance in Huber‟s understanding of 
freedom as communicative freedom and will consequently be developed in more 
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detail in the discussion on his concept of communicative freedom concluding this 
chapter.  
 
Huber understands Paul to interpret Christ‟s life, death and resurrection as the 
constitution of, empowerment and exhortation to and promise of freedom (e.g. in 
Huber, 1999:169). This serves as expression of his conviction that freedom is one of 
the basic concepts of Christianity and of the importance of the biblical witness (and 
by implication the church) for his theological project (e.g. Huber, 1985:113). 
 
 
3.  MARTIN LUTHER: THE CLASSIC REDISCOVERER OF 
 FREEDOM 
 
For Huber (1996c:105–106; 1999:169–170), the two historical highlights in the 
interpretation of Christian freedom are the apostle Paul and Martin Luther. Whereas 
Paul functions as the archetype of Christian freedom, Luther‟s rediscovery of the 
freedom of a Christian serves as Huber‟s foundational interpretation of the meaning 
of Christian freedom. Huber regards Luther as one of the first theologians to relate 
Christian freedom constructively to the development of modern society. Luther‟s 
connection between the social and individual components of freedom and between 
its private and public dimensions is of importance for Huber‟s work on freedom. The 
following discussion is aimed at tracing the contours of Huber‟s usage of Luther, 
which will be investigated by means of three dimensions of freedom present in 
Luther‟s work. For Huber‟s understanding of freedom particularly the way in which 
Luther relates God‟s bestowal of freedom to the individual person and the realisation 
of freedom in society is significant and it will therefore form the basis for our 
discussion. 
 
When using Luther to develop communicative freedom, Huber recognises the 
ambivalence of the work and reception of Luther, and that hermeneutical decisions 
need to be taken in order to interpret his work responsibly. As the case is with any 
thinker of Luther‟s stature, his work has been used for various purposes and in 
various different contexts. This is mostly due to the breadth and nearly incomparable 
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influence of his work, but partly also due to some inherent ambivalences it presents. 
We shall start this discussion, therefore, by investigating how Huber views the 
ambivalences in Luther‟s work and its reception. 
 
3.1  Which Luther? 
 
Huber (1990a:80) acknowledges that a number of different interpretations of Luther‟s 
work have been used in many different contexts.31 During the Protestant Orthodoxy 
of the 17th century, for example, Luther was honoured for being the great teacher 
who re-established the importance of the Bible and the different states ordered by 
God, namely the spiritual, worldly and marital. It was believed that by protecting and 
maintaining these states the heritage of the Reformation would be honoured and 
therefore these states were forcefully emphasised. The Pietistic movement used 
Luther‟s thought to confirm the ethical implications of the gospel and focused on the 
unity between conversion and personal improvement. During the Enlightenment, 
Luther‟s renewed focus on individual autonomy, his brave search for truth and his 
assumed liberation of true religion from the church were highlighted as the core of 
his theology. 
 
Huber regards different interpretations legitimate only to the extent that it stays true 
to the broader thrust of Luther‟s work. For Huber attempts at using Luther‟s theology 
to either legitimate political regimes or to lessen Christianity‟s public relevance are in 
contradiction with the thrust of his work. In Protestantismus und Protest Huber 
(1987:65ff) shows that Luther‟s theology does not imply privatised religion but often 
requires concrete political action. This he does by connecting theologies of liberation 
with freedom in Luther‟s theology, and showing that the Protestant concept of 
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 Huber makes use of Luther in a wide range of contexts. In “In Konflikten einen Weg finden – 
Beratung im Feld von Ehe, Familie, Schwangerschaft als Aufgabe der Kirche” (2000c) he quotes 
Luther in the context of challenges families face; in “Hat das protestantische Arbeitsethos noch eine 
Zukunft?” (2000d) Luther‟s contribution to the Protestant work ethic is honoured; in “Die 
Herausforderungen für die Theologie in einem pluralistischen Europa aus ökumenischer Perspektive 
– Eine evangelische Stellungnahme” (2006dd) the fact that Luther was a lecturer at a university is 
partly used as motivation to appreciate the positive attitude of Protestantism towards academic 
theology. Huber also makes use of Luther significantly in terms of his contribution to the discussion on 
human dignity and freedom, such as in Rechtfertigung und Recht (Huber, 2001h) and in less well-
kown speeches such as “Das Ende der Person? Zur Spannung zwischen Ethik und Gentechnologie” 
(2001g) and “Dass der Mensch mehr ist als seine Taten. Das christliche Menschenbild im Licht der 
Rechtfertigungsbotschaf” (2007m). 
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freedom Luther‟s work expresses is incompatible with (political) oppression (Huber, 
1987:65) but is realised in solidarity (Huber, 1987:67).32  
 
In Konflikt und Konsens Huber (1990a:81ff) discusses Luther‟s misuse in recent 
German history as the attempt to either legitimate a political regime or to privatise 
Protestantism‟s critical impulses. Some commentators understood the founding of 
the German Empire in 1871, for example, as the first political realisation of the 
Lutheran tradition. With the founding of the German Empire, what was seen as 
typical Lutheran civil obedience got its true object, and in this time research on 
Luther experienced exponential growth. The elements in Luther‟s theology that 
taught the importance of civil obedience were emphasised disproportionately. In this 
new Empire the „German Luther‟ was born. The „German Luther‟ paved the way for a 
century during which this Luther was used in even more disturbing ways (1990a:81–
86). 
 
In 1933, the 450th anniversary of Luther‟s birth, the Deutsche Christen (who were 
practically fully aligned to the National Socialist German Workers‟ Party) planned a 
range of events and publications celebrating Luther and the political order of the day, 
including a „Protestant Day‟, followed by an „Empire-Luther Day‟ as well as an 
extensive commemorative volume titled Martin Luther, deutscher Kämpfer (Martin 
Luther, the German Fighter). On the grounds of Luther being the founder of the 
Evangelical Church in Germany, the founder of the German language and literature 
and the initiator of German unity, the Deutsche Christen even attempted to have his 
birth date made into a public holiday. On the 15th of August 1933, Adolf Hitler was 
requested to become the patron of this day, because Luther was seen to have been 
the first spiritual Führer. However, both attempts failed, primarily due to Hitler‟s 
attempt to retain good relations with the Vatican. 
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 In this book Huber (1987:59–68) develops freedom as liberation by means of three perspectives, 
namely (a) “Christliche Freiheit ... ist Befreiung vom Zwang zur Selbstrechtfertigung” (1987:65); (b) 
“Für reformatorisches Verständnis sind Freiheit und Unterdrückung unvereinbar” (1987:65); and (c) 
“Für den christlichen Glauben gehören Freiheit und Liebe zusammen. ... Freiheit verwirklicht sich in 
der Solidarität, nicht in der Konkurrenz” (1987:67). In this context he also refers to Latin American 
liberation theology as was programmatically articulated by Gustavo Gutiérrez in A Theology of 
Liberation (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1973). 
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However, not only political opportunism can be blamed for the misuse of Luther‟s 
work. Huber also acknowledges that its multi-faceted character and its scope 
contribute to its susceptibility for misuse. It was especially the anti-Semitic notes in 
Luther‟s theology that struck a chord in some quarters. The so-called Curse Theory 
that was deduced from Luther‟s work was of great influence (Huber, 1990a:87). 
According to this theory the „mysterious curse‟ that has rested on the Jews for 
centuries is in fact a curse they have placed on themselves. Through their rejection 
of Christ, the Jews are ensuring themselves being continuously cursed. According to 
Huber (1990a:87), especially two of Luther‟s social-ethical viewpoints contributed to 
his misuse, namely that Jews do not know what real work means and do in fact not 
want to do real work and that Jews promote usury.33 
 
During this time it was not noted, however, that the anti-Semitist notes in his work 
were in continuity with such suggestions in scholastic theology and the humanistic 
writings of the 15th century. It was also not noted that anti-Semitism in Luther‟s work 
form a discrepancy within the broader thrust of his work (Huber 1990a:88). As was 
the case with other radical applications of Luther‟s theology, the unwillingness to 
interpret his theology in a nuanced and responsible way can be seen as the most 
important reason for its perversion. 
 
In the light of the breadth, scope and ambivalence of Luther‟s work, Huber 
(1990a:90) formulates his own position on the use of Luther. He chooses to use 
Luther‟s theology not simply as a cultural heirloom but as a theological challenge. In 
modern-day Germany the responsible interpretation and application of such an 
important theorist is as great a challenge as what it was before. Huber (1987:53) 
understands the central challenge of Luther‟s theology as rearticulating his radical 
rediscovery of Christian freedom. 
 
Huber (1987:52–53) understands Luther‟s connection between three dimensions of 
freedom as definitive of his rediscovery of biblical freedom. The freedom of the 
individual conscience serves as hinge between the freedom of faith that is 
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 In this regard Huber‟s justification for Luther‟s view on the devil (1987:50) is also partly applicable, 
namely that he was, in many respects, “ein zutiefst mittelalterlicher Mensch” and that the challenge of 
distinguishing between the „essence‟ of his work and what might be regarded as its historical 
circumstances should not be underestimated. 
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constituted by God and the freedom of the Christian in society.34 In the following 
sections the researcher will describe these dimensions in more detail, the first being 
the freedom of faith as the basis of Christian freedom. 
 
3.2  The basic freedom of a Christian: The freedom of faith  
 
Luther‟s most famous statement about freedom, and indeed the most succinct 
summary of communicative freedom, is to be found in his treatise on freedom, Von 
der Freiheit eines Christenmenschen (1520):35 “A Christian is a free master over all 
things and subject to nobody. A Christian is a helpful servant and subject to all.”36 
 
The first of these two statements radicalises a conception of freedom common to 
Luther‟s time, namely freedom understood as the control over others (Huber, 
1985:210). Especially the Greeks understood the essence of freedom as the power 
of masters over their servants (Huber, 1985:209). In terms of Luther‟s theology, 
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 Cf. e.g. Huber 1992a:115. In this article, entitled “Ökumenische Situation und protestantisches 
Prinzip”, Huber uses what he interprets as Luther‟s connection between faith‟s freedom, the freedom 
of conscience and freedom in society as the pinnalce of Protestantism‟s view on freedom in general: 
“Die Diskussion über die Freiheit als Grundimpuls und Prinzip des Protestantismus hat ihre Spitze ... 
also gerade darin, daß die zugesagte Freiheit des Glaubens, die wahrgenommene Freiheit des 
Gewissens sowie die verfaßte Gestalt der Freiheit in Kirche, Gesellschaft und Staat in einem 
unauflöslichen Zusammenhang gesehen werden.” 
35
 Huber notably and prominently makes use of Luther‟s double thesis in Kirche in der Zeitenwende 
(1999), “Christliche Freiheit in der freiheitlichen Gesellschaft” (1996c) and in important lectures such 
as “Evangelisch im 21. Jahrhundert” ( 2007b). He also cites Luther‟s double thesis in many other 
lectures and speeches. Although these lectures and speeches span a great range of topics Huber‟s 
interpretation of the double thesis nearly always follows the contours that are set out in this section. 
Cf. e.g. the speech concerning the Protestant work ethos, “Der Mensch ist zur Arbeit geboren wie der 
Vogel zum Fliegen. Hat das protestantische Arbeitsethos noch eine Zukunft?” (2007j); his speeches 
on the renewed importance of (cultural) virtues such as “Lesen lernen – Zur Wiederentdeckung einer 
kulturellen Grundkompetenz aus evangelischer Perspektive” (2006z), “Beheimatung im Eigenen – 
Respekt vor dem Anderen. Zum kulturellen Auftrag der Medien” (2005c), “Der Zukunft auf der Spur” 
(2005k), “In deinem Lichte schauen wir das Licht – Quellen und Perspektiven christlicher Spritualität” 
(2005s), “Die Tugend des Glaubens” (2004i), “Europa als Wertegemeinschaft – Seine christlichen 
Grundlagen Gestern, Heute, Morgen” (2001b); his speeches on the public role of the (Evangelical) 
church such as “Gemeinschaft gestalten – Evangeliches Profil in Europa” (2006i), “Von der Freiheit 
der Kinder Gottes – Plädoyer für eine selbstbewusste Kirche” (2006r), “Evangelisch – profiliert – 
wertvoll” (2006t), , “Die Herausforderungen für die Theologie in einem pluralistischen Europa aus 
ökumenischer Perspektive – Eine evangelische Stellungnahme” (2006dd), “Der Auftrag der Kirchen in 
einem Zusammenwachsenden Europa” (2005d), “Unvereinbare Gegensätze? Scharia und säkulare 
Recht” (2005q), “Der Beruf zur Politik – Zwanzig Jahre Demokratiedenkschrift der EKD” (2005w), 
“Demokratie wagen – Der Protestantismus im politischen Wandel 1965 – 1985” (2005bb), 
“Protestantismus – Abgesang oder Zukunftsmodell?” (2004c), “Unantastbare Menschenwürde – Gilt 
sie von Anfang an?” (2001e) and “Die Rolle der Kirchen als intermediärer Institutionen in der 
Gesellschaft” (2000a). 
36
 “Ein Christenmensch ist ein freier Herr über alle Dinge und niemand untertan. Ein Christenmensch 
ist dienstbarer Knecht aller Dinge und jedermann untertan.” 
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however, the first thesis is indicative of the fact that the Christian is not at the 
disposal of any centre of power. Importantly, the Christian is also not victim of his or 
her own sin. This thesis confirms the existence of the Christian as grounded in God‟s 
gracious bestowal of dignity and in this radical sense it can be said that the Christian 
is master over all things (Huber, 1999:170). Nothing can ensure or endanger the 
righteousness of the Christian before God, which is why the Christian is free (Huber, 
1985:210). 
 
Luther transcends the popular understanding of freedom further by qualifying the first 
thesis. As Jüngel (1978:55) also shows, the first thesis implies power relations where 
the master and the servant fulfil distinctly different roles. Luther dialectically unifies 
these two roles in the person of the Christian. His seemingly paradoxical second 
thesis emphasises the close connection between freedom and service in the 
Christian tradition, as seen also in Calvin‟s famous statement, “To serve God is the 
highest freedom” (cited in Huber, 1987:53). The „paradox‟ is allayed when one 
enquires into the grounds fir the first thesis. The freedom of faith frees the Christian 
for service, exactly because there is no reason to realise freedom by controlling 
others (Huber, 1985:210). For Luther, freedom is not grounded in control over 
oneself or others but it is rather understood as identity grounded in God‟s initiative, 
paradigmatically confirmed by his incarnation (Huber, 1985:210).  
 
Freedom and service therefore do not exclude one another, but each is implied by 
the other. The relationship with God includes the relationship with other persons, a 
concept in Luther‟s theology that Huber develops further in the concept of 
communicative freedom. Luther already emphasises, although somewhat 
unsystematically and within a different socio-historical context, the inalienable 
connection between the individual and the community by indicating how personal 
self-determination implies both the relationship with God and with other persons 
(Huber, 1999:170; cf. also 1990d:61). 
 
Some scholars pose the critical question as to whether the distinction between 
master and servant is not to be correlated with Luther‟s distinction between geistliche 
and the leibliche dimensions of being human, or the innerer Mensch and the 
äußerlicher Mensch, which may seem to imply a dichotomous anthropology (cf. 
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Jüngel 1978:56ff). These scholars argue that the question as to „where‟ the „essence‟ 
of the person is to be situated cannot be sufficiently answered by such an 
anthropology.37 A close reading of the way Huber employs Luther reveals that the 
question concerning the „meaning‟ or „essence‟ of reality is radically reformulated in 
Luther‟s theology.  
 
God‟s alien righteousness is understood as the measure and integrating principle of 
the individual and of human existence as such (Huber, 2001h:23ff). The distinction 
between master and servant in Luther‟s concept of freedom therefore serves as 
expression of the human condition but not of humanity‟s worth (Huber, 2004d). 
Jüngel (1978:73–77) responds to this criticism in a similar manner by showing that 
Luther consistently takes the unity of the person as starting point and that he uses 
the distinction between the outer and inner person to describe Christ‟s renewing 
work. Luther does not correlate the external person with being servant, and the inner 
person with being free (Jüngel 1978:71). The distinction rather serves to place the 
eschatological tension of being human within the reality of Christ‟s victory over sin 
(cf. Huber, 1996b:171-172 and Jüngel, 1978:74). In characterising the inner person 
as the „new‟ or the „spiritual‟ person Christ‟s recreating presence within the life of the 
believer is underlined (Jüngel, 1978:75). This implies that the freedom of faith 
enables the believer to participate in God‟s renewing work and liberates the believer 
to serve others by unifying the roles of „master‟ and „servant‟. 
 
The multi-faceted understanding of freedom in Luther‟s theology is illustrated by his 
understanding of the sacraments. In two sermons dating from 1519, Luther uses the 
sacraments of baptism and the Eucharist to show how the individual and communal 
moments of freedom are intricately connected (Huber, 1990d:61–63; 1992a:117–
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 In this regard it can be asked whether a distinction between these two dimensions of being human 
does not lead to a situation where an unbridgeable gap develops between “act and actor, person and 
praxis” (Jüngel, 1978:60). Jüngel (1978:60) therefore writes: “Unter der „wirklichen Unfreiheit‟ versteht 
die Kritiker ganz selbstverständlich die gesellschaftliche Unfreiheit. Dabei ist vorausgesetzt, daß der 
„innere Mensch‟ gegenüber den äußeren Dingen zumindest weniger „wirklich‟ ist. ... Das wahre 
menschliche Subjekt ist niemals das Subjekt der Praxis. Damit ist in einem bisher ungekannten 
Masse die Person von der Verantwortung für ihre Praxis entlastet, in eins aber auch frei geworden für 
jede Art von Praxis: die in ihrer inneren Freiheit und Fülle ruhende Person kann sich nun erst ganz in 
die äußere Praxis stürzen, da sie weiß, daß ihr darin im Grunde doch nichts geschehen kann. Mit der 
Trennung von Tat und Täter, Person und Praxis ist auch schon die „doppelte Moral‟ gesetzt, die als 
Trennung von „Amt‟ und „Person‟ einen der Grundpfeiler der lutherischen Ethik bildet.” 
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118).38 Luther understands baptism as the individual moment of Christian existence, 
as baptism signifies the birth of the new person and a lifelong process of renewal. 
The act of baptism appropriates God‟s grace by signifying that it can neither be 
brought about nor be invalidated by the person. The act of baptism enables the 
individual believer to receive God‟s liberation from sin within earthly confines, and 
this liberation is therefore appropriated by the daily renunciation of sin (Huber, 
1990d:62). Baptism accentuates the personal element of being a Christian and 
symbolises the comprehensive individuality that freedom brings about. 
 
The Eucharist symbolises the sociality that freedom leads to (Huber, 1990d:63). It 
symbolises the communal element by representing the communal appropriation and 
realisation of salvation. The bread and wine are signs of partaking in Christ and His 
earthly body. According to Luther, the Eucharist establishes the church as a 
community where its members do not keep life and its gifts for themselves but share 
everything (Huber, 1990d:62).39 The result is a community of openness and 
acceptance, where those in need can bring their needs without fear, and where 
those with the ability to help can bring there resources freely in service communal 
life. 
 
Luther therefore grounds his understanding of freedom in Christ‟s life and death 
(Huber, 1990d:63). Christ‟s incarnation opened the possibility for real freedom, 
transcending categories of human power. Baptism drowns the old person who tries 
to secure freedom by human means and frees the Christian to rest in community. 
The bread and wine are then the signs of this community, grounded in the death and 
resurrection of Christ, a community of equals aiming to serve and make the death of 
the old person and the birth of a new community increasingly visible. 
 
Huber connects this comprehensive freedom of which the sacraments testify with 
Luther‟s ecclesiology. Luther understands the church as the congregation of those 
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 Cf. also how Luther understood baptism as not in the first place the sign of a true Christian but of 
the true church (Huber, 1990a:332). In his article “Auf dem Weg zu einer Kirche der offenen Grenzen” 
Huber (1990a:321–345) uses this impulse to show how Luther‟s work supports an ecclesiology that is 
not orientated by the boundaries of the church but by its being. 
39
 Huber interestingly only refers to the sharing of spiritual goods: “Das Abendmahl begründet eine 
Gemeinschaft, in der keiner etwas für sie behält, weil alle geistlichen Güter (researcher‟s italics) 
miteinander geteilt werden ...” (Huber 1990d:63). 
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who are holy in faith (“Gemeinde oder Sammlung der Heiligen im Glauben”). He 
distinguishes between spiritual and earthly Christianity by acknowledging that the 
congregants are holy only „in faith‟. His aim is not to distinguish between a so-called 
visible and invisible church but rather to emphasise the theological basis of the 
church (Huber, 1990a:332). The freedom to be church relieves the community of 
believers of the burden to set its boundaries because God grounds the holiness of 
the church (1990a:332). 
 
Therefore, the connection between the real church and the church of faith is not 
dependent on external characteristics but on Christ. This is also the deepest reason 
for Luther‟s insistence on the real church being recognisable only by the preaching of 
the gospel and the sacraments.40 The implication for his sacramentology is that the 
sacraments do not primarily serve as characteristics of true membership of the 
church but rather serve to characterise the true church. Again it is God‟s action, as 
the sacraments testify, that constitutes the true church and true membership (Huber, 
1990a:333). The basis of Luther‟s ecclesiology is the freedom instituted and 
maintained by God. This enables the church to have „open boundaries‟ and focus its 
attention on its being rather than on its boundaries (Huber, 1990a:334).  
 
The implications of Luther‟s view on freedom are, however, not simply of 
ecclesiastical relevance. In addition to the freedom of faith, Huber also develops the 
public relevance of Luther‟s freedom (cf. Huber, 1987). Huber understands Luther‟s 
view on freedom as to coordinate three fundamental dimensions of freedom with one 
another, an important articulation Huber integrates with his broader theological 
project. According to this view, Christian freedom connects the freedom of faith that 
was discussed in this section, the freedom safeguarded by the conscience and the 
responsible realisation of freedom in society with one another (Huber, 1996c:108). 
As attention has already been devoted to the first of these dimensions, the second 
will now be investigated, namely Luther‟s view on freedom of conscience 
(Gewissensfreiheit), which functions as the hinge between the first and third 
dimensions of freedom.  
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 “Where one sees baptism, the bread [i.e. Eucharist] and the gospel, wherever and with who it may 
be, there the church undoubtedly is” (cited in Huber, 1990a:333). [“Wo du nämlich siehst, daß Taufe, 
Brot und Evangelium sind, an welchem Ort auch immer, bei welchen Personen auch immer, dort ist 
unzweifelhaft die Kirche.”] 
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3.3  The hinge between the freedom of faith and freedom in 
 society: Freedom of conscience 
 
Huber understands Luther‟s concept of Christian freedom as not simply of 
theological relevance but as also having significant political implications. Huber 
(1987:56) is of the opinion that Luther‟s interpretation of freedom forms one of the 
building blocks for human rights and the freedom of conscience, religion and 
expression.41 As was indicated in the previous section, this does not mean that 
Luther‟s public influence was only constructive. Especially his focus on the 
importance of obedience to the authorities (Obrigkeitsgehorsam) has caused Luther 
to be made the advocate of unqualified obedience to authorities in some circles (cf. 
Huber, 1990a: 81). 
 
These scholars regard the way in which civil obedience was introduced to the 
German psyche as the greatest political effect of the Reformation, and in particular of 
Luther (Huber, 1987:50). Luther brought the word Obrigkeit (a word referring 
especially to political authority) into the German language (Huber, 1987:50–51). 
Controversially, it was Luther who told the farmers who rebelled against oppressive 
authorities to stop all violence and to simply submit themselves to these authorities. 
At the same time Luther encouraged the princes to react with as much force as 
possible. During this conflict, Luther (cited in Huber, 1987:50) was recorded as 
saying, “What wonderful times we live in, times during which a prince can earn 
heaven easier by spilling blood than others can by praying”.42 
 
Huber (1987:50) attributes this glaring contradiction of Luther‟s focus on the freedom 
of the individual conscience to his medieval worldview. Luther understood the world 
as the place where God and the devil are battling one another, and it was the role of 
Christian princes to take part in this battle by using whatever means they may have 
                                                             
41
 Huber (2000b) meaningfully regards Luther‟s insistence on the freedom of conscience as not only 
designating the boundary of the power of the state but also that of the actions of the church: “Die 
weltliche Obrigkeit fand ihre Grenze, wie Luther schon einschärfte, an der Freiheit des Gewissens; 
aber auch für die Kirche galt, dass sie ihrem Wahrheitsanspruch nur durch das Wort, nicht aber durch 
Zwang Resonanz verschaffen durfte.” 
42
 “Solch‟ wunderliche Zeiten sind jetzt, daß ein Fürst den Himmel mit Blutvergießen verdienen kann, 
besser den andere mit Beten.” 
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had. Luther most likely understood the farmers‟ rebellion as an outbreak of the latent 
evil within them. 
 
Despite these ambivalences, Huber regards Luther as the defender of the freedom 
of the individual conscience. For Luther the individual conscience forms the hinge 
between God‟s bestowed freedom (Huber, 1993a:24) and the responsible use of this 
freedom in society (Huber, 1996c:108). In continuation with the humanistic ideas of 
his time Luther regarded the individual conscience as absolutely free and deemed it 
impossible to act against one‟s conscience (cf. Huber, 1996c:108). This is illustrated 
in Luther‟s famous, albeit possibly apocryphal, speech delivered in 1521 in Worms 
where he stated that it is impossible for him to act against his conscience.43 In this 
regard Luther‟s thought served as an important precursor to modern theories of the 
freedom of religion, expression and conscience (cf. Huber, 1996b:136-142 and 
2001h:12-18). 
 
However, Huber (1996c:108) notes that the conscience is not liberated to an 
arbitrary type of freedom, but that it is directed by the Word of God. In the speech 
Luther delivered in Worms he also states that his conscience is „compelled‟ by the 
Word of God (Huber, 1987:60). God‟s alien righteousness „imprisons‟ the conscience 
of the free person by enabling freedom to be realised in service to others.44 The 
freedom of conscience therefore expresses the freedom of faith but as 
Verbindlichkeit („commitment‟ or „obligation‟) (Huber, 1993b:70-80) and not primarily 
as autonomy or individuality (Huber, 1993b:71).45 
                                                             
43
 Cf. the speech as cited in Huber, 1987:60: “Wenn ich nicht durch das Zeugnis der Heiligen Schrift 
oder Gründe der Vernunft überwunden werde, denn weder dem Papst noch den Konzilien allein 
vermag ich zu glauben, da es feststeht, daß sie wiederholt geirrt und sich selbst widersprochen 
haben, so halte ich mich überwunden durch die Schrift, auf die ich mich gestützt habe, so ist mein 
Gewissen in Gottes Wort gefangen, und darum kann und will ich nichts wirderrufen, weil gegen das 
Gewissen zu handeln weder sicher noch lauter ist. Gott helfe mir!” 
44
 Cf. Reinhard Brandt‟s detailed discussion on justification as the liberation of the human conscience, 
i. e. the human will, in Die ermögliche Freiheit: Sprachkritische Rekonstruktion der Lehre vom 
unfreien Willen (Hannover: Luterisches Verlagshaus, 1992). 
45
 Huber (1993b:71) expresses the ethical implications of this Verbindlichkeit as follows: “[D]er 
theologischen Einsicht, daß menschliche Freiheit nicht durch menschliches Handeln hervorgebracht 
wird, sondern in der Wirklichkeit Gottes wurzelt, hat eine responsorische Konzeption menschlicher 
Autonomie zur Folge. Und aus dieser Verknüpfung resultiert, daß die Ethik des Gerechten – in der 
Einschränkungen individueller Rechte nur um der individuellen Rechte anderer willen erfolgen dürfen, 
also dem Grundsatz des distributiven Vorteils entsprechen müssen – konstruktiv auf eine Ethik des 
Guten bezogen wird, in der menschliche Freiheit als kommunikative Freiheit zu ihrem Ziel kommt. 
Von einer solchen Ethik ließe sich sagen, sie habe die Spannung zwischen Verbindlichkeit und 
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This freed conscience of the Christian has a specific character, namely that of a 
resurrected conscience. Luther made this point memorably: “To wake up one‟s 
conscience is nothing less than raising the dead” (Huber, 1987:62).46 Put in other 
words it can be said that understanding the use of the conscience as the „raising of 
the dead‟, signifies its self-critical character. The conscience serves as hinge 
between the faith of freedom and faith in society amidst the tension of sin, salvation 
and consummation. This tension was especially tangible in Luther‟s time, as the devil 
and his powers were understood as material forces competing with God for the soul 
of the individual. Luther therefore understood the conscience as being either 
controlled by God or by the devil, and consequently only the resurrected conscience 
of the Christian can be understood as a trustworthy hinge. A clear conscience is 
never a condition due to human achievement but is always the conscience acquitted 
by God, in the process of being fully freed (Huber, 1987:62). 
 
The emphasis Luther places on the liberation of the individual conscience therefore 
does not imply ethical individualism. According to Huber (1996c:108–109) Luther 
understands the conscience as the hinge between the freedom of faith and 
responsibility in society as it is both liberated and directed by the righteousness of 
God. The freed conscience of the Christian enables public responsibility by 
connecting God‟s Word with the context within which it must be realised. Whenever 
any political power does not respect the freedom of conscience, Luther understood 
that authority to have reached the boundary of its power (1987:52). The legitimacy of 
any authority is dependent on the extent to which it serves freedom of conscience. 
Wherever any authority acts in a way that disregards freedom and the fact that 
fundamentally it cannot be guaranteed by any human authority, such an authority 
oversteps its mandate (Huber, 1987:56). In such instances, the fundamentally free 
conscience of the Christian enables and forces reaction in order to restore a society 
based on the inalienable freedom of individuals.  
 
We have now seen how Huber understands Luther‟s conception of the freedom of 
conscience to form the hinge between the freedom of faith and responsibility in 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
Freiheit darin konstruktiv gelöst, daß die Verbindlichkeit der Freiheit selbst zu ihrem entscheidenden 
Thema geworden ist.” 
46
 “Die Gewissen aufzurichten und zu ermuntern, ist nichts anderes als Tote auferwecken.” 
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society. This section will be concluded by elaborating on Luther‟s understanding of 
the public realisation of freedom. The public character of freedom is especially 
relevant in Luther‟s so-called „doctrine of the two regiments‟ (Lehre von den zwei 
Reichen). In the following section, this doctrine will be employed to investigate this 
third element of Luther‟s understanding of freedom. 
 
3.4  Freedom in society: Luther and the two regiments 
 
When considering the public implications of Luther‟s concept of freedom, some 
would refer to Luther‟s doctrine of the two regiments to discredit his political ethics. 
This would surely be done by understanding this „doctrine‟ as legitimating an 
unbridgeable division between the political and religious spheres in society. Such an 
argument might then be further motivated by Weber‟s distinction between the 
Brüderlichkeitsethik (brotherly ethic) of Christianity and the Eigengesetzlichkeit 
(autonomy) of other societal spheres, and even by the abovementioned „Lutheran‟ 
Obrigkeitsgehorsam. 
 
According to Huber (1985:42ff) such opinions ignore the fact that Luther‟s reference 
to two regiments does not form part of a worked-out doctrine but is used rather 
unsystematically, and is closely linked to other distinctions that Luther makes. The 
kingdom of God and the kingdom of the world, the spiritual and earthly regiments, 
the status ecclesiasticus, status politicus and status oeconomicus of the Christian 
are all distinctions to be used in conjunction with one another (cf. Huber, 1985:41). 
Attempting to understand the connection between these themes in Luther‟s theology 
responsibly is aided considerably by noting the history of interpretation of this 
doctrine (Huber, 1990:94–97; 1985:42–46; 62–67).47 
 
Although acknowledging and making use of Luther‟s distinction between different 
kingdoms or regiments are nothing new, understanding these distinctions as a 
doctrine is a relatively recent development.48 In 1932 reference was still made to 
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 Cf. Eberhard Jüngel, “Zwei Schwerter – Zwei Reiche. Die Trennung der Mächte der Reformation” in 
Ganz Werden (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003). 
48
 Cf. Huber (1985:53–70) in his article “„Eigengesetzlichkeit‟ und „Lehre von den zwei Reichen‟” in 
Folgen christlicher Freiheit. Cf. also e.g. a classic study such as Paul Althaus, Die Ethik Martin 
45 
 
Luther‟s “so-called Two-Spheres Theory”.49 It was only after the struggle between 
church and state from the 1920s up to the 1940s that Luther‟s „doctrine‟ of the two 
regiments emerged. In 1921 Emanuel Hirsch made use of this distinction in Luther‟s 
theology to construct a theory on the relationship between politics and religion by 
emphasising the legitimacy of a division. In the Dritte Reich, the meaning of politics 
changed in order to assume the all-encompassing character the totalitarian state 
gave to it.  
 
Politics increasingly became the dominant force in society. It gained a religious 
dimension, in the sense that the politics of the day aimed at giving an exhaustive and 
authoritative interpretation of reality. Although separated from politics, thoughts 
championed by the likes of Hirsch enabled the church to be the “religious soul of the 
religiously laden unity of the nation” while at the same time disabling it to be of public 
relevance and to deliver prophetic critique (Huber, 1990a:95). This doctrine therefore 
effectively led to the uncritical service of the church to the politics of the day by 
means of the supposed independence of the state from society. 
 
The first systematic explication of this doctrine was Harald Diem‟s dissertation that 
appeared only in 1938, titled “Luther‟s doctrine of the two kingdoms, investigated 
from the perspective of his understanding of the Sermon on the Mount” (cf. Huber, 
2006b; 2006d; 2007k). Diem attempted to oppose the over-importance of the worldly 
regiment as well as the assumed autonomy of especially the political sphere by 
reading the doctrine in terms of Luther‟s theology. His conclusion was that the two 
regiments or kingdoms are, according to Luther, not completely separate but that 
differentiation is necessary in order to constructively connect these spheres. The 
original question Luther posed in this regard was how the Sermon on the Mount is of 
relevance also for the worldly regiment. He resolved this question by identifying the 
office of preaching as the most important way in which the two regiments are 
connected. It is in preaching that God‟s Word speaks, through which the Holy Spirit 
resurrects both the individual as well as the communal conscience. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
Luthers (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1965) or a more recent study such as Ulrich Duchrow, 
Christenheit und Weltverantwortung (Stuttgart, 1983). 
49
 Huber (1990a:94) refers to E. Wolf‟s “lutherischen sog. Zwei-Sphären-Theorie”. 
46 
 
According to Huber, this study, along with other important studies and 
controversies,50 made clear that Luther understood both regiments as the 
battleground for God‟s clash with the forces of evil and that he used these regiments 
to emphasise God‟s relationship with his creation. Consequently, God‟s relationship 
with the whole of his creation has implications for Christians, in particular the way in 
which they take part in realising his will. Luther does not privatise or individualise 
freedom but understands the freed conscience as bound by the will of God and 
therefore only free to the extent that it serves others. This basic movement in itself 
contradicts any reading of Luther that sees his work as promoting an absolute 
separation between the political and religious.  
 
The Reformation as such, and Luther in particular, therefore never understood the 
freedom of faith to only refer to the „spiritual‟ dimension of a person or of reality, but 
understood it as having concrete public implications. Huber (1990d:51) regards 
Luther‟s understanding of freedom not as an „ideology that stabilises society‟ but as 
the „impetus for developing culture and politics further‟. Huber‟s interpretation of 
Luther‟s Lehre von den zwei Reichen (1985:42–46; 62–67) holds that God‟s 
sovereignty frees the resurrected conscience to convinced and faithful actions in 
society, for the whole of society is under God‟s control. The way in which the freed 
conscience is to interpret the public relevance of the freedom of faith depends differs 
in different contexts.  
 
Huber (e.g. in 1990d:57ff and 1996c:113ff) understands his own theological project 
and in particular his work on freedom as the continuation of this impulse from the 
Reformation, as we shall see in the discussion of the concept of communicative 
freedom. 
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 E.g. that of Barth and Althaus in 1921, cf. Huber 1985:59–60. 
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4.  DIETRICH BONHOEFFER: REALISING FREEDOM FOR 
 OTHERS 
 
The theologian Dietrich Bonhoeffer is one of the previous century‟s most notable 
defenders of Christian freedom, and at the same time one of Huber‟s important 
influences in developing communicative freedom. Bonhoeffer influences Huber 
significantly both as one of the Confessing Church‟s most prominent representatives 
and as an exemplar of how theology should be embodied.51 Bonhoeffer‟s strong 
focus on the embodiment of Christian truth is articulated strikingly in a lecture he 
delivered in Finkelwald (cited in Huber, 2006n): 
 
The truth the church bears witness to is neither the result of deductions, 
nor is it the mediation of a certain doctrine. This truth takes place.52 It 
creates its own form of existence. It is [therefore] possible for the church 
to preach the pure doctrine, with it nevertheless being untrue.53 
 
Like Huber, also Bonhoeffer did not fear the historical processes of his time.54 Huber 
(e.g. in 2006l) regards Bonhoeffer‟s often radical criticism of religion a result of his 
intimate knowledge of Germany‟s modern classes. Growing up in a family of 
Germany‟s enlightened elite that kept a critical distance from the church, Bonhoeffer 
intimately knew many of the tenets of modernity and the secularisation of his time.55 
                                                             
51
 Huber is, e.g., the spokesperson of the editors who publish Bonhoeffer‟s work (Evangelische Kirche 
Berlin-Brandenburg-schlesische Oberlausitz, 2008). 
52
 This sentence is deceptively difficult to translate and loses much of its elegance in English. 
53
 “Die Wahrheit, von der die Kirche Zeugnis ablegt, ist nicht das Resultat von Deduktionen, sie ist 
nicht die Vermittlung eines bestimmten Lehrbestandes. Sie ist geschehende Wahrheit. Sie erschafft 
sich ihre Existenzform. Es ist möglich, dass die Kirche die reine Lehre predigt und dass sie dennoch 
unwahr ist.” 
54
 Also Huber is wary of demonising processes of societal change. Cf. e.g. Huber‟s comment on 
individualisation in his article “Christliche Freiheit in der freiheitlichen Gesellschaft” (1996c:114): “Nicht 
darum geht es, die Individualisierungsprozesse der Gegenwart zu dämonisieren. Sondern es geht 
darum, angesichts der gegenwärtigen gesellschaftlichen Entwicklungsdynamik Individualität und 
Sozialität, Selbstbestimmung und Solidarität in eine neue Balance zu bringen.” 
55
 In his lecture “Mündigkeit und Macht – Dietrich Bonhoeffers Anspruch an Kirche und Gesellschaft 
heute”, Huber (2006l) sketches Bonhoeffer‟s family background and especially their place within the 
elite of his day. Huber regards Bonhoeffer‟s criticism towards power to have been born in this context 
and regards this context to have initiated Bonhoeffer‟s democratic convictions: “In behüteten 
Verhältnissen war der in Breslau geborene Dietrich ... . Im Berliner Grunewald wohnte die Familie in 
einem Umkreis, in dem sich intellektueller Weitblick mit der Bereitschaft verband, an der Gestaltung 
von Gesellschaft und Politik teilzunehmen. Die Harnacks, Delbrücks, Dohnanyis und Bonhoeffers, 
deren Kinder sich bereits in der Schulzeit befreundeten, gehörten zu den tragenden Schichten des 
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He believed that faithful Christianity embraces life and that secularisation and 
processes of democratisation should be accepted and integrated in the centre of the 
lives of Christians.56 For Huber, Bonhoeffer‟s connection between freedom and 
responsibility serves as a helpful instrument by means of which to translate the 
Luther‟s conviction that justification and faithful service belong together.57  
 
In this section, contours of Bonhoeffer‟s theology of freedom most relevant for 
Huber‟s work on communicative freedom will be investigated. The first part will 
concern Bonhoeffer‟s understanding of the relation between Christianity and religion. 
In the second section, the ecclesiological and ethical implications of this discussion 
will be investigated. In the last part of this section Bonhoeffer‟s suggestion that the 
realisation of freedom can be understood as a learning process will be examined.58 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
ausgehenden Kaiserreichs wie der beginnenden Weimarer Republik. Die loyalen Mitarbeiter des 
wilhelminischen Preußen entwickelten sich zu Vernunftrepublikanern, die Deutschlands 
Eigenständigkeit bewahren, aber auch seinen Platz im Kreis der modernen demokratischen Staaten 
sichern wollten.” 
56
 Cf. e.g. Huber 2006n where Huber outlines the implications of Bonhoeffer‟s understanding of “Sein 
in Christus” as “eine neue Schöpfung”, namely the typical Bonhoefferian suspension of the division 
between a religious and profane sphere: “Er folgert daraus, dass in Christus nicht eine neue Religion 
gestiftet, sondern ein Stück Welt neu geschaffen wird. Es liegt also das Pfingstgeschehen nicht in 
erster Linie in einer neuen Religiosität, sondern es ist die Botschaft von einer neuen Schöpfungstat 
Gottes. Und das heißt: Das ganze Leben wird mit Beschlag belegt. Es geht nicht einmal um eine 
Vorordnung des Religiösen vor dem Profanen, sondern um eine Vorordnung des Tuns Gottes vor 
dem Religiösen und dem Profanen.” 
57
 On the 4
th
 of February 2006 Huber (2006n) delivered the speech “Das Vermächtnis Dietrich 
Bonhoeffers und die Wiederkehr der Religion”, celebrating what would have been Bonhoeffer‟s 100
th
 
birthday. In this lecture he connects the existential character of Bonhoeffer‟s theology with his famous 
encounter with the Sermon on the Mount. This encounter Huber regards as Bonhoeffer‟s deepened 
concern with issues regarding freedom and justice: “Bonhoeffers Vorbildwirkung hat ohne Zweifel 
damit zu tun, dass Lebensgeschichte und Theologie sich in seinem Fall besonders eng miteinander 
verbinden. ... Ihm lag die Begegnung mit der Bergpredigt zu Grunde, die ihm, wie er selbst bezeugt, 
im Alter von 26 Jahren widerfuhr. In der Zeit seines Lebens, in der die akademische Wirksamkeit im 
Vordergrund stand, noch vor Hitlers Machtergreifung, begegnete er der Bergpredigt in einer Weise 
wie nie zuvor. Diese Begegnung machte ihn, wie er in selbstkritischer Abgrenzung gegenüber 
vorausliegenden Phasen seines Lebens sagte, zum Christen. Und sie gab zugleich seiner ethischen 
Haltung eine Klarheit, die sich zwar schon angebahnt, aber noch nicht im Letzten durchgesetzt hatte. 
Die Verpflichtung auf Frieden und Gerechtigkeit wurde nun zum bestimmenden Grundmotiv.” 
58
 Cf. also John de Gruchy (ed.), Bonhoeffer for a new day: Theology in a time of transition (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997); Keith Clements, Freiheit wozu? Dietrich Bonhoeffer als ständige 
Herausforderung (Bonn: Paul Rugenstein, 1991); and Clifford Green, Freiheit zur Mitmenschlichkeit: 
Dietrich Bonhoeffers Theologie der Sozialität, Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 2004). 
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4.1  Freedom from religion 
 
4.1.1 Religion as the historical garment of Christianity 
Huber regards Bonhoeffer‟s work to be characterised by his frequent return to the 
question of “what Christianity is and who Christ is for us today” (cf. Huber, 2007k; 
1987:31).59 Bonhoeffer was convinced that this question could not be answered by 
using pious religious words, because religion has no legitimate role to play in a 
modern world. At the end of his life he radicalised this train of thought by claiming 
that religionless Christianity is the only form of Christianity that will be able to survive 
modernity.60 In order to understand these radical statements better, it is important to 
note how Bonhoeffer understood religion.61 
 
For Bonhoeffer, „religion‟ was nothing more than a historical garment with which 
Western society dressed Christianity and the form Christianity as (Western) religion 
took on increasingly contradicted its essence (Huber, 1987:38; 1985:193ff). 
According to Bonhoeffer, this historically formed expression is characterised by at 
least four elements (Huber, 2006n; 1987:38; 1985:193ff). Firstly, God‟s 
transcendence is understood in spatial terms. This means that the „place‟ where God 
primarily exists is in his other-worldly kingdom.62 Secondly, religion individualises 
humanity‟s relationship with God, implying that God is primarily in a direct 
relationship with his individual followers. Thirdly, God is invoked as a deus ex 
machina, namely as something that fills the gaps (still) left by scientific knowledge. In 
this sense, God‟s existence serves simply to explain the inexplicable. Lastly, 
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 In his first letter concerning this theme Bonhoeffer asks who Christ – or indeed Christianity – is for 
people as a way in which to start deconstructing the “abgetrennten Raum der Innerlichkeit oder des 
Gewissens” (Huber, 2007k). 
60
 For more on these impulses, cf. e.g. Huber‟s lecture “Das Vermächtnis Dietrich Bonhoeffers und die 
Wiederkehr der Religion” (2006n). 
61
 Concerning the Wirkungsgeschichte of Bonhoeffer‟s work on freedom from religion, cf. Ernest Feil‟s 
article written for Huber‟s Festschrift “Zur Frage nach der „Freiheit‟ und der „Religion‟ im Interesse der 
„Religionsfreiheit‟. Überlegungen im Anschluss an menschenrechtliche und verfassungsrechtliche 
Bestimmungen” (in Reuter, H-R., Bedford-Strohm, H., Kuhlmann, H. & Lütcke, K-H. (eds.), Freiheit 
verantworten: Festschrift für Wolfgang Huber zum 60. Geburtstag, Gütersloh: Kaiser, Gütersloher 
Verl. Haus, 2002:421–432). 
62
 In German the word Jenseits is used to denote „the other side‟. 
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Bonhoeffer saw this historical garment as relegating religion to the private sphere of 
human existence. Hereby it denies faith public relevance.63 
 
He was convinced that such a type of Christianity does not correspond with the 
maturity and rationality of humanity64 but disempowers believers by preparing them 
to live in a world that does not exist. However, the main reason Bonhoeffer 
advocated a religionless Christianity was because Christianity as religion contradicts 
the very essence of Christianity (Huber, 2006k; 2006n; 1985:195). 
 
4.1.2 Religion as contradiction of the essence of Christianity 
Bonhoeffer‟s belief that religion contradicts the essence of Christianity can be 
explained in two ways. The first, implicit reason is the strong influence of the Old 
Testament on Bonhoeffer‟s thought. Huber (1985:195) notes that during 
Bonhoeffer‟s time in the Tegel Prison the role of the Old Testament markedly 
increased in importance for him, and therefore the focus on integration of the 
different spheres of life and also the focus on the earthliness of life. 
 
The second reason, and of the most importance for Bonhoeffer‟s theology, was 
articulated by Bonhoeffer himself. He understood the God image in Western religion 
as fundamentally in conflict with the way God made himself known (Huber, 2006k; 
2006n).65 The way in which his omnipotence is invoked in religious language is in 
contradiction with some of Christ‟s most central utterances in the New Testament. A 
religious view of God finds it difficult to truly integrate his self-revelation by means of 
                                                             
63
 Huber (1985:194) mitigates Bonhoeffer‟s critique against religion somewhat by stating that it should 
be read in its original context. In Bonhoeffer‟s time the differentiation of society and specifically the 
increased individualisation and privatisation of religion gained momentum. At the same time religion 
was given a societal function, especially in the way it legitimated centres of power in society. 
64
 In the lecture “Dietrich Bonhoeffer – ein evangelischer Heiliger?” Huber (2007k) delivered in Rome 
he interestingly does not regard a „rational‟ Christianity as in correspondence with human maturity, 
autonomy and rationality. With Bonhoeffer Huber regards the challenge as going back to the “Anfänge 
des Verstehens” in order for Christianity to again be discovered as “etwas Neues und Umwälzendes”. 
Therefore Huber states, “Die Abkehr von der religiösen Gewandung des Christentums geschieht um 
seiner Substanz willen. Der Frieden Gottes und das Nahen seines Reiches sind entscheidend. Ein 
neuer Zugang zu Gerechtigkeit und Wahrheit tritt in den Blick. Eine Sprache sucht Bonhoeffer, die 
nach traditionellen Maßstäben vielleicht unreligiös ist, die aber befreiend und erlösend wirkt.” 
65
 In a number of speeches Huber describes the “Ohnmacht Christi im Leiden und am Kreuz” as the 
“Dreh- und Angelpunkt” of Bonhoeffer„s understanding of God. See most notably “Das Vermächtnis 
Dietrich Bonhoeffers und die Wiederkehr der Religion” (2006n) and “Dietrich Bonhoeffer – ein 
evangelischer Heiliger?” (2007k). 
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Christ‟s powerlessness. Bonhoeffer used the Gethsemane scene to illustrate this: In 
this scene, as is the case in the rest of the New Testament, Jesus is presented as 
God‟s suffering Son, the incarnation of God‟s love (cf. Huber, 2006n). Bonhoeffer 
saw this scene as the reversal of everything the religious person expects from God. 
Bonhoeffer writes as follows: 
 
On the cross, God allows himself to be forced out of the world, [on the 
cross] God is powerless and weak in the world. Only in this way is God 
with us, and does He help us. It is ... clear that Christ does not help us by 
means of His omnipotence, but by means of His powerlessness, [by 
means of]his suffering! The Bible shows us God‟s powerlessness and his 
suffering; only the suffering God can help us (cited in Huber, 2006l).66 
 
Bonhoeffer‟s insistence that Christianity should free itself from religion was grounded 
in a theology of Good Friday (Huber, 2006n). Christianity does not take believers 
away from the world, as Bonhoeffer believed religion does, but calls them to being 
human. Being human Bonhoeffer understood as being willing to take part in God‟s 
suffering, for taking part in God‟s suffering is the way to life (Huber, 1987:36).  
 
Apart from the Gethsemane scene and Christ‟s death on the cross, the Sermon on 
the Mount also had a great influence on Bonhoeffer. He describes his study of the 
Sermon on the Mount in 1932 as something that changed his spirituality 
fundamentally (cf. Huber, 2004m; 2006b; 2006d; 2006l; 2007k). For the first time he 
read it as a liberating address that requires absolute obedience. He experienced 
becoming a Christian for the first time, as his focused shifted away from himself 
(Huber, 1987:32). After this encounter, he understood the Sermon on the Mount as 
showing the real meaning of righteousness and indicating the way to life.67 For 
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 “Gott lässt sich aus der Welt herausdrängen ans Kreuz, Gott ist ohnmächtig und schwach in der 
Welt und gerade und nur so ist er bei uns und hilft er uns. Es ist ... ganz deutlich, dass Christus nicht 
hilft kraft seiner Allmacht, sondern kraft seiner Schwachheit, seines Leidens! ... Die Bibel weist den 
Menschen an die Ohnmacht und das Leiden Gottes; nur der leidende Gott kann helfen.“ 
67
 Cf. in this regard e.g. the lecture Huber (2006b) delivered in honour of the Weiße Rose movement 
in Munich in 2006. In this lecture Huber correlates Bonhoeffer‟s ethic of responsibility with that of the 
Scholl-siblings. 
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Bonhoeffer, this meant that Christians should turn to those around them and 
intercede to achieve real justice and peace in the world.68  
 
Turning to others in freedom has implications especially for Bonhoeffer‟s 
ecclesiology and his ethics. Bonhoeffer believed that an authentic realisation of 
Christian freedom, liberated from religion, should therefore lead to the church as 
„church for others‟ and ethics as „ethics for others‟, characterised by responsibility 
and the willingness for substitutionary action. The ecclesiological and ethical 
implications of Bonhoeffer‟s work are of particular relevance for Huber‟s work on 
communicative freedom, and in the following section it will be investigated in more 
detail. 
 
4.2  Free for others: Ethical and ecclesiological implications 
 
4.2.1  Ecclesiological implications 
Already in his doctoral dissertation, Sanctorum Communio, Bonhoeffer noted that 
Christ‟s suffering for the sake of the world should lead to a church “being there for 
others” (Huber, 1985:173).69 Huber (2007k) goes on to show how Bonhoeffer 
changed the classic Christian pro me to pro nobis, therewith showing that Christ‟s 
substitutionary death was not simply „for me‟ but also „for us‟. The corporate 
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 Huber (1987:29–32; 42–27) therefore also develops Bonhoeffer‟s suggestion for a “Konzil des 
Friedens” further. Huber (1987:43–47) identifies five sentences from Bonhoeffer‟s writings of 1934 to 
outline Bonhoeffer‟s possible council of freedom, namely (a) “Frieden soll sein, weil Christus in der 
Welt ist.”; (b) “Es gibt keinen Weg zum Frieden auf dem Weg der Sicherheit”; (c) “Das ökumenische 
Konzil ist versammelt.”; (d) “Müssen wir uns von den Heiden im Osten beschämen lassen?”; and (e) 
“Heute noch – wer weiß ob wir uns im nächsten Jahr noch wiederfinden”. Concerning Huber‟s own 
work on peace, cf. Friedensethik (Huber & Reuter1990b), co-written with Hans-Richard Reuter, Die 
Streit um Wahrheit und die Fähigkeit zum Frieden (1980:119–139) and also lectures in this regard, 
such as “Rückkehr zur Lehre vom gerechten Krieg? Aktuelle Entwicklungen in der evangelischen 
Friedensethik” (2004p). 
69
 Huber (2006n) regards Bonhoeffer‟s ecclesiology as the central theme of his theology. Not only was 
his first major theological work Sanctorum Communio but in a programmatic lecture he gave in 1932 
he also stated that the church is both the subject and the presupposition of theology (Huber, 2006n). 
Huber then quotes Bonhoeffer‟s interpretation of this lecture he delivered as motivation: “Da wurde es 
mir klar, dass das Leben eines Dieners Jesu Christi der Kirche gehören muss. Daraus zog er auch 
die berufliche Konsequenz, zunächst in der Gemeindearbeit in London, dann aber vor allem in der 
Ausbildung der Vikare der Bekennenden Kirche. Diese Konzentration war darin begründet, dass ihm 
nun alles an der Erneuerung der Kirche und des Pfarrerstandes lag.” Cf. Dietrich Bonhoeffer, 
Sanctorum Communio. Ein dogmatische Untersuchung zur Soziologie der Kirche (Munich: Chr. 
Kaiser Verlag, 1960). 
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dimension of Christian freedom played a definitive role in Bonhoeffer‟s work,70 and 
Huber consequently regards the church as arguably the most important theme in 
Bonhoeffer‟s theology.71  
 
In terms of the previous section it can be said that God‟s powerlessness on the cross 
implies that the church should be a community of solidarity. In Folgen christlicher 
Freiheit Huber (1985:172ff) explains how Bonhoeffer‟s conviction that the church is 
„God‟s new will with humanity‟ serves as the most concise summary of Bonhoeffer‟s 
ecclesiology. By stating that the church is God’s new will with humanity, God‟s 
relationship with humanity is expressed by his act of making the communion 
peccatorum into the communion sanctorum. The church as the community of 
justified sinners signifies God‟s will for humanity, as it expresses humanity‟s 
existence in terms of creation, sin, justification, sanctification and redemption. 
 
For Bonhoeffer, the church is at the same time also God‟s new will with humanity. In 
a very real sense Bonhoeffer understood the church as „the body of Christ‟, as Christ 
incarnates God‟s new will with humanity.72 Already in the early stages of his 
theology, Bonhoeffer described the church in terms of Christ‟s presence. He also, 
somewhat more controversially, described Christ in terms of the type of community 
He instituted. The church as „church for others‟ therefore corresponds with Christ as 
„the Person for others‟.73 He therefore paradigmatically states that the life, death and 
                                                             
70
 Cf. also Wayne Whitson Floyd (1997:55–56) in The modern theologians: “We are our relationships, 
Bonhoeffer was convinced, for we were created for community, brought into being reflecting the 
image of a God who is the relationship of Father, Son and Holy Spirit. In Christ ... we see both what 
God is like and who we are as well, and the God-human reveals that it is God‟s nature as well as our 
own to be free for encounter with an authentic „other‟, desiring out of love to be loved in return, freely 
and without coercion or constraint.” 
71
 In his speech “Dietrich Bonhoeffer – ein evangelischer Heiliger?” delivered in Rome Huber (2007k) 
– in his capacity as bishop – relates the central importance of the church for Bonhoeffer‟s theology to 
his first visit to Rome: “Die Wirklichkeit der Kirche wird, in Rom beginnend, für lange Zeit zum 
bestimmenden Thema der Theologie Dietrich Bonhoeffers. Wenige Jahre später wird der 
Einundzwanzigjährige der Theologischen Fakultät in Berlin eine Doktorarbeit vorlegen, die den Titel 
trägt: „Sanctorum Communio. Eine dogmatische Untersuchung zur Soziologie der Kirche‟. Und seine 
erste akademische Vorlesung wird bald darauf den Titel tragen: „Das Wesen der Kirche‟. Die Kirche 
ist für Bonhoeffer das Vorzeichen vor der Klammer jeder richtigen Theologie. Mit den vierzig 
Novizinnen und ihrem Gesang in Trinitá dei Monti hat das begonnen. Und mit dem „Santo‟ der 
Kinder.” 
72
 Bonhoeffer also states this in a more philosophical manner when he describes the church as “Christ 
existing as congregation”. 
73
 In his book Kirche Huber (1979:172–180) Huber takes up Bonhoeffer‟s terminology to also develop 
“Kirche für andere” as an element of his ecclesiology. 
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resurrection of Christ are not simply „for me‟, but that Christ‟s substitutionary action is 
socially constituted.74 
 
According to Bonhoeffer confining Christ‟s redemptive work to the individual‟s 
relationship with God would imply a misunderstanding of Christ‟s incarnation. Huber 
(e.g. in 1996b:172) develops this impulse further by showing that Christ‟s incarnation 
conclusively proves that self-determination and life in community presuppose one 
another. This impulse can also be seen in Huber‟s concept of justice, and particularly 
in the way that he regards the position of a community‟s disadvantaged members as 
the criterion for measuring the wellbeing of society as a whole (Huber, 1999:192; 
1996b:186). 
 
4.2.2  Ethical implications 
Christianity as „being there for others‟ has important implications for Bonhoeffer‟s 
ethical project. Huber (e.g. 2006m) regards two concepts as having particular 
relevance for Bonhoeffer‟s ethics, namely responsibility and substitution (e.g. Huber, 
2006m). Bonhoeffer embedded the concepts of responsibility and substitution into 
his ethics of responsibility. In the following succinct statement Huber (2007k) 
explains how Bonhoeffer understood the connection between responsibility and 
substitution: 
 
It is remarkable how clear it is what moved Bonhoeffer: that Christian 
freedom leads to responsibility, that the individual should be willing to take 
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 Although Bonhoeffer‟s close connection between Christology and ecclesiology prevents his 
ecclesiology from becoming mere sociology of religion, there are also some dangers. In Folgen 
christlicher Freiheit Huber (1985:202–203) identifies some of these dangers. Arguably the greatest 
danger is that the difference between Christ and believers will not be made clear enough. This may 
lead to uncertainty as to how to understand the difference between the church as a form of Christ‟s 
revelation and the church as the community of believers. Huber (1985:202) is of the opinion that the 
relationship between Bonhoeffer‟s Christology and ecclesiology should be complemented by 
distinguishing between Christ as the primary subject of the church and believers as secondary 
subjects. This distinction acknowledges that believers in the first place need love, acceptance, service 
and forgiveness. Christ as primary subject of the church enables the continued liberation that enables 
believers to be there for other. 
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up this responsibility in a substitutionary manner, and that this 
responsibility includes the willingness to take over the guilt of others.75 
 
In his article “Sozialethik als Verantwortungsethik” (1990a:136–157) Huber gives one 
of his clearest explanations of his view on Bonhoeffer‟s ethics. Specifically 
Bonhoeffer‟s theological interpretation of responsibility is of importance for Huber‟s 
work on freedom (1990a:143–144). In order to structure Bonhoeffer‟s ethics he 
identifies two basic contexts of responsibility, namely responsibility before and 
responsibility for.  
 
In this article Huber (1990a:143) identifies the basic form of responsibility in 
Bonhoeffer‟s work as responsibility before God.76 According to the Christian 
understanding of responsibility, God will ultimately hold humanity responsible for its 
actions. The language that characterises this sense is that of the Last Judgement. 
This basic sense focuses not so much on God‟s judgement but rather emphasises 
the fact that responsibility functions in a framework much wider than the individual 
life. „Responsibility before‟ corresponds with what Huber (1990a:144) calls the 
„answer structure‟ of responsibility in Bonhoeffer‟s ethics.77 Responsibility is the 
complete answer in reaction to the reality given by God through Christ. It therefore 
concerns the whole of reality and is based on God‟s actions in defining human 
reality. 
 
The second context of responsibility is responsibility for others. Here the willingness 
for substitutionary action (Stellvertretung) comes into play.78 Bonhoeffer‟s 
Christology forms the background of this context of responsibility in his work: Christ 
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 “Umso erstaunlicher ist es, wie klar man im Rückblick erkennen kann, was Bonhoeffer bewegte: 
dass christlich verstandene Freiheit in die Verantwortung führt, dass diese Verantwortung die 
Bereitschaft zur Schuldübernahme einschließt.” 
76
 Huber, interestingly, does not take this theme up in this form often. When he makes use of the Last 
Judgement it is more often to identify the criterion by means of which earthly justice will be measured 
rather than considering God as judge. In this regard, see especially Gerechtigkeit und Recht 
(1996b:161ff) and also Kirche in der Zeitenwende (1999:192). 
77
 Cf. Oswald Bayer, Freiheit als Antwort (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1995) in which he considers the 
meaning of personhood in the light of God‟s justification.  
78
 For theological background to the concept of Stellvertretung, cf. e.g. Christoff Gestrich, Christentum 
und Stellvertretung (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2001); Martin Bieler, Befreiung der Freiheit: Zur 
Theologie der stellvertretenden Sühne (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1996); and Helmut Gollwitzer, 
Von der Stellvertretung Gottes: Christlicher Glaube in der Erfahrung der Verborgenheit Gottes 
(Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1967). 
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represents humanity before God and advocates on behalf of humanity, which is the 
basis for the substitutionary action of Christians on behalf of others (Huber, 2006b).79 
Christ took the initiative in addressing the predicament of humanity and in this way 
He freed the church to express its thankfulness in responsible actions. Reciprocity is 
therefore not a prerequisite for responsible action.80 This Bonhoeffer illustrated by 
explaining the role of the father, teacher and statesman in terms of substitutionary 
action (Huber, 1990a:145). All three these roles are characterised by moments of 
asymmetry as others‟ causes are taken up on their behalf. Bonhoeffer regarded this 
moment of asymmetry as the great theme of Jesus‟ Sermon on the Mount: Pre-
emptive action rather than reciprocity characterises Christian responsibility.  
 
Huber integrates the themes of responsibility and substitutionary action in a number 
of ways in his theology. He develops responsibility, and particularly self-limitation, as 
the expression of freedom in many of his most important descriptions of 
communicative freedom, such as in Kirche in der Zeitenwende (1999:210-215), 
Konflikt und Konsens (1990a:193–194; 204–207), Friedensethik (1990b:243–246), 
“Die Verbindlichkeit der Freiheit” (1993b:70–81) and “Christliche Freiheit in der 
freiheitlichen Gesellschaft (1996c:114–115). He applies responsibility as 
substitutionary action most often to his work on environmental ethics, namely as the 
duty of humanity to curb unsustainable actions on behalf of future generations (cf. 
e.g. Huber 1990a:154 and 1993a:170ff). 
 
However, to connect freedom, responsibility and substitutionary actions still does not 
imply that freedom will be attained, as Bonhoeffer‟s life also showed. Especially in 
his more recent speeches and lectures Huber discusses freedom as something that 
has to be learnt. In this regard, Bonhoeffer‟s poem “Stationen auf dem Wege zur 
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 In his lecture “Flugblätter der Freiheit. Verantwortliches Handeln aus christlichen Wurzeln” Huber 
(2006b) uses Bonhoeffer‟s participation in the conspiracy to kill Hitler as example of how 
substitutionary action and taking over the guilt of others can imply one‟s alienation from the 
community of faith: “Mit seinem Eintritt in die Konspiration gegen Hitler begab Bonhoeffer sich weit 
aus dem Binnenbereich des christlichen Glaubens und der kirchlichen Tätigkeiten hinaus. Er trat 
hinein in das Inkognito der Verschwörung. Er übte sich in allen Künsten der Verstellung.” 
80
 Cf. Bonhoeffer‟s conviction that an “uncompromising stand” regarding some convictions is 
sometimes necessary: “There are things for which an uncompromising stand is worthwhile. And it 
seems to me that peace and social justice, or Christ himself, are such things” (quoted in Huber 
2006ff). 
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Freiheit”, provides for a last perspective on his contribution to Huber‟s work on 
freedom. 
 
4.3  Learning freedom 
 
Bonhoeffer understood freedom not simply as a substance that needs to be acquired 
but also as a way of living.81 This corresponds with his conviction that faith is an act 
of life (Lebensakt)82 that concerns the whole person, within all of the complexities of 
life.83 In his poem “Stationen auf dem Wege zur Freiheit”, written while in prison, one 
gains a better understanding of how he understood the process of becoming free 
(Huber, 2006b; 2006d; 2006l). 
 
In this poem he identifies four stations one encounters en route to freedom, namely 
discipline, action, suffering and death.84 In an outline he wrote for the poem, he 
describes discipline as “To learn to control oneself”, action as “To learn to act, to 
seize what is real, not to float in possibilities”, suffering as “To learn to suffer – to lay 
oneself in others‟ hands” and death as “To learn to die – the highest feast on one‟s 
way to freedom” (Huber, 2006d).85 
 
The poem starts with the connection Bonhoeffer makes between freedom and 
discipline. The fact that Bonhoeffer does not regard self-control as a restriction of 
freedom is a way of thinking that contradicts many current understandings of 
freedom. Huber (2006b) notes that realising one‟s freedom in a certain manner 
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 In his recent work, Huber also makes a connection between freedom as something that has to be 
learnt and virtue. Cf. in this regard “Flugblätter der Freiheit. Verantwortliches Handeln aus christlichen 
Wurzeln” (2006b), “Nachfolge Heute” (2006d) and “Von der Freiheit der Kinder Gottes – Plädoyer für 
eine selbstbewusste Kirche” (2006r). Cf. also the speech Huber (2006ff) delivered at the World 
Council of Churches‟ 9
th
 Assembly in Porto Alegre where he reminds the assembly that Bonhoeffer‟s 
encouraged Christians “to pray, to do justice, and to wait on God”. 
82
 E.g. in his speech “Dietrich Bonhoeffer – ein evangelischer Heiliger?” (Huber 2007k). 
83
 In this speech Huber (2007k) also connects faith as Lebensakt with interreligious dialogue: “Auch 
im Umgang mit der Wiederkehr der Religion bewähren sich der Respekt vor der Mündigkeit des 
Menschen und die Überzeugung, dass der Glaube ein Lebensakt ist, der den ganzen Menschen 
ergreift. Das ist das eine, was wir gerade heute – in einer Zeit der Wiederkehr der Religion – von 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer lernen können.” 
84
 In German, these stations are Zucht, Tat, Leiden and Tod. In his planning of the poem these 
stations are clearly identifiable (in Huber, 2006d): “Zucht  1. Lerne dich selbst beherrschen / Tat 2. 
Lerne handeln. Das Wirkliche ergreifen, nicht im Möglichen schweben / Leiden 3. Lerne leiden – in 
andere Hände legen / Tod 4. Lerne sterben. Höchstes Fest auf dem Wege der Freiheit.” 
85
 For more detail on Bonhoeffer‟s poetry, cf. Jürgen Henkys, Geheimnis der Freiheit: Die Gedichte 
Dietrich Bonhoeffers aus der Haft (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 2005). 
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necessarily excludes other possibilities and freedom therefore always requires 
narrowing down the available alternatives. On the one hand, therefore, Bonhoeffer‟s 
connection between freedom and discipline is a statement of fact. On the other hand, 
we have seen that Bonhoeffer‟s view of freedom includes not simply the possibility to 
do what one wants, but his emphasis on being there for others implies a broader 
view. Freedom also implies taking responsibility for others and for life in community 
In Huber‟s words (2006b), “When freedom does not simply grant the right to the 
enjoyment of life, but serves to create a sustainable form of life, then this form of life 
also includes the willingness to refrain [from one‟s „rights‟].”86 
 
The next station, namely action, is easier to understand in terms of Bonhoeffer‟s 
theology. As he also stated in his draft, freedom exists not in the abstract but in 
realising it. The realisation of freedom is inextricably bound to the question how it 
responsibly takes up the cause of those who cannot take up their own. Bonhoeffer‟s 
biography illustrates how the risk comes into play with the obligation to take action. 
By being part of a conspiracy aiming to assassinate Hitler, Bonhoeffer found out the 
extent of taking up others‟ guilt and being part of actions contradicting one‟s own 
beliefs, as well as the potential of failure. 
 
As is well known, the attempt to assassinate Hitler failed and eventually led to 
Bonhoeffer‟s execution. Although the poem ends with the stations of „suffering‟ and 
„death‟ Bonhoeffer did not understand the failure to realise freedom as reason to 
abandon the venture of learning freedom. Indeed, Bonhoeffer‟s theology shows that 
the shock of failure is part of the process of learning freedom. Suffering is not reason 
enough for hopelessness, for the responsible realisation of freedom is the duty of all 
Christians, irrespective of the outcome of their attempts (Huber, 2006d). Therefore 
Bonhoeffer was of the opinion that freedom will be understood completely only on 
the other side of death. 
 
Consequently, the process of learning freedom does not end when no more 
possibilities to act seem to exist anymore. Suffering and death should not be 
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 Wenn Freiheit nicht nur die Lizenz zum Lebensgenuss erteilen, sondern eine auf Dauer 
verlässliche Lebensform darstellen soll, dann schließt diese Lebensform auch die Bereitschaft zum 
Verzicht ein.” 
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understood as in opposition to freedom but are rather to be understood as stations 
en route to freedom. In a sense Bonhoeffer emphasised the inherently 
eschatological character of freedom as he neared the end of his life, and as we shall 
see this impulse is present in Huber‟s work on freedom. Huber (2006b) is of the 
opinion that the implications of especially the last station is that when no more 
possibilities to act exist anymore, learning freedom starts taking on characteristics of 
mysticism. When the actions of the individual cannot withstand external oppression 
anymore, the freedom God keeps intact and his special concern for the oppressed 
serve as last source of hope. With this hope Bonhoeffer also ends his poem: 
 
Freedom, we have searched for you in discipline, and in acting, and in 
suffering. / Dying we recognise you now in the face of God.87 
 
 
5.  HEINZ EDUARD TÖDT: CONNECTING FREEDOM, 
 HUMAN DIGNITY AND RESPONSIBILITY 
 
Although his work does not enjoy the international recognition of the other 
theologians who have been discussed, Heinz Eduard Tödt certainly counts as one of 
the important influences on Huber and the way he develops freedom. Their 
academic relationship started when they began to work together at the 
Forschungsstätte der Evangelischen Studiengemeinschaft (FEST) in Heidelberg in 
1968. At that time Huber also chose to write his professorial dissertation (German: 
Habilitationsschrift) under Tödt‟s supervision, which he finished in 1972.88 Huber and 
Tödt worked together on a number of projects, of which the book Menschenrechte 
(the first edition was published in 1977 by Kreuz-Verlag) is arguably the most well-
known outcome. 
 
Huber himself understands Tödt‟s most significant contribution to theology to be his 
work on theological ethics. In an appraisal delivered in honour of Tödt in Heidelberg 
(“Strukturen verantwortlichen Lebens. Die Bedeutung Heinz Eduard Tödts für die 
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 “Freiheit, dich suchten wir lange in Zucht und in Tat und in Leiden. / Sterbend erkennen wir nun im 
Angesicht Gottes dich selbst.” 
88
 The Habilitationsschrift was published in 1973 as Kirche und Öffentlichkeit by Ernst Klett Verlag. 
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theologische Ethik.”)89, Huber identified six aspects of Tödt‟s work he deemed 
important. Firstly, Tödt felt a strong sense of responsibility for his work as lecturer, 
which caused him to devote his attention often to the wellbeing and development of 
his students rather than to his own academic career.90 Secondly, Tödt consistently 
orientated his work toward the biblical message, something that is also clear in 
Huber‟s work. Thirdly, Tödt interpreted current reality to be influenced significantly by 
science and technology, which still is in need of orientation toward God and His 
revelation through Christ.91 Huber fourthly honoured Tödt‟s focus on the necessity 
and possibility of human responsibility. Fifthly Huber honoured Tödt‟s sensitivity to 
the process of moral deliberation, which should avoid the mistakes of both purely 
normative ethics as well as those of situational ethics. Lastly Huber identified Tödt‟s 
focus on contemporary church history – in particular his focus on the work of 
Bonhoeffer – as one of the most important contributions he made. Faith can 
empower believers to socio-political resistance, especially when Christians are 
willing to take the position of the most defenceless (Huber, 1992b:250–251). 
 
To sum up, Huber understands Tödt‟s work to be characterised by two keywords: 
reality and responsibility (Huber, 1992b:241). As was the case with Bonhoeffer (and 
as is the case with Huber) Tödt‟s work is characterised by respect for the specific 
contexts within which theology should be done. Huber‟s general appreciation of 
Tödt‟s work provides useful background information for investigating the role his 
theology plays in Huber‟s work on freedom. It is meaningful to note Tödt‟s influence 
regarding human dignity and its connection to communicative freedom, and his 
emphasis on responsibility. 
 
5.1  Connecting freedom and human dignity 
 
In Tödt‟s concept of freedom, God is consistently understood as the initiator of 
freedom (Schuhmacher, 2006:235). Tödt binds Christian freedom to the sovereign 
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 Huber, 1992b, cf. also Schuhmacher 2006:402–404. 
90
 In his foreword to Tödt‟s Perspektiven theologischer Ethik (Munich: Kaiser) Huber states that Tödt 
chose to prepare lectures of a high quality above writing as many books as possible (Tödt, 1988:8).  
91
 In his book Der Spielraum des Menschen: Theologische Orientierung in den Umstellungskrisen der 
modernen Welt (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus), e.g., he describes the scientification of reality 
as reducing it to anthropocentric categories (1979:15). 
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act of God especially on the grounds of Galatians 5:1. Tödt makes use of the term 
„communicative freedom‟ to designate its dependence on the act of God. Therefore 
„communicative‟ is often used in conjunction with „finite‟ as it expresses God‟s 
sovereignty. However, God‟s freedom does not create merely receptive subjects. 
Tödt regards God‟s freedom to underlie the maturity and autonomy of the modern 
person (Schuhmacher, 2006:233–235). This implies that the communicative 
character of freedom connects God‟s constituting action with the person‟s 
responsibility to realise freedom in relationship with others.  
 
Like Huber also Tödt does not regard the maturity and autonomy of different 
individuals as the restriction of freedom but as its enablement. Christian freedom is 
realised in turning to one‟s neighbour, in grounded personal identity and in human 
sociality (Schuhmacher, 2006:256–257). Tödt therefore connects his anthropology 
closely with a comprehensive understanding of human freedom. The equal 
fundamental dignity of all people is based on the relationship God initiates with 
humanity (Schuhmacher, 2006:236).  
 
However, as does Huber92, Tödt (1988:190) acknowledges the inherent tension in 
such a close connection between freedom and human dignity. The God-given dignity 
of all persons does not only justify the individuality of all but implies a fundamental 
equality of all persons. It does seem as if the over-emphasis of either individuality or 
equality can lead to disrespect for the other. A one-sided focus on the freedom of all 
can as easily lead to the perpetuation of societal injustice, as a one-side focus on 
equality can lead to egalitarianism and the disregard of personal freedom (Tödt, 
1988:197–198). 
 
In order to optimise both freedom and equality, Huber and Tödt consequently 
suggest a third concept, namely participation (Tödt, 1988:199; Huber & Tödt, 1977 
93–96). Freedom can never stay an abstract concept, and the concept of 
participation forces the concept of freedom into realisation. At the same time 
participation prevents equality from becoming an egalitarian principle that disregards 
human diversity (Tödt, 1988:199). Tödt (1988:200) therefore responds to the 
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 Huber develops the tension between freedom and equality in especially Gerechtigkeit und Recht 
(1996b). 
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inherent tension by acknowledging the necessity of both freedom and equality being 
realised within a specific context and he therefore makes use of this „hermeneutical 
rule‟ to regulate the realisation of human dignity. 
 
The integration of freedom, equality and participation Tödt (1979:92) understands to 
be the basic movement of modern theories of human rights and at the same time as 
the Christian contribution to the discourse on human rights (1979:95). When any one 
of these elements is neglected, human dignity itself is endangered and the church 
then has the duty to advocate for the comprehensive enablement of human dignity. 
This also implies that Tödt (1979:104) does not equate the Christian belief in the 
equal dignity of all persons with modern theories concerning human rights although 
he acknowledges significant analogies. 
 
5.2  Emphasising responsibility 
 
Although the term „responsibility‟ has a strong Christian background, Tödt regards it 
as important that the term also be kept accessible outside a Christian frame of 
reference (Schuhmacher, 2006:290). He is of the opinion that an ethic of 
responsibility does not reduce the depth of ethics but that it connects all three 
different modes of ethical reflection that already Schleiermacher identified, namely 
virtue ethics, deontological ethics and situation ethics (the more consequentialist 
categories) (Tödt, 1979:50; 1988:44). He does concede that at first glance 
deontological ethics seems to be analytically much closer to an ethic of responsibility 
than is the case with the other two categories. However, important differences also 
exist between a deontological ethic and an ethic of responsibility (Tödt, 1988:44–45). 
 
Within deontological ethics, reality is made into the material from which the 
consequent duty originates but without asking what this reality itself may mean. An 
ethic of responsibility, however, implies taking responsibility for the future (too), 
which means that reality and its possibilities should be engaged (Tödt, 1988:44). 
Tödt expounds the concept of responsibility in a theological manner by making use 
of Bonhoeffer‟s distinction between to two dimensions of responsibility 
(Schuhmacher, 2006:291). On one level the question „for who‟ or „for what‟ (wofür) 
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responsibility should be taken has to be answered. This can include substitutionary 
actions on behalf of others or simply taking responsibility for a specific assignment. 
On a second level responsibility has to be taken „before‟ or „in the presence‟ of 
realities that transcend situational categories, for example God, „history‟ or the self.93 
 
On a different level it should also be noted that Tödt makes a close connection 
between freedom, dignity and responsibility. The dignity bestowed by God implies for 
Tödt the ability and duty for responsible actions (Schuhmacher, 2006:239). Tödt 
understands the possibility of human responsibility to be a result of humanity created 
in the image of God (Schuhmacher, 2006:239). He understands God not to be 
„jealous‟ of human autonomy but as the One who reconstitutes the freedom that has 
been lost (Tödt, 1979:26). Four areas of reference concern human responsibility, 
namely responsibility for other persons, for coming generations, for the earth and for 
the continued enabling of life of all living creatures (cf. Schuhmacher, 2006:240).94 
 
* 
 
Some of the most significant theological sources that influence Huber‟s work on 
freedom have been considered. In the following section the way in which Huber 
integrates these theologies into his concept of communicative freedom will be 
investigated. 
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 Schuhmacher‟s quote of Tödt‟s description of an ethic of responsibility in a course presented in 
1972/73 illustrates his understanding succintly: “Verantwortungsethik ... bezieht die voraussehbaren 
Folgen eines Verhaltens in die Urteilsfindung über die einzuschlagende Orientierung ein und 
akzeptiert nicht, daß eine gute Absicht von der Schuld für tatsächlich eintretende Folgen dispensiere 
(Gesinnungsethik). In dieser Ethik gibt es eine doppelte Verweisung, einmal auf das, wofür (einen 
anderen Menschen, eine Aufgabe) einer, und auf das, wovor (Gott, Selbst, „Geschichte‟) einer 
Verantwortung übernimmt” (Schuhmacher, 2006:291). 
94
 As will be clear later, Tödt‟s work on communicative freedom exhibits many similarities with that of 
Huber. Apart from their influence on one another, another reason for this is that many of Tödt‟s 
important ideas concerning freedom and human dignity were articulated in Menschenrechte, which 
was co-written by Huber. 
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6.  WOLFGANG HUBER: ARTICULATING CHRISTIAN 
 FREEDOM ANEW 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Huber‟s work is permeated by the conviction that freedom forms a central theme of 
Christian theology95, and in some of his works he even seems to regard it as the 
central theme of Christian theology (e.g. 1993b:71). 
 
For Huber, freedom is the „Protestant principle‟ and of special relevance in modern 
societies (1990d:59). In his articles “Der Protestantismus und die Ambivalenz der 
Moderne” (1990d) and “Ökumenische Situation und protestantisches Prinzip” 
(1992a) Huber investigates the idea of freedom as the Protestant principle. He traces 
the question as to what the principle of Protestantism is through Karl Friedrich 
August Kahnis (1992a:109), Johann Philipp Gabler (1990d:51ff; 1992a:110), Georg 
Friedrich Wilhelm Hegel (1990d:52), Friedrich Schleiermacher (1990d:52ff), Friedrich 
Julius Stahl (1992a:113), Ernst Troeltsch (1990d:54ff), Paul Tillich (1990d:56; 
1992a:114), Ernst Wolf (1996b:56) and Trutz Rendtorff (1990d:57ff). Those attempts 
either to individualise freedom or to equate Christian freedom with civil freedom in 
society Huber strongly opposes on the ground of its origins in the Reformation. He 
acknowledges that this Protestant principle has indeed had some tragic political 
consequences (Huber, 1992a:113), but holds that its basic movements should not be 
equated with its misinterpretations (Huber, 1990d:57).  
 
In this section, the way in which Huber takes up the Protestant principle in his work 
will be investigated. First, the importance of freedom for his theology will be 
discussed, after which the concept of communicative freedom itself will then be 
investigated. 
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 Most notably in Folgen christlicher Freiheit (esp. 1985:113–127), Protestantismus und Protest 
(1987:49–68), “Der Protestantismus und die Ambivalenz der Moderne” (1990d), “Ökumensiche 
Situation und protestantisches Prinzip. Eine Problemanzeige” (1992a), “Die Verbindlichkeit der 
Freiheit. Über das Verhältnis von Verbindlichkeit und Freiheit in der evangelischen Ethik” (1993b), 
“Öffentliche Kirche in pluralen Öffentlichkeiten”( 1994a), “Christliche Freiheit in der freiheitlichen 
Gesellschaft” (1996c) and Kirche in der Zeitenwende (esp. 1999:163–214). 
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6.2 Freedom in Huber’s theology 
 
Even a cursory look at different dimensions of Huber‟s theology substantiates the 
expressed importance of freedom in his work. Huber views the main theme of ethics 
in general, for example, as reflecting on the implications of the basic freedom of 
humanity (1985:113). Christian ethics concerns the freedom to life, and ethics is 
therefore relevant for all of the different spheres of life (1993b:71). In his article 
“Freiheit und Institution. Sozialethik als Ethik kommunikativer Freiheit” (1985:113-
127) Huber explicates the importance of freedom for his social ethics. The modern 
focus only on the individuality, rationality and autonomy of the person presupposes a 
negative understanding of freedom, which problematises the relationship of the 
individual to the community. Ethics based on a comprehensive Christian 
understanding of freedom should transcend the confines of the individual conscience 
and should recognise that social ethics is not simply a subdivision of ethics but that it 
is a dimension of all ethical reflection (Huber, 1985:115). 
 
In Huber‟s bioethics, more specifically, the central role of freedom is articulated in a 
different manner, but it is just as central.96 Here he makes use of the inalienable 
freedom, one can also say dignity, of the person to form his arguments concerning 
stem cell research, abortion, organ transplants and euthanasia.97 The basis of his 
argument here is that the freedom bestowed by God should be respected, as must 
the task of humanity to realise its freedom in a responsible manner be respected. 
These impulses are closely connected to his anthropology. Indeed, his work on 
freedom and his anthropology seem to share the same content but concern different 
implications. Freedom forms the basis of human life and is bestowed by God, which 
implies that the core of human existence is its inalienable worth. In lectures such as 
“Dass der Mensch mehr ist als seine Taten. Das christliche Menschenbild im Licht 
                                                             
96
 Concerning Huber‟s bioethics, cf. Martin Honecker‟s article written in honour of Huber, “Bioethik 
und Schöpfungsglaube” (in Reuter, H-R., Bedford-Strohm, H., Kuhlmann, H. & Lütcke, K-H. (eds.), 
Freiheit verantworten: Festschrift für Wolfgang Huber zum 60. Geburtstag. Gütersloh: Kaiser, 
Gütersloher Verl. Haus, 2002: 580–593). 
97
 In his bioethical speeches and lectures Huber virtually without exception take the inalienable dignity 
of the individual as starting point and then applies it to specific subjects. Cf. e.g “Unantastbare 
Menschenwürde – Gilt sie von Anfang an?” (2001e), “Was ist vertretbar? Etische Probleme der 
Organplantation” (2001f), “Das Ende der Person? Zur Spannung zwischen Ethik und Gentechnologie” 
(2001g), “Wissenschaft und Verantwortung in unserer Zeit” (2002c), “Unsterblichkeit und Würde. Kant 
zu Ehren” (2004d) and “Der Tod – Grenze oder Macht? – Vortrag beim Tag der 
Geisteswissenschaften der Berlin-Brandenburgischen Akademie der Wissenschaften” (2004f). 
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der Rechtfertigungsbotschaft” (Huber, 2007m) and in a book such as Rechtfertigung 
und Recht (Huber, 2001h) Huber connects freedom and human dignity with God‟s 
gracious justification of the sinner. This impulse from the Reformation consistently 
underlies Huber‟s work on freedom and its implications for his anthropology. 
 
Freedom is also of central importance for Huber‟s ecclesiology. His most often-used 
description of the church is the church as „Raum und Anwalt der Freiheit‟ (1985:205–
216). The church should be the place where freedom is paradigmatically 
experienced and renewed, and this should lead to the church being the advocate of 
freedom in society. In this regard the basic movement is that God‟s constitution of 
freedom is the basis of the existence of the church, and only when the church 
attempts to realise this freedom by being a „space of lived freedom‟ can it also be an 
advocate for freedom in society. The diaconical engagement of the church is 
therefore only as credible as its lived life (Huber, 1985:212). 
 
The public dimension of Huber’s theology, furthermore, is also characterised by the 
central role freedom plays.98 He understands freedom not simply as a central 
Christian concept but as a central concept in modern societies. The shared 
importance of freedom in Protestantism and modern societies is the instrument by 
means of which he engages the public sphere. The result is that the respect for the 
freedom of conscience of others – especially of those who may have opinions 
differing from one‟s own – forms a basic presupposition of his public theology 
(Huber, 1990a:137). The importance of the freedom of conscience furthermore 
implies that one should be free to articulate one‟s own position in order to contribute 
to constructive dialogue in society. Neither a position of relativism nor one of 
universalism therefore corresponds with this fundamental freedom of conscience 
(1994a:171–172). In Die tägliche Gewalt: gegen den Ausverkauf der 
Menschenwürde (1994a) Huber suggests a position of „relative universalism‟, that 
enables the articulation of particular convictions, beliefs and standpoints but places it 
within the framework of broader societal needs.  
 
                                                             
98
 In Protestantismus und Protest Huber (1987:9) states that his interest in political ethics, i.e. the 
public dimension of his theology, already characterised his work at the Forschungsstätte der 
Evangelischen Studiengemeinschaft (FEST) in Heidelberg and was also the primary reason for his 
participation in the German Church Conferences (Deutsche Kirchentage). 
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Rather than attempting to develop a new concept of freedom, however, Huber‟s 
theological project is aimed at unlocking the critical potential of Christian freedom 
within the context of the different spheres of modern societies.99 In this way Huber 
consciously places himself in continuation of the Protestant tradition of interpreting 
freedom as the central concept within Christianity, initiated by Martin Luther. By 
faithfully testifying to the freedom God gracefully bestows, Huber believes the church 
can be kept orientated to its essence whilst at the same time contributing to societal 
wellbeing, as he also stated at the Future Congress in Wittenberg: 
 
Christian theology has struggled for the right understanding of freedom. 
Throughout all its phases, forms, routes and ramifications it has held on to 
the conviction that the Christian understanding of freedom has an 
indispensable contribution to make to the understanding and embodiment 
of freedom. Christian freedom will also be the only and decisive basis for 
us to be the church of freedom in the 21st century. In the light of all the 
uncertainties that lie ahead of us, we will be able to find orientation only by 
means of the freedom that God has given to use through Christ and that 
we accept in faith. We find orientation only in freedom given to us by God, 
towards ourselves and for our neighbours (Huber, 2007b).100 
 
 
                                                             
99
 Huber suggests „democratic communitarianism‟ as the position that should be taken in when 
attempting to articulating and realising freedom (Huber 1999:198). This concept allows for individuality 
and sociality to be connected with regard to public actions: “[D]ie mit diesem Begriff bezeichnete 
Konzeption [trägt] dem Tatbestand Rechnung, daß Freiheit der menschlichen Person und ihre 
Verantwortung gegenüber einer Gemeinschaft unlöslich zusammengehören. Rechte der einzelnen 
können nur solange bewahrt werden, wie auch für die Erhaltung und Weiterentwicklung der 
Gemeinschaft im ganzen Verantwortung übernommen wird” (Huber 1999:198). 
100
 “Die christliche Theologie hat um das rechte Verständnis der Freiheit gerungen. Sie hat in allen 
ihren Phasen, Ausgestaltungen, Richtungen und Verästelungen festgehalten, dass das christliche 
Freiheitsverständnis einen unaufgebbaren Beitrag zum Verständnis und zur Gestaltung der Freiheit 
leistet . Diese christliche Freiheit wird auch die alleinige und entscheidende Basis sein, die uns als 
Kirche der Freiheit evangelisch im 21. Jahrhundert sein lässt. Bei aller Ungewissheit über die Wege, 
die vor uns liegen, werden wir den nötigen Mentalitätswandel nur in der Freiheit finden, die Gott uns 
in Jesus Christus schenkt und die wir im Glauben für uns gelten lassen. Orientierung finden wir in der 
Freiheit durch Gott, zu uns selbst  und für unsere Nächsten.” 
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6.3  The concept communicative freedom 
 
Huber makes use of the term communicative freedom to denote the comprehensive 
and critical nature of the rediscovery of Christian freedom by the Reformation.101 
This concept allows for the critical potential of Christian freedom to be unlocked and 
specifically aims both at liberating the Christian discourse on freedom from the 
private sphere of human existence and bridging the gap between individualised and 
overly communitarian understandings of freedom.  
 
The term itself Huber originally encountered in the work of the philosopher Michael 
Theunissen, his friend and fellow member of the Social Democratic Party of 
Germany.102 Theunissen originally made use of communicative freedom in the 
context of Hegel‟s philosophy in his book Sein und Schein: Die historische Funktion 
der Hegelschen Logik (Frankfurt a.M., 1978).103 Although Theunissen also lays 
emphasis on the role of „the other‟ in the understanding of freedom, Huber makes 
little use of the original context of the term. 
 
Together with Tödt, Huber was the first theologian to employ the term in a 
theological context. As scholar at the University of Heidelberg, Tödt also had contact 
with Theunissen, and he already used the term at least in 1979 in the then 
unpublished lecture “Versuch einer ethischen Theorie sittlicher Urteilsfindung” (it was 
published in 1988 as part of the book Perspektiven theologischer Ethik), which is the 
same year in which Huber initially delivered “Freiheit und Institution. Sozialethik als 
Ethik kommunikativer Freiheit” (published in Folgen christlicher Freiheit). However, in 
Menschenrechte (co-written by Huber and Tödt in 1977) Huber and Tödt make use 
of the concept, although somewhat hesitantly.104 Here already one finds Huber‟s 
typical connection between Luther‟s double thesis on freedom as well as Paul‟s work 
                                                             
101
 Huber (1987:54) indeed regards the Reformation as the rediscovery of Christian freedom, and he 
regards its rearticulation as necessarily having societal consequences: “Reformation ... heißt nichts 
anderes als die Wiederentdeckung der christlichen Freiheit. An die Reformation anzuknüpfen, heißt, 
Anschluss an diese gefährliche Entdeckung zu suchen.” 
102
 Cf. e.g. Huber‟s dedication of Folgen christlicher Freiheit: Ethik und Theorie der Kirche im Horizont 
der Barmer Theologischen Erklärung to Theunissen (and Alfred Schindler) (1985:9). 
103
 Schuhmacher describes Theunissen‟s use of the concept as follows: “Dieser Begriff meint eine 
Öffnung des sich selbst loslassenden Ich auf den anderen hin und das Konstituiertwerden des Selbst 
vom anderen her” (2006:255). 
104
 Although freedom is an important theme in the book, it is referred to as „communicative‟ freedom 
only on p. 164. 
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on freedom (although not his work in Galatians but in 1 Corinthians). Interestingly 
Theunissen‟s book in which he used communicative freedom for the first time was 
only published in 1978, which seems to cause Huber and Tödt‟s use of the term to 
precede what Huber designates as its original published context (Huber, 
1985:118).105  
 
Against privatised interpretations of freedom Huber unites freedom as the Protestant 
principle with the founding political acuteness and consequences of Protestantism, 
namely the protest in 1529 against the emperor‟s oppressive religious policies 
(Huber, 1990d:50).106 The Protestant understanding of freedom is therefore 
characterised by its public character, connecting different dimensions within and 
between persons and in society itself:  
 
The discussion on freedom as Protestantism‟s basic impulse and principle 
is best expressed by the indissoluble connection between the freedom of 
faith, the freedom of conscience and freedom in the church, society and 
the state. In terms of its historical development, it is an unacceptable 
reduction when freedom is merely understood in an individualistic manner 
(Huber, 1992a:115).107 
 
Christian freedom always has a built-in critical capacity that allows it to maintain a 
critical distance from the institutionalisation of truth (cf. Tillich, cited in Huber, 
1990d:55).108 This ability to keep a critical distance from socio-historical reality Huber 
                                                             
105
 Huber and Tödt refer to the Herderkorrespondenz 30 (1976), p. 453 as the source for their use of 
the term communicative freedom in Menschenrechte. 
106
 In Der christliche Glaube (2008b:174–175) Huber states the Christian responsibility to witness 
publicly in very strong terms: “Die christliche Kirche würde etwas Entscheidendes verfehlen, wenn sie 
sich aus der gesellschaftlichen Mitverantwortung verabschieden würde. Das Eintreten für 
Menschenwürde und Menschenrechte, die Mitverantwortung für Gerechtigkeit, Frieden und 
Nachhaltigkeit in ökologischer wie sozialer Hinsicht sind immer wieder auf neue Weise aktuell.” 
107
 “Die Diskussion über Freiheit als Grundimpuls und Prinzip des Protestantismus hat ihre Spitze ... 
also gerade darin, daß die zugesagte Freiheit des Glaubens, die wahrgenommene Freiheit des 
Gewissens sowie die verfaßte Gestalt der Freiheit in Kirche, Gesellschaft und Staat in einem 
unauflöslichen Zusammenhang gesehen werden. Es ist demgegenüber schon historisch eine 
unzulässige Verkürzung, wenn das Prinzip des Protestantismus in einem individualistisch gefaßten 
Freiheitsbegriff gefunden wird.” 
108
 Huber often speaks of the public dimension of Protestantism. In some of his works he even 
regards the influence of Christianity on culture – especially on European culture – as an expression of 
this public character. Although Huber acknowledges the distinction between Christianity and 
European culture it does at times seem not to be very clear. Cf. e.g. his speech “Protestantismus und 
Kultur am Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts” (2000b): “Von seinen Anfängen an gibt es das Christentum 
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understands as the result of its embeddedness into an eschatological framework 
(Huber, 2001h:8). Communicative freedom asks for the commitment and faithful 
embodiment of God‟s ultimate consummation of freedom (Huber, 1999:200). 
 
Huber also articulates the understanding of freedom by the Reformation as 
communicative freedom in reaction to individualised understandings of freedom. 
Indeed, he regards attempts by some contemporary theologians to use the legacy of 
the Reformation to over-emphasise human individuality as misusing this legacy 
(Huber, 1992a:115). He emphatically argues that the Reformation already 
emphasised the biblical connection between human individuality and sociality. 
Whereas a theologian like Jürgen Moltmann sees the close connection between 
sociality and individuality as a modern phenomenon, Huber (Huber, 1996c:61) 
grounds it in the meaning of freedom in Christianity itself: 
 
My thesis is: Already the reformational understanding of freedom is 
characterised by the fact that individuality and sociality have the same 
source. The Reformation understands freedom as communicative 
freedom. If one wants to make use of notions from the Reformation, then 
one cannot simply place freedom and solidarity without any connection 
next to each other, or even play them off against each other. One should 
rather understand these concepts in terms of their indisputable 
connection.109 
 
When formulating the connection between individuality and sociality within current-
day socio-historical realities, communicative freedom sets in motion dialogue with 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
nicht anders als in lebhafter Auseinandersetzung mit der Kultur. Die Entfaltung des christlichen 
Glaubens wäre nicht denkbar gewesen, wenn sich nicht die Glaubensbotschaft der christlichen Bibel 
mit der Kultur der griechisch-römischen Antike verbunden hätte. ... Ohne diese Verbindung könnte 
man nicht erklären, wie sich das kulturelle Gedächtnis Europas entwickelt hat. Denn christliche Bibel 
und antike Kultur zusammen bilden „das Rückgrat des kulturellen Gedächtnisses der christlichen Welt 
des Mittelalters‟. Schon immer werden Bestandteile des kulturellen Gedächtnisses in Frage gestellt. 
Einzelelemente wurden neu interpretiert. Der Streit um das Verhältnis zwischen Christentum und 
Kultur bahnt sich schon im Neuen Testament an. Bei den Apologeten des 2. Jahrhunderts zeigt sich 
bereits ein ausgeprägtes Bewusstsein dafür, dass die Wahrheit des christlichen Glaubens auf das 
Wahrheitsbewusstsein der eigenen Zeit bezogen werden muss.” 
109
 “Meine These heißt: Gerade das reformatorische Freiheitsverständnis ist durch die 
Gleichursprünglichkeit von Individualität und Sozialität gekennzeichnet. Die Reformation versteht 
Freiheit als kommunikative Freiheit. Will man die Impulse der Reformation in unserer Gegenwart 
aufnehmen, kann man Freiheit und Solidarität nicht beziehungslos nebeneinander stellen, oder gar 
gegeneinander ausspielen; man muß sie vielmehr in ihrem unlöslichen Zusammenhang sehen.” 
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two significant traditions of interpreting freedom. When Huber emphasises the close 
connection between human sociality and human individuality (programmatically in 
1985:117–119; 1990d:57–65; 1993a:71; 1996c:106) he is applying the 
Reformational understanding of freedom in order to bridge the distance between two 
important scholarly understandings of freedom, namely „negative freedom‟ and 
„positive freedom‟, as Isaiah Berlin has articulated these two concepts of freedom.110 
 
In terms of its content, communicative freedom denotes an integration of two of the 
most important narratives of freedom, namely what Isaiah Berlin characterises as 
negative freedom and positive freedom in his famous inaugural lecture at the 
University of Oxford published as “Two Concepts of Liberty” (1958). The concept of 
negative freedom is grounded in the liberal intellectual tradition, according to which 
freedom is understood as the freedom of the individual from interference by others 
(Huber, 1996b:222). Concepts such as individuality, responsibility, rationality, 
dialogue and rights are of importance in this tradition. Exponents of positive freedom 
emphasise that individual freedom is always dependent on presuppositions that 
should be formulated and maintained in broader contexts (cf. e.g. the explanation in 
Huber, 1996b:222). Concepts such as sociality, justice, solidarity and equality are of 
importance in this tradition. 
 
In this section the task is to situate Huber‟s concept of freedom within the Christian 
sources that sustain it. The extent to which Huber‟s work is in continuity with its 
sustaining sources is clear when one considers what he identifies as the three main 
movements of communicative freedom (especially in 1996c; 1999:167–176). It will 
be shown how Huber develops communicative freedom as, in the first place, initiated 
by God‟s gracious initiative. God‟s initiative, secondly, leads to the constitution of 
human dignity that does not isolate persons from one another but forms the origin of 
both human individuality and human sociality. Thirdly Huber acknowledges – in 
continuation of the legacy of the Reformation and the critical nature of 
communicative freedom – that freedom can only be realised within a specific 
historical context, which requires that the reality of human sinfulness should be taken 
seriously. It will be shown how the provisional and contextual nature of its realisation 
                                                             
110
 Cf. Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958) and Political 
Ideas in the Romantic Age. Their Rise and Influence on Modern Thought (London: Pimlico, 2006). 
72 
 
is developed as the call to continuous faithful and hopeful action. These three 
dimensions clearly reflect the focus of the Reformation on God‟s grace received 
within the reality of human sin, which leads to thankful service. In the next section it 
will be shown that Huber rearticulates these movements in such a way as to lay the 
foundation for the interaction with modernity. 
 
6.3.1 Constituted by God 
Communicative freedom is, in the first place, constituted by God‟s initiative, which 
gives it an inalienable character (Huber, 1985:211). Huber makes use of the 
Christian salvific history to describe its inalienable character. 
 
He understands God‟s act of creation as the constitutive moment of freedom 
(1999:171). By creating humanity in his image God bestows human beings with an 
inalienable worth. Huber (1999:171) cites Michael Welker to show that in the first 
creation account in Genesis God‟s creative act is brought into connection with the 
creative abilities of humanity itself.111 The giving of names to the animals and the 
cultivation of the earth signify the enabling character of freedom. God does not 
constitute freedom by creating passive and merely receptive human beings but 
enables humanity to apply its freedom. In Der christliche Glaube (2008b:37) Huber 
connects creation with God‟s self-limitation. Creation is not aimed at enabling 
arbitrary freedom, but in choosing to create a specific world God limits Godself. 
Huber takes up the concept Zimzum from Kabbalah to describe this self-limitation 
inherent to freedom. The creative freedom God bestows on humanity therefore does 
not imply mortal omnipotence but responsibility.112 
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 For a critical evaluation of Welker‟s theology, cf. Auke Compaan‟s doctoral dissertation, Kreatiewe 
Pluralismes? ’n Kritiese analise van wet en evangelie in die denke van Michael Welker (Stellenbosch: 
Stellenbosch University, 2002). 
112
 Huber deconstructs the classical view of God‟s omnipotence with creation by introducing the 
theme of His self-limitation already in Kirche in der Zeitenwende (1999:219–220) but especially in Der 
christliche Glaube: “Das Bekenntnis zu Gott als dem Schöpfer verbindet sich immer wieder mit der 
Allmacht als göttlicher Eigenschaft. Wer die Welt ins Dasein ruft, verfügt über die Macht schlechthin – 
nämlich über die Macht dazu, dass aus Nichts Etwas wird. Aber in der Schöpfung entfaltet sich nicht 
nur Gottes Allmacht; in ihr zeigt sich vielmehr zugleich eine Selbstbegrenzung Gottes. ... Diese in der 
Kabbala entwickelte Lehre [Zimzum] besagt in ihrem Kern, dass zur Freiheit Gottes auch der 
Verzicht, die freiwillige Selbstzurücknahme gehört. In der Schöpfung legt Gott sich auf diese 
bestimmte Welt fest; er verzichtet auf die Verwirklichung anderer ... Welten” (Huber 2008b). 
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God also renews the bestowed freedom by means of his salvific initiative. Huber 
(1999:172; 1996b:107) shows that human directionlessness113 or relationlessness,114 
in other words sin (Huber, 1996b:107), causes freedom to be endangered but that 
Christ‟s life, death and resurrection serve as the paradigmatic re-establishment of 
the inalienable character of freedom. By using terminology developed by Eberhard 
Jüngel115 Huber calls Christ the Truth that has power over life and death.116 The truth 
Christ incarnates is experienced as a liberating power for it liberates humanity from 
the „basic lie of human existence‟:117 the conviction that humanity is able to produce 
life and meaning on its own. Christ therefore renews the gift of freedom that was 
constituted already with creation by reaffirming the basic truth of human existence, 
namely that human freedom is inalienable. 
 
Huber (2008b:232ff) places God‟s liberation in perspective by connecting the 
salvation brought by Christ to its ultimate consummation (cf. also Huber, 1999:175). 
In this regard he distinguishes between empty expectation and grounded hope 
(Huber, 2008b:205ff). With Christ‟s incarnation as the living Truth the coming of 
God‟s kingdom already commenced, as Christ‟s resurrection confirmed (Huber, 
2008b:222). Therefore even seemingly contradictory experiences do not contradict 
Christian hope. In Christ, God‟s willingness to suffer with his creation 
(Leidensempfindlichkeit) is shown to be the connection between „God‟s eternity‟, in 
other words his coming kingdom, and the current imperfection of reality (Huber, 
2008b:225). According to Huber, God‟s compassion leads Christianity to embark on 
                                                             
113
 Huber uses this term from Hegel‟s work to denote sin. 
114
 In Der christliche Glaube Huber (2008b:69–73) partly revises his description of sin. Whereas he 
uses Hegel‟s term Orientierungslosigkeit in many of his earlier descriptions of sin, notably also in 
Kirche in der Zeitenwende (1999), he does not use it in Der christliche Glaube. Instead he describes 
sin as in the first instance being separated from God (2008b:69). He then explicates this separation 
as the negation of the three theological virtues of faith, hope and love by Unversöhntheit, 
Hoffnungslosigkeit and Lieblosigkeit. Separation from God therefore implies also the separation from 
fellow humans and sin ultimately leads to Beziehungslosigkeit (2008b:71). 
115
 Huber uses a set of arguments developed by Eberhard Jüngel in a speech delivered in 1992. For 
this argument, cf. also “Theologie und Kirchenleitung – Vortrag zu Ehren von Eberhard Jüngel, 
Tübingen” (2005n), “Nachfolge” (2006d); “Barmherzigkeit mit den Zweiflern – Überlegungen zum Weg 
unserer Kirche” (2006f), “Kirche im Aufbruch – Eine Zeitansage zum Kongressthema der 
Arbeitsgemeinschaft Missionarische Dienste in Leipzig” (2006g) and “Gemeinschaft gestalten – 
Evangeliches Profil in Europa” (2006i). 
116
 Cf. also John 8:32 where Christ is identified as the Truth that liberates his people. 
117
 Huber uses the word Lebenslüge. Cf. e.g.  “Nachfolge heute” (2006d) “Kirche im Aufbruch” 
(2006g) and “Gemeinschaft gestalten – Evangelisches Profil in Europa” (2006i). 
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a „plan of action‟ (Weltprogramm) to express God‟s compassion in his world (Huber, 
2008b:225). 
 
Huber (2007b) can therefore describe the inalienable character of freedom as 
follows: 
 
This is the core of the Christian freedom of faith: it is freedom from sin and 
freedom to praise God; it is grounded in God‟s grace and compassion, 
revealed in Christ‟s death and resurrection, testified to in Holy Scripture 
and appropriated in faith.118 
 
Grounding communicative freedom in God‟s sovereign constitution thereof has 
profound implications for the way in which Huber works out the concept in the rest of 
his theology. One finds arguably one of the clearest expressions of the inalienability 
of communicative freedom in Huber‟s anthropology. In his book Rechtfertigung und 
Recht (2001h), Huber develops the implications of the justification brought about by 
Christ as the basis of human dignity. God‟s righteousness will always be an „alien 
justice‟ and therefore God‟s sovereign act constitutes human existence, giving it an 
inalienable character (Huber, 2001h:23). Huber can therefore state the following: 
 
That I am a person is not dependent on my deeds or – thank God – on my 
misdeeds. I can act responsibly because I am respected (by God) beyond 
my responsible actions. This is the most fundamental meaning of 
„justification‟ (Huber, 2001g).119 
 
By grounding human dignity in God‟s initiative Huber is consequently also able to 
relate his anthropology to the pre-statal character of human rights (Huber & Tödt, 
1977:77–80) and to develop his political ethics in critical solidarity with the 
secularisation, democracy and pluralism of modern societies insofar as these 
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 “Dies ist der Kern aller christlichen Glaubensfreiheit: Sie ist Freiheit von der Sünde und Freiheit 
zum Gotteslob; sie ist in Gottes Gnade und Barmherzigkeit gegründet, in Christi Sterben und 
Auferstehen offenbar, in der Heiligen Schrift bezeugt und im Glauben ergriffen.” 
119
 “Daß ich Person bin, ist nicht abhängig von meinen Taten und deshalb Gott sei Dank auch nicht 
von meinen Untaten. Ich kann verantwortlich handeln, weil ich geachtet bin über all mein 
verantwortliches Handeln hinaus. Das ist der ganz elementare Sinn dessen, was wir mit dem Wort 
„Rechtfertigung‟ beschreiben.” 
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societies respect the inalienable character of human dignity (cf. Huber, 1987:74; 
1990c:29; 2004h; 2004l; 2005w). 
 
The fact that freedom is constituted by God has also implications for Huber‟s 
ecclesiology.120 His most-used description of the church is the „space and advocate 
of freedom‟ (Raum und Anwalt der Freiheit) (cf. especially Huber, 1985:205–216). 
The church can be the space of freedom only because Christ is its „primary subject‟ 
(Huber, 1985: 202). The church is therefore the place where God‟s constitution and 
renewal of freedom are paradigmatically experienced and where this freedom is 
being realised in a fragmentary manner (Huber, 1996b:173). 
 
The implications of God‟s sovereign constitution of freedom are furthermore clear in 
Huber‟s ethics. He regards ethics as contemplating the „freedom to life‟ (Huber, 
1985:115). The basis of this freedom is trust in God‟s bestowal of freedom (Huber, 
2006r). Ethics does not concern trust in human abilities but is characterised by what 
Huber calls Gelassenheit, namely unperturbed trust in the liberation brought about 
by God (cf. Huber 2006b; 2006e; 2006s).121 In some of his writings Huber 
consequently describes ethics as realising thankfulness towards God (cf. e.g. Huber, 
1990a:135). As is the case for Tödt (cf. Schuhmacher, 2006:240ff), Huber is of the 
opinion that an ethic of responsibility is the basic form that Christian thankfulness 
should take on (cf. Huber, 1990a:135–157). 
 
Understanding freedom as grounded in God‟s sovereign act is in contradiction with 
many modern-day conceptions of freedom. Especially in Europe freedom was often 
understood as closely connected to power and especially the extent of one‟s power 
(Huber, 1985:119). The Greeks already understood society as consisting of slaves 
and masters, with freedom consequently being the privilege of those with the most 
                                                             
120
 Huber lays down the basic assumptions of his ecclesiology especially in his book Kirche (1979) but 
works out the relevance of freedom only in some of his more recent works, such as e.g. Folgen 
christlicher Freiheit: Ethik und Theorie der Kirche im Horizont der Barmer Theologischen Erklärung 
(1983), Konflikt und Konsens. Studien zur Ethik der Verantwortung (1990), Gerechtigkeit und Recht 
(1996) and Kirche in der Zeitenwende: gesellschaftlicher Wandel und Erneuerung der Kirche (1999). 
121
 Cf. e.g. Huber‟s lecture “Flugblätter der Freiheit. Verantwortliches Handeln aus christlichen 
Wurzeln” (2006b) where he states the following: “Wenn die Würde des Menschen nicht an dem hängt, 
was ihm selbst zu eigen ist oder von ihm selbst hervorgebracht wird, kann der Mensch seine 
Eigenschaften wie seine Leistungen mit der Gelassenheit betrachten, aus der heraus auch der Stolz 
auf Gelungenes allein menschliches Maß behält.” 
76 
 
power, in other words the masters (Huber, 1985:209). Those who can exert power 
over others are therefore the only ones who can claim to be free.  
 
Even in modern societies it is still the case that power over oneself, over other 
persons and over nature is understood as freedom (Huber, 1985:209). Underlying 
such understandings of freedom is the conviction that freedom is the result of human 
action and that one‟s freedom should be protected against the freedom of others. 
The concept of communicative freedom serves as a correction to such conceptions 
of freedom. The inalienable character of communicative freedom forms the basis for 
the way in which Huber understands communicative freedom to express the 
connection between human sociality and individuality (e.g. Huber, 1996c:105) and is 
the basic reason why socio-historical circumstances and sin lead to hopeful action 
and not desperation (e.g. Huber, 1990c:35). 
 
6.3.2 Relational 
God‟s constitution of freedom forms the basis for its personal character (Huber, 
1999:168–170; 1996c:104–106).122 Not only are creation, salvation and redemption 
indications of God‟s initiative in the constitution of freedom but they are also 
relational concepts. Relationships initiated and maintained by God form the basis of 
communicative freedom.123 Bonhoeffer‟s assertion that in Christ humans see that 
God is fundamentally for them (pro nobis) (cf. Huber, 2007k) not only gives 
expression to God‟s initiation of a relationship but at the same time gives expression 
to the fact that the human person is always a „person in relationship‟ (Person-in-
Beziehung) (Huber, 1996c:106).  
 
                                                             
122
 Concerning the relational character of human dignity, cf. also Russel Botman (2003: 382) in “A cry 
for life in a global economic era” (in Welker, M & Alston, W. M. (eds.), Reformed Theology. Identity 
and Ecumenicity. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans): “The free individual lives competitively in a market that 
has become a law unto itself. The fundamentals of the market replace the fundamentals of the 
community. The anti-community aspect of globalisation ... must be confronted with a revisioning of 
ecclesiology in terms of the oikos narratives in the Bible. The oikos concept reveals God‟s intention 
for building or forming sustainable relationships of people in „households‟, of created reality in 
„ecosystems‟, and of churches in the „ecumene‟.” 
123
 Cf. Christoff Schwöbel, Gott in Beziehung (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2002) and in particular the 
section “Menschsein als Sein-in-Beziehung. Zwölf Thesen für eine christliche Antropologie” 
(2002:193–226); and Stanley Rudman, Concepts of person and Christian ethics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997:119–222). 
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God‟s bestowed freedom is therefore not a „substance‟ in need of protection against 
the freedom of others but can only be realised relationally (cf. e.g. Huber, 2001a; 
2007m). Huber describes freedom as „movement, because it moves the person from 
the desire to control to the ability to serve (Huber, 1985:211). Huber therefore takes 
up the significance of Bonhoeffer‟s suggestion that the traditional interpretation of 
God‟s actions being „for me‟ (pro me) be changed to „for us‟ (pro nobis), for God‟s 
justification initiates relationships structured not according to the logic of self-
preservation but according to the logic of self-giving trust in God‟s liberation (cf. 
Huber, 2005e; 2006b; 2006r).124 By constituting freedom „for us‟ God also reveals its 
true nature, namely that it means „being there for others‟ (Huber, 1985:173). 
Communicative freedom therefore gives expression to the fact that freedom can only 
be realised by being there for others, which intimately connects its constitution and 
realisation with one another.125 Praising God and serving others cannot be separated 
from one another but are united in communicative freedom (Huber, 2007b): 
 
[Freedom] has its highest fulfilment when it leads to praise to the God who 
became human for us in Christ. A freedom that is grounded in God‟s 
incarnation and that has its fulfilment in praise ... is freedom that is given 
by God and confirmed in one‟s relationship with oneself and by 
interceding for others.126 
 
Of fundamental importance for Huber‟s concept of communicative freedom is 
therefore its relational character. Conceiving the understanding of freedom by the 
Reformation as fundamentally „communicative‟ in character expresses Huber‟s 
conviction that the inalienable character of freedom is constituted in relationship with 
God and can only be experienced in interpersonal relationships. This relational 
                                                             
124
 Huber makes this point succinctly in his lectures “Glauben in der Welt – Die Säkularisierung und 
Zukunft der Kirchen” (2005e), “Flugblätter der Freiheit. Verantwortliches Handeln aus christlichen 
Wurzeln” (2006b), “Zukunft gestalten – Erwartungen an Religion und Glaube” (2006k) and “Von der 
Freiheit der Kinder Gottes – Plädoyer für eine selbstbewusste Kirche” (2006r). 
125
 In other words, one can say that God‟s love implies loving one‟s neighbour, as Huber also states 
unequivocally: “Wer Gott liebt, liebt auch den Nächsten” (Huber, 2008b:250). Love indeed does not 
stand in contrast to freedom but serves freedom (2008b:267).  
126
 “[Freiheit] kommt zu ihrer höchsten Erfüllung, wenn sie sich aufschwingt zum Lob Gottes, der in 
Jesus Christus uns zu Gute menschliche Gestalt annimmt. Eine in Gottes Menschwerdung 
begründete Freiheit, die im Lob Gottes ihre Erfüllung findet ... ist eine Freiheit, die sich ein Mensch 
von Gott schenken last, um sie im Verhältnis zu sich selbst wie im Eintreten für seinen Nächsten zu 
bewähren.” 
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character is expressed by Huber‟s connection of two closely connected sets of 
concepts.  
 
Firstly the concept of communicative freedom holds that human individuality and 
sociality are not in contradiction to one another but are both the result of God‟s 
bestowal of freedom (Huber, 2000a).127 To give expression to this intimate 
connection Huber uses the term Gleichursprünglichkeit (most notably in 1990d:57–
65).128 This term refers to human individuality and sociality as having the „same 
source‟, namely God‟s bestowal of freedom.129 
 
Although God‟s act of creation has already shown that individuality is meant to be 
realised and experienced in community, God‟s renewal of the gift of freedom by 
means of Christ‟s incarnation decisively showed that freedom can only be realised in 
the act of being there for one another (Huber, 1990d:60). Personal freedom implies 
being available to one‟s neighbour, for Christ‟s incarnation made clear that „deathly 
competition‟ need not reign but that „reciprocal openness‟ is the way to life (Huber, 
1985:118).  
 
Huber (1985:117–118) cites Paul‟s exposition of freedom in his letter to the 
Galatians to illustrate how freedom does not lead to individual isolation but to 
community. The call to freedom of the gospel should not be misunderstood as the 
call to „individualistic‟ freedom, as Paul consistently adds a qualification to his 
description of Christian freedom. For example, in Galatians 5 he states that 
Christians are called to freedom, and this freedom implies that Christians are 
liberated from selfishness and enabled to serve one another in unconditional love. It 
is therefore to be understood in clear distinction from for example Kant‟s lex 
                                                             
127
 Cf. e.g. the importance of the responsible realisation of individuality in his speech “Die Rolle der 
Kirchen als intermediärer Institutionen in der Gesellschaft” (2000a): “Die Verwirklichung der eigenen 
Ziele, des eigenen Lebensplans, der eigenen Interessen soll – und kann – so erfolgen, dass darin die 
Verantwortung nicht nur für das eigene Leben, sondern für das gemeinsame Leben zur Geltung 
kommt.” 
128
 A number of philosophical attempts to reconcile individuality and sociality exist. Cf. e.g. Albert 
Keller, Philosophie der Freiheit (Graz: Verlagshaus Styria, 1994). 
129
 See specifically Huber 1985:117–118; 1987:53–58; 1990d:105–107; 1996c:61–62; 1999:169–170 
and the sections in this chapter concerning Paul and Luther. 
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iustitiae130 as freedom does not isolate persons from one another but can only be 
realised in community and reciprocal understanding (Huber, 1996c:105). 
 
The Gleichursprünglichkeit of individuality and sociality, secondly, implies the 
connection of a second set of concepts, namely freedom and responsibility. That the 
relational character of communicative freedom implies the connection between 
freedom and responsibility is made clear in Huber‟s exposition of Luther‟s famous 
double thesis.131 As was discussed in more detail earlier, Luther understood freedom 
as meaning being absolutely free from the power of others and being absolutely 
willing to serve others, as his double thesis illustrates: “A Christian is a free master 
over all things and subject to nobody. A Christian is a helpful servant and subject to 
all.”132  
 
The first part of the thesis emphasises that freedom is grounded in the person, for 
freedom from the power of other implies a person endowed with inalienable worth. 
The second part of the thesis emphasises that this freedom can be realised only in 
service to others, which means that the freedom itself (as was indicated at the 
beginning of this section) does not correspond with individual isolation. In Huber‟s 
words (1999:170), “Voluntary holding back for the sake of others is not the restriction 
                                                             
130
 “Enter a condition in which what belongs to each can be secured to him/her against everyone 
else.” 
131
 This thesis may even be regarded as one of the catchphrases of communicative freedom, as 
Huber uses it very often, especially in his capacity as bishop. In a great number of these speeches 
Huber also uses Luther‟s double thesis to draw the Protestant profile in understanding freedom as 
communicative freedom. Cf. e.g. the following speeches: “Evangelisch im 21. Jahrhundert” (2007b), 
“Der Mensch ist zur Arbeit geboren wie der Vogel zum Fliegen. Hat das protestantische Arbeitsethos 
noch eine Zukunft?” (2007j), “Glaube und Vernunft” (2007t), “Gemeinschaft gestalten – Evangeliches 
Profil in Europa” (2006i), “Von der Freiheit der Kinder Gottes – Plädoyer für eine selbstbewusste 
Kirche” (2006r), “Evangelisch – profiliert – wertvoll” (2006t), “Lesen lernen – Zur Wiederentdeckung 
einer kulturellen Grundkompetenz aus evangelischer Perspektive” (2006z), “Die Herausforderungen 
für die Theologie in einem pluralistischen Europa aus ökumenischer Perspektive – Eine evangelische 
Stellungnahme” (2006dd), “Beheimatung im Eigenen – Respekt vor dem Anderen. Zum kulturellen 
Auftrag der Medien” (2005c), “Der Auftrag der Kirchen in einem Zusammenwachsenden Europa” 
(2005d), “Der Zukunft auf der Spur” (2005k), “Unvereinbare Gegensätze? Scharia und säkulare 
Recht” (2005q), “In deinem Lichte schauen wir das Licht – Quellen und Perspektiven christlicher 
Spritualität” (2005s), “Der Beruf zur Politik – Zwanzig Jahre Demokratiedenkschrift der EKD” (2005w), 
“Demokratie wagen – Der Protestantismus im politischen Wandel 1965 – 1985” (2005bb), 
“Protestantismus – Abgesang oder Zukunftsmodell?” (2004c), “Die Tugend des Glaubens” (2004i), 
“Europa als Wertegemeinschaft – Seine christlichen Grundlagen Gestern, Heute, Morgen” (2001b), 
“Unantastbare Menschenwürde – Gilt sie von Anfang an?” (2001e) and “Die Rolle der Kirchen als 
intermediärer Institutionen in der Gesellschaft” (2000a).  
132
 “Ein Christenmensch ist ein freier Herr über alle Dinge und niemanden untertan. Ein 
Christenmensch ist dienstbarer Knecht aller Dinge und jedermann untertan.” 
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of freedom but its expression. Self-determination and recognition of others, love for 
oneself and love for one‟s neighbour belong together.”133 
 
Huber regards the Barmen Theological Declaration as a modern formulation of 
Luther‟s description of the unity between freedom and responsibility (Huber, 
1985:7).134 Apart from Huber‟s connection to Barmen being indicative of his affinity to 
the Bekennende Kirche tradition, its content also illustrates Huber‟s continuity with 
the development of theology of freedom within Christianity. Huber makes a 
connection between his work and Barmen especially by means of the second and 
fourth theses of the declaration.  
 
In the second thesis, for example, it is made clear that the joyous liberation of the 
Christian leads to free and thankful service to others.135 Because Christ is “God‟s 
assurance of the forgiveness of all our sins” Christians are liberated to “free, grateful 
service to his creatures” as part of their “joyful deliverance from the godless shackles 
of this world” (EKD 2006c). The fourth thesis has the consequent theory of the 
church in mind when it is emphasised how the form of existence of the church is 
grounded in God‟s grace: The message the church preaches is the same message 
that grounds the existence of the church and therefore necessarily opens the church 
to others.136 Communicative freedom indeed grounds a community within which 
“dominion of some over the others” does not function but where the “whole 
congregation” is called to live in reciprocal respect for one another (EKD 2006c). 
Communicative freedom is indeed more than a „condition‟ in which people are set up 
against one another, but it is a „process‟ by means of which life can be lived with 
                                                             
133
 “Die freiwillige Selbstzurücknahme um der andern willen erscheint nicht als Einschränkung der 
Freiheit, sondern als deren Ausdruck. Selbstbestimmung and Anerkennung des andern, Liebe zu sich 
selbst und Liebe zum Nächsten gehören zusammen.” 
134
 One of Huber‟s most important collections of essays concerns the connection between ethics and 
ecclesiology in the light of the Barmen Theological Declaration; cf.  Folgen christlicher Freiheit: Ethik 
und Theorie der Kirche im Horizont der Barmer theologischen Erklärung (Huber 1985). For helpful 
background to Barmen, cf. Ernst Wolf, Barmen: Kirche zwischen Versuchung und Gnade (2
nd
 ed., 
Munich: Chr Kaiser, 1984). 
135
 “Wie Jesus Christus Gottes Zuspruch der Vergebung aller unserer Sünden ist, so und mit gleichem 
Ernst ist er auch Gottes kräftiger Anspruch auf unser ganzes Leben; durch ihn widerfährt uns frohe 
Befreiung aus den gottlosen Bindungen dieser Welt zu freiem dankbarem Dienst an seinen 
Geschöpfen.” 
136
 “Der Auftrag der Kirche, in welchem ihre Freiheit gründet, besteht darin, an Christi Statt und also 
im Dienst seines eigenen Wortes und Werkes durch Predigt und Sakrament die Botschaft von der 
freien Gnade Gottes auszurichten an alles Volk.” 
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others (Huber, 1999:169).137 Huber therefore continues by stating, “According to the 
Christian understanding freedom is realised in a community of unreserved respect 
and love. Freedom‟s true place is in community and reciprocal understanding; 
freedom indeed has a communicative character.”138 
 
In terms of Luther‟s formulation it can therefore be said that the resurrection of the 
conscience of the individual is not the call to individualism but forms the hinge 
between God‟s bestowal of freedom and its realisation in relationships (Huber, 
1987:62).  
 
6.3.3 A call to action 
Huber, lastly, develops communicative freedom in the context of human sin (cf. 
1996c:107–109; 1999:173–176).139 Huber regards the consciousness of sin as a call 
to action instead of leading to resignation.140 This corresponds with the constructive 
and positive nature Huber‟s theological project as such. Already in an earlier work 
such as Kirche und Öffentlichkeit (1973) his research is not merely a descriptive 
endeavour, but an attempt to engage societal reality. Also in Protestantismus und 
Protest (1987) and Konflikt und Konsens (1990) it is clear that Huber recognises the 
extent and depth of societal challenges as a means by which to develop an 
appropriate way forward. The way Huber incorporates sin into communicative 
freedom presents the same structure, namely as a presupposition of the human 
condition that requires self-criticism and hopeful action. 
 
                                                             
137
 “Freiheit ist mehr als ein Zustand, in dem man das Seine gegen jede andern gesichert weiß; sie ist 
ein Prozeß, in dem das Leben mit andern gelingt.” 
138
 “Freiheit verwirklicht sich nach christlichem Verständnis in der Gemeinschaft von Menschen, die 
einander in vorbehaltloser Anerkennung und Liebe begegnen. Freiheit hat ihren genuinen Ort in 
Gemeinschaft und wechselseitiger Verständigung; sie trägt also kommunikativen Charakter." 
139
 Some criticism levelled against Huber‟s work is that he seems to give disproportionately little 
attention to the role of sin. This may partly be seen in the length of this last section. It is therefore also 
noteworthy that in Der christliche Glaube (2008b:53–77) Huber devotes a whole section to the 
question of suffering, evil, sin and guilt and integrates it into his argument. 
140
 Cf. Hans Joas‟ article in Huber‟s Festschrift, “Der Wert der Freiheit ind die Erfahrung der 
Unfreiheit” (in Reuter, H-R., Bedford-Strohm, H., Kuhlmann, H. & Lütcke, K-H. (eds.); Freiheit 
verantworten: Festschrift für Wolfgang Huber zum 60. Geburtstag. Gütersloh: Kaiser, Gütersloher 
Verl. Haus. 2002:446-455); as well as Michael Theunissen in “Freiheit und Schuld – Freiheit und 
Sünde” (2002:343–356). 
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Like Hegel, Huber (1999:174) is of the opinion that Christianity cannot be the religion 
of freedom if the reality of sin is not taken seriously. For Huber (1996c:107) sin 
implies more than mere moral failings but forms part of the human condition. He 
therefore regards humanity as fundamentally prone to directionlessness141 or 
relationlessness142. Put in other terms, this means that Huber takes original sin as 
one of the presuppositions of the human condition.  
 
Situating sin in the human condition is, of course, by no means a widely accepted 
position to take in. Although a number of different arguments can be lodged against 
such a position, Huber develops a response to specifically one line of argumentation, 
namely that original sin implies indifference towards structural injustice and 
inhumanity (1996c:108).143 Huber shows that communicative freedom‟s self-critical 
and provisional character enables action. 
 
Being conscious of original sin means, firstly, that God‟s bestowal of freedom can 
never lead to self-righteousness, for communicative freedom sharpens self-criticism 
to recognise one‟s own tendency to disregard God‟s bestowal of freedom (Huber 
1987:54). Its self-critical nature is expressed, for example in the double movement in 
Huber‟s ecclesiology (cf. e.g. 1985:211): the church‟s ability to be advocate for 
freedom in society is renewed every Sunday by its experience and reminder of God‟s 
liberation. Put in another way, the necessity of self-criticism is grounded in a 
distinction between present reality and God‟s future. Sin sharpens the attention for 
the fact that freedom‟s current realisation can at most be provisional or a „parable‟ of 
                                                             
141
 Huber uses this term from Hegel‟s work to denote sin. 
142
 In Der christliche Glaube (2008b:69-73) he also partly revises his description of sin. Whereas he 
Hegel‟s term “Orientierungslosigkeit” in most of his descriptions of sin, notably also in Kirche in der 
Zeitenwende (1999) he does not use it in Der christliche Glaube. Instead he describes sin as in the 
first instance being separated from God (2008b:69). He then explicates this separation as the 
negation of the three theological virtues of faith, hope and love by “Unversöhntheit”, 
“Hoffnungslosigkeit” and “Lieblosigkeit”. Separation from God therefore implies also the separation 
from fellow humans and sin ultimately leads to “Beziehungslosigkeit” (2008b:71). 
143
 For some recent discussions on the topic, and in particular concerning original sin, cf. Christiane 
Tietz-Steiding, Freiheit zu sich selbst: Entfaltung eines christlichen Begriffs von Selbstannahme 
(Tübingen, 2004); Timothy Carter, Paul and the power of sin: Redefining "beyond the pale” 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Anselm Schubert, Das Ende der Sünde: 
Anthropologie und Erbsünde zwischen Reformation und Aufklärung (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht, 2000); Alistair McFayden, Bound to sin: Abuse, Holocaust, and the Christian doctrine of sin 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Raymund Schwager, Brauchen wir einen 
Sündenbock? Gewalt und Erlösung in den biblischen Schriften (Taur: Kulturverlag, 1994); and Ted 
Peters, Sin: Radical evil in soul and society (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994). 
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real freedom,144 and therefore calls for the continuous faithful advocacy for freedom 
(Huber 1990c:35). Huber therefore regards the acceptance of original sin, secondly, 
to uncover – and not to conceal – structural forms of un-freedom and injustice as the 
distinction between God‟s future and present realities is constantly kept in mind (cf. 
Huber 1999:174ff).  
 
Recognising sin as an indication of the difference between current reality and God‟s 
future, thirdly, does not lead to resignation. Huber (e.g. in 2008b:77) regards the 
consciousness of sin as a call to action.145 Indeed, the provisional character of 
freedom serves as an impetus for action. He states (Huber 1999:175): 
 
The ability to recognise sin as the reason for not being free sharpens 
one‟s attention for the despotism that causes avoidable societal 
unfreedom. ... A comprehensive theological understanding of freedom is 
characterised by distinguishing between faith‟s bestowed freedom and the 
responsibility for freedom in society and the state and at the same time 
connecting it.146 
 
The way in which Huber integrates realism regarding the human condition into his 
understanding of freedom is clear in a book such as Protestantismus und Protest 
(1987). This book takes the willingness and ability of Protestantism to keep a critical 
distance from the political realisation of freedom as starting point. According to 
Huber no system, not even democracy, can count on the complete adherence of 
                                                             
144
 In Gerechtigkeit und Recht Huber (1996b:173) uses the term "parable of justice" to describe the 
provisional realisation of justice. 
145
 Cf. in this regard Isaiah Berlin‟s (1958:57) striking formulation from his famous lecture “Two 
concepts of liberty” delivered in Oxford: “It may be that the ideal of freedom to live as one wishes – 
and the pluralism of values connected with it – is only the late fruit of our declining capitalist 
civilisation ... Principles are not less sacred because their duration cannot be guaranteed. Indeed, the 
very desire for guarantees that our values are eternal and secure in some objective heaven is 
perhaps only a craving for the certainties of childhood or the absolute values of our primitive past. „To 
realise the relative validity of one‟s convictions‟, said an admirable writer ... „and yet to stand for them 
unflinchingly, is what distinguishes a civilised man [sic] from a barbarian.‟ To demand more than this 
is perhaps a deep and incurable metaphysical need; but to allow it to guide one‟s practice is a 
symptom of an equally deep, and far more dangerous, moral and political immaturity.” 
146
 “Die Wahrnehmungsfähigkeit für die Sünde als Ursache der Unfreiheit schärft auch die 
Aufmerksamkeit für die gesellschaftliche Willkür, die Menschen in vermeidbarer Unfreiheit hält. ... Ein 
umfassendes theologisches Freiheitsverständnis ist gerade dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß es die 
zugesagte Freiheit des Glaubens und die Verantwortung für die Freiheit in Gesellschaft und Staat 
voneinander unterscheidet und zugleich miteinander verknüpft.” 
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Protestantism but can at most expect „critical solidarity‟ (cf. Huber, 1987:75). Huber‟s 
critique of progress (1990d:37ff) and modern applications of justice (1996b:155) is 
also based on the conviction that human attempts at attaining complete freedom 
cannot be trusted completely but are in constant need of revaluation.  
 
 
7.  SUMMARY 
 
In this chapter the theological location of communicative freedom was investigated. It 
was shown that Huber does not attempt to develop a new concept of freedom but 
that he regards communicative freedom as an expression of the Reformational 
rediscovery of freedom. This was illustrated by the prominent role the theologies of 
the apostle Paul and Martin Luther play in Huber‟s understanding of communicative 
freedom. 
 
It was shown, furthermore, that especially Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Heinz Eduard 
Tödt assist Huber in rearticulating the Protestant understanding of freedom in such a 
way that it takes the challenges of modern times seriously. In this sense the centre of 
their contribution possibly lies in their work on the connection between freedom and 
responsibility. It was shown that specifically Tödt‟s work on the connection between 
freedom, human dignity and responsibility presents a close correspondence with that 
of Huber, as they even started using the term communicative freedom more or less 
contemporaneously. From Huber‟s uses of Bonhoeffer and Tödt one can therefore 
conclude that the Confessing Church tradition serves as an important influence on 
how Huber understands Paul and Luther‟s work on freedom to be rearticulated in 
modern societies.147 
                                                             
147
 It should be noted, however, that these theologians are by no means the only ones whose work, 
and specifically whose work on freedom, is integrated into the concept of communicative freedom. 
The aim of this chapter was to investigate the theological location of communicative freedom and not 
to list all the theologians Huber makes use of. The aim of this dissertation is also not to investigate the 
whole of Huber‟s work and identify all of his influences but to examine his work on communicative 
freedom.  It is the case that Huber, for example, also often makes use of Friedrich Schleiermacher‟s 
work. Cf. e.g. his use of Schleiermacher in Folgen christlicher Freiheit (1985:206–207) and his use of 
Schleiermacher in Kirche in der Zeitenwende (1999:128–132) in order to differentiate between 
different forms of human action. He notably also makes use of Hegel‟s work but usually as a 
motivation for his own line of argumentation and rarely as a substantial significant element of the 
argument itself. In his article “Freiheit und Institution. Sozialethik als Ethik kommunikativer Freiheit” 
(1985:113–127), e.g., Huber‟s argues for the connecton between communicative freedom and social 
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It was then shown that Huber develops communicative freedom from classic 
Reformational themes, namely God‟s grace, thankful service and sin. He articulates 
these classic themes in a way that allows for the engagement of current socio-
historical realities. One therefore saw that communicative freedom incorporates 
these themes by forming a critical concept that bridges both privatised and 
individualised understandings of freedom.  
 
A first conclusion to be drawn is therefore that communicative freedom can be 
understood as the rearticulation of Luther‟s interpretation of freedom in Paul‟s 
theology, with the theology of the Confessing Church playing a significant role. 
 
The second conclusion concerns the nature of communicative freedom. By virtue of 
being a rearticulation of the classic Protestant understanding of freedom, it is also to 
be understood as a critical concept aimed at engaging its socio-historical context. 
 
This chapter will be used as basis by means of which to investigate this critical 
character of communicative freedom further. Huber explicitly identifies the socio-
historical context within which he rearticulates the classic Protestant understanding 
of freedom as that of modernity, and he understands it as the duty of Protestantism 
to take the project of modernity further by contributing to both its affirmation and its 
renewal (Huber, 1990d:47). The second and third chapters will concern the way in 
which communicative freedom engages modernity. The next chapter will investigate 
its critical affirmation of some central tenets, and the third will investigate the 
contribution of communicative freedom to the renewal of modernity. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
ethics and uses Hegel‟s work to understand Bonhoeffer‟s argumentation in Sanctorum Communio 
better. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
AFFIRMING THE INDIVIDUAL AND MODERN 
SOCIETY 
How communicative freedom critically 
affirms modernity  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In the previous chapter it was shown that Huber develops communicative freedom 
as a contemporary rearticulation of the Reformation‟s rediscovery of the Christian 
freedom (cf. e.g. Huber 1993b:71). It is this study‟s thesis that Huber rearticulates 
freedom as a critical concept in a specific context, namely that of modernity. 
Consequently its engagement of modernity will be traced in order to investigate the 
concept and its role in Huber‟s work further. 
 
In introducing communicative freedom‟s engagement of modernity we now turn to 
one of Huber‟s clearest discussions of the topic. In his article “Der Protestantismus 
und die Ambivalenz der Moderne” Huber (1990d:50) describes the necessity for a 
„critical alliance‟148 between Protestantism and modernity, indicating both the 
possibility of affirmation and the need to address modernity‟s ambivalences. It would 
be premature (voreilig) to bid modernity farewell due to two reasons (1990d:47).149 
Huber believes, firstly, that the modernist project can still contribute to a more 
humane and peaceful world, and secondly he is of the opinion that Protestantism 
cannot simply abandon a project it partly initiated,150 as particularly its understanding 
of freedom contributed to the current form of modernity.151  
                                                             
148
 The German phrase he uses is “kritisches Bündnis”. 
149
 In his articles “Der Protestantismus und die Ambivalenz der Moderne” (1990d); “Öffentliche Kirche 
in pluralen Öffentlichkeiten” (1994a) and “Christliche Freiheit in der freiheitlichen Gesellschaft” 
(1996c) and in speeches such as “Protestantismus und Kultur am Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts” 
(2000b), “Europa als Wertegemenischaft – Seine christlichen Grundlagen Gestern, Heute, Morgen” 
(2001b), “Der christliche Glaube und die politische Kultur in Europa” (2004h) and “Gemeinschaft 
gestalten – Evangeliches Profil in Europa” (2006i) Huber draws a close connection between the 
rediscovery of freedom by the Reformation, the development of modernity and the contribution the 
comprehensive Christian understanding of freedom should make to the renewal of modernity. Cf. in 
this regard also Jürgen Moltmann‟s Gott im Projekt der modernen Welt: Beiträge zur öffentlichen 
Relevanz der Theologie (Gütersloh: Chr. Kaiser/Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1997). 
150
 The extent to which Christianity has contributed to the formation of modernity is the subject of 
fierce academic debates. Cf. in this regard e.g. Jacob Neusner (ed.), Religious foundations of 
Western society: Judaism, Christianity and Islam (Nashville: Abingdon, 2005). 
151
 Cf. in this regard Anton Knuth‟s work on Kurt Leeses‟s research concerning the relationship 
between Protestantism and modernity in Der Protestantismus als moderne Religion: historisch-
systematische Rekonstruktion der religionsphilosophishen Theologie Kurt Leeses (1998–1965) 
(Frankfurt a.M.: Peter Lang, 2005). Cf. also Albrecht Grözinger (ed.), Protestantische Kirche und 
moderne Gesellschaft: zur Interdepenz von Ekklesiologie und Gesellschaftstheorie in der Neuzeit 
(Zürich: ZVT, 2003); and Ralph McInerny, Modernity and religion (Notre Dame: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1994). For a more critical text on the relationship between modernity, freedom and 
Christianity, cf. Martien Brinkman‟s The tragedy of human freedom: The failure and promise of the 
Christian concept of freedom in Western culture (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2003, translated by Harry 
Flecken and Henry Jansen). 
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In a lecture given in honour of Dietrich Bonhoeffer in Münster Huber (2004c) 
articulates the critical alliance of Protestantism with modernity as follows: 
 
The churches of the Reformation have not only bemoaned or suppressed 
the Enlightenment project, but also incorporated it into their own 
theological thought in responsibility before God. The important 
theologians of the last 200 years ... signify the willingness to relate the 
Enlightenment and [Christian] faith with one another. The Evangelical 
Church has of course occasionally also reacted against the Enlightenment 
and modernity, but generally we have to acknowledge the close 
connection between the Reformation‟s core and the modern world. This 
connection places our churches before particular challenges and 
duties.152 
 
For Huber, the promise of modernity and the challenges it presents to Protestantism 
meet in the concept of freedom (cf. also 1991:672). Again we can refer to Huber‟s 
speech “Evangelisch im 21. Jahrhundert” (2007b) as he also articulates the central 
importance freedom has for modernity: 
 
Freedom is modernity‟s promise, it is modern times‟ pledge. No other 
concept has led to so many hopes and expectations, confidence and 
change. At the same time no other concept has led to so much fear and 
arrogance, destruction and excessive demands. This freedom has a 
dazzling appearance. And although it is often paid out in small amounts, 
commercial packaging and deceptive disguises it still has a good 
reputation (Huber, 2007b).153 
                                                             
152
 “Die Reformationskirchen haben das Projekt der Aufklärung nicht nur beklagt oder verdrängt, 
sondern auch aufgenommen, ihm Einlass in ihr eigenes theologisches Denken gewährt und es vor 
Gott zu verantworten gesucht. Die großen Theologen der zweihundert Jahre, ... stehen [alle] für die 
Bereitschaft ... Glauben und Aufklärung vor Gott und dem Evangelium zusammen zu denken. 
Natürlich hat die evangelische Kirche bisweilen auch antiaufklärerisch und antimodernistisch agiert; 
aber aufs Ganze gilt es festzuhalten, dass der Glutkern der Reformation eine besondere Nähe zu 
dieser modernen Welt hat, die auch unsere Kirchen in besondere Herausforderungen und Aufgaben 
stellt.” 
153
 “Freiheit ist die Verheißung des Projekts Moderne; sie ist das Versprechen der Neuzeit. Mehr 
Hoffnungen und Erwartungen, mehr Zuversicht und Veränderungen hat kein anderer Begriff 
freigesetzt; zugleich hat kein Begriff so viele Ängste und Anmaßungen, so viele Zerstörungen und 
Überforderungen ausgelöst wie dieser. Das Ansehen der Freiheit ist schillernd: Sie wird heute zwar 
89 
 
In this citation one should notice Huber‟s use of both the concept „modernity‟ as and 
„modern times‟. The distinction between modern times (die Neuzeit) and the way in 
which it was given form by modernity (Modernität) is important for grasping Huber‟s 
understanding of the relationship between Protestantism and modernity (Huber, 
1990d:32–49).154 For Huber (1990d:32–33), „the modern age‟ refers to the age that 
was ushered in by the Renaissance and the Reformation. Religion served as a 
liberating force and the revived knowledge of God led to a deepened and 
revolutionary discovery of human subjectivity. He understands modernity, on the 
other hand, as characterised by the Enlightenment, the French and American 
revolutions and the Industrial Revolution and as referring to the structures that 
characterise a post-confessional society. In both of these processes the Reformation 
played an important role, but Huber situates its primary influence in the advent of the 
modern age. 
 
It can be stated that the birth of a confessionally heterogeneous society, brought 
about by the Reformation, was the single most important political occurrence that 
shaped the Enlightenment. The Reformation brought processes of secularisation into 
motion that eventually led to the idea that the organisation of society cannot depend 
on religious authority. The Thirty Years‟ War, Huguenot wars and England‟s 
revolution wars expressed the need for a society organised on foundations that are 
binding, also if no God should exist (Huber, 1996d:33). 
 
The search for the organisation of society based on other sources of authority than 
those brokered by religious institutions led to the political system being founded on 
natural law (Huber, 1996d:34). What can be understood by the rational capacity was 
made the main criterion for understanding and applying natural law. The basis for the 
organisation of society was not Godly authority (as understood by a specific 
confession) but the social contract (Huber, 1996d:34), later worked out further by 
theorists such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
oft in kleinen Münzen, in kommerzieller Verpackung und in täuschender Verkleidung ausgezahlt, doch 
sie hat gleichwohl einen guten Ruf.” 
154
 For texts on the recent (German) discussion on die Neuzeit and die Moderne, cf. Bert Altena and 
Dick van Lente, Gesellschaftsgeschichte der Neuzeit (Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht: Göttingen, 2008); 
Reimar Müller, Aufklärung in Antike und Neuzeit (Berlin: Berliner Wissentschaftlicher Verlag, 2008); 
and Kurt Imhof, Die Diskontinuität der Moderne: zur Theorie des sozialen Wandels (Frankfurt a.M: 
Campus, 2006). 
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Mill. These tectonic societal changes brought about by the Reformation and the 
Renaissance and taken further by the processes of modernisation not only 
influenced the political sphere but also had implications for the whole of society 
(Huber, 1996d:34).  
 
Huber (1990d:34) therefore regards this epochal process of societal change as 
initiated by the advent of modern times, which was brought into action also by the 
Reformation and was implemented in society by modernity.155  With the relationship 
between modernity and Protestantism as background the next two chapters will be 
concerned with how communicative freedom engages modernity. In this chapter the 
researcher will continue by investigating in what sense communicative freedom 
expresses an affirmation of modernity.156  
 
The research conducted for this study has shown that the way in which Huber 
affirms modernity by means of communicative freedom can be organised by two 
broad themes. These themes are the importance of the individual in modern 
                                                             
155
 Beck et al. (2001:20–21) identifies six characteristics of what can be called classic modernity (or as 
they call it, first modernity). The first three of these characteristics function on a systemic level, 
whereas the last three are so-called „process and action assumptions‟ (Prozeß- und 
Handlungsselbstverständlichkeiten). The first of the three systemic characteristics is that the societies 
of classic modernity understand themselves as primarily nation-states or at leas states where 
geographical boundaries serve to demarcate the state. Modern societies are characterised, secondly, 
by a programmatic individualisation. Every person‟s freedom and equality form the basis of society 
and can only be limited by means of social obligations and the division of labour by society. Thirdly, 
modernity is characterised by capitalistic acquisitive societies (Erwerbsgesellschaften) where every 
individual theoretically has the opportunity to fulltime employment. Classic modernity is characterised, 
fourthly, by the exploitation of nature, with nature understood as a resource external to societal reality 
and inexhaustible. Fifthly, a scientifically shaped understanding of rationality, which is closely 
connected to progress as the world‟s disenchantment, dominates classic modernity. This rationality 
clearly also plays a part in the exploitation of natural resources. Lastly functional differentiation is 
understood as the basis for the organisation of society. 
156
 As Huber affirms some central modernist tenets in a critical manner, each section shall therefore 
be aimed at outlining Huber‟s qualified affirmation which necessarily will include his criticism. Huber 
(1987:54) relates this critical manner of affirming modernity to the self-critical sense of Christian 
freedom: “Christliche Freiheit im reformatorischen Verständnis hat einen selbstkritischen Sinn. Darin 
unterscheidet sie sich von einer verbreiteten Form des Redens von Freiheit und ihres Gebrauchs. 
Verbreitet ist es, daß man von anderen die Gewährleistung von Freiheiten fordert, um selbst von den 
Folgen der Freiheit entlastet zu sein. Verbreitet ist etwa das Verständnis des freiheitlichen 
Rechtsstaats als eines Gemeinwesens, das individuelle Freiheiten schützt – unabhängig davon, ob 
die Bürger mit ihnen verantwortlich umgehen oder nicht. Freiheit bedeutet in einer solchen Denkweise 
den Schutz vor der Macht des andern, mehr nicht.” Communicative freedom enables critical solidarity 
and in this sense it also enables Christians to also take responsibility for the implications of their 
freedom. This freedom, fowever, is grounded in God‟s bestowal thereof and ultimately not dependent 
on the state‟s guarantees: “Nicht die Freiheit, die man durch eigene Leistung erring, sondern die 
geschenkte Freiheit, die aller Menschenwürde zu Grunde liegt, bildet den Inhalt der Glaubens- und 
Gewissensfreiheit.” Cf. also Huber 1990a:262. 
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societies and the structuring of sociality by modernity. This corresponds with Huber‟s 
suggestion (1990d:57–65) in the article “Protestantismus und die Ambivalenz der 
Moderne” that communicative freedom should engage modernity by means of its 
articulation of the Gleichursprünglichkeit of human individuality and sociality. In the 
first section of this chapter, the affirmation of the central role of the individual will be 
investigated. In a first step Huber‟s view on the relationship between human dignity 
within Protestantism and the role of the individual within modernity will be discussed. 
Then the concept of human rights will be examined as both an expression of the 
influence of Christianity on the importance of the individual in modern societies, as 
well as a point of connection between a Protestant understanding of freedom and the 
role of the individual in modernity. In the second section of the chapter the way in 
which the concept of communicative freedom affirms modernity‟s organisation of 
human sociality will be discussed. This will be done by investigating the 
secularisation, democratism and pluralism that characterises modernity. 
 
 
2.  THE INDIVIDUAL PERSON: ENTRUSTED WITH 
 FREEDOM 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
The central importance of the individual is one of the key tenets of modernity.157 
According to Kant‟s classic definition of the Enlightenment the individual is liberated 
from a self-imposed immaturity.158 Despite the necessary criticism of this definition, it 
                                                             
157
 Many studies that consider the role of the individual in modern societies have appeared in recent 
years. These studies reflect the realisation that the role of the individual in modern societies cannot 
and should be understood in isolation from broader societal structures and needs. Cf. e.g. Thomas 
Kron and Heidi Jörges, Individualisierung (Bielefeld, 2008);  William Outhwaite, The future of society 
(Malden: Blackwell, 2006); Andrea Birbaumer (ed.), Der flexibilisierte Mensch: Subjektivität und 
Solidarität im Wandel (Heidelberg: Asanger, 2003); Matthias Junge, Individualisierung (Frankfurt a.M.: 
Campus, 2002); Markus Schroer, Das Individuum der Gesellschaft: synchrone und diachrone 
Theorieperspektiven (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 2001); Ulrich Beck (ed.), Kinder der Freiheit 
(Frankfurt a.M: Suhrkamp, 1997); Ulrich Beck (ed.), Individualisierung und Integration: neue 
Konfliktlinien und neuer Integrationsmodus? (Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 1997). 
158
 “Aufklärung ist der Ausgang des Menschen aus seiner selbstverschuldeten Unmündigkeit. 
Unmündigkeit ist das Unvermögen, sich seines Verstandes ohne Leitung eines anderen zu bedienen. 
Selbstverschuldet ist diese Unmündigkeit, wenn die Ursache derselben nicht am Mangel des 
Verstandes, sondern der Entschließung und des Mutes liegt, sich seiner ohne Leitung eines anderen 
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articulates the modern conviction that all individuals share the same measure of 
inherent dignity, fundamental equality, basic rationality and autonomy. Huber (cf. e.g. 
1996b:136–142; 2001h:12–18) understands human rights to be the contemporary 
expression of the importance of the individual. He reads Article 1 of the United 
Nations‟ Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948)159 as an expression of the 
centrality of the individual in modern societies as it is an integration of the three most 
important modern articulations of the importance of the individual, namely the 
individual in America‟s Christian Enlightenment, the importance of human rationality 
in Europe‟s secular Enlightenment and the fraternalism of the French Revolution 
(1996b:258). 
 
In the concept of communicative freedom the individual is also of crucial importance. 
As was seen in Chapter 1, God graciously bestows freedom on the individual person 
(cf. Huber, 1985:211). Huber uses different phrases to express the centrality of the 
individual person. In terms of the salvific history, for example, the person is 
constituted by God as God‟s initial bestowal of freedom in his act of creation, its 
renewal through Christ and its ultimate consummation show (cf. Huber, 1999:171ff). 
In Rechtfertigung und Recht (cf. e.g. 2001h) the importance of the individual is again 
expressed by God‟s justification of the sinner.160 As was shown in Chapter 1, the 
bestowal of freedom also constitutes its personal character (Huber, 1999:168–170; 
1996c:104–106). The importance of the individual does not lead to boundaries being 
set up between persons161 but enables persons to take responsibility for one another 
(cf. e.g. Huber, 1990a:143). 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
zu bedienen. Sapere aude! Habe Mut, dich deines eigenen Verstandes zu bedienen! ist also der 
Wahlspruch der Aufklärung” (Immanuel Kant, Berlinische Monatsschrift Vol. 4:481, 1784). 
159
 Article 1 reads, “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed 
with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.” 
160
 Huber uses the implications of the justification of sinners, as it was rediscovered by the 
Reformation, to address a wide range of themes, from opposing the death penalty (e.g. in “Dass der 
Mensch mehr ist als seine Taten. Das christliche Menschenbild im Licht der 
Rechtfertigungsbotschaft”, 2007m), stem cell research (e.g. in “Was ist vertretbar? Etische Probleme 
der Organplantation”, 2001f and “Das Ende der Person? Zur Spannung zwischen Ethik und 
Gentechnologie”, 2001g) and abortion (e.g. in “Unantastbare Menschenwürde – Gilt sie von Anfang 
an?”, 2001e and “Familie haben alle – Für eine Zukunft mit Kindern”, 2006bb) to considering the 
impact of 9/11 (e.g. Gerecht aus Glauben – die Gegenwartsbedeutung des christlichen 
Menschenbilds, 2001a) and the integration of Turkey into the European Union (e.g. “Der christliche 
Glaube und die politische Kultur in Europa”, 2004h). 
161
 Cf. Huber‟s critique of some forms of individualisation in Kirche in der Zeitenwende. His criticism is 
directed especially against those forms of individualisation that erode community (1999:88–89): “In 
der Individualisierung gehören also die Freisetzung von vorgegebenen Lebensformen und die 
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In this section, the way in which communicative freedom engages the importance of 
the individual will be investigated. In the first part of this section the researcher will 
investigate how communicative freedom engages the rights or basic freedom 
modernity guarantees each person. This will be done by enquiring into how the 
dignity of the individual is affirmed,162 what the relevance of communicative freedom 
for this affirmation is, and how it is to be connected with human rights. 
 
After the researcher has investigated the meaning of the central role of the individual 
he will, in a second step, investigate how communicative freedom engages the 
duties that can be expected of the individual in modern societies. It will be shown 
that communicative freedom reframes „duty‟ as „responsibility‟ and that responsibility 
is implied with freedom. The responsible realisation of freedom is not to be 
understood as its limitation but indeed as its expression. 
 
2.2  The dignity of the free individual 
 
2.2.1  Communicative freedom and human dignity 
Within Christianity the individual fulfils a central role, as the Judeo-Christian tradition 
understands God to relate to humanity by means of his relationship with individual 
persons (Huber, 2006b). In Der christliche Glaube Huber (2008b:101–107) expounds 
the parable of the prodigal son (Luke 15:11–32), the story of the sinful woman (Luke 
7:36–50) and the parable of the labourers in the vineyard (Matthew 20:1-16) as 
illustrations of how Jesus brings humanity to God by returning individuals to the 
safety of God‟s care (Huber, 2008b:105). It is especially the basic conviction of 
Protestant Christianity that 
 
God values every person in a special way. Precisely in this way does God 
bestow every person with dignity which is stronger than differences 
brought about by achievement or ability. ... [T]he equal dignity of all 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
Entzauberung traditionsbestimmter insitutioneller Sicherheiten mit der Aufgabe einer neuen, 
individuell verantworteten Reintegration unmittelbar zusammen.” 
162
 Currently Huber‟s work on bioethics always centres around the theme of human dignity. In some of 
his other works it plays and important part in e.g. the rationale for solidarity (e.g. Protestantismus und 
Protest), an ethics of responsibility (Konflikt und Konsens) and his arguments against societal 
violence (Die tägliche Gewalt) and for peace (Friedensethik). 
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persons [is] grounded in God‟s unsearchable goodness (Huber 
2008b:107).163 
 
Huber understands the Reformation to be the most important and most influential 
rediscovery of the meaning and implications of this impulse. In Rechtfertigung und 
Recht (2001h:18–33) Huber sketches Luther‟s dramatic rediscovery of this biblical 
truth. Luther‟s basic question concerned the meaning of „God‟s righteousness‟164, 
and specifically how a sinful person can be accepted by a righteous God (Huber, 
2001h:23).165 Rather than understanding God‟s righteousness as only „active‟ 
righteousness, in other words enforcing his righteousness by means of his power to 
punish, Luther rediscovered the „passive‟ dimension of God‟s righteousness or God‟s 
gracious justification of the sinner (Huber, 2001h:23–24). Luther‟s discovery of the 
second part of Romans 1:17, namely that God‟s righteousness “is revealed through 
faith for faith” (NRSV) forced him to revise his understanding of God and God‟s 
relationship with humanity. God‟s righteousness is therefore given to the sinner and 
cannot be achieved (Huber, 1993a:24). 
 
By understanding God‟s righteousness as a gift Luther revised a long tradition of 
understanding God‟s righteousness as a characteristic of God (Huber, 2001h:25). 
The justification of the sinner by means of the gift of God‟s righteousness means that 
God‟s righteousness always stays an „alien‟ justice. This explains Luther‟s conviction 
that a Christian indeed is sinful and justified at the same time. Seen from the 
perspective of the merciful God‟s judgement, however, the Christian is justified 
(Huber, 2001h:25–26). Huber understands this discovery Luther made as a definitive 
confirmation of the inefficacy of human attempts at self-justification and creating 
meaning (Huber, 2001h:27). 
 
                                                             
163
 “Er würdigt jeden auf besondere Weise. Gerade darin verleiht er allen Menschen eine Würde, die 
stärker ist als die Unterschiede der Leistung oder des Vermögens. ... [D]ie Begründung der gleichen 
Würde jedes Menschen [ist] in der unausforschlichen Güte Gottes.” 
164
 “For I am not ashamed of the gospel; it is the power of God for salvation to everyone who has faith, 
to the Jew first and also to the Greek. For in it the righteousness of God is revealed through faith for 
faith; as it is written, „The one who is righteous will live by faith‟” (Romans 1:16–17, NRSV). 
165
 Cf. Eberhard Jüngel, Das Evangelium von der Rechtfertigung des Gottlosen als Zentrum des 
christlichen Glaubens (Tübinen: Mohr Siebeck, 1999). 
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In contrast to understanding human worth as a substance that is owned by the 
individual, the Christian witness – especially since the Reformation – understands 
human dignity to be grounded in the relationship God initiates with the sinner. 
Through God‟s justification166 one discovers oneself as a being that cannot be 
defined in terms of any of one‟s abilities or mistakes but as a being that transcends 
any attempt at a final definition (Huber, 1993a:155).167 God‟s constitution of human 
dignity therefore implies relationality to be a constitutive element of a Christian 
understanding of human dignity (Huber, 2006b): 
 
Nowhere is humanity given a higher standing than in the Judeo-Christian 
tradition where the person is understood as God‟s counterpart. It 
understands humanity‟s dignity not as a substance that „belongs‟ to the 
individual, but as constituted by the relationships by means of which life 
is lived. Among these relationships, however, God‟s relationship with 
humanity is the most important. The relationship with the people with 
whom life is shared, the world within which life is lived and to oneself is 
of resultant importance. ... This is expressed in the idea of „image of 
God‟.168  
 
                                                             
166
 Huber makes relatively little use of the concept of sanctification. Huber (1993a:156) is indeed of 
the opinion that the Calvinist emphasis on the connection between God‟s gracious election and 
sanctification is of importance and regards it as an important development of Luther‟s initial discovery 
but rarely develops it further. Here he picks up the Calvinist connection between individual freedom 
and responsibility. Cf. in this regard Sovereign Grace: The Place and Significance of Freedom in John 
Calvin’s Political Thought by William Stevenson where he describes “irreducible, yet partial” individual 
freedom (1999:11–57) as the Calvinist basis for “corporate action, but under judgement” (1999:59–
103). 
167
 It should be noted, however, that in Der christliche Glaube (2008b: 38–49) Huber interestingly 
chooses to motivate human dignity not by means of God‟s gracious justification but by means of his 
act of creation. However, this apparent shift of focus does not change the central elements of his 
understanding of human dignity. In Die christliche Glaube (2008b:38) Huber‟s main categories of 
describing human dignity are the person described as an „answering being‟, relationships as the 
realisation of personhood and the importance of personal responsibility, all of which correspond to the 
central aspects of human dignity in the rest of his work. 
168
 “Nirgendwo wird höher vom Menschen geredet als in der jüdischen und christlichen Tradition, die 
im Menschen ein Ebenbild, ein Entsprechungsbild Gottes sieht. ... Unter diesen Beziehungen aber 
steht die Gottesbeziehung des Menschen oben an. Die Beziehung zu den Mitmenschen, mit denen er 
sein Leben teilt, zu der Lebenswelt, in der er sich bewegt, und zu sich selbst treten dem zur Seite. 
Der Mensch, der sich in solchen Beziehungen vorfindet und der diese Beziehungen ausdrücklich 
thematisieren kann, ist Person; das kommt im Begriff der Gottebenbildlichkeit zum Ausdruck.” 
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Huber specifically makes use of Kant‟s philosophy to align the inalienable and 
personal character of human dignity with the modernist project.169 The most 
important Kantian idea Huber takes up in his work is that the person being is an „end 
in itself‟ and not a „means to an end‟.170 A human being is therefore always a „person‟ 
and never simply an „object‟ (Sache). In some instances, Huber (e.g. 2004d) 
expresses this distinction as a distinction between „worth‟ (Wert) and „dignity‟ 
(Würde). Huber (1990a:222–223) cites Kant to substantiate this distinction:  
 
In the „kingdom of ends‟ everything has either a price, or dignity. 
Something with a price can be exchanged for something else, for an 
equivalent. However, that which does not have a price or equivalent has 
dignity.171 
 
At this juncture it should be noted that the relationality inherent in the Protestant 
understanding of human dignity seems to be wholly analogous to the concept of 
communicative freedom as it has been expounded in Chapter 1. Indeed, it seems to 
be even more than an analogy. Human dignity in Huber‟s work may be understood 
as an application of the concept of communicative freedom to the discussion on the 
role of the individual in society, and it will be used as such in this chapter.172 In 
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 In his lecture “Unsterblichkeit und Würde. Kant zu Ehren”, delivered on the 200
th
 anniversary of 
Kant‟s death, Huber (2004d) reads Kant‟s attempt to answer the last of his seminal questions (“What 
may I hope?”) by means of the immortality of the soul as his affirmation the grounding relationality of 
human dignity. Huber explains how Kant turns to practical reason in order to answer this question. He 
finds an answer to his question by regarding moral claims as having little authority if the soul should 
cease to exist after a person‟s death. This implies the person‟s ability to take responsibility for life 
itself, which again implies a point of reference that transcends particular situations or even the 
individual life. According to Huber, this implies human „addressability‟ as the basic structure of the 
human soul in Kant‟s work. This means, consequently, that the person‟s ability to act rationally and 
take responsibility is fixed in what can be called „the structures of intersubjectivity‟. Cf. also Georg 
Essen and Magnus Striet (eds), Kant und die Theologie (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche 
Buchgesellschaft, 2005). 
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 This Huber does, e.g., in “Flugblätter der Freiheit. Verantwortliches Handeln aus christlichen 
Wurzeln” ( 2006b) and “Dass der Mensch mehr ist als seine Taten. Das christliche Menschenbild im 
Licht der Rechtfertigungsbotschaft” (2007m). 
171
 “Im Reiche der Zwecke hat alles entweder einen Preis, oder eine Würde. Was einen Preis hat, an 
dessen Stelle kann auch etwas anderes, als Äquivalent, gesetzt werden: was dagegen über allen 
Preis erhaben ist, mithin kein Äquivalent verstattet, das hat eine Würde.” 
172
 In the lecture on Kant mentioned earlier (“Unsterblichkeit und Würde. Kant zu Ehren”), Huber 
(2004d) articulates the importance of human dignity in a way that nearly fully corresponds with his 
conviction regarding the central importance of freedom for modern times: “Die Würde des Menschen 
ist eines der großen Themen des 20. und wohl auch des 21. Jahrhunderts. Ein Nachdenken über die 
Würde des Menschen hat sich im 20. Jahrhundert gerade deshalb entfaltet, weil es in ihm immer 
wieder am Respekt vor demjenigen Kern der menschlichen Person fehlte, der über alle Tode hin 
Bestand hat. Vor allem gilt das für die totalitären Regime des vergangenen Jahrhunderts.”  
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Chapter 1 it was shown how God constitutes the inalienable freedom of the 
individual person (cf. e.g. Huber, 1987:56). The relational dimension of freedom is 
grounded in God‟s initiative (Huber, 1999:171ff). Freedom is not dependent on 
individual characteristics or abilities but on God‟s gracious bestowal thereof (Huber, 
2001h).173  
 
The founding relationship initiated by God is consequently also the expression of the 
grace that grounds the dignity of the individual. In other words, God‟s decision to 
initiate a relationship with humanity already starts with creation and is carried 
through despite human sin, as salvation through Christ and the ultimate redemption 
of reality signify (Huber, 1999:171–176). This relationship is not based on the merit 
of the person, but the relationship itself bestows the person with worth. The 
justification of the sinner consequently forms the centre also of communicative 
freedom, and human dignity can be understood as an application of this basic idea. 
 
Its inalienable character forms the basis for the personal character of communicative 
freedom as it can only be realised in relationship (Huber, 1985:211).174 As was 
indicated, this implies that communicative freedom proposes that Christian freedom 
should not be viewed as a substance but as movement (Huber, 1985:211). The 
same applies for the anthropology communicative freedom presupposes: Human 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
In this respect, cf. also how Huber (2004l), in terms of the need for societal dialogue, makes a 
fundamental connection between human dignity and freedom in his speech “Religionsfreiheit und 
offene Gesellschaft – ein Prüfstein aktueller Dialoge in Europa”: “Religionsfreiheit als universales, 
jedem Einzelnen zukommendes Menschenrecht fordert von allen Religionsgemeinschaften 
Anerkennung und Respekt gegenüber anderen Religionsgemeinschaften. ... Die Basis für geistige 
Freiheit, Gewissensfreiheit und damit auch für die Freiheit der Religion liegt in der Menschenwürde. 
Nur wer frei ist, sich zwischen Gut und Böse, Recht und Unrecht selbstverantwortlich zu entscheiden, 
kann sein Leben in Freiheit unter Achtung der Menschenwürde seiner Mitmenschen entfalten. 
Gewissensfreiheit und Religionsfreiheit gehören eng zusammen. Wenn Menschen ihre Religion nicht 
frei ausüben können, sind sie in ihrer innersten Freiheit betroffen.” 
173
 In “Die Verbindlichkeit der Freiheit: Über das Verhältnis von Verbindlichkeit und Freiheit in der 
evangelischen Ethik” Huber (1993b:71) formulates the unity between human dignity and God‟s 
bestowal of freedom as follows: “[D]er theologische Einsicht, daß menschliche Freiheit nicht durch 
menschliches Handeln hervorgebracht wird, sondern in der Wirklichkeit in der göttlichen Anrede 
würzelt, hat eine responsorische Konzeption menschlicher Autonomie zur Folge. Und aus dieser 
Verknüpfung resultiert, daß die Ethik der Gerechten ... konstruktiv auf eine Ethik des Guten bezogen 
wird, in der menschliche Freiheit als kommunikative Freiheit zu ihrem Ziel kommt.” 
174
 In his article “Kirche als Raum und Anwalt der Freiheit” in Folgen christlicher Freiheit Huber 
(1985:211) succinctly connects the inalienable and relational character of communicative freedom: 
“Radikal ist Freiheit dann verstanden, wenn sie in der Unverfügbarkeit der menschlichen Person 
gründet und auf umfassende Gemeinschaft zielt.” 
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dignity should not be understood in substantial categories but in relational categories 
(Huber, 1999 211ff).  
 
In terms of Huber‟s theology, therefore, the term human dignity serves as an 
expression of God‟s bestowal of freedom, which enables the engagement of 
communicative freedom with the status of the individual in modern societies. 
Freedom can, however, only be realised in specific circumstances and often these 
societal circumstances require revision. The influence of Christianity‟s insistence on 
the equal freedom of all persons had on the liberation of the individual in society, 
specifically by means of human rights, serves as one such attempt at the revision of 
society and will be discussed in the next section. This will provide perspective 
concerning the historical and cultural connection between human dignity in 
Christianity and human rights in modernity. 
 
2.2.2  Human dignity and the development of human rights 
The rediscovery of the inalienable dignity of the individual by the Reformation 
exerted a significant influence on the development of human rights and its 
codification serves as expression of its central role in modern societies. Huber 
(1996b:136-142, 2001h:12-18) identifies five stages in the development of human 
rights in order to systematise Christianity‟s influence on its development. 
 
The first stage is the Christianising of the Roman Empire. Whereas Christianity kept 
a critical distance from the state and juridical system, the „Constantinian turn‟ at the 
beginning of the 4th century led to the organisation of society being orientated to 
Christianity. This also led to the secularisation of Christianity itself and to the 
mitigation of the radical character of the gospel, specifically with regard to criticism 
on behalf of those in disadvantaged positions (Huber, 1996b:136-137; 2001h:12). 
The „Papal Revolution‟ followed this stage and stretched from 1050 until about 1200.  
 
This second stage was characterised by the systematisation of legal policies, 
especially by means of the agreement of the different spheres of the legal system. 
The Decretum Gratiani of 1140 first applied this criterion to canonical law, but it was 
soon applied to the other spheres too. Natural law was now used as the principle by 
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means of which the internal consistency of the law should be protected, as it was 
believed that the basic principles of natural law were to be found in God‟s general 
revelation. Already this second stage signifies the emancipation of the legal system 
from its Christian roots (Huber, 1996b:137).  
 
The resultant view of the individual person that developed during this time was the 
individual as „Christian person‟, with the person being constituted by baptism. 
Baptism constituted the civil personhood of the individual, and those who were 
excommunicated or not baptised had practically no civil rights. Although humanity 
was strictly divided into two groups (Christians and heathens) the Papal Revolution 
placed the individual in the centre of the legal system and laid the groundwork for 
human rights (Huber, 1996b:137–138; 2001h:13). 
 
Huber (1996b:138; 2001h:14) understands the Reformation as a third stage. As the 
Reformation emphasised the legitimacy and specific influence of both worldly and 
churchly powers, it brought about an important dimension of societal secularisation. 
The result was that freedom of conscience and of religion became ingrained into the 
societal fabric.175 Huber (1996b:228–231) understands the Reformation to have 
radicalised movements that were already set in motion in Spain and Italy. The Italian 
humanists, for example, took up the biblical theme of humanity as created in the 
image of God, with philosophers like Count Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (1463–
1494) understanding humanity as corresponding to God, with unending opportunities 
to act upon (Huber, 1996b:228). The Spanish late-scholasticism of the first half of the 
16th century also played an important role in emphasising the equal dignity of all 
people (Huber, 1996b:229). This was especially due to the widening of the horizons 
of the Spanish brought about by the explorations of the 15th century.  
 
Questions regarding the integration of „non-European‟ persons into especially the 
theological frame of reference were of central importance for the initial development 
                                                             
175
 This egalitarian interpretation then also served as correction of the differentiation by Antiquity 
between dignitas and honor as two forms of human dignity (Huber, 1993a:151). Whereas dignitas 
referred to that which all humans share and which distinguishes them from animals, honor referred to 
the different abilities different people have and legitimised the resulting societal stratification. 
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of human rights.176 The consequence was dividing humanity into the categories of 
Christians/the civilised and heathen/the uncivilised, despite Pope Paul III‟s Papal bull 
Sublimis Deus, promulgated on the 2nd of June 1537, stating that the “Indians” are 
also “truly men”.177 A range of debates concerning the status of the „heathens‟ 
followed. Spanish philosopher-priests such as Francisco de Vitoria (also known as 
the „father of international law‟), Bartolomé de las Casas (1484–1566) and Francisco 
Suárez (1548–1617) focused on the sociable nature of human beings, by means of 
which they connected with humanity‟s rational capability, with which they proved that 
heathens were also fully human (Huber, 1996b:229; 2008b:40). 
 
The confessional wars that followed the Reformation led to a fourth stage. It became 
clear that religious convictions – especially when still used to partly legitimate legal 
systems – can lead to violence, which led theorists such as Grotius and Hobbes to 
argue for a legal system not based on God‟s existence and its confessional shaping. 
The era of legal positivism was inaugurated by the consequent conviction that the 
state itself should be the source of the legal system. As the power of the state 
increased, the need for counterbalances was increasingly articulated. Basic and civil 
rights were seen as the most important of these counterbalances, and they were 
programmatically formulated during the French and American revolutions (Huber, 
1996b:139; 2001h:15). 
 
The Enlightenment provided the foundational ideas for a fifth stage in this 
development. The discovery of human subjectivity and autonomy by the 
Enlightenment led – despite some of its questionable consequences – to the legal 
acceptance of the person as an autonomous legal subject.178  This stage can only be 
seen to have come to a conclusion in modern societies with the United Nations‟ 
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 Cf. e.g. Rolf Gröschner (ed.), Des Menschen Würde – entdeckt und erfunden im Humanismus der 
italienischen Renaissance (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008); Charles G. Nauert, Humanism and the 
culture of Renaissance Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); and Andre Chastel, 
The age of humanism: Europe 1480–1530 (London: Thames and Hudson, 1963).  
177
 “We, who, though unworthy, exercise on earth the power of our Lord and seek with all our might to 
bring those sheep of his flock who are outside into the fold committed to our charge, consider, 
however, that the Indians are truly men and that they are not only capable of understanding the 
Catholic Faith but, according to our information, they desire exceedingly to receive it.” 
178
 For the reception of human rights in societies influenced by other religious and cultural ideas than 
those that were responsible the concept of human rights Huber makes use of, cf. Irene Bloom, J. Paul 
Martin and Wayne L. Proudfoot (eds.), Religious diversity and human rights (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1996). 
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Universal Declaration of Human Rights that was accepted in 1948 (Huber, 
1996b:139; 2001h:15–16).179  
 
We have now seen how Huber understands the idea of freedom to have influenced 
developments of human rights, specifically by means of the concept of human 
dignity. Although modern societies are therefore described as „secular‟, the historical 
relationship between modernity and Christianity (in particular Protestantism) allows 
for analogies between human rights and human dignity. It was seen, for example, 
that the pre-statal character of human rights corresponds with the inalienable nature 
of communicative freedom and human dignity (cf. Huber, 1987:74; 1990c:29; 2004h; 
2004l; 2005w). In the following section this will be taken as background to 
understand Huber‟s suggestion for relating the importance of the individual in the 
concept of communicative freedom to the modern understanding of human rights.180  
 
2.2.3  Relating individual freedom to human rights 
In describing his view on how to relate Protestant theology to human rights Huber 
presents six arguments by means of which some of the largest ecclesial 
communities have sought to address this relationship (Huber, 1996b:246–249).181 
Firstly one finds an unwillingness to interact with the concept of human rights by 
means of theology. According to this viewpoint, the secular character of human 
rights is respected when theological resources are not employed to affirm and 
provide corrections. Such a position is possible – according to this argument – 
because human rationality is all that is needed to understand the logic and necessity 
of human rights. The result is, however, that the public character of Christian 
                                                             
179
 Huber (1996b:140–142; 2001h:16–18) then speculates whether one can identify a sixth stage. He 
regards the renewed discovery of the ambivalence of individualisation and its connection with the 
exploitation of nature and the worsening situation of the weakest members of society as reason 
enough to re-evaluate the view of the individual person in society. Specifically the connection between 
the individuality and sociality of the individual person is seen as a challenge that has to be faced. 
Within this context then he regards communicative freedom to make a contribution to the 
development of human rights, as it continues to emphasise the Gleichursprünglichkeit of human 
individuality and sociality. 
180
 For the development of the United Nations‟ Universal Declaration of Human rights, see Huber and 
Tödt‟s discussion in Menschenrechte: Prespektiven einer menschilchen Welt (1977:14–24). 
181
 Huber clearly does not aim to fully represent the diversity of each tradition he makes use of but 
uses broad generalisation of the ecclesial traditions to illustrate the lines of argumentation he wishes 
to highlight. 
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theology is denied, that the historical character of any catalogue of human rights is 
ignored and that humanity‟s rationality is overestimated (Huber, 1996b:246–247). 
 
The second form of argumentation is especially prevalent in Roman Catholic circles 
and applies a „double motivation‟ to understand the relation of individual freedom to 
human rights. Natural law is used as first motivation by deducing the status and 
worth of human beings from their status in nature itself. Since the Second Vatican 
Council the salvific argument won ground as second motivation, according to which 
the creation of humanity in God‟s image is indicative of humanity‟s worth, despite sin. 
Typical of this position is the Catholic connection between nature and grace, leading 
to two complementing arguments. Huber understands this typically Roman Catholic 
relationship between nature and grace to be problematic in this instance because it 
presupposes an overly optimistic view of human dignity, as the imago Dei seems not 
be influenced by sin. As was indicated above, Huber is of the opinion that human 
dignity is – as the case is with freedom – a relational concept that is perverted by sin 
but not destroyed, for it is God who initiates and maintains his relationship with 
humanity (Huber, 1996b:247).182 
 
In the Orthodox tradition, thirdly, one finds a strong focus on the sanctity of life. 
Consequently it is found deficient of a specific focus on human dignity and freedom. 
Rather than basing societal responsibility on the dignity and freedom each person 
has, the celebration of God‟s creative power leads to thankfulness that is realised by 
taking responsibility for life itself (Huber, 1996b:247). For Huber, the Orthodox 
position is not so much lacking in itself as it hinders the public participation of the 
church. 
 
Fourthly Huber (1996b:247–278) identifies a Reformed line of argumentation used to 
describe the relationship between human rights and human dignity. This line of 
argumentation uses God‟s righteousness as integrative concept. Because God‟s 
faithfulness concerns the whole of humanity, all people have inalienable dignity. Due 
to the universality of human rights they can be understood as the expression of 
God‟s faithfulness to his covenant with the whole of humanity. Therefore a culture of 
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 For a discussion of the relationship between modern Catholic theology and human rights, see 
Huber and Tödt, 1977:39–45. 
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human rights deserves the affirmation of Christianity. Huber criticises this line of 
argumentation for the way it confuses two distinctly different implications of God‟s 
covenant. God‟s election of humanity to form part of the covenant implies a passive 
acceptance of his graceful election. At the same time, however, his covenant 
requires obedience, also in the public sphere. Huber misses a nuanced use of God‟s 
righteousness and fears that this line of argumentation is a reduction of God‟s 
relationship with humanity. 
 
The functional theory of human rights, fifthly, equates the conviction of humanity‟s 
inalienable dignity with the Christian idea of justification of the sinner through God‟s 
grace. Huber‟s criticism against this line of argumentation is that it can be a too 
modernistic treatment of the theme (Huber, 1996b:248). Making use of this 
Reformational doctrine is in itself not wrong – Huber himself makes extensive use of 
this doctrine to motivate the Christian view on human dignity – but it can be used 
only to confirm modernist ideas concerning human rights and human dignity and 
does not allow for a critical distance. Huber criticises this type of argumentation. 
 
Lastly, Huber presents his own suggestion. Huber (1996b:248; Huber & Tödt, 
1977:162–175) uses two terms to typify his argument, namely „analogy‟ and 
„difference‟ (Entsprechung or Analogie und Differenz), where a triad of concepts – 
freedom, equality and participation – forms the basis for the relationship between his 
understanding of human dignity and human rights. 
 
2.2.3.1  Huber‟s argument: Analogy and difference 
Huber (1996b:248) is of the opinion that any attempt at considering the relationship 
between human rights and human dignity within Christianity should take into account 
continuities without diminishing critical distance. In opposition to attempts at 
deducing human rights directly from Christian truths, Huber wants to respect the 
secular character of human rights, despite the Christian contribution to its formation. 
Human rights are therefore 
 
a human, generally accessible concept, which one can accept without 
presupposing Christian notions. One can nevertheless ... appreciate it 
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anew by deciphering its value and meaning theologically. This enables 
one to identify which tendencies pertaining to human rights are required of 
Christians, and which tendencies should be rejected (Huber & Tödt, 
1977:162).183 
 
Huber is of the opinion that the concept of human rights in the first instance is aimed 
at protecting the individual person‟s position in society, as was seen in the 
discussion of its development (Huber, 1996b:248). The way in which it is done is by 
ensuring the freedom, equality and right to participation of all people. Huber regards 
these three concepts to form the basic structure of human rights, and he regards this 
triad as keeping the individual and social elements of human rights intact. Already in 
Menschenrechte (1977), which he co-authored with Heinz Eduard Tödt, Huber sets 
out this model of analogy and difference, of which he makes use especially in 
Gerechtigkeit und Recht (1996b) again. 
 
The modern understanding of human rights essentially implies freedom as an inborn 
human quality. It can be neither under the control of the state nor of society itself and 
forms a constitutive part of the individual person. Therefore the concept of human 
rights cannot be invalidated by its vulnerability to systemic manipulation (Huber & 
Tödt, 1977:163). Here the analogy with communicative freedom, as it was discussed 
in the previous chapter, is clear. Communicative freedom also has the inalienability 
of human dignity as assumption. It diverges from human rights, however, as 
communicative freedom was shown to be grounded in God‟s grace and therefore 
differs significantly from a „stoic-idealistic‟ interpretation of dignity, which understands 
freedom as the human ability to be at one‟s own disposal.  
 
Freedom is therefore not a naive „free freedom‟ (freie Freiheit) but always has the 
character of „liberated freedom‟ (befreite Freiheit) as God renews the gift of freedom 
by liberating the individual person from the power of sin (Huber & Tödt, 1977:163) 
and in this sense calls people to one another (cf. again Huber,  1985:118; 1990d:60). 
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 “Für eine derartige theologische Interpretation bleibt die Menschenrechtsidee ein humaner, 
allgemein zugänglicher Gedanke, den man ohne die Voraussetzung des christlichen Glaubens 
akzeptieren könnte. Dennoch kann man auf diese Weise, wie wir meinen, den Gehalt und Sinn des 
Menschenrechtsgedankens theologisch ein Stück weit entschlüsseln und so neu würdigen. Dadurch 
gewinnt man Kriterien, die zur Urteilsbildung darüber beitragen, welche Tendenzen in der 
Menschenrechtsentwicklung von Christen gefördert, welche abgewiesen sollten.” 
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Christ‟s incarnation, death and resurrection enable the renewal of freedom, and 
God‟s liberation therefore binds the individual person to Christ. The way in which 
Christ brought about liberation shapes the freedom to which the person is liberated, 
as was seen in Huber‟s interpretation of Paul and Luther (cf. also Huber & Tödt, 
1977:164). The liberated freedom brought about by Christ does not initiate a closed 
relationship between God and the individual person but opens up the individual to 
the fundamental relationality of human nature. 
 
Whereas communicative freedom agrees with the inalienability of personal freedom 
implied by human rights, its motivation for the agreement excludes individualising 
tendencies. For Huber, the subversiveness of Jesus‟ message and the connection 
between his teaching and its political repercussions are of paradigmatic importance 
in this regard (Huber, 1987:15).184 On a different level, consequently, the freedom of 
conscience acknowledged by human rights allows for the expression of religion and 
requires the public participation of religious communities in order to legitimate 
concepts such as human rights (cf. Huber, 1985:211; 2006x). Confessing to 
Christian freedom consequently requires the freedoms of expression and of religion 
(Huber & Tödt, 1977:164) without being dependent on these freedoms for realising 
the freedom of faith (cf. Luther, cited in Huber, 1999:170: Huber & Tödt, 1977:165). 
 
The method of analogy and difference is therefore aimed neither at an unqualified 
approval nor at a disapproval of human rights but aims to engage the differences 
and analogies in a nuanced way, as was seen by means of communicative freedom. 
The second element of the triad is equality, and it presents the same structuring 
relationship. In the first part of this section it was seen that God‟s bestowal of 
freedom on all implies a radical and critical form of equality, which is also expressed 
by human rights (Huber & Tödt, 1977:166; cf. 1996b:173). In Galatians 3:26–29, for 
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 In Protestantismus und Protest Huber states memorably, “[Die Kirche] vergißt, daß sie sich zu 
einem Herr bekennt, der als Aufrührer hingerichtet wurde. Die Nachricht, daß sein Reich nicht von 
dieser Welt sei, war keineswegs ein Abschied von „dieser Welt‟, sondern politisch höchst folgenreich: 
ein respektloser Hinweis auf die Grenzen aller politischen Herrschaft. ... Vielmehr ist der christliche 
Glaube so politisch, wie er persönlich ist. Er betrifft die äußeren Lebensverhältnisse, wie er das 
Innere der Menschen verwandelt. Er hat es mit dem Frieden der Staaten ebenso zu tun wie mit dem 
Frieden der Herzen. Denn er betrifft den ganzen Menschen. ... Die Kirche kann und darf also nicht 
verschweigen, daß ihr Bekenntnis zu dem Mann am Kreuz Anstoß erregt und Ärger macht. Von 
diesem Bekenntnis hat die Alternative zwischen persönlicher Frömmigkeit und politischer 
Verantwortung keinen Bestand. Glaube und Politik gehören zusammen” (Huber, 1987:15). 
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example, the Christian understanding of equality is founded on the constitutive 
relationship, namely the relationship God initiates “through Christ”. The result is that 
Paul can state that there is therefore no longer “Jew or Greek, there is no longer 
slave or free, there is no longer male and female; for all of you are one in Christ 
Jesus”. The act of baptism serves to testify to the equality given by Christ in order to 
be realised in relationship (Huber & Tödt, 1977:167).185 In other words, the difference 
between equality according to its Christian understanding and equality in human 
rights is that in society it is secured legally, whereas in the Christian understanding it 
is grounded in God‟s love (Huber & Tödt, 1977:167). 
 
Again the Gleichursprünglichkeit of human individuality and sociality motivates the 
analogy in such a way as to indicate where the boundaries lie (Huber, 1996c:106). 
When equality is implemented in a totalitarian way (Huber, 1999:189) at the expense 
of individual freedom, the analogy has reached its boundaries (cf. also Huber & Tödt, 
1977:166). Both human rights and communicative freedom therefore imply radical 
equality, but it is expressed in different ways. 
 
The last element of the triad that keeps human rights intact and serves to illustrate 
Huber‟s method of analogy and difference is that of participation. As was seen in the 
discussion of Tödt‟s work (cf. Tödt, 1988:199ff), this element of the triad integrates 
freedom and equality by necessitating the concretisation of human rights. Built on 
the equal possibility for all to utilise and develop their unique abilities the realisation 
of participation will therefore always imply the constructive tension between freedom 
and equality (Huber & Tödt, 1977:169). 
 
Regarding participation the analogy is also not complete but is characterised by the 
specific features of the Protestant understanding of participation. This difference – 
although not necessarily fundamental – between the Christian view on participation 
and the way in which it functions in human rights is that the Christian view uses 
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 In Kirche in der Zeitenwende Huber describes baptism as follows: “[Die Taufe] eignet dem 
Menschen also diejenige Freiheit zu, die durch keine seiner eigenen Taten erworben oder endgültig 
verloren werden kann. Sie verbürgt denjenigen gnädigen, tröstlichen Bund Gottes mit jedem 
Menschen, durch den die gesamte Lebensgeschichte unter das Urteil der göttlichen Barmherzigkeit 
tritt. Sie eignet dem Menschen Freiheit von der Sünde zu, wie sie unter den Bedingungen irdischer 
Existenz nur durch die tägliche Absage an die Sünde beantwortet werden kann, weil sie sich erst in 
der Zukunft Gottes in ihrer vollen Herrlichkeit zeigen wird” (1999:143). 
107 
 
participation as an integrative concept, which allows for individuality, sociality, 
relationality, service and responsibility to be placed in close conceptual proximity to 
one another, whereas participation in human rights has a more pragmatic character. 
 
Huber and Tödt (1977:170) express the Protestant connection between freedom and 
equality by means of their understanding of the church. The church is a community 
of equals who are called to serve one another and the world with their different gifts 
to illustrate the Christian understanding of participation. Paul can therefore say in 1 
Corinthians 12:4 that it is “the same Spirit” through whom different gifts are given, 
and that these gifts different individuals have are for the “common good” (12:7), for 
the church is “one body” with “many members” (12:12). Consequently, if “one 
member suffers, all suffer together with it; if one member is honoured, all rejoice 
together with it” (12:26). Participation therefore has the potential of integrating the 
individual and social elements of being human in a very effective way. 
 
2.3  The responsibility of the free individual 
 
In Chapter 1 it was shown that the personal character of communicative freedom 
connects human individuality and sociality, for communicative freedom also means 
„being there for others‟ as communicative freedom is grounded in the liberation 
brought about by Christ‟s self-sacrifice (Huber, 1985:118, 173). In this regard 
Luther‟s double thesis was used to illustrate that self-limitation for the sake of others 
does not limit freedom but serves as its expression (Huber, 1999:170). Realising 
communicative freedom therefore implies taking responsibility before God for the 
wellbeing of one‟s neighbours (Huber, 1990a:143–144). 
 
In the first part of Chapter 2 the way in which this understanding of freedom engages 
the importance of the individual within modernity is investigated. In the previous 
section the way in which communicative freedom engages the centrality of the 
individual by means of the rights guaranteed by modernity was investigated. In this 
section, the way in which communicative freedom engages the duties implied by 
some of the rights of modernity will be investigated (cf. Huber & Tödt, 1977:106–
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113).186  This investigation will be conducted by means of the connection between 
freedom and responsibility made by communicative freedom. Of basic importance is 
that the concept of communicative freedom does not separate „rights‟ from „duties‟ 
but it regards serving one‟s neighbour as the expression of freedom.187 
 
In the first part the contributions of Max Weber, Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Hans Jonas 
will be investigated in order to understand why Huber regards an ethic of 
responsibility as necessary. The second part will focus on how Huber relates 
communicative freedom to such an ethic.188 
 
2.3.1  Describing the need for responsibility 
In his important article “Sozialethik als Verantwortungsethik” (1990a:136–157) Huber 
programmatically motivates the need for the freedom of modernity to be realised in 
an ethic of responsibility, especially by means of Max Weber‟s diagnosis of 
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 Concerning the duties and responsibilities connected with democratic rights, cf. e.g. Patrick 
Hayden and Chamsy el-Ojelli (eds.), Confronting globalization: Humanity, justice, and the renewal of 
politics (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); Mary Anne Warren, Moral status: Obligations to 
persons and other living things (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Carol C. Gould, Globalizing 
democracy and human rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); and April Carter and 
Geoffrey Stokes (eds.), Democratic theory today: Challenges for the 21
st
 century (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 2002). For studies in this regard more concentrated on the southern African context, cf. Peris 
Jones and Kristian Stokke (eds.), Democratising development: The politics of socio-economic rights in 
South Africa (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2005); Sid Noel (ed.), From power sharing to democracy: Post-
conflict institutions in ethnically divided societies (Montréal: McGill-Queen‟s University Press, 2005); 
and Kristina Bentley, Whose right is it anyway? Equality, culture and conflicts of rights in South Africa 
(Cape Town: HSRC Publishers, 2003). 
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 The way in which Huber develops individual freedom within an ethic of responsibility can also be 
understood as his reaction to modern processes of individualisation that harm life in community. He 
regards the limits of individualisation, for example, as its erosion of the communal handing-over of 
values and worldview that is important for taking in one‟s place in society (1999:90). The result is – 
especially in self-declared modern societies – the emergence of a so-called patchwork identity 
(1999:88). As individualisation leads to the weakening of the influence of old institutions, people 
increasingly have to rely on their own ability to integrate especially the representation of reality by the 
mass media. The reality is an often-contradictory patchwork reality, which necessarily leads to the 
formation of patchwork identities (1999:88–89). Concerning patchwork identities, cf. also Heiner 
Keupp, Thomas Ahbe, Wolfgang Gmür, Renate Höfer, Beate Mitzscherlich, Wolfgang Kraus, Florian 
Straus, Identitätskonstruktionen: Das Patchwork der Identitäten in der Spätmoderne (Reinbek bei 
Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1999). See also Stephan Pfürtner‟s article in honour of Huber, “Virtuelle Welt und 
Naturerfahrung. Zur ethischen und religiöson Seite eines Beziehungsverlustes” (in Reuter, H-R., 
Bedford-Strohm, H., Kuhlmann, H. & Lütcke, K-H. (eds.), Freiheit verantworten: Festschrift für 
Wolfgang Huber zum 60. Geburtstag. Gütersloh: Kaiser, Gütersloher Verl. Haus, 2002:491–503). 
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 For a study outlining the broad movements of the development of Protestant ethics, cf. Christofer 
Frey, Die Ethik des Protestantismus von der Reformation bis zur Gegenwart (2
nd
 ed., Gütersloh: 
Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1994). 
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society.189 He integrates Weber‟s diagnosis with those of Dietrich Bonhoeffer and the 
philosopher Hans Jonas in order to formulate his own position. 
 
Weber’s work on the development of ethics is generally known for the seemingly 
rigid distinction between an ethic of conviction (Gesinnungsethik) and an ethic of 
responsibility (Verantwortungsethik) he articulated, notably in the lecture “Politik als 
Beruf” he delivered in 1919 (Huber, 1990a:138).190 Whereas an ethic of conviction 
employs the intention of actions as the basis for ethical decision making, in an ethic 
of responsibility the possible consequences of actions form the basis of ethical 
decision making. When generalised, it means that one‟s own good intentions are of 
primary importance in an ethic of conviction, and being willing to take responsibility 
for the consequences of one‟s actions is of primary importance in an ethic of 
responsibility. 
 
Huber (1990a:139) regards this distinction in Weber‟s work as generalising and 
failing to recognise its broader frame of reference, namely Weber‟s understanding of 
the development of ethics. Already in the lecture “Politik als Beruf” Weber stated that 
an ethic of conviction does not imply a lack of responsibility and an ethic of 
responsibility does not imply a lack of conviction. These two modes of ethical 
decision making can be understood as stages in the development of ethics and can 
therefore be seen to complement one another (Huber, 1990a:139–140).191 
 
For Weber, the Reformation signifies the transition from an ethic of laws 
(Gesetzesethik) to an ethic of conviction (Huber, 1990a:140). The former was 
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 For the possible role of and ethic of responsibility in South Africa, see “The ethics of responsibility: 
Human rights in South Africa” by Barney Pityana (in Bonhoeffer for a new day: Theology in a time of 
transition, edited by John de Gruchy, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997:209–219). 
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 Cf. Wolfgang Schluchter (ed.), Max Webers Sicht des okzidentalen Christentums: Interpretation 
und Kritik (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1988). Cf. also Sung Ho Kim, Max Weber’s politics of civil 
society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); David J. Chalcraft (ed.), The protestant ethic 
debate: Max Weber’s replies to his critics (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2001); Roger 
Brubaker, The limits of rationality: An essay on the social and moral thought of Max Weber (London: 
Allen & Unwin, 1984); and Stephen P. Turner, Max Weber and the dispute over reason and value: a 
study in philosophy, ethics and politics (London: Routledge, 1984). 
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 In 1987:79–80 Huber identifies this connection even in the qualities necessary for politics Weber 
identifies in this lecture: “[die] Leidenschaft für eine „Sache‟; [das] Verantwortungsgefühl für die 
betroffenen Menschen und die voraussehbaren Folgen; und schließlich [das] Augenmaß, daß die 
großen politischen Ziele durch das „starke langsame bohren von harten Brettern‟ in das jeweils 
erreichbare umsetzt.” Already the passion for a cause and the commitment to grand aims illustrate the 
inadequacy of a rigid distinction between an ethic of conviction and an ethic of responsibility.  
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characterised by detailed sets of laws, which gave direction for specific situations. In 
terms of power relations this ethic was kept intact by extra-personal authority 
(Fremdzwang). An ethic of conviction, however, marked the transition from 
heteronomy to autonomy. The Reformation brought about a turn to the recognition of 
the individual conscience, which was built on the rediscovery of God‟s gracious 
justification of the sinner. General principles, rather than specific rules, now started 
to form the basis of ethics and corresponded with the newfound respect for the 
individual conscience. 
 
The Enlightenment took these impulses further, and especially the individual 
person‟s autonomy grew in importance. Characteristic of the ethic of conviction is 
Kant‟s categorical imperative, “Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at 
the same time will that it should become a universal law.”192 Because Kant 
understood ethics as ethics of freedom and that it should correspond with the 
autonomy of the individual, he consistently separated principles from the contexts 
within which they can function (Huber, 1985:114). He regarded the reflection on the 
broader frameworks within which ethics function – for example societal institutions – 
as the prerogative not of morality but of legality. In this context he formulated his lex 
iustitiae as follows: “Enter a condition in which what belongs to each can be secured 
to him/her against everyone else” (Huber, 1985 114). 
 
After the Enlightenment, Weber regarded ethics as making another significant 
transition, namely from an ethic of conviction to an ethic of responsibility. The 
primary difference between these two modes of ethical decision making is the move 
from the simple use of ethical principles to a reflexive use thereof. Freedom of 
conscience led to the pluralising of society and of ethical convictions in particular, 
which again led to the simple use of principles not being sufficient. It became 
necessary to include the freedom of conscience of the other in one‟s own process of 
ethical decision making. Therefore it became increasingly difficult not to include the 
possible consequences of one‟s own actions in the decision-making process, as it 
forms the basis of the reflexive use of one‟s own ethical principles (Huber, 
1990a:140).  
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 “Handle so, daß die Maxime deines Willens jederzeit zugleich als Prinzip einer allgemeinen 
Gesetzgebung gelten können.” 
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It is therefore clear why Huber is of the opinion that generalising Weber‟s work as if 
he meant an ethic of conviction and an ethic of responsibility to exclude one another 
does not reflect his own intention, and neither does it reflect the complexity of ethical 
decision making. Huber states, “Ethics ... always has to answer the question as to 
how specific principles can be realised in the context of certain conditions, and which 
risks should be taken into account” (Huber, 1990a:139).193 
 
Although Huber uses Weber‟s description of the development of ethical thinking, he 
regards Bonhoeffer’s description of the socio-theoretical developments that 
necessitated an ethic of responsibility and his development of the meaning of 
responsibility in this context as particularly helpful (Huber, 1990a:143–145).194 
Bonhoeffer was of the opinion that the abstractions that were prevalent in both the 
ethics of laws and of conviction were shown to be insufficient. An isolated individual, 
removed from broader social contexts and in the position to be orientated by the 
absolute good, formed the basis of these modes of ethical decision making. For 
Bonhoeffer, as for Huber, however, any type of ethic is always social ethics too 
(Huber, 1990a:143). The concept „social ethics‟ is not a subdivision of ethics but a 
perspective in terms of which all forms of ethics function (Huber, 1985:115).  
 
For Bonhoeffer, practising ethics meant asking what the „good‟ means in the context 
of a specific historical situation. Its focus, therefore, is not the individual way of life as 
such but its contribution to the formation of a specific historical moment in time. 
Huber formulates this perspective in terms of his understanding of ethics as the 
freedom to life: “Christian freedom should not only be interpreted as understanding 
the purpose of the individual‟s individuality, but its meaning for societal institutions is 
of equal importance” (Huber, 1985:115).195 
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 “[E]thik [steht] immer vor der Frage, wie bestimmte Handlungsprinzipien in einem Zusammenhang 
von Handlungsbedingungen zur Geltung gebracht werden können und welche Risiken dabei zu 
beachten sind.” 
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 For a discussion on Bonhoeffer‟s ethics, and in particular the role of responsibility, cf. Tödt‟s 
Authentic faith: Bonhoeffer’s theological ethics in context (translated by David Stassen and Ilse Tödt, 
Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2007). Cf. also Gunter M. Prüller-Jagenteufel, Befreit zur Verantwortung: 
Sünde und Versöhnung in der Ethik Dietrich Bonhoeffers (Münster: Lit, 2004) and for a more general 
discussion Stephen E. Fowls and L. Gregory Jones, Reading in communion: Scripture and ethics in 
Christian life (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1991). 
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 “Christliche Freiheit ist nicht allein als Bestimmung der Person in ihrer Individualität und 
Innerlichkeit auszulegen, sondern sie ist zugleich auszulegen in ihrer Bedeutung für den Bereich 
gesellschaftlicher Institutionen.” 
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Secondly, Bonhoeffer clarified what he understood as the content of responsibility. 
As was already indicated in the section concerning Bonhoeffer, he identified two 
points of reference: responsibility before (Verantwortung vor) and responsibility for 
(Verantwortung für) (Huber, 1990a:143–144). He regards responsibility before God 
as the basic form of responsibility. Christian existence is characterised by an answer 
structure: Due to God‟s gracious liberation, Christian existence in its totality can be 
understood as a joyous answer to this liberation. The way in which liberation was 
brought about reveals a basic truth about life itself and has implications for how 
responsibility for others is undertaken. 
 
Responsibility for others therefore flows from the responsibility before God. 
Bonhoeffer developed responsibility Christologically as “the combined totality and 
unity in answer to the reality given to us through Christ” (Huber, 1990a:144).196 
Because Christ brought about this reality by means of his life and death, 
responsibility also concerns life and death and not simply particular situations or 
principles. And because Christ‟s life and death were characterised by substitutionary 
action, Christian responsibility for others should also be characterised by substitution 
(Huber, 1990a:144). Verantwortung für should therefore be characterised by the 
willingness for substitutionary action (Stellvertretung), and Verantwortung vor should 
be characterised by the answer structure of life. 
 
Although an ethic of responsibility is characterised by its reflexive use of principles, 
Bonhoeffer adds an important moment of one-sidedness in the concept of 
substitutionary action. Responsibility therefore includes the willingness to take over 
the guilt of others and risking a responsible act without expecting reciprocity, for 
Bonhoeffer shows reciprocity not to be the presupposition for responsible actions 
(Huber, 1990a:144–145). Totalitarian tendencies are averted as the Verantwortung 
für is kept in balance by the Verantwortung vor [Gott]. God‟s liberation leads to 
thankful service and comprises the whole of the life of the individual, to the extent of 
taking on the guilt of others and attempting to take the place of Jesus‟ „lesser 
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 “Verantwortung meint „die zusammengefaßte Ganzheit und Einheit der Antwort auf die uns in 
Christus gegebene Wirklichkeit‟.” 
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brothers‟197. Taking responsibility for others is therefore the result of living in 
responsibility to God, which prevents totalitarian tendencies. 
 
This is in stark contrast to the one-sidedness present in the ethic of responsibility of 
Jonas.198 He understands responsibility as a relationship directed by power and in 
which reciprocity plays virtually no role. Jonas can therefore speak of the „totality‟ of 
responsibility (Huber, 1990a:147; 1999:183). The willingness to take substitutionary 
action is aimed at creating reciprocal commitments (Huber, 1999:184), which causes 
the moment of one-sidedness to be put in service of reciprocity and indeed the 
reflexive use of principles. Huber explains the danger of a totalitarian ethic of 
responsibility as the result of being unwilling to include the ultimate responsibility of 
the individual, namely responsibility towards God (Huber, 1990a:147). When the 
ethical frame of reference is confined to human existence and it is not placed in the 
basic relationality that enables this reality, an ethic of responsibility will always be 
endangered by totalising tendencies. 
 
However, Huber does also take up important elements of Jonas‟s understanding of 
responsibility. Unlike Weber and Bonhoeffer, Jonas takes the technological 
advances of modernity as starting point for his ethic of responsibility (Huber, 
1990a:145). By means of its own possibility it is possible for humanity to destroy 
itself or to exploit and endanger nature to an extent that was up to now not possible. 
This is a situation with which ethics has never been confronted, and it necessitates 
important changes in ethical thinking. Jonas consequently proposes two changes in 
ethical thinking. 
 
Firstly, ethics must include the possible consequences that actions carried out in the 
present may have. This means that the future must be included in the process of 
ethical decision making. Jonas changes Kant‟s categorical imperative in order to 
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 Cf. Matthew 25:40: “Truly I tell you, just as you did it to one of the least of these who are members 
of my family, you did it to me” (NRSV). 
198
 For a helpful collection of essays on Jonas‟s work, see Ethik für die Zukunft: Im Diskurs mit Hans 
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include the new possibilities of self-destruction technology has brought about to the 
following: “Act in such a way that the consequences of your action comply with 
permanent and genuine human life on earth”199 (cited in Huber, 1990a:206). This 
means that actions of which the potential consequences can endanger permanent 
and genuine human existence on earth should be abandoned rather than risked. 
Huber identifies two objections to Jonas‟s new categorical imperative (Huber, 
1990a:206).  
 
The first concerns the anthropocentrism of this principle: An ethic of responsibility 
should protect not only permanent and genuine human life on earth but also the 
existence and worth of nature itself. The whole of God‟s creation is worthy of 
protection, not simply humanity. Huber‟s second objection is that the meaning of 
genuine human existence is by no means clear. It could be argued that such an 
imperative can disregard the freedom of future generations by deciding on their 
behalf what kind of reality they should want to choose. Huber proposes that future 
generations should rather be allowed at least at much freedom as current 
generations have. This he understands to correspond with the dignity of those 
generations better than attempting to determine the meaning of „genuine‟ human life. 
 
According to Jonas the second change necessary for ethical thinking to progress is 
departing from of its anthropological optimism. He gives three reasons for this, 
namely that human nature is not static but fluid, the recognition of what is right is not 
simple, maybe impossible in some instances, and the consequences of human 
actions are not always predictable anymore (Jonas, 1988:15). The title of his book 
already signifies the need for this change: In opposition to Ernst Bloch‟s Das Prinzip 
Hoffnung he entitled his book Das Prinzip Verantwortung, in order to situate his 
ethical project in the reality of human existence. He wants to take the ambiguity of 
human existence seriously (Huber, 1990a:146).200 
 
                                                             
199
 “Handle so, daß die Wirkungen deiner Handlung verträglich sind mit dir Permanenz echten 
menschlichen Lebens auf Erden.” 
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 It is insightful to note that, as a Jew, Jonas was deeply conscious of the human propensity to 
failure. The Second World War plays an important role in his thought, theoretically and personally, as 
his mother was killed in Auschwitz‟s gas chambers. In this regard he published the book Der 
Gottesbegriff nach Auschwitz: eine jüdische Stimme (1987, Franfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp). 
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After this investigation of how Huber understands the thought of Weber, Bonhoeffer 
and Jonas in motivating the need for an ethic of responsibility, the researcher will 
turn to the contribution communicative freedom can make to the discussion. This will 
especially enable one to gain a better understanding of the responsibility 
communicative freedom implies and how it engages the individual‟s role in modern 
societies. 
 
2.3.2  Communicative freedom as the integration of freedom and 
 responsibility 
The concept of communicative freedom reveals the close connection between 
freedom and responsibility in Christianity and in this sense also affirms the 
connection between human rights and duty made by modernity. In Chapter 1 it was 
shown that the concept consistently deconstructs individualised (Huber, 1992a:115; 
1996c:61) and privatised (Huber, 1992:115) views of freedom by constructing a 
relational understanding of freedom (Huber, 1985:211). This basic relationality is 
consistently shown to be grounded by God by means of Christ‟s substitutionary 
death (Huber, 2007b). The way in which this fundamental relationality is constituted 
characterises the way in which freedom is to be realised. Substitutionary love and 
service form the basis of this freedom (Huber, 1990a:144). In other words, one can 
say that an understanding of freedom that is grounded in the notion of God will 
include respect for the lives of others (Huber, 1999:221).201 
 
Luther‟s double thesis was shown to be one of the most influential articulations of 
communicative freedom: Only the liberated person is truly able to serve freely202. 
Individualisation does not follow the liberation of the individual conscience, but the 
“resurrection of the conscience” (Huber, 1987:62) enables a true openness to others. 
It was also shown that Luther picked up these impulses from Paul: Using freedom as 
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 It is interesting to note that the recent discussion on an ethic of responsibility is focused on its 
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 “Ein Christenmensch ist ein freier Herr über alle Dinge und niemanden untertan. Ein 
Christenmensch ist dienstbarer Knecht aller Dinge und jedermann untertan.” 
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“an opportunity for self-indulgence” contradicts its essence, for liberation implies the 
freedom to “become slaves to one another [through love]” (Galatians 5:13). 
 
When considering how the individual should realise the freedom bestowed by God, it 
becomes clear that the responsible realisation thereof in community is an inviolable 
premise of communicative freedom. The double-relationality of freedom (freedom 
constituted in God‟s relationship to humanity and realised in relationships with 
others) consequently corresponds with the two areas of reference Bonhoeffer 
identified as „responsibility before‟ and „responsibility for‟ (Huber, 1990a:143). As was 
shown, responsibility before God prevents the ethic that flows from Christian 
freedom to be totalised (Huber, 1999:183) or individualised (Huber, 1985:115). 
Taking responsibility for others means respecting the dignity and freedom of 
conscience of others (Huber, 1990a:247) and includes the willingness for 
substitutionary action (e.g. Huber, 2007k)203. 
 
Although communicative freedom affirms the inalienable dignity of the individual it 
does not advance the separation of people but calls people to one another. The 
concept communicative freedom therefore gives expression to the fact that freedom 
is by definition to be realised in a responsible manner. Such an ethic is characterised 
by the possibility of self-limitation (Huber, 1990a:193–194; 1990a:204–207; 
1990b:243–246; 1993b:70–81; 1999:210–215).204 Huber‟s understanding of self-
limitation differs significantly from traditional understandings of self-control, where 
the primary concern is one‟s relationship with oneself. Self-limitation in the sense 
Huber uses it neither means one‟s „soul‟ controlling one‟s „body‟ (as Aristotle 
understood it); nor does it mean the individual‟s ability to lead an autonomous life (an 
idea that gained momentum during the Enlightenment). In the Protestant sense self-
limitation concerns not only the individual person but at the same time the 
relationship with other people and with God (Huber, 1999:213). Self-limitation can 
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 Huber delivered this significant recent speech entitled “Dietrich Bonhoeffer – ein evangelischer 
Heiliger?” (2007k) on Bonhoeffer in Rome and again put strong emphasis on the role of 
Stellvertretung (substitutionary action) in his work. 
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 The article “Die Verbindlichkeit der Freiheit: Über das Verhältnis von Verbindlichkeit und Freiheit in 
der evangelischen Ethik” is one of the infrequent instances where Huber (1993b:70–81) develops 
„self-limitation‟ (Selbstbegrenzung) as the „binding character‟ (Verbindlichkeit) of freedom.  
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therefore be understood as the “voluntarily holding back for the sake of others” 
(Huber, 1999:214).205 
 
Some ethicists have attempted to suggest criteria by means of which self-limitation 
can be enacted, notably Jonas (cf. e.g. Huber, 1990a:206). He is of the opinion that 
when the possibilities that technological progress brings about are taken into 
account, actions should be directed by a heuristic of fear. In accordance with his 
conviction that ethics should revise its anthropological optimism he is of the opinion 
that the human ability to destroy cannot be underestimated. Huber, however, prefers 
to use „concern‟ (Betroffenheit) as criterion (Huber, 1990a:152–154). Huber regards 
concern as criterion for self-limitation within an ethics of responsibility as having 
three areas of reference, namely the disempowered members of society, future 
generations and nature (Huber, 1990a:154).  
 
In different ways one finds these criteria for self-limitation in Huber‟s work. In Konflikt 
und Konsens (1990a), for example, Huber lays strong emphasis on the protection of 
nature (1990a:176–194; 208–235) as he also does in Friedensethik (1990b:243ff), 
Die tägliche Gewalt (1993a:150–184) and Kirche in der Zeitenwende (1999:210–
222). He consistently connects self-limitation with regard to nature with the concern 
for future life on earth, notably in the articles “Fortschrittsglaube und 
Schöpfungsgedanke. Überlegungen zur Verantwortung der Wissenschaft” 
(1990a:195–207) and “„Nur wer die Schöpfung liebt, kann sie retten.‟ 
Naturzerstörung und Schöpfungsglaube” (1990a: 176–194) in Konflikt und Konsens 
and the section “Freiheit im Verhältnis zur Natur” in Kirche in der Zeitenwende 
(1999:210–214). 
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 Huber applies the logic of self-limitation within an ethic of responsibility notably to the responsibility 
of scientists. In the light of the profound influence research in the natural sciences has on 
technological progress and consequently on society itself, Huber most emphatically argues for an 
ethic of self-limitation in the context of the natural sciences. His argument is that science needs to be 
orientated by principles other than „truth‟ (Huber, 1990a:205). Although the search for truth should 
stay an important value for the sciences, humanity‟s ability to change the natural environment, and 
indeed to destroy it, may not be left uncalculated anymore (Huber, 1990b:244). Human abilities have 
changed dramatically: Humanity is now in a position to endanger life itself. This implies that self-
limitation cannot be understood as the limitation of freedom but indeed as ensuring that freedom stays 
possible (Huber, 1999:216). Therefore self-limitation requires consciously distinguishing between 
what humanity is able to do and what humanity should be allowed to do (Huber, 1990b:245). 
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In Huber‟s view, responsibility is not in contradiction to communicative freedom and 
the importance of the individual, but serves as its expression. In this sense 
communicative freedom engages the central position of the individual in modernity 
critically by means of its integration of freedom, human dignity and responsibility into 
one concept. It can therefore be said that by means of communicative freedom the 
central importance the individual is given within modernity is affirmed. This is, 
however, a qualified affirmation, for freedom is not understood as disconnecting 
individuals from one another, but as it is grounded in relationality it enables persons 
to realise their freedom in service to one another. 
 
 
3.  MODERN SOCIETY: THE SPACE FOR THE 
 REALISATION OF  FREEDOM 
 
3.1  Introduction 
 
In the previous section it was shown that the concept of communicative freedom 
critically affirms one of the most characteristic features of modernity, namely the 
central importance of the individual person. In this section the researcher turns to 
how communicative freedom engages the organisation of human sociality in modern 
societies. Generally, this arrangement can be described as the institutional 
measures that are set by modern societies in order to enable the constructive and 
peaceful co-existence of different individuals (cf. Beck, Bonß, & Kieserling, 
2001:20).206 
 
It should be noted that in his engagement of the different dimensions of the 
corporate dimension of modernity, Huber does not give one systematic account of 
what he understands as the most significant characteristics of modern societies. It is 
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 Ulrich Beck makes use of the term „transnational states‟ to refer to what here is broadly called 
modern societies. With this concept Beck affirms globalisation, the archaic nature of the use of 
„nation-state‟ by classic modernity and also that the state continues to be an indispensable part of 
global politics (Beck, 1997a:183–192). Beck describes the transnational state as follows (Beck, 
1997a:184): “Gegen die Denkblockaden des nationalstaatlichen Politikmonopols und die 
Horrorvorstellungen eines imperialen Weltstaates, dessen Machtanspruch nicht zu entrinnen wäre, ist 
diese Reformulierung und Reformation des internationalen politischen Raums gerichtet, die eine 
komplexe Architektur von Souveränität und Identität ermöglicht.” 
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possible, though, to systematise his engagement by means of three characteristics, 
namely secularisation, democracy and pluralism. 
 
3.2  The secularisation of society 
 
Huber (e.g. in 1996b:30–40) engages the secularity and continued secularisation of 
modernity in a number of ways.207 His engagement of the theme is characterised by 
the dominance of his juridical interpretation of secularisation (cf. Huber, 
1999:42ff).208 He understands secularisation, in the first instance, as the process of 
separating worldly and religious authority from one another, therewith creating the 
space for the free co-existence of different groups and individuals.209 He 
understands Grotius‟s famous dictum, namely that the legal system should function 
as if there is no God (etsi deus non daretur), as one of the first and most succinct 
descriptions of the essence of secularisation.210 
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 This is an important theme in Huber‟s work, and specifically in order to debunk onesided 
interpretations of secularisation. Cf. e.g. how Huber discusses secularisation and its implications in 
many of his most important works, e.g. Konflikt und Konsens (1990a:291–320), Gerechtigkeit und 
Recht (1996b:30–40; 1996b:136–142) and Kirche in der Zeitewende (1999:44–74). Cf. also the sheer 
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Verhältnis von Religion und Recht” (2003d), “Der christliche Glaube und die politische Kultur in 
Europa” (2004h), “Religionsfreiheit und offene Gesellschaft – ein Prüfstein aktueller Dialoge in 
Europa” (2004l), “Religion – Politik – Gewalt – Erwartungen an den Kongress” (2005b), “Glauben in 
der Welt – Die Säkularisierung und Zukunft der Kirchen” (2005e), “Fünfzig Jahre Loccumer Vertrag – 
Das öffentliche Wirken der Kirche und seine Wahrnehmung in den Verträgen zwischen Staat und 
Kirche” (2005f), “Unvereinbare Gegensätze? Scharia und säkulare Recht” (2005q), “Die Religionen 
und der Staat” (2005t), “Religionsfreiheit und Toleranz – Wie aktuell ist der Augsburger 
Religionsfriede?”  (2005aa), “Die Religionen und der säkulare Staat” (2006j), “Zukunft gestalten – 
Erwartungen an Religion und Glaube” (2006k), “Renaissance des Glaubens – Die Säkularisierung 
und die Zukunft der Kirchen” (2006s) and “Gesicht zeigen – Festrede anlässlich der Eröffnung der 
Woche der Brüderlichkeit im Municher Rathaus” (2006aa). 
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 Cf. also Christof Gestrich‟s article written in honour of Huber “Kirche, Säkularisierung, Ethik” (in 
Reuter, H-R., Bedford-Strohm, H., Kuhlmann, H. & Lütcke, K-H. (eds.), Freiheit verantworten: 
Festschrift für Wolfgang Huber zum 60. Geburtstag. Gütersloh: Kaiser, Gütersloher Verl. Haus, 
2002:102–115). 
209
 For Huber‟s most recent published discussion, see Kirche in der Zeitenwende, especially 1999:44–
51. 
210
 Cf. Eberhard Jüngel, “Säkularisierung – Theologische Anmerkungen zum Bergriff einer weltlichen 
Welt” in Entsprechungen: Gott – Wahrheit – Mensch (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2002:285–289); Jörg 
Dierkken, Selbstbewußtsein individueller Freiheit (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005:49–68); Peter 
Berger (ed.), The desecularisation of the world: Resurgent religion and world politics (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1999); and David Ziedan, The resurgence of religion: A comparative study of selected 
themes in Christian and Islamic discourses (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2003). Cf. also Friedrich Gogarten‟s 
classic Verhängnis und Hoffnung. Die Säkularisierung als theologisches Problem. (Stuttgart: Friedrich 
Vorwerk Verlag, 1953). 
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The result of Huber‟s juridical interpretation (1999:62) is that he distinguishes 
between the process of secularisation and the secularisation of society itself. He 
therefore does not equate the disempowerment of religious institutions with 
secularisation. Indeed, the Reformation contributed greatly to the secularisation of 
modernity (Huber, 2001h:14). As has been shown in the previous section its 
emphasis on the dignity of the individual and the consequent freedom of conscience 
had political implications (Huber, 1987:60), and notably contributed to the 
secularisation of the legal system (Huber, 2001h:15). Huber regards equating 
secularisation with an anti-religious stance as disregarding its roots and indeed as 
taking up an „unenlightened‟ position.  
 
Huber advocates for the position of „enlightened secularism‟ to denote an 
understanding of secularism that forms the basis of a stable society where different 
religions can participate and cooperate. In his speech “Glauben in der Welt – Die 
Säkularisierung und die Zukunft der Kirchen” (2005e) Huber elaborates on this 
concept: 
 
[T]he process of secularisation led to enlightened secularity, and from a 
Christian perspective enlightened secularity needs to be advocated and 
actively represented. This type of secularity is connected with the 
categorical distinction between the state and religion and respect for every 
person‟s dignity and the freedom of religion form its basis. Advocating 
enlightened secularity is as important in dialogue with Muslims as it is in 
conversation with proponents of laicism.211 
 
When Huber investigates the decreasing importance of religious institutions in many 
modern societies he does, however, also refer to this process as secularisation but 
understands reasons other than the separation between the state and religious 
institutions to contribute to this state of affairs (1999:51–66). The researcher will 
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 “[D]er Prozess der Säkularisierung [hat] zu einer aufgeklärten Säkularität geführt, die man heute 
auch aus Gründen des christlichen Glaubens aktiv vertreten und verfechten muss. Denn diese 
aufgeklärte Säkularität und die mit ihr verbundene kategoriale Unterscheidung zwischen Staat und 
Religion hat sich als unumgängliche Voraussetzung für die Achtung der gleichen Würde jedes 
Menschen wie für die Wahrung der Religionsfreiheit erwiesen. Ein aktives Eintreten für aufgeklärte 
Säkularität ist heute gegenüber muslimischen Gesprächspartnern genauso notwendig wie gegenüber 
den Verfechtern eines staatlichen Laizismus ...” 
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therefore examine Huber‟s view on secularisation from two perspectives, namely 
secularisation as, in the first instance, the secularisation of the legal system. The 
second perspective takes cognisance of the first but focuses on the changing role of 
religious institutions. In the third section communicative freedom as an expression of 
the continued relevance of religious convictions will be investigated. This will be 
done in the context of the development of a secular constitution and the declining 
public influence of religious institutions. 
 
3.2.1  The development of a secular constitution212 
Huber (1999:44–45) sees the roots of the term „secularisation‟ in the so-called 
Investiturstreit of the 11th and 12th centuries.  Essentially this conflict concerned the 
power of „worldly‟ authorities to appoint clergy. In a context where the whole 
organisation of society was understood as sacral and religiously legitimated this 
distinction between „church‟ and „state‟ profoundly challenged the worldview of the 
time. However, the word „secularisation‟ was not used to describe the distinction 
between „worldly‟ and „religious‟ authority. Up to the 17th century the word 
saecularisatio was only used to denote a monk‟s transition from status regularis to 
status saecularis, in other words from subservience to a specific order to the status 
of worldly priesthood (Huber, 1999:45). 
 
It was only in 1646 that the term saecularisiret was used to describe the 
dispossession of church property (Huber, 1999:46), gradually starting to resemble 
what is meant with secularisation today and providing the foundation for the juridical 
secularisation fundamental to modern society. Basically this secularity referred to 
organising the state as if there was no God (Huber, 1996b:31, 139).213 This meant 
using natural law as basis for the juridical system. It did not mean, however, that it 
was the opinion of Grotius and his contemporaries that God did not exist: They 
understood the existence of what is good and just in nature – and the consequent 
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 For a detailed discussion on the German contours of secularisation, and in particular the 
development of the churchs‟ relationship to the state see Staat und Kirche im 19. und 20. 
Jahrhundert: Dokumente zur Geschichte des deutschen Staatskirchenrechts that was co-written by 
Huber‟s father Ernst Rudolf (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1973) and Kirche und Öffentlichkeit (Huber, 
1973). 
213
 In this context Grotius coined his famous phrase etsi deus non daretur. 
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correspondence with God‟s law – as God‟s providential rationality and therefore the 
expression of God‟s  existence (Huber, 1996b:31).  
 
Huber (1999:47–51) especially makes use of German developments to sketch the 
significance of the juridical aspects of secularisation. Of importance is that a secular 
constitution developed as expression of the emancipation of the political sphere from 
religious legitimisation. A secular constitution does not imply the irrelevance of 
religious matters but signifies the duty of the state to form the framework within 
which different ideals can be realised by different groups and individuals while at the 
same time contributing to the corporate wellbeing of society. 
 
Huber (1999:49–50) uses the German constitution as an example of how this 
secularity of the state can ensure the constructive freedom of religion. In the German 
context it is especially the independence of both church and state, the recognition of 
the public responsibility of the church, the right of the church to organise itself and 
the right to property that form the basis for the role of the church in society. Co-
operation between church and state is therefore possible and indeed hoped for, as 
the state is understood as being dependent on especially religious communities to 
take up their public responsibility.  
 
Apart from creating the framework within which religious communities can realise 
their aims, the secularity of the constitution also serves to limit the power of the state 
(Huber, 1985:95–112). Whenever the state does not serve the interests of the 
people, and specifically for ensuring iustitia et pax (justice and peace),214 the state 
acts beyond its limits (Huber, 1985:97–98; 2005bb). Justice is not simply to be 
understood as ensuring the functionality of a juridical system but is aimed at 
ensuring that people can live in freedom and respect one another as equals. Peace 
is again not to be understood as simply the absence of war but as the dignified co-
existence of different groups and individuals (Huber, 1996b:454–455). Huber 
connects these limits of the power of the state with the fifth thesis of the Barmen 
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 By using these two terms, Huber explicitly connects his thought with the classical Christian political 
teaching on the extent and role of political power. 
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Declaration:215 The legitimacy of the state and its correspondence with God‟s will are 
to be evaluated not ontologically but functionally, namely by the extent to which the 
state provides that what is needed for the dignified and peaceful co-existence of its 
citizens (Huber, 1985:97).  
 
Rather than creating an artificial and forced division between state and religious 
communities, the secular constitution enables cooperation of individuals and groups 
with different motivations to achieve shared goals (Huber, 1985:51). It is therefore 
possible to speak of the constitutions of modern society per definition being 
characterised by enlightened secularity,216 which means that the limits and duties of 
both religious communities and the state are acknowledged.217 Again it is clear that 
the process of secularisation by no means implies the secularity of society or the 
irrelevance of religious institutions (Huber, 2003d). Huber clearly affirms this 
dimension of the secularisation of society as it requires of religious communities to 
be active in civil society, articulate their views and represent their members. 
 
3.2.2  The changed role of Christianity 
Apart from denoting the separation between worldly and religious authority, 
secularisation can also refer to the changing role of religious institutions.218 The 
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 “Die Schrift sagt uns, daß der Staat nach göttlicher Anordnung die Aufgabe hat, in der noch nicht 
erlösten Welt, in der auch die Kirche steht, nach dem Maß menschlicher Einsicht und menschlichen 
Vermögens unter Androhung und Ausübung von Gewalt für Recht und Frieden zu sorgen. ... Wir 
verwerfen die falsche Lehre, als solle und könne der Staat über seinen besonderen Auftrag hinaus 
die einzige und totale Ordnung menschlichen Lebens werden und also auch die Bestimmung der 
Kirche erfüllen. Wir verwerfen die falsche Lehre, als solle und könne sich die Kirche über ihren 
besonderen Auftrag hinaus staatliche Art, staatliche Aufgaben und staatliche Würde aneignen und 
damit selbst zu einem Organ des Staates werden.” 
216
 Huber uses this term often in his discussion of secularisation but also in the context of the 
discussion of the role of the church in the state and the duty of the state (especially in Germany) to 
also create spaces where religion can be promoted. Cf. e.g. Huber 1999:50, “In Verantwortung vor 
Gott und den Menschen” (2002a), “Hat der Glaube noch Zukunft?” (2003b), “Protestantismus – 
Abgesang oder Zukunftsmodell?” (2004c), “Der christliche Glaube und die politische Kultur in Europa” 
(2004h), “Die jüdisch-christliche Tradition” (2004m), “Religion und Politik in Deutschland und den USA 
– ein Vergleich” (2004o), “Religion – Politik – Gewalt” (2005b), “Glauben in der Welt – Die 
Säkularisierung und Zukunft der Kirchen” (2005e), “evangelisch – profiliert – wertvoll” (2005h), 
“Zukunft gestalten. Das reformatorische Erbe und das Verhältnis zwischen Europa und den USA” 
(2005i), “Renaissance des Glaubens – Die Säkularisierung und die Zukunft der Kirchen” (2006s), 
“Evangelisch – profiliert – wertvoll” (2006t) and “Dietrich Bonhoeffer – ein evangelischer Heiliger?” 
(2007k). 
217
 With regard to the limit of religious communities‟ actions, this means the idea of a theocracy is not 
reconcilable with the secularity of modern society (Huber, 2005q; 2006j). 
218
 Cf. Michael Ariens, Religious liberty in a pluralistic society (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 
2002). 
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strongest evidence for this interpretation is the declining church membership of 
especially European mainline churches.219 It is estimated, for example, that the 
EKD‟s membership will decline from 26 million in 2003 to 17 million in 2030 (EKD, 
2006:21).220 Although partly due to societal changes such as lower birth rates, this 
still serves to illustrate the changing role of especially Christianity in what was the 
„Christian West‟. Apart from the factual decline in membership, Huber supplements 
such figures with the reality of most likely also a decline in commitment of those 
members that will choose to stay (Huber, 1999:61), reflecting something of the 
decline in all of the old institutions of modern society (Huber, 1999:87–88).221 These 
changes necessarily cause Christianity to reconsider its role in society. 
 
Huber refrains from speaking of the decline in influence of religion as such, as global 
society is characterised by a renewed interest in religion and indeed by the political 
relevance of religion.222 Although modern societies may be publicly secular (and 
even this is open for discussion) it is increasingly clear that their „private‟ dimensions 
are anything but secular (Huber, 1996d:453; 1999:62; 2003d). In recent speeches 
with themes as different as “Wissenschaft und Verantwortung in unserer Zeit” 
(2002c), “Der christliche Glaube und die politische Kultur in Europa” (2004h), 
“Zukunft gestalten. Das reformatorische Erbe und das Verhältnis zwischen Europa 
und den USA” (2005i), “Flugblätter der Freiheit. Verantwortliches Handeln aus 
christlichen Wurzeln” (2006b) and “Integration – Zusammenleben – Zukunft 
gestalten: Perspektiven in Kirche und Gesellschaft” (2006v), Huber speaks of the so-
called „return of religion‟ (Wiederkehr der Religion) to designate the renewed interest 
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 See Huber 1999:51–56 for more on the German situation. 
220
 For a more detailed discussion on the place of the Evangelical Church in Germany within the 
context of juridical secularisation, see “Religionsfreiheit und Kirchenfreiheit: Zur gegenwärtigen 
Tendenzen im Staatskirchenrecht” (Huber, 1990a:291–320). 
221
 In some of his works Huber regards the diminishing influence of societal institutions as also the 
result of the process of individualisation and he links it closely to what he understands as a change in 
societal values that is taking place. In 1996c:112, e.g., he refers to this state of affairs as “die 
Auflösung vorgegebener sozialer Lebensformen und die schwindende Bindungskraft traditioneller 
Sozialzusammenhänge” and contributes it to the process of individualisation. 
222
 One of the most telling examples of the increased relevance of religion is the fact that after Tony 
Blair resigned as the United Kingdom‟s Prime Minister on the 27
th
 of June 2007 he took up the role of 
Middle East envoy of the United Nations, the European Union, the United States of America and 
Russia and identified managing religion constructively as one of his important tasks in this capacity. In 
2008 he consequently also founded the Tony Blair Faith Foundation aimed at enabling faiths to act for 
global good, and he is teaching a course on faith and globalisation in 2008 at Yale University. 
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in and relevance of religion.223 The variety of themes he connects the return of 
religion with suggests the importance of the theme for Huber, as well as the 
continued importance of religion in so-called secular societies. Huber understands 
especially two factors to contribute to this return of religion. 
 
The close connection between religion and violence since the intensified violence in 
the Middle East, 9/11 and the murder of Taizé‟s Frère Roger is the first reason for 
this renewed relevance of religion (Huber, 2006s). Although this connection often 
causes a skewed interpretation of religion, it serves to illustrate that – despite 
secularisation – religion has not ceased to influence and change both societies and 
personal biographies. Huber sees one of the most convincing reasons for the 
continued relevance of religion – secondly – in the fact that it serves as a source of 
meaning, perspective and balance in a materialist and globalised society. In a sense 
the return of religion gives expression to what Huber calls “the crisis of modernity”, 
as the ideals of progress and rationality, especially by means of science and 
economics, are showing themselves to be reducing the depth of human life (Huber, 
1990d:39). The more relentlessly society focuses on the globalised economy and 
financial interests, the more society asks for countermeasures, a movement Huber 
(2006k) understands to lead to the renewed appreciation of religion: “A new belief is 
developing that a completely worldly, sheer business-frenzied and radically 
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 Although Huber connects the return of religion with a variety of themes his argumentation 
concerning the return of religion more or less follows the same contours, as will be discussed in the 
rest of this section. Cf. e.g. “Wissenschaft und Verantwortung in unserer Zeit” (2002c), “Der Tod – 
Grenze oder Macht?” (2004f), “Der christliche Glaube und die politische Kultur in Europa” (2004h), 
“Religion – Politik – Gewalt” (2005b), “Glauben in der Welt – Die Säkularisierung und Zukunft der 
Kirchen” (2005e), “Fünfzig Jahre Loccumer Vertrag – Das öffentliche Wirken der Kirche und seine 
Wahrnehmung in den Verträgen zwischen Staat und Kirche” (2005f), “evangelisch – profiliert – 
wertvoll” (2005h), “Zukunft gestalten. Das reformatorische Erbe und das Verhältnis zwischen Europa 
und den USA” (2005i), “Kirche als Zeichen in der Zeit – Kulturelles Erbe und Sinnvermittlung für das 
21. Jahrhundert” (2005j), “Theologie und Kirchenleitung – Vortrag zu Ehren von Eberhard Jüngel, 
Tübingen” (2005n), “Glauben verstehen – Protestantismus und Theologie” (2005r), “In deinem Lichte 
schauen wir das Licht – Quellen und Perspektiven christlicher Spritualität” (2005s), “Flugblätter der 
Freiheit. Verantwortliches Handeln aus christlichen Wurzeln” (2006b), “Barmherzigkeit mit den 
Zweiflern – Überlegungen zum Weg unserer Kirche” (2006f), “Zukunft gestalten – Erwartungen an 
Religion und Glaube” (2006k), “Dietrich Bonhoeffer – ein evangelischer Heiliger?” (2006m), “Das 
Vermächtnis Dietrich Bonhoeffers und die Wiederkehr der Religion” (2006n), “Verantwortlich im Sinne 
der Pressefreiheit” (2006q), “Renaissance des Glaubens – Die Säkularisierung und die Zukunft der 
Kirchen” (2006s), “Evangelisch – profiliert – wertvoll” (2006t), “Gott und Geld – Christliche Ethik und 
wirtschafliches Handeln” (2006u), “Integration – Zusammenleben – Zukunft gestalten: Perspektiven in 
Kirche und Gesellschaft” (2006v), “Christliche Moral und ökonomische Vernunft – ein Wiederspruch?” 
(2006w), “Gesicht zeigen” (2006aa), “Vor Gott und den Menschen – Der etische Auftrag der Kirche in 
unserer Zeit” (2007d), “Globalisierung ohne Moral? Die Verantwortung eines Unternehmers” (2007e), 
“Das Christliche in unserem Land – Standort und Perspektiven” (2007l) and “Freiheit und soziale 
Verantwortung. Eine sozialethische Perspektive” (2007r). 
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consumerist life is too banal, too external and too superficial. ... With the return of 
religion, humanity‟s soul rebels against its commercial reduction.”224 
 
Although the return of religion is not in traditional forms but often takes on the form of 
mysticism or patchwork spirituality (cf. e.g. Huber, 1996c:112), this state of affairs 
still signifies the reaffirmation that religion has an important societal role to play. As 
was seen, this is not a new development but is in correspondence with the roots of 
secularisation itself. 
 
Although each of these dimensions of secularisation poses new challenges, it is 
clear that neither of them implies that secularisation means that modern society itself 
can be described as „secular‟. Communicative freedom serves as an expression of 
the space religiously motivated concepts may claim within the secularism of 
modernity. At the same time it illustrates how the secularisation of modernity can be 
respected whilst articulating decidedly Christian conviction. 
 
3.2.3  Communicative freedom as the expression of the continued 
 relevance of religious convictions 
Huber regards the changing role of religious institutions and concepts as the 
opportunity for a more faithful embodiment of the gospel (Huber, 2008b:148).225 
Articulating the Reformation‟s rediscovery of freedom as communicative freedom is a 
way in which to seize this opportunity. Apart from serving as a critical rearticulation of 
the Christian understanding of freedom, Huber therefore develops communicative 
freedom also as a distinctly Protestant concept of freedom and an expression of 
enlightened secularity. It is clear that rigid interpretations of for example Luther‟s so-
called doctrine of the two regiments (Huber, 1985:33–52; 1996b:448–449) or 
Weber‟s Eigengesetzlichkeit of the different spheres of society (Huber, 1985:53–70) 
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 “Es entsteht ein neues Gespür dafür, dass ein komplett diesseitiges, rein wirtschaftstaumeliges 
und radikal konsumzentriertes Leben zu banal, zu äußerlich und zu oberflächlich ist. ... Mit der 
Rückkehr der Religion rebelliert die Seele der Menschen gegen ihre kommerzielle Reduktion.” 
225
 In Der christliche Glaube Huber (2008b:148) gives one of his most recent descriptions of how 
changed societal conditions can lead to a renewed focus on the church‟s mission to function within 
the presence of God and bound to Christ: “Die Kirchen haben die Aufgabe, geistesgegenwärtig auf 
die Zeichen des Aufbruchs zu achten und den suchenden Menschen einen Ort für ihre Hoffnungen 
und Fragen unzubieten. In ihnen wird beispielhaft vorgelebt, was es heißt, von Glaube, Hoffnung und 
Liebe getragen zu sein. Sie können die Freiheit ausstrahlen, die aus der Bindung an Jesus Christus 
entsteht.” 
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do not adequately describe the role of religion and religiously motivated convictions 
in a secular society. His understanding of secularisation allows Huber to develop 
communicative freedom in an unambiguously Protestant fashion whilst respecting 
the secularity of the state. 
In a speech such as “Gemeinschaft gestalten – Evangelisches Profil in Europa” 
Huber (2006i) expresses how processes of societal change – and implicitly 
processes of secularisation – allow and ask for a clear account of the sources that 
inform convictions. In this speech, communicative freedom consequently motivates 
the processes of reform of the Evangelical Church:226 
 
Responsible freedom is not only the main feature of the Protestant 
existence in the world, but it also determines the profile of an evangelical 
church. The Evangelical Church in Germany‟s reform process is therefore 
determined by the theme „church of freedom‟.227 
 
In its memorandum Kirche der Freiheit228  (EKD, 2006:7ff) the EKD then describes 
out how it aims to set its profile in a society characterised by processes of 
secularisation. Its reaction is characterised by four goals, namely (a) spiritual 
profiling instead of indistinct activity, (b) prioritising instead of aiming for 
completeness, (c) structural mobility and (d) shifting the focus of the activities of the 
church to the outside instead of self-contentment.229 Huber (e.g. 2007l) affirms the 
process of reclaiming its profile as an imperative grounded in the Christian religion 
itself: “The Evangelical Church reacts to the current societal situation by 
rediscovering its own religion, by strengthening its own faith and uncovering its own 
treasures” (2007l). 
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 Cf. importantly Kirche der Freiheit 2006:7ff for the EKD‟s official opinion. 
227
 “Verantwortete Freiheit ist nicht nur der Grundzug evangelischer Existenz in der Welt, sie bestimmt 
zugleich das Profil einer evangelischen Kirche. Wir haben deshalb in der Evangelischen Kirche in 
Deutschland den kirchlichen Reformprozess ... unter den Leitbegriff der Kirche der Freiheit gestellt.” 
228
 As was stated already in Chapter 1 Huber was the chairperson of the commission responsible for 
writing this document. 
229
 “Geistliche Profilierung statt undeutlicher Aktivität”, “Schwerpunktsetzung statt Vollständigkeit”, 
“Bewegligkeit in den Formen statt Klammern an Strukturen” and “Außenorientierung statt 
Selbstgenügsamkeit”. 
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Developing a profiled concept of freedom is asked for also in the context of the so-
called „return of religion‟ in many modern societies.230 As we have seen processes of 
secularisation unexpectedly also leads to what Huber characterises as the 
Wiederkehr der Religion.231 This return of religion does not only imply the return of 
Christianity but also the renewed regard for religion as such and in particular for 
individualised and privatised forms thereof (e.g. Huber, 2005e). As he is of the 
opinion that constructive public discourse is not served by vague and ambiguous 
religious content,232 the challenges lie especially in articulating religious convictions 
in a way that makes dialogue cooperation possible.233 Religion that simply „comforts‟ 
disregards the „prophetic impulses‟ that are necessary for it to contribute to societal 
wellbeing.234 Developing communicative freedom is therefore an effort to articulate 
the relevance of the Christian gospel within the framework allowed for by the 
secularity of the state in order to enact the responsibility of this religion towards the 
whole of God‟s creation.235 
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 Cf. Eberhard Jüngel‟s interpretation in “Untergang oder Renaissance der Religion? Überlegungen 
zu einer schiefen Alternative” in Indikative der Gnade – Imperative der Freiheit (Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck, 2000:24–39). Cf. also Lee Raymond and Susan Ackerman, The challenge of religion after 
modernity: beyond disenchantment (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002); Hans-Joachim Höhn, Postsäkular: 
Gesellschaft im Umbruch – Religion im Wandel (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2006); and Robert 
Cummings Neville, Religion in late modernity (New York: State University of New York Press, 2002). 
For an earlier sociological interpretation, cf. Rodney Stark and William Sims Bainsbridge (eds.), The 
future of religion: Secularisation, revival and cult formation (London/California: University of California 
Press, 1985). 
231
 Cf. e.g. “Nachfolge heute” (2006d), “Kirche im Aufbruch” (2006g), “Gemeinschaft gestalten – 
Evangeliches Profil in Europa” (2006i), “Was bedeutet Ökumene der Profile?” (2006p), “Die 
Herausforderungen für die Theologie in einem pluralistischen Europa aus ökumenischer Perspektive 
– Eine evangelische Stellungnahme” (2006dd), “Glaube, Werte, Differenzen” (2007c), “Das 
Christliche in unserem Land – Standort und Perspektiven” (2007l) and “Dass der Mensch mehr ist als 
seine Taten. Das christliche Menschenbild im Licht der Rechtfertigungsbotschaft” (2007m). 
232
 In Der christliche Glaube (2008b:178) Huber fittingly speaks of vagabundierende Spiritualität. 
233
 Huber (e.g. in 2005h) consequently continuously campaigns for the recognition that religions 
contribute to the wellbeing of society itself: “[N]icht nur für die Religionsdialoge ist heute nach der 
Selbst-Bildung des Glaubens gefragt; sondern insgesamt hängt die Präsenz des Christlichen im 
öffentlichen Raum, seine Bedeutung für unser kulturelles Selbstverständnis, sein möglicher Beitrag 
zur Ausbildung einer gegenwartsbezogenen Ich-Identität daran, dass wir uns selbst und die Ströme 
der eigenen Traditionen kennen.” 
234
 Cf. e.g. Huber (2005e): “Religion, die nur vertröstet, stellt den prophetischen Impuls der biblischen 
Botschaft still. Religion, die das Bündnis mit der Aufklärung aufkündigt, verweigert sich einem 
kritischen Wahrheitsanspruch. Fanatismus und Gewaltbereitschaft, die sich der wiederkehrenden 
Religion bedienen, fordern Widerspruch heraus.” 
235
 When connected with the reality of religious pluralism and democracy‟s protection of minority rights 
the convinced public expression of religious convictions as an important element of enlightened 
secularity is by no means unproblematic. A case in point is the laws against wearing a headscarf in 
schools in Germany, as highlighted by the court case between Fereshta Ludin and the German 
federal state Baden-Württemberg in 2003. The court ruled against Ludin‟s argument that wearing a 
headscarf was an expression of her religious convictions and that it should be allowed in public 
schools. Huber was quoted by the Evangelischer Pressedienst (epd) in 2004 as saying that the ban 
on wearing headscarves was an expression of religious freedom. Although he agrees that religious 
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This figure of thought is not the result of the EKD‟s memorandum but is set out in 
detail already in Gerechtigkeit und Recht (Huber, 1996b:142–144). He does this by 
means of the unity and distinction between the exclusivity and universality of God‟s 
relationship with the world through Christ. The exclusivity of God‟s relationship with 
the world lies in the fact that through Christ‟s death and resurrection God identified 
himself exclusively with Christ, an identification that is complete and unique (Huber, 
1996b:142). Through Christ he completely entered the world and accentuated his 
role in the covenant of grace. Without Christ it is therefore impossible to understand 
God‟s relationship with the world. 
 
At the same time God‟s incarnation in Christ signifies the universality of his 
relationship with the world (Huber, 1996b:143). Christ exemplifies God‟s faithfulness 
towards the whole of humanity, and Christ is God‟s compassionate and gracious 
reaction to the precarious situation of humanity as a whole. The exclusivity of God‟s 
relationship with the world at the same time also gives expression to the universality 
of this relationship.236 When Huber therefore argues for a profiled explication of 
freedom in the concept of communicative freedom, the particularity of the Christian 
resources simultaneously also expresses the universality of the concept. In other 
words, Huber understands Christian truth not as simply having cultural values as 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
freedom means that religious symbols should be allowed in public spaces his opinion was that when a 
religious symbol has political implications, it does not necessarily enjoy the same protection anymore. 
He was quoted by the epd as saying: “Religionsfreiheit bedeute nicht, Religion als bloße Privatsache 
zu betrachten, sagte Huber. Zwar dürften religiöse Überzeugungen nicht aus dem öffentlichen Raum 
verbannt werden. Es müsse aber immer wieder darüber nachgedacht werden, in welcher Form und 
bis zu welchen Grenzen sie öffentlich zur Schau gestellt werden dürfen. Das gelte besonders dann, 
wenn ein religiöses Zeichen sich mit politischen Deutungsmöglichkeiten verbinde” (epd, 2004). Huber 
argues in a similar vein concerning the right of Muslims to wear a headscarf in “Der christliche Glaube 
und die politische Kultur in Europa” (2004h), “Religion und Politik in Deutschland und den USA – ein 
Vergleich” (2004o), “Unvereinbare Gegensätze? Scharia und säkulares Recht” (2005q) and “Dialog 
der Religionen in einer pluralen Gesellschaft – Überlegungen aus evangelischer Perspektive” 
(2007q). In terms of Huber‟s argument that religions necessarily have political implications and that it 
is the duty of religions to engage the public sphere as they also have the right to do so, this is a 
peculiar and unexpected argument. For another position on the topic, cf. Rolf Schieder (2008:224) in 
Sind Religionen gefährlich?. 
236
 Huber connects this figure of thought with Barth‟s Christengemeinde and Weltgemeinde, according 
to which the Christian congregation forms the centre of concentric circles that have the worldly 
congregation on the outside (Huber, 1996b:143). Reality is therefore formed and sustained by God‟s 
decision to be exclusively incarnated in Christ. 
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content but that a „worth-less‟ truth (wertlose Wahrheit)237 stands at its centre: God‟s 
self-initiated relationship with the world.238 
 
Communicative freedom therefore expresses the affirmation of the processes of 
secularisation in modern societies. Within the boundaries of the secularisation 
communicative freedom is the expression of the necessity for religious communities 
to express religiously motivated convictions in order to contribute to societal 
wellbeing. 
 
3.3  Democracy as preferred political system 
 
Democracy can be regarded as a second dimension of modernity‟s structuring of 
human sociality that communicative freedom engages.239 This engagement will be 
investigated firstly by means of the historical ties between Christianity and 
democracy, then by means of the role Christianity fulfils in democracy, and this 
chapter will conclude with an investigation as to how communicative freedom 
contributes to the sustenance of modernity. 
 
3.3.1  Christianity and democracy 
When discussing the interaction between democracy and Christianity, one of Huber‟s 
basic presuppositions is that democracy is not a „Christian form of government‟ but a 
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 Cf. Eberhard Jüngel, Wertlose Wahrheit (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1990). 
238
 Huber‟s focus on Christian truth as a „worth-less‟ truth corresponds with his call for a renewed 
Christian profile in the context of pluralism, secularisation and the Renaissance of religion. With this 
concept he also engages the cultural role Christianity plays in Europa and particularly in Germany. 
See e.g. “Der christliche Glaube und die politische Kultur in Europa” (2004h), “Die jüdisch-christliche 
Tradition” (2004m), “evangelisch – profiliert – wertvoll” (2005h) and “Evangelisch – profiliert – wertvoll” 
2006t. 
239
 Huber engages democracy in a number of different ways. In his recent speeches he focuses, e.g., 
on Protestantism‟s contribution to the development of democracy in “Der Protestantismus als 
Weltkulturerbe – Erbe und Verpflichtung” (2004g), “Der christliche Glaube und die politische Kultur in 
Europa” (2004h and 2004), “Ethik und Demokratie” (2004q), “Glaube und Macht” (2004r), “Religion – 
Politik – Gewalt” (2005b), “Der Auftrag der Kirchen in einem zusammenwachsenden Europa” (2005d), 
“Future of the European Project” (2006y), “Glaube, Werte, Differenzen” (2007c); and on the church‟s 
public responsibility in “Fünfzig Jahre Loccumer Vertrag – Das öffentliche Wirken der Kirche und 
seine Wahrnehmung in den Verträgen zwischen Staat und Kirche” (2005f), “Zukunft gestalten. Das 
reformatorische Erbe und das Verhältnis zwischen Europa und den USA” (2005i), “Unvereinbare 
Gegensätze? Scharia und säkulares Recht” (2005q), “Die Religionen und der Staat” (2005t), “Der 
Beruf zur Politik – Zwanzig Jahre Demokratiedenkschrift der EKD” (2005w), “Die Religionen und der 
säkulare Staat” (2006j), “Gerecht aus Glauben – die Gegenwartsbedeutung des christlichen 
Menschenbilds” (2001a), “Vertrauensberufe im Rechtsstaat” (2006x). 
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form of political organisation that deserves the critical solidarity of Christianity 
(Huber, 2005w). The historical ties between modern society and Christianity 
furthermore cause some fundamental ideas within democracy to coincide with 
Christian convictions. In his article “Protestantismus und Demokratie” Huber 
(1990c:11–26) investigates this interplay between distance and nearness.240 
 
On the one hand, one finds the virtual unity between Christianity and democracy in 
the United States of America as an expression of the nearness between Christianity 
and democracy. Especially the idea of a covenant between God and humankind and 
the „democratic turn‟ given to this covenant by leftist Puritans influenced the 
development of American politics (Huber, 1990c:16). Despite these democratic 
impulses, it was only from the American Revolution onwards that democratic values 
such as institutionalised tolerance and freedom of conscience and religion gained 
ascendancy (Huber, 1990c:17). With the Jackson Democracy America started to 
become a country within which people with different cultures and religious 
convictions could cohabit (Huber, 1990c:17). 
 
The First Amendment in 1791 changed the overtly Christian character of the 
American political environment, and the democratisation of America deepened. The 
wide-ranging campaign for the freeing of slaves revealed two ways of relating to 
democracy: Both those who argued for the continuous democratisation of democracy 
and those who argued for obedience to the existing structures of society based their 
arguments on the unity between democracy and Christianity (Huber, 1990c:18). 
 
On the other hand, contexts such as that of German Lutheranism signify distance 
between Christianity and democracy. The fact that until well into the 19th century the 
church mostly uncritically accepted the German monarchy as political system 
contributed to this distance (Huber, 1990c:20).241 Only before the First World War 
                                                             
240
 Cf. in this regard also Siobhan Nash-Marshall, What it takes to be free: Religion and the roots of 
democracy (New York: Crossroad, 2003); Alan Race and Ingrid Shafer, Religions in dialogue: From 
theocracy to democracy (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002); Ronald F. Thiemann, Religion in public life: A 
dilemma for democracy (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 1996); and Jochen-Christoph 
Kaiser, Christentum und politische Verantwortung: Kirchen im Nachkriegsdeutschland (Stuttgart: 
Kohlhammer, 1990). 
241
 Huber interestingly mentions how even Friedrich Schleiermacher understood the monarchy – in 
opposition to democracy – as the political system that is in accordance with modern states (Huber, 
1990c:21). 
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the relationship between Protestantism and the monarchy started to change, with the 
church increasingly taking a neutral stand towards the political system (Huber, 
1990c:24). Rather than legitimating the political system, it was understood as an 
institution with power that should be based in legitimate authority and exercised 
through the juridical system, and consequently German Lutheranism refocused its 
loyalty to the political system of the time (Huber, 1987:70, 1990c:20–21). After the 
First World War the relationship between the church and the state changed even 
more, as was the case after the Second World War. It was in this time that German 
Lutheranism started to develop an ethic of also the political form of society (Huber, 
1987: 70–71).  
 
Huber (1990c:28–29) understands two ways of relating Christianity to the state to 
have also developed in Germany: Whereas one group put a renewed emphasis on 
the authority of the state and aimed at renewing the legitimating function of 
Christianity, another group started emphasising the equal freedom of all citizens and 
the responsible use of this freedom. Huber can be placed in the latter group, as his 
participation and apparent important role in the composition of the EKD‟s 
Demokratiedenkschrift242 that appeared in 1985 for example illustrates.243 
 
Despite the fact that democracy is not by definition Christian and that Christianity 
cannot by definition subscribe to democracy, Huber argues for a constructive 
relationship (see Protestantismus und Protest 1987:74–79 and e.g. Huber, 2004q; 
2004r; 2006x). The point of connection between democracy and Protestant 
Christianity that makes this critical affirmation possible is the shared importance of 
the inalienable dignity of the individual, as was shown in the previous section 
(1987:74; 1990c:29; 2004h; 2004l; 2005w). As was shown already in Chapter 1, 
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 Die evangelische Kirche und freiheitliche Demokratie: der Staat des Grundgesetzes als Angebot 
und Aufgabe; eine Denkschrift der Evangelischen Kirche in Deutschland (Gütersloh: Gütersloher 
Verlagshaus Mohn, 1985). 
243
 In the speech “Der Beruf zur Politik – Zwanzig Jahre Demokratiedenkschrift der EKD” Huber 
(2005w) delivered in Berlin on the 25
th
 of June 2005 he articulates the current-day implications this 
memorandum has, specifically the continued need for the democratic co-operation of Christians:  “Die 
Demokratie ist ebenso wenig eine „christliche Staatsform‟ wie jede andere Staatsform auch. 
Gleichwohl ist, wie die Denkschrift festhält, die positive Beziehung von Christen zum demokratischen 
Staat des Grundgesetzes nicht nur äußerlich. Sie hat mit grundlegenden Überzeugungen und 
Werthaltungen des christlichen Glaubens zu tun. Die unantastbare Würde jedes Menschen, die 
Anerkennung von Freiheit und Gleichheit, der nüchterne Blick auf die Irrtumsanfälligkeit und 
Schuldhaftigkeit der menschlichen Natur und der Respekt vor der Verschiedenheit der Menschen 
stehen beispielhaft für Gesichtspunkte, in denen Christentum und Demokratie sich treffen.” 
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communicative freedom implies that human dignity is given by God and realised in 
relationship with others and is therefore not at the disposal of any worldly authority. 
As has been indicated, the importance of human dignity in Christianity meets 
democracy specifically in its promotion of a culture of human rights, which precedes 
the power of the state.244  
 
It is the obligation of the state, therefore, to ensure that institutional measures are set 
within which this inalienable dignity can be realised. Human rights therefore precede 
the power of the state (Huber & Tödt, 1977:77).245 In the light of the sovereignty of 
human rights, Huber can therefore state the following (1987:74): 
 
Democracy deserves special affirmation by Christians because it explicitly 
respects human dignity as preceding all state and societal power. For 
Christianity it is very important that human dignity cannot be brought 
about or be dispossessed by the state... Understanding democracy 
therefore starts with understanding the state‟s limits.246 
 
In his lecture “Ethik und Demokratie” Huber (2004q) states that the guarantee of 
individual freedom by democracy does not imply a blind optimism. The Christian 
understanding of humanity is also characterised by a deep-seated realism that 
includes the conviction that humanity is subjected to sin. In Chapter 1 it was 
therefore shown that the realisation of God-given freedom always has a provisional 
character. Its provisional character is interpreted as a call to action by means of 
constructive participation and, where necessary, advocacy (Huber, 1987:75–76; 
1996b:173; 2004q). 
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 Cf. Christof Heyns and Karen Stefiszyn (eds.), Human rights, peace and justice in Africa: A reader 
(Pretoria: Pretoria University Press, 2006) for discussions on the current state of human rights in 
Africa. 
245
 In this regard Huber and Tödt (1977:77–80) speaks of the vorstaatliche and vorgesellschaftliche 
components of human rights. 
246
 “Eine besondere Zustimmung der Christen verdient die Demokratie also deshalb, weil sie 
ausdrücklich eine Würde des Menschen anerkennt, die aller staatlichen und gesellschaftlichen Macht 
vorgeordnet ist. Daß die Würde der menschlichen Person nicht vom Staat hervorgebracht oder 
entzogen werden kann, ist dem christlichen Glauben besonders wichtig ... . ... Deshalb aber beginnt 
das Verständnis der Demokratie mit der Einsicht in die Grenzen, die dem Staat gesetzt sind.” 
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Taking human fallibility and sinfulness into account implies, in the first place, that in 
the case of emergencies human dignity will have to be protected by means of 
force.247 In accordance with Barmen, Huber regards the use of force as legitimate 
only when it is aimed at ensuring justice and peace by means of the responsible use 
of human insight and human abilities (Huber, 1985:98–99).  
 
Human fallibility and sinfulness implies, secondly, that the relationship between 
Christianity and democracy is characterised by the consciousness of the limits of the 
power of the state (Huber, 1987:74). The supremacy of civil and human rights, 
including the possibility of active participation in political decisions, also serves to 
limit the power, of the state for wherever the democratic state does not serve and 
respect the dignity of all its citizens, it has reached the limits of its power (Huber, 
1985:103–104).  
 
It is noteworthy that Huber understands the substance of democracy not as simply 
the freedom for the majority to rule but as respect for the equality of all people and 
their ability to take part in political decision-making processes (Huber, 1987:75). 
When political authorities are disloyal to this sustaining core of democracy, the 
church and theology (like the rest of society) have the duty to respond with prophetic 
criticism. Prophetic criticism is not to be understood as anarchist and irreconcilable 
with the democratic culture of modern society, but by emphasising freedom, equality 
and solidarity it indeed subscribes to the most important tenets of society (Huber, 
1990a:270).  
 
Huber consequently understands the right to civil disobedience in the event of 
constitutional crises as a touchstone of democracy (1987:85),248 as fallibility is 
indeed not restricted to the citizens of the democratic state but is also a true of its 
rulers and structures (1990c:33). A fundamental reciprocal accountability, built on the 
equal dignity of all, therefore forms the basis of the Christian view of democracy and 
of the relationship between the two. Ingrained into its self-understanding is its 
                                                             
247
 Huber (1987:75) does not regard the state‟s duty to act against evil as unique to democracy. What 
he does regard as the unique contribution of democracy to withstanding evil is its sensitivity to the 
corruptibility of human power, specifically by means of the distinction between different spheres of 
power. 
248
 Cf. also Protestantismus und Protest (1987:85–104) and Konflikt und Konsens (1990a:253–271). 
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relative and provisional character; it is indeed only when democracy is understood as 
a system able to improve and constantly in need of improving that one takes it 
seriously (Huber, 1987:77).249 
 
Although a qualified connection, it is nonetheless clear that Huber engages 
democracy in terms of its affirmation. He clearly regards democracy as a form of 
protecting human dignity. His qualified affirmation has implications for the role he 
understands Christianity to fulfil in democracies, which will be investigated in the next 
section, and has significant implications for the way in which communicative freedom 
functions in this context. 
 
3.3.2  Christianity in democracies 
Huber (1985:55–58; 1994a:162–167; 1996c:100–103) understands modern societies 
to be differentiated into different areas of reference, with the state, the economic 
sphere, civil society and cultural communication being the most important of these 
areas of reference. Concerning the implications of democracy for the church and 
theology, it should be noted that democracy as a system itself fits mainly in the 
political sphere but it is sustained by the other areas of reference of society. This 
illustrates the porous nature of the divisions between the different spheres of society 
and is of relevance for the role of the church in modern societies.250 The church and 
theology are therefore dependent on the institutional framework created by 
democracy whilst at the same time also contributing to its maintenance (Huber, 
1994a:176).251 
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 “Die Demokratie ist nach ihrem Selbstverständnis eine vorläufige und relative Staatsform. Weder 
für die Werte, die sie vertritt, noch für die Form, in der sie verfaßt ist, beansprucht sie letzte Gültigkeit. 
... Gerade dann, aber nur dann nimmt man die Demokratie ernst, wenn man sie als zugleich 
verbesserungsfähige und verbesserungsbedürftige Staatsform begreift” (Huber 1987:77). 
250
 Beck (1997a:191–192) speaks of a neue Mittelalterlichkeit that characterises the transnational 
state: no solid boundaries exist and the tran-national state needs to share its citizens‟ loyalty with 
other regional and global authorities. 
251
 In his lecture “Freiheit und soziale Gerechtigkeit – Sozialer Protestantismus in der globalisierten 
Welt” (2007n) Huber succinctly articulates this reciprocal relationship between the different spheres of 
society: “Zivilgesellschaft, Staat und Markt: ihr Zusammenspiel ist immer wieder neu zu justieren. Es 
bleibt gestaltbar. Wie viel Markt wir wollen, wie viel Staat wir brauchen und wie viel Zivilgesellschaft 
wir sind ist nicht naturgesetzlich vorgegeben, sondern beruht auf Entscheidungen, politischen wie 
individuellen.” 
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Huber (Huber, 1994a:168–172; 1996c:101–103; 1999:267–282) understands civil 
society as the place in society where the church and theology utilise and contribute 
to societal freedom by formulating theories such as communicative freedom. The 
institutions of civil society mediate between the individual and society by articulating, 
influencing and enacting shared views and contributing to societal discourse (Huber, 
1999:271).252 For civil society to be able to fulfil this role, it should present at least 
three characteristics (Huber, 1996c:102–103; 1999:273–275). The first of these 
characteristics is its diversity. The interests of society are not served when civil 
society has a centre of power controlled by one large institution.253 Freedom of 
religion and freedom of conscience are basic presuppositions for the diversity of civil 
society. 
 
The different institutions of civil society should be characterised, secondly, by 
independence. This does not mean indifference towards the other members of civil 
society or towards other spheres of society but the freedom to articulate views 
independent from a dominant centre of power. The neutrality of the state is an 
important presupposition for the independence of civil society. The last characteristic 
of civil society necessary for it to contribute to the maintenance of societal freedom is 
what Huber calls Zivilcourage (civil courage) (Huber, 1996c:103; 1999:275). This 
refers to the ability and willingness of citizens to contribute to civil society and to 
society itself by articulating and enacting their own convictions in responsible ways. 
As will be indicated in the following section concerning democracy and 
communicative freedom, civil courage is one of the presuppositions of democracy 
that it cannot guarantee on its own and for which it is dependent on other spheres of 
society. 
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 In some of his writings Huber consequently chooses to speak of the church as an „intermediary 
institution‟. His speech “Die Rolle der Kirchen als intermediärer Institutionen in der Gesellschaft” 
(2000a) is a good representation of how Huber understands the mediatory role of the church: “Für die 
einzelnen leistet sie einen Dienst der Vermittlung zwischen der geglaubten und der erfahrenen 
Wirklichkeit. Sie bietet einen Deutungshorizont an, der die verschiedenen Felder persönlichen und 
gesellschaftlichen Lebens in einem inneren Zusammenhang erkennen läßt. Als 
Interpretationsgemeinschaft ermöglicht sie es den einzelnen, selbst die Deutung der 
gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit mitzuprägen und an der Weiterentwicklung gesellschaftlicher 
Sinnmuster mitzuarbeiten. So schafft sie Verbindungen zwischen den einzelnen und vermittelt 
zwischen ihnen und dem Leben in der Gesellschaft, ja im Kosmos. In diesem – durchaus 
anspruchsvollen – Sinn kann man die Kirche als „intermediäre Institution‟ bezeichnen.” 
253
 For the German context, Huber‟s article “Welche Volkskirche meinen wir? Ein Schlüsselbegriff 
gegenwärtigen Kirchenverständnisses im Anschluß an die 3. Barmer These” (1985:130–146) is of the 
utmost importance. In this article he reconstructs the concept Volkskirche. 
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Being part of civil society is both an offer to participation and the obligation to interact 
meaningfully.254 Communicative freedom can then indeed be understood as a 
contribution from within civil society to contribute to the maintenance of democracy 
as a political system in order for it to truly serve the dignity of all people. This, Huber 
believes, can be done by nurturing trust in democracy by means of communicative 
freedom.255 
 
3.3.3  Communicative freedom and trust in democracy 
Huber (1999:67) agrees with Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde‟s famous dictum,256 
namely that the liberal and secular state lives from presuppositions it cannot provide, 
and he incorporates this thought into his work. Michael Welker (2002:225–242) picks 
up this movement in Huber‟s work in the article “Wovon der freiheitliche Staat lebt. 
Die Quellen politische Loyalität im spätmodernen Pluralismus” that he wrote for 
Huber‟s Festschrift.257 Here he emphasises Huber‟s belief that democracy, as a form 
of government that is cognisant of its fallibility and the necessity of a trustworthy 
system of balances and counterbalances, is built on presuppositions that transcend 
its limits.258 This includes the loyalty of the citizens, the willingness to contribute to 
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 The EKD‟s Demokratiedenkschrift (1985) speaks of Angebot und Aufgabe (cf. Huber, 1987:73). 
255
 Cf. e.g. “Der christliche Glaube und die politische Kultur in Europa” (2004h). 
256
 “Der freiheitliche, säkularisierte Staat lebt von Voraussetzungen, die er selbst nicht garantieren 
kann” (Böckenförde, Staat, Gesellschaft, Freiheit. Frankfurt, 1976:60). Böckenörde (1977:60) then 
continues by identifying the liberal and secular state as not only the guarantor of freedom but also as 
dependent on citizens‟ use of their freedom in order to contribute to its sustenance: “Als freiheitlicher 
Staat kann er einerseits nur bestehen, wenn sich die Freiheit, die er seinen Bürgern gewährt, von 
innen her, aus der moralischen Substanz des einzelnen und der Homogenität der Gesellschaft, 
reguliert. Anderseits kann er diese inneren Regulierungskräfte nicht von sich aus, das heißt, mit den 
Mitteln des Rechtszwanges und autoritativen Gebots zu garantieren versuchen, ohne seine 
Freiheitlichkeit aufzugeben und – auf säkularisierter Ebene – in jenen Totalitätsanspruch 
zurückzufallen, aus dem er in den konfessionellen Bürgerkriegen herausgeführt hat.” 
257
 Reuter, H-R., Bedford-Strohm, H., Kuhlmann, H. & Lütcke, K-H. (eds.). 2002. Freiheit 
verantworten: Festschrift für Wolfgang Huber zum 60. Geburtstag. Gütersloh: Kaiser, Gütersloher 
Verl. Haus. Cf. also Robert Leicht‟s article he wrote for the Festschrift, “Ohne Gott ist kein Staat zu 
machen. Von der öffentlicher Relevanz der Religion im säkularer Zeitalter” (2002:243–254). 
258
 In his lecture “Die Religionen und der säkulare Staat” Huber (2006j) implicitly expound 
Böckenförde‟s dictum by stating that the democratic state is not legitimated by means of a 
transcendent source of authority but by its people: “Der moderne, freiheitliche und demokratische 
Staat legitimiert sich nicht von Gott her, sondern von den Menschen her, die in diesem Gemeinwesen 
miteinander verbunden sind. Damit verträgt sich durchaus der Hinweis auf diejenigen Grundlagen, die 
dieses Gemeinwesen nicht selbst hervorbringen kann, von denen es aber gleichwohl abhängig ist.” 
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social cohesion, legitimising political rule, taking part in processes of revision and 
repositioning and the willingness and ability to partake in societal discourse.259 
 
In developing the rediscovery of Christian freedom by the Reformation as a critical 
concept Huber contributes to these presuppositions. This he does by developing a 
concept of freedom that utilises the resources of a specific community in order tot 
contribute to the discussion on one of the key concepts of democracy,260 namely 
trust.261 By developing communicative freedom from the resources of the Protestant 
Christian community, Huber develops an understanding of freedom that builds 
community and implies responsibility whilst respecting individuality. In this way he 
contributes to social cohesion by nourishing the loyalty of the citizens to the well-
being of society. Huber (1987:74) regards trust as an important Böckenfördian 
presupposition that communicative freedom contributes to democracy,262 as 
democracy is doomed to failure when citizens do not trust the state or one another. A 
lack of societal trust furthermore makes any form of constructive societal discourse 
virtually impossible (Huber, 2006x).263  
 
In the speech “Vertrauensberufe im Rechtsstaat” Huber explains how communicative 
freedom contributes to building societal trust. The emphasis placed by 
communicative freedom on God‟s sovereign constitution of freedom as well as on its 
realisation in relationships forms the basis to work on trusting relationships in 
everyday life and to contribute to the renewal of these relationships.264 Freedom is 
understood as movement away from oneself (Huber, 1985:211) or „letting oneself go‟ 
(Huber, 2006x) as it is constituted in relationship and can be realised also only in 
relationship with others. Letting oneself go (Sichverlassen) in freedom means 
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 Cf. also Erwin Teufel (ed.), Was halt die moderne Gesellschaft zusammen? (Frankfurt a.M.: 
Suhrkamp, 1996). 
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 E.g. “Von der Freiheit der Kinder Gottes – Plädoyer für eine selbstbewusste Kirche” (Huber, 
2006r). 
261
 In this regard, cf. e.g. Anthony Giddens‟ The consequences of modernity (Oxford: Polity/Blackwell, 
1990), and in particular section 3. 
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 In “Öffentliche Kirche in pluralen Öffentlichkeiten” (1994a) Huber motivates the role of trust-building 
institutions by stating that society does not simply consist of rational and mature individuals but that 
the ability to make decisions and contribute to community is primarily brought about by groupings of 
people who share and agree on specific interpretations of reality (1994a:170). 
263
 Cf. also “Bausteine einer zukunftfähigen Gesellschaft” (Huber, 2004k) and “Barmherzigkeit mit den 
Zweiflern – Überlegungen zum Weg unserer Kirche” (2006f). 
264
 Huber formulates this connection, albeit in a slightly different manner (2006x): “Aus christlicher 
Sicht ist deshalb beides nötig: sich in Gottesdienst und Gebet des Vertrauensverhältnisses zu Gott zu 
vergewissern und im Alltag des Lebens an Vertrauensverhältnissen zu arbeiten und sie zu erneuern.” 
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„getting involved with others‟ (sich auf einen anderen ... einzulassen) (Huber, 2006x), 
whereas not letting go of oneself leads to forsakenness, directionlessness and 
indeed unfreedom.265  
 
Huber‟s argument is that the democratic state is dependent on citizens who are 
trustworthy by observing their freedom in a communicative manner and who are 
willing to advocate for trustworthiness in societal structures (cf. Huber, 2005f).266 
Huber (2005x) explains it as follows: 
 
Christians want to promote trust by campaigning for trustworthiness in 
relationships between people.... Christians expect of all people carrying 
public responsibility to create space for trustworthiness in these 
relationships. Christians are also willing to take such responsibility on 
themselves. Without this kind of fundamental [societal] consensus trust in 
society‟s basic rules is impossible.267 
 
In Kirche in der Zeitenwende Huber (1999:197–199) uses Bellah‟s terminology to 
designate the political position within democracy that the concept of communicative 
freedom leads to as „democratic communitarianism‟.268 It gives expression to the fact 
that personal freedom and responsibility towards society are inextricably connected, 
for the rights of the individual can only be protected when responsibility is also taken 
for the preservation and development of society (1999:198). For Huber (1999:199), 
democratic communitarianism is only sustainable when it is based on freedom, and 
communicative freedom provides exactly such a basis.  
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 In “Vertrauensberufe im Rechtstaat” (2006x) Huber formulates the connection between not letting 
oneself go and unfreedom as follows: “Wer sich nicht verlässt, fühlt sich verlassen, vielleicht sogar 
unfrei oder – weil von den verschiedenen Deutungsmöglichkeiten der einen Wirklichkeit umher 
geschoben – orientierungslos. Gottvertrauen dagegen vermittelt einen Standpunkt im Leben.” 
266
 “Die freiheitliche Staat ist darauf angewiesen, dass er von Bürgerinnen und Bürger getragen wird, 
die sich ihrer Freiheit bewusst sind und diese Freiheit verantwortlich wahrnehmen” (Huber, 2005f). 
267
 “Vertrauen wollen Christen dadurch fördern, dass sie um Verlässlichkeit im menschlichen 
Miteinander werben ... . Christen erwarten von allen Menschen in öffentlicher Verantwortung, ... 
Verlässlichkeit im menschlichen Miteinander Raum zu geben. Dabei sind sie bereit, selbst 
entsprechende Verantwortung zu übernehmen. Ohne einen solchen Grundkonsens kann es kein 
Vertrauen in die Grundregeln einer Gesellschaft geben” 
268
 Cf. Robert Bellah, Richard Madsen, William M. Sullivan, Ann Swidler and Steven M. Tipton, Habits 
of the heart: Individualism and commitment in American life (New York: Harper & Row, 1985). Cf. also 
the important collection of essays edited by Axle Honneth, Kommunitarismus: Eine Debatte über die 
moralischen Grundlagen moderner Gesellschaften (Frankfurt a.M/New York: Campus, 1995, 3
rd
 
edition). 
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It should be noted that contributing to its presuppositions differs significantly from 
legitimising the political system of democracy. The fact that communicative freedom 
can contribute to trust in democracy itself still does not imply that Christian freedom 
and the institutionalised freedoms of democracy are to be equated with one another 
or that Huber advocates unqualified support for democracy. Attempts to equate 
Christian freedom with the freedoms of democracy will always be a devaluation of 
Christian freedom (Huber, 1996c:104). As was seen already in the first chapter, 
communicative freedom serves as a critical concept – and not a legitimising concept 
– in modern societies as it bridges the gap between individuality and sociality 
(Huber, 1990d) as well as between the individual and the public sphere (Huber, 
1985:113–127).  
 
In this sense the provisional character of communicative freedom again serves as 
important point of orientation, as the relationship of Protestantism with modernity – 
albeit one of critical affirmation – functions within an eschatological framework 
(Huber, 1990c:35), which is why Christians are able and willing to make a 
contribution to the maintenance of democracy. In the final instance this loyalty is both 
qualified and energised by a view on God‟s kingdom that transcends the boundaries 
of any form of government, as Huber states: 
 
As the New Testament teaches us, it will be a kingdom of unforced 
reconciliation, abolished oppression; it is a kingdom where violence, sin 
and death will be conquered. It will be a kingdom of freedom. That 
Christians who hope for this kingdom already start to put freedom into 
practice as solidarity should be a plausible idea. This idea grounds 
Protestantism‟s critical loyalty towards democracy (Huber, 1990c:35).269  
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 “Es ist, wie das Neue Testament lehrt, ein Reich zwangloser Versöhnung, aufgehobener 
Unterdrückung, beendeter Ausbeutung; es ist ein Reich, in dem Gewalt, Sünde und Tod überwunden 
sind. Es ist also ein Reich der Freiheit. Daß Christen, die auf das Reich der Freiheit hoffen, jetzt 
solidarische Freiheit praktizieren – das sollte ein plausibler Gedanke sein. Er begründet die kritische 
Loyalität der Protestanten zur Demokratie.” 
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3.4  The challenge of pluralism 
 
A last element of modernity‟s structuring of modernity Huber engages by means of 
communicative freedom is pluralism. In his speech “Der Auftrag der Kirchen in einem 
zusammenwachsenden Europa” (2005d) Huber makes his characteristic point270 that 
the fight for religious freedom by the Reformation had a decisive influence on the 
development of modernity and that the advocacy for the dignity and freedom of the 
individual person by the Reformation laid the groundwork also for modern processes 
of pluralisation.271 In a slightly different context he also argued in this manner in 
Rechtfertigung und Recht (2001h:43).  
 
Huber (2003a) notably does not view pluralism as an end in itself but as a descriptive 
category. Pluralism therefore only has legitimacy if it serves the dignity of different 
people who inhabit the same geographical space. Pluralism therefore also reaches 
its limits when the dignity of the person is not respected (Huber, 2005t): “For the 
sake of human freedom, the boundary of [society‟s] plurality should be formed by 
human rights as expression of the respect for the inalienable dignity of all people and 
the ability to enact this freedom.”272 
 
In this section it will be shown how Huber affirms the pluralisation of modernity, how 
he understands further pluralisation to proceed and in what sense he regards 
communicative freedom as an appropriate reaction to pluralism. 
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 In the lecture “Der christliche Glaube und die politische Kultur in Europa” Huber (2004h) states the 
Protestant contribution to pluralism unambiguously: “Kulturelle und religiöse Vielfalt, das Prinzip des 
Pluralismus, waren aber keineswegs immer selbstverständliche Elemente politischer Kultur in Europa. 
Sie sind ein christliches Erbe. Das Christentum hat wesentlich zur europäischen Pluralität beigetragen 
und ist auch weiterhin Garant und Prägekraft für die politische Kultur in der EU.” 
271
 For a detailed discussion on pluralism and its implications for Christianity, cf. Pluralismus und 
Identität, ed. Joachim Mehlhausen (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus/Chr Kaiser, 1995). For a 
discussion on the implications of pluralism for Christian ethics, cf. Ian S. Markham, Plurality and 
Christian Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
272
 “Um die Freiheit der Menschen willen erfährt die Pluralität ihre Grenzen an den Menschenrechten, 
die den Menschen in seiner unantastbaren Würde respektieren und ihn zum Gebrauch seiner Freiheit 
befähigen.” 
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3.4.1  Pluralism and the structure of modern societies 
Huber (1994a:167–172) describes his view on pluralism and pluralisation 
programmatically in the article “Öffentliche Kirche in pluralen Öffentlichkeiten”, which 
is an expanded version of a lecture he delivered at the Humboldt University in Berlin 
in 1993. He understands the different areas of reference of modern society, as was 
identified in a previous section, to be in need of continuous pluralisation and 
consequently describes the need for pluralisation in terms of these four areas of 
reference.273 
 
The democratic state, as the main actor in the political sphere, is responsible for 
creating and maintaining the space within which pluralism can be realised and 
protected. The respect for human rights, particularly the protection of the freedom of 
conscience and expression, and its legal framework are some of the most important 
means by which the democratic states enables the co-existence of different groups 
and individuals. Huber (1994a:168) is of the opinion that continued processes of 
pluralisation should enable the democratic state to facilitate peaceful and 
constructive co-existence better. He understands it to be possible especially by 
means of further decentralisation, increased public participation and a deepened 
orientation towards basic human and civil rights (Huber, 1994a:168). 
 
The economic sphere is characterised by the competition between different interests, 
and in particular between the different interests of capital and labour, and the 
competition between different sellers for the same buyers. Huber believes that its 
pluralisation should allow for the increased democratisation of the economic sphere. 
For Huber (1994a:169) this means that the market should not be left on its own, for 
leaving its processes to themselves does not necessarily serve the interests of the 
whole of society. Indeed, this may lead to uninhibited individualisation and the 
depletion of the social resources of society, for asking how common welfare is 
served will then not be of any importance. Huber therefore argues that the 
                                                             
273
 In some of Huber‟s analyses concerning the structure of society the work of Niklas Luhmann plays 
an implicit role. Cf. in this regard Günter Thomas and Andreas Schüle (eds.), Luhmann und die 
Theologie (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2006) and Niklas Luhmann in “Moderne 
Systemtheorien als Form gesamtgesellschaftlicher Analyse” (in Luhmann, N. & Habermas, J. (eds.), 
Theorie der Gesellschaft oder Sozialtechnologie. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1971) and The 
differentiation of society (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982). 
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democratisation of the market can only be brought about by general conditions set 
by political actors. 
 
The third area of reference of modern societies is civil society, and Huber regards its 
pluralisation as also contributing to a more humane society. Only a differentiated civil 
society is able to articulate its views legitimately in order to find universal consensus 
with regard to matters that concern the whole of society (Huber, 1994a:169–170). 
Huber (1994a:171) is of the opinion that – especially in previously homogenous 
societies – the increased enabling of cultural communication should serve as the 
basis for the pluralism of civil society. This means that neither relativism nor a 
universalistic search for homogeny should be regarded as appropriate reactions to 
pluralisation within society (Huber & Graf, 1991; Huber 1994a:171). Instead of 
longing for cultural monocentrism or multiculturalism with relativist indifference as 
aim, multicultural communication should assist in pluralising pluralism in order to 
contribute to a society where the constructive co-existence of difference is 
possible.274 In this article Huber shows how pluralism can serve human dignity and 
freedom when it is not interpreted as a goal in itself. In this context Huber argues that 
communicative freedom is a contribution to ensuring that pluralism and its continued 
pluralisation serves the dignity of individuals and the integrity of life in community. He 
consequently develops communicative freedom as a reaction to pluralism that 
transcends the positions of fundamentalism, integrationalism and relativism.  
 
3.4.2  Reacting to pluralism 
A number of reactions to the pluralism of modernity are possible, of which 
fundamentalism may currently the most visible. Fundamentalism as a reaction to 
societal pluralism forms an important background to especially Huber‟s recent 
discussions on pluralism.275 Especially the integration of German Muslims, attempts 
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 Cf. e.g. Huber, 1994a:171–172. Huber continues by stating that cultural communication is of 
importance especially in contexts where economic interests dominate public life. The dominance of 
economic interests often leads to utilitarian and expressive individualism that does not contribute to a 
society of different equals, able to engage in dialogue concerning the basic presuppositions of 
constructive co-existence. 
275
 Especially since 9/11 Huber started to address the challenge religious pluralism poses more often 
than the case was earlier. Cf. “Gerecht aus Glauben – die Gegenwartsbedeutung des christlichen 
Menschenbilds” (2001a), “Hat der Glaube noch Zukunft?” (2003b), “Protestantismus – Abgesang oder 
Zukunftsmodell?” (2004c), “Der christliche Glaube und die politische Kultur in Europa” (2004h), 
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of Turkey to become part of the European Union, the 9/11 tragedy and smaller 
incidents like the conflict a caricature drawn of Islam‟s prophet Mohammed caused 
and the cancellation of a German performance of Mozart‟s Idomeneo in Berlin in 
2006 cause Huber to often speak on how religious communities should react to 
societal pluralism. It is not, however, simply a recent theme in his work but is of 
relevance in much of his earlier work too. 
 
In 1991 already, in a discussion with Friedrich Wilhelm Graf in the journal 
Evangelische Kommentare titled as “Konfessorische Freiheit oder relativistische 
Offenheit. Ein theologisches Streitgespräch”, Huber (1991:671) stated that 
fundamentalism is one of the biggest dangers for religions trying to position 
themselves in a pluralistic (and globalising) context. In this article he describes 
fundamentalism as the search for simple relations amidst the factual reality of 
pluralism, which is given by means of strictly structured views on reality aimed at 
providing answers to pluralisation and change, especially in terms of a literal reading 
of the basic text of the specific community (Huber & Graf, 1991:671). In this context 
Huber emphasises the importance of religious communities being able and willing to 
engage in dialogue and to practise tolerance.276  
 
Huber identifies integrationalism as another position that can be adopted by religious 
communities in pluralistic contexts. Especially in Europe there are some who long for 
a Christian Europe, where the pluralism of modern society is managed by a Christian 
orientation (Huber & Graf, 1991:671). Huber typifies a third unconstructive religious 
reaction to the pluralism of modern society as that of relativism. Although often also 
called a pluralistic viewpoint, Huber sees a definite difference between the two. This 
is mainly because a pluralistic society is dependent on certain basic shared aims that 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
“Religionsfreiheit und offene Gesellschaft – ein Prüfstein aktueller Dialoge in Europa” (2004l), 
“Religion und Politik in Deutschland und den USA – ein Vergleich” (2004o), “Religion – Politik – 
Gewalt” (2005b), “Die Religionen und der Staat” (2005t), “Religionsfreiheit und Toleranz – Wie aktuell 
ist der Augsburger Religionsfriede?” (2005aa), “Die Religionen und der säkulare Staat” (2006j), 
“Dialog der Religionen” (2007g) and “Dialog der Religionen in einer pluralen Gesellschaft – 
Überlegungen aus evangelischer Perspektive” (2007q). 
276
 In terms of the current contours of fundamentalism, Huber understands consensus on a number of 
themes as presupposition for dialogue, namely the view on violence, the view on members of other 
religious communities, the view on the equality of especially men and women, the view of democracy 
and public responsibility, and the view of human rights and the freedom of religion in particular 
(Huber, 2004h; 2005t). 
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are fed by its pluralising, which will not be able to occur if an incapacitating relativism 
is made the main societal aim.277 
 
Developing the concept of communicative freedom is an attempt to avoid all of these 
positions by both respecting pluralism and contributing to its humane development 
(Huber & Graf, 1991:671). Within the context of pluralism Huber (1991:672) 
understands communicative freedom to respond to three challenges. Firstly, this 
Protestant understanding of freedom should show how the freedom of faith, the 
freedom of conscience and the responsible use of freedom in society belong 
together. As was shown in Chapter 1 in terms of Luther‟s theology freedom of 
conscience serves as the „hinge‟ between the freedom of faith and freedom in 
society (Huber, 1996c:108). 
 
In pluralistic contexts the implication of Luther‟s work on the freedom of conscience 
is that also the freedom of one‟s different neighbour should be respected (Huber, 
1990a:140), as respecting the freedom of others also means respecting differences. 
He therefore states in his article “Sozialethik als Verantwortungsethik” (1990a:165): 
 
The pluralising of ethical conceptions ... leads to a next step in the 
evolution of ethical worldviews. It signifies the transition from the simple to 
the reflexive use of principles.... Respect for others‟ freedom of 
conscience, which forms the basis of ethical orientations that might even 
differ from my own, is the origin of an ethics of responsibility.278 
 
Huber (1991:672) secondly regards the connection between individuality and 
sociality made by communicative freedom as an important presupposition for 
pluralism. Freedom, as was seen, can only be realised in community. Constructively 
engaging pluralism therefore means not seeing one‟s neighbour as a limit to one‟s 
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 In 1990d:46 Huber describes one of the greatest shortcomings of the relativist or postmodern 
position to be its assumed inability to contribute to the formation of identity. According to Huber, such 
a position implicitly understands indifference as the core of freedom, and such a concept of freedom 
does not enable the formation of identity.  
278
 “Die Pluralisierung ethischer Konzeptionen ... ruft nun aber einen weiteren Schritt in der Evolution 
ethischer Weltbilder hervor; den Übergang vom einfachen zum reflexiven Prinzipiengebrauch ... . Der 
Respekt vor der Gewissensfreiheit des andern, die ihn zu einer eigenen, von der meinigen 
möglicherweise abweichenden ethischen Orientierung nötigt, ist der Entstehungsort der 
Verantwortungsethik.” 
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own freedom (Huber, 1996c:106). Discourse between different groups and 
individuals on how to build societal cohesion is therefore not optional but a 
prerequisite for a constructive reaction to pluralism. 
 
Communicative freedom lastly engages the pluralism of modernity by means of its 
connection between freedom and responsibility (Huber & Graf, 1991:672). As was 
seen earlier in this chapter, self-limitation serves as expression of communicative 
freedom and is not to be understood as the limitation of freedom itself (Huber, 
1990a:193–194; 1990a:204–207; 1990b:243–246; 1993b:70–81; 1999:210–215). 
The peaceful co-existence of different individuals and groups is therefore not served 
by the self-righteous assertion, but as we have seen in Chapter 1 freedom becomes 
“concrete in the willingness to compromise and cooperate” (EKD, 2006a:13). 
 
By developing communicative freedom, Christian resources are therefore used to 
formulate a position that respects societal pluralism by constructively contributing to 
societal discourse on the meaningful realisation of freedom. The universalism of 
Huber‟s Christian sources is applied to the context of a plurality of interpretative 
communities. The tolerance inherent to such a position is therefore grounded in the 
conviction a diversity of positions is necessary to sustain societal pluralism, and 
therefore the universalism of the Christian sources is not used to disable dialogue. 
Huber does not understand pluralisation and pluralism as endangering the 
development and realisation of a Christian position on freedom but understands 
societal pluralism as requiring such contributions. 
 
 
4.  SUMMARY 
 
In this chapter the researcher has investigated how and within what context the 
concept of communicative freedom affirms modernity. It was shown that 
communicative freedom critically affirms both the centrality of the individual as well 
as the most important measures by which modernity organises society. 
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In the first section it was shown that human rights can be understood as the 
expression of modern society of the importance of the individual. It was shown how 
communicative freedom gives expression to the inalienable character of freedom 
and that God‟s bestowal of freedom forms the basis of the dignity of the person. 
Human dignity was also shown to be the point of connection between the Protestant 
understanding of freedom and human rights. 
 
The affirmation of the centrality of the individual was shown, however, to be a 
qualified affirmation. The connection between responsibility and individual freedom 
made by communicative freedom was shown to direct its understanding of human 
dignity. It was shown that responsibility and self-limitation are not in contradiction to 
individual freedom but serve as its expression. 
 
In the second section, the affirmation by communicative freedom of some of the 
fundamental societal principles of modernity was investigated. It was shown that 
there is no fundamental tension between secularisation, democracy, pluralism and 
communicative freedom but that Huber‟s concept of freedom is articulated to function 
within the context of these societal principles. Secularisation was described in the 
light of especially its juridical meaning and it was seen that the so-called renaissance 
of religion expresses the continued relevance of religiously motivated convictions. In 
the part concerning democracy it was consequently shown that this system of 
government is indeed dependent on trust-building concepts such as communicative 
freedom for its sustenance. Lastly it was shown that societal pluralism is not to be 
understood as a problem that needs to be solved but as a challenge that needs to be 
engaged. Huber‟s conviction that pluralism is not a goal in itself but is in service of 
human dignity was illustrated by his suggestion that communicative freedom is a 
constructive reaction to pluralism that transcends relativism, fundamentalism and 
integrationalism. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
RENEWING PROGRESS, RESTORING 
JUSTICE AND PRACTISING DIALOGUE 
How communicative freedom contributes 
to the renewal of modernity 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The thesis of this study is that Huber‟s concept of communicative freedom is a 
reformulation of Christian freedom in order to engage modernity critically. In Chapter 
1 the way in which the concept of communicative freedom rearticulates this freedom 
was therefore investigated. It was shown that communicative freedom is not an 
attempt to formulate a new theory on freedom but rearticulates the rediscovery of 
freedom by the Reformation. It was also shown that the theology of the Confessing 
Church plays a significant role in how Luther‟s rediscovery of Paul‟s work on freedom 
is rearticulated by communicative freedom. In one sense communicative freedom is 
therefore in continuity with classic Protestant concepts of freedom.  
 
At the same time the concept of communicative freedom is rearticulated to be of 
relevance in a specific context. The act of rearticulation itself shows that 
communicative freedom is a critical concept and unlocks the public relevance of the 
Protestant understanding of freedom. The first chapter therefore formed the basis for 
the consequent investigation of how this concept engages its context. The second 
and third chapters consequently concern the engagement of modernity by 
communicative freedom. The argument is structured as to devote one chapter to the 
primary ways in which communicative freedom affirms modernity and another to how 
it contributes to the renewal of modernity. 
 
The second chapter was devoted to the way in which communicative freedom 
affirms modernity. The investigation revealed that it is possible to evaluate its 
affirmation in terms of two dimensions of freedom, namely its individual and social or 
corporate dimensions. In this chapter, the contribution to the renewal of modernity 
will be investigated.279 
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 The necessity of the renewal of modernity is a position adopted by a number of authoritative 
researchers. Notably, and of importance for understanding Huber‟s work, Ulrich Beck‟s description of 
the development of „second modernity‟ coincides with the contribution of communicative freedom to 
the renewal of modernity. In the book Modernisierung der Moderne Beck, Wolfgang Bonß and 
Christoph Lau identifies five processes that necessitate the modernising of modernity and that are 
leading to second modernity (Beck et al., 2001:22–24). These five processes are (a) globalisation; (b) 
individualisation; (c) the gender revolution; (d) the so-called „third revolution‟, or the change in the 
structure of employment and maybe even of the „employment society‟; and (e) the political dynamics 
caused by the ecological crisis. For a theological attempt to describe a departure from modernity, cf. 
Michael Trowitzsch, Über die Moderne hinaus (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1999). 
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As has been mentioned in Chapter 2, Huber regards it as „premature‟ (voreilig) to bid 
farewell to modernity (Huber, 1990d:47) but at the same time views an uncritical 
advancement of the modernist project as insufficient (1990d:43–44). Questions 
regarding the central challenges of modernity should be posed in order for modernity 
to contribute to the betterment of humankind.280 For Huber, this means to utilise the 
critical loyalty towards modernity to find binding criteria for responsible actions in the 
present (1990d:50). In the light of an irrational faith in progress (e.g. Huber, 
1990d:39–43), a looming ecological crisis (e.g. Huber, 1990a:208–235; 2008b:50ff), 
continued poverty, inequality and injustice (e.g. Huber, 1980; 1987; 1990b) and 
renewed religious and cultural violence (e.g. Huber, 2004l; 2005aa; 2007g) Huber 
proposes that the theme of freedom is as relevant for the affirmation of modernity as 
it is for its renewal. In an interview Huber gave in 2008 he identifies taking 
responsibility for freedom as the 21st century‟s „great theme‟:  
 
Freedom is the important theme of the 21st century. After the century of 
dictatorships we have now entered the century of freedom. After the 
World Wars we are now in the century of responsibility for peace and the 
future (2008c).281 
 
The current challenges of modernity are addressed neither by a relativist view of 
freedom (Huber, 1990d:45; 1991:671; 1992a:101–102) nor by a fundamentalist view 
(Huber, 1990d:44; 1991:671; 1992a:101). Huber regards the continuation of 
modernity to be dependent on a view of freedom that proceeds from the identity of 
individuals and groups and not only connects individuality and sociality theoretically 
but also employs this connection to take responsibility in a complex world (Huber, 
1993a:14).282 As we have seen in the discussion of pluralisation, Huber (1991:671–
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 In his foreword of Protestantismus und Protest Huber (1987:10) formulates the need for the 
continued renewal of modernity by Protestantism as the contribution to “[die] Entwicklung einer 
politischen Kultur ... für die der Protest nicht ein lästiges Übel, sondern eine wichtige Form der 
politischen Mitverantwortung darstellt”. The aim of criticising democratic societal structures is 
therefore not their replacement but their reform in order to correspond with the dignity of all the 
members of society. 
281
 “Freiheit ist ja das große Thema des 21. Jahrhunderts. Nach dem Jahrhundert der Diktaturen sind 
wir in das Jahrhundert der Freiheit eingetreten, nach dem Jahrhundert der Weltkriege sind wir in das 
Jahrhundert der Verantwortung für Frieden und Zukunft eingetreten.” 
282
 Cf. e.g Huber‟s articulation in Die tägliche Gewalt (1993a:14): “So wertvoll ein Zugewinn an 
individueller Freiheit ist, so problematisch kann er werden, wenn der Sinn für Solidarität schwindet, 
dem die Freiheit der anderen ebenso wichtig ist wie die eigene. So bereichernd individuelle 
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672) suggests in his article “Konfessorische Freiheit oder relativistische Offenheit” 
ways in which communicative freedom can engage the challenges of modernity, 
namely connecting individual freedom with the equal freedom of other members of 
society, connecting freedom and self-limitation and emphasising the freedom of 
conscience as the presupposition for societal responsibility. 
 
The research done for this study has shown that communicative freedom contributes 
to the renewal of modernity in categories that broadly correspond with the three 
implications Huber identified in the article. In this chapter, Huber‟s contribution to the 
renewal of modernity will consequently be investigated in terms of three broadly 
corresponding themes. It should be noted that Huber does not give any systematic 
account of the contribution of either his theology or the concept of communicative 
freedom to the renewal of modernity. However, it is the premise of this study that the 
way in which Huber develops communicative freedom has definite implications for 
also the renewal of modernity. Moreover, applying the concept in this way unlocks its 
use in contexts other than Huber‟s native Germany. 
 
In the first section of this chapter, Huber‟s connection between freedom and self-
limitation will form the basis for his critique of the dominant concept of progress in 
modern societies. The ambiguity of progress, as the ecological crisis gives 
expression to, will form the background of this section. In the second section, 
Huber‟s connection between freedom and equality will be investigated as a 
contribution to making modernity more just. The challenge that continued poverty, 
exclusion and inequality pose to modernity forms the background of this section. In 
the third section of this chapter, increased global integration and the resultant 
cultural and religious tension and violence will form the backdrop for investigating the 
implications of taking freedom of conscience as starting point for realising 
communicative freedom. This will be done by investigating Huber‟s work on dialogue 
as a way to reach corporate responsibility for the humane and peaceful co-existence 
of different people. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
Freiheitsmöglichkeiten sein können, so fragwürdig werden sie, wenn eine wachsende Zahl von 
Menschen durch sie überfordert ist. Von individueller Freiheit kann nur verantwortlich Gebrauch 
machen, wer der eigenen Identität in ausreichendem Maß gewiß ist.” 
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2.  CONNECTING FREEDOM AND SELF-LIMITATION: 
 RENEWING PROGRESS 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
The speed with which living conditions are changing globally ... is still 
increasing. Terms such as nuclear energy, genetic engineering, modern 
communication technologies, digitalisation, artificial intelligence and 
artificial reproduction signal changes that most people cannot grasp, 
whether it is morally or intellectually. The achievements of technological 
development and societal advancement seem to be inextricably bound to 
its negative repercussions, such as the destruction of the natural 
environment and of humankind‟s social ecology, the endangering of 
individual biographies ... and the disruption of human relationships. Not 
only opportunities and life-expectancies are increasing, but also potential 
dangers (Huber, 1999:216).283 
 
In this text from Kirche in der Zeitenwende (1999) Huber expresses some of the 
most urgent challenges of modern times. The ambiguity of progress is central to 
these challenges, as scientific and technological progress in particular demonstrates: 
The apparent betterment of humankind is inextricably connected to its potential 
destruction.284 In a speech delivered at the Deutscher Evangelischer Kirchentag in 
                                                             
283
 “Noch immer nimmt die Geschwindigkeit zu, mit der sich die Lebensumstände auf dem Globus 
insgesamt ... umstülpen. Nuklearenergie, Gentechnologie, moderne Kommunikationstechniken, 
Digitalisierung, künstliche Intelligenz und künstliche Reproduktion: so heißen die Signalworte für 
einen Wandel, der in seiner Rasanz und in seinen Ausmaßen von den meisten Menschen weder 
intellektuell noch moralisch bewältigt werden kann. Die großen Erfolge technologischer Entwicklung 
und gesellschaftlichen Aufschwungs sind mit negativen Auswirkungen scheinbar unlöslich verquickt: 
mit Zerstörungen in der natürlichen Umwelt, wie in der Sozialökologie der Menschen; mit der 
Gefährdung individueller Biographien ...; mit dem Zerbrechen menschlicher Beziehungen .... Auf der 
einen Seite werden die Lebenschancen und Lebenserwartungen gesteigert; zugleich aber wachsen 
damit auch die Gefährdungen.” 
284
 For the critique of progress, cf. importantly Henrich von Nussbaum (ed.), Die Zukunft des 
Wachstums: Kritische Antworten zum “Bericht des Club of Rome” (Düsseldorf: Bertelsmann 
Universitätsverlag, 1973). For more recent German discussions, cf. Michael Schlitt, Umweltethik 
(Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1992) and Christina Aus der Au, Achtsam wahrnehmen: Eine 
theologische Umweltethik (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 2003).  
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Berlin in 1989285 Huber expresses this paradoxical phenomenon even clearer: Not 
only modern scientific and technological achievements are unfathomable but so are 
the possible catastrophes that accompany them (Huber, 1990a:211).286 According to 
Huber, modernity can imply a form of trust in progress that contributes to this 
ambiguity directly (1990a:198).287 
 
Huber (e.g. 1999:218–219) regards the connection between freedom and self-
limitation as crucial in addressing the ambiguity of progress. The concept of 
communicative freedom, as was seen in Chapter 2, connects self-limitation and 
individual freedom as freedom is understood to be realised in relationship with others 
(cf. e.g. Huber, 1985:211). The connection between freedom and self-limitation 
made by communicative freedom will consequently form the backdrop for 
investigating Huber‟s critique of progress and will be developed as a first contribution 
communicative freedom makes to the renewal of modernity.288  
 
In the first part of this section, Huber‟s view on progress as the integrative moment of 
modernity will be discussed. The second part will concern the basic 
misunderstanding of freedom that underlies an irrational trust in progress, namely a 
concept of freedom that is divorced from responsibility. This section will conclude 
with suggestions based on communicative freedom on how freedom can be realised 
responsibly in the principal areas of reference of modern societies. 
 
                                                             
285
 In this time Huber also wrote Protestantismus und Protest (1987) in which he regards nuclear 
energy as the symbol for human power and its ambiguities (Huber, 1987:23). 
286
 Shortly after this statement, Huber goes even further by stating that the potential for catastrophes 
is built into modern technological abilities: “Wir leben mit technischen Systemen, denen ein 
erhebliches Katastrophenpotential eingebaut ist” (Huber, 1990a:211). 
287
 In 1987 Huber (1987:109–110) regarded the ambivalence of progress to be visible in at least five 
areas: (a) “die Spaltung der Gesellschaft in diejenigen, die über Erwerbsarbeitsplätze verfügen, und 
Erwerbslose”; (b) “die noch immer wachsende Kluft zwischen Umweltbelastungen oder 
Umweltkatastrophen ... und die Ansätzen zu Gegenmaßnahmen”; (c) “der dramatische Gegensatz 
zwischen dem Wohlstand in den Industrienationen und den Lebensbedingungen in den Ländern 
Asiens, Afrikas und Lateinamerikas”; (d) “eine Form der Friedenssicherung, die den Frieden durch 
technische Mittel gewährleisten soll”; and (e) “die Gefahr, daß der wissenschaftliche Zugriff auf die 
genetische Ausstattung des Menschen in die technologische Manipulation des Lebens selbst münden 
wird”. 
288
 In this regard a section such as 1999:211–215 in Kirche in der Zeitenwende typifies the 
contribution Protestantism can make. Huber is of the opinion that by making use of Christian 
resources, especially that of the Reformation, the connection between freedom, self-control 
(Selbstbeherrschung) and self-limitation (Selbstbegrenzung) can again be regained. 
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2.2  An irrational trust in progress 
 
In his important article “Der Protestantismus und die Ambivalenz der Moderne” 
(1990d) Huber gives arguably his clearest explanation of why he understands the 
idea of progress to be the guiding theme for modernity. He considers Wilhelm von 
Humboldt‟s choice of „the autonomous self-reflexive individual‟, the accumulation of 
wealth or understanding modernity as simply a cultural or even economic 
phenomenon (1990d:37–38). He comes to the conclusion, however, that the 
influential proposal to understand the guiding theme for modernity as that of 
progress has the most merit. According to this interpretation, modernity is 
characterised by 
 
...its fleetingness, by the constant transition from the old to the new, from 
worse to better.289 This modern awareness of progress is built on the 
conviction that the transition to the new and the better should not be 
restricted to science and technology but should be extended to politics 
and culture (1990d:38).290 
 
He situates the roots of progress in the Enlightenment. At that time, however, 
progress was understood in other categories than the case is today, namely as the 
principal challenge humanity must set itself in order to be emancipated from its self-
imposed immaturity (1990d:38). To a large extent this initial version of progress can 
thus be understood as the need for political liberation and transformation from 
structures that disregard human autonomy and rationality. Huber consequently 
understands the French Revolution as an expression of the momentum this 
understanding of progress gained.291 In Huber‟s opinion, Kant‟s famous definition of 
                                                             
289
 Here Huber makes use of Charles Baudelaire‟s famous phrase “La modernité, c‟est le transitoire, 
le fugitif, le contingent” from his book Le Peintre de la vie moderne which is published in Friedhelm 
Kemp et al. (eds.), Charles Baudelaire: Sämtliche Werke / Briefe, Vol. 5. (Munich, 1989, pp. 213–
259). 
290
 “[Das Spezifische der Moderne liegt gerade in] ihrer Flüchtigkeit, im beständigen Übergang vom 
Alten zum Neuen, vom Schlechteren zum Besseren. Dieses neuzeitliche Fortschrittsbewusstsein ist 
davon überzeugt, daß der Übergang zum Neuen und Besseren nicht auf die Leitsektoren von 
Wissenschaft und Technik beschränkt bleiben darf, sondern auf die Bereiche von Politik und Kultur 
übergreifen muss.” 
291
 Huber (1987:111) understands the French and American revolutions to be connected in their 
shared conviction that societal progress should be measured by means of human dignity and related 
concepts. 
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the Enlightenment as the liberation from self-imposed immaturity – as was quoted in 
the previous chapter – is therefore closely connected to rational and autonomous 
political actions aimed at enabling the co-existence of the freedom of different 
individuals. Drawing on the meaning progress had during the Enlightenment, Huber 
concludes that when modernity stays true to the heritage of the Enlightenment, real 
progress should principally be measured by the enforcement of a constitution within 
states and peace between states and should always have a critical character 
(1990a:200). 
 
Huber believes that this initial – one may even say legitimate – understanding of 
progress has faded. Increased technological capabilities and expanded scientific 
knowledge have led to the departure from its initial critical character (Huber, 
1990d:38). In his article “Fortschrittsglaube und Schöpfungsgedanke. Überlegungen 
zur Verantwortung der Wissenschaft” (1990a:195–207) Huber explains that this 
critical idea of progress has been replaced by trust in progress. According to him, the 
trust in progress implies belief in the future and the confidence that this future will be 
better (1990a:198).292 For Huber, trust in progress therefore gives expression to the 
relationship modernity has to time (1990d:36), as modernity understands human 
activity to be able to facilitate change in order to constantly move to a better world. 
 
Already in his book Kirche Huber (1979:211–216) bases his critique of progress on 
its unqualified trust in a better future.293 History is understood as the gradual but 
certain transition to a better world. Huber (1979:213) articulates his criticism as 
follows: “The key motive [of progress] is not the idea that the expansion of human 
abilities in itself is already progress, but of greater importance is the idea that the 
concept of progress refers to a better future...”294 The result is that discoveries as 
diverse as that of “gunpowder, the compass or the art of printing” and historical 
experiences as diverse as “the discovery of America and the contention that the 
                                                             
292
 The original German formulation is even more striking: “Fortschrittsglaube ist Zukunftsgewißheit: 
die Gewißheit nämlich einer besseren Zukunft” (Huber, 1990a:198). 
293
 Here his argument is that trust in a better future cannot be based on human abilities but only on 
God‟s goodness (1979:215). The church, and not technology or science, therefore embodies this 
hope. 
294
 “Das beherrschende Motiv ist dann nicht die Meinung, daß alle Expansion menschlicher Macht 
schon Fortschritt sei; sondern bestimmend ist der Gedanke, daß der Begriff des Fortschritts auf eine 
bessere Zukunft verweist...” 
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individual is free” are all interpreted as the proof that what is new is better than what 
is old and that this transition is the direct result of human abilities. Huber (1990a:199) 
sees this belief in progress reflected in the changed meaning of knowledge: 
Knowledge is no longer understood as the cognitive consideration of an inexplicable 
world295 but as research, discovery and construction. 
 
Huber chooses to speak of the „belief‟ in progress rather than the „concept‟ or „theory‟ 
of progress to characterise its departure from being the result of the actions of free 
and autonomous persons to an irrational trust in human abilities.296 Central to its 
irrationality is the conviction that societal progress follows the same trends297 as 
those that are discovered in nature and created in the development of new 
technologies (Huber, 1990a:200).298 
 
Huber recognises this irrational trust in progress in at least four of the societal 
spheres of modernity.299 The rationality of science is characterised, for example, by a 
profound dichotomy between what is immediate and its possible medium- and long-
term consequences. Its inability to extend the strict rationality of observation, 
experimentation and theorising to the medium and long term reveals a contradictory 
irrationality or at least a rationality based on a restricted view of time (Huber, 
1990d:40).  
 
Huber also deconstructs the rationality of economic efficiency: The irrational and 
unsustainable exploitation of nature does not correspond with the focus on 
sustainability and rationality with regard to forms of organisation, even though forms 
of organisation are dependent on the sustainable development of nature (Huber, 
                                                             
295
 This phrase is difficult to translate to English and reads as follows in German: “Das Wissen 
versteht sie nicht mehr als das erkennende Betrachten einer unverfügbaren Welt ....”  
296
 It is significant to note that Huber delivered the lecture “Fortschrittsglaube und 
Schöpfungsgedanke” and argued for the irrationality aspects of the belief in progress at the University 
of Gießen in honour of a natural scientist. 
297
 Huber makes use of the term Eigengesetzlichkeit that Weber uses to describe the functional 
differentiation of modernity to refer to the trends, or even laws, that are transferred from science and 
technology to the other spheres of human existence. 
298
 In “Der Protestantismus und die Ambivalenz der Moderne” Huber also describes this transferral of 
trends as the reason for the deviation for the „original‟ understanding of progress: “Doch die 
Erfahrung, daß die Erweiterung wissenschaftlicher Kenntnisse und technischer Fähigkeiten mit 
eigengesetzlicher Gewalt Fortschritt ermöglicht und verbürgt, führt zum Verblassen dieses kritischen 
Fortschrittsbegriffs” (1990d:38). 
299
 Cf. also Huber 1990a:176–194; 1990a:208–225; 1990d:40. 
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1990d:41). Regarding the rationality of politics another dichotomy is of relevance: 
Whereas modern nation states are internally organised around broadly trustworthy 
and legitimate institutions, international relationships often exhibit irrational conflicts, 
illegitimate actions and untrustworthy politics (Huber, 1990d:41). Moreover, in terms 
of the personal way of life, modern society‟s promise of a rational and meaningful 
order paradoxically leads to fragmented and isolated individuals (Huber, 1999:89ff) 
who are at the mercy of their perception of their personal needs (Huber, 1990d:42). 
 
Huber argues that the irrationality of the trust in progress diverges from the 
Enlightenment rationality that gave birth to it (1990a:200). The Enlightenment did not 
consider progress to be based on a blind faith in human abilities but saw progress as 
the result of planned actions taken by free individuals, sometimes in the face of 
resistance (1990a:200–201). Freedom was therefore not understood as the arbitrary 
use of abilities but as planned action. It is clear that the way in which Huber develops 
communicative freedom is a response to this challenge (cf. Huber, 1990d:43). Huber 
proposes the connection between freedom and responsibility made by 
communicative freedom by means of self-limitation to address this irrationality. 
 
2.3  Regaining the connecting between freedom and self-limitation 
 
The intensifying ecological crisis serves as one of the clearest examples of how the 
irrational trust in progress of modernity is leading to escalating crises (Huber, 
2008b:50–51).300 Huber regards the „residual risk‟ (Restrisiko) of technological 
advancements – the possible danger even when all theoretically possible safety 
measures have been taken – as constantly increasing. Although most of humanity is 
subjected to it unwillingly and even unknowingly, it significantly endangers the 
continued existence of life on earth (Huber, 1990a:212).301 
                                                             
300
 Huber describes the ecological crisis as the “central challenge regarding humanity‟s responsibility 
for creation in the 21
st
 century” (2008b:50) and regards the measures that should be taken as 
transcending previous forms of responsibility: “Diese Aufgaben gehen über den gewohnten 
räumlichen und zeitlichen Horizont persönlicher wie politischer Lebensgestalung hinaus. Wir sind 
unmittelbar an der Gestaltung von Lebensbedingungen beteiligt, die über die eigene Lebenszeit oder 
den Horizont der eigenen Verantwortlichkeit hinausweisen. ... Wir leben in einer natürlichen Umwelt, 
die wir als Einzelne nicht unmittelbar bestimmen können, deren Existenz und Fortbestand wir alle 
aber mittelbar prägen.”  
301
 In describing the causes of this residual risk Huber especially focuses on the potential dangers of 
nuclear energy. In this regard see, e.g. Huber, 1987:24–25. 
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Huber (1990a:197ff) regards the tendency in politics and science to react simply with 
increased safety measures as misinterpreting the core of the challenge. For him, the 
key challenge is not to develop „mistake-friendly‟ (fehlerfreundliche) and humane 
technologies but to protect progress against the potential failures of humanity 
(Huber, 1990a:197). The challenge is not simply to „immunise‟ technology against 
human failures but to inquire critically as to the understanding of freedom and the 
consequent understanding of progress that underlie these modern challenges.302 
 
Reacting to the ambiguity of progress with renewed and intensified measures of 
control conceals the fact that the realisation of freedom depends on the setting of 
societal goals that correspond with human dignity. Huber consequently understands 
the dominance of an irrational trust in progress as a „goal crisis‟ (Zielkrise) and not a 
„control crisis‟ (Steuerungskrise) (1990a:204–205).303  
 
In a first step the irrationality of progress should be addressed by recognising that 
technological, economic and scientific advancement are already societal goals 
themselves and should therefore not be subjected only to measures of control but to 
criticism: 
 
Technological progress and economic growth do not ensure employment 
for everybody who searches for a work. It is in fact linked to increasing 
unemployment. Technological progress is accompanied by a „residual 
risk‟ of which the menacing character can be suppressed but not ignored. 
                                                             
302
 In Protestantismus und Protest Huber (1987:107) motivates his critique of progress from another 
perspective, namely regarding how quality of life can be understood. The search for increased 
(economic) growth does not address the deeper question of whether it contributes to a better quality 
of life. Huber therefore states, “Die selbstzerstörerischen Folgen unbegrenzten Wachstums kamen in 
den Blick. Die Frage nach der Lebensqualität, die Überlegungen über qualitatives Wachstum, aber 
auch die Debatte über gesellschaftliche Grundwerte sind Signale dafür, daß die Frage aufs neue 
ansteht, welche Ziele gesellschaftlicher Entwicklung ethisch verantwortet werden können.” 
303
 In this section he formulates this challenge as follows: “[Die Gefährdungen der Gegenwart 
bedeuten] nicht nur eine Steuerungskrise, sondern eine Zielkrise. Denn in ihnen meldet sich die 
Frage an, welche Ziele gesellschaftlichen Handelns und damit auch wissenschaftlicher Forschung 
verantwortet werden können” (Huber 1990a:204―205). 
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What kind of goals can justify these ambivalent effects? Or should the 
reversion to another modernity be announced?304 (Huber, 1987:107) 
 
In a second step Huber proposes the revision of societal goals by means of the 
connection between freedom and self-limitation. When freedom is divorced from 
responsibility, and consequently self-limitation, it leads to a measure of arbitrariness 
and irrationality that can endanger life on earth.305 Communicative freedom bridges 
the assumed contradiction between freedom and self-imitation by showing that 
responsibility does not limit freedom but is its expression.306 Individual dignity does 
not mean protecting one‟s own against that of one‟s neighbour but can be realised 
freely only in relation to others, as was seen in chapters 1 and 2 (Huber, 1990d:57–
65).  
 
Communicative freedom therefore shows that individualistic self-determination is not 
compatible with authentic human freedom and that self-limitation is an expression of 
freedom: 
 
If one wants to recognise self-determination – that means freedom – as 
the aim and meaning of human life, one should not only endeavour to lead 
one‟s own life according to the principle of moral autonomy but should 
abstain from assuming to have right over others‟ lives. Self-determination 
can be regarded as a universal moral principle only when it also allows for 
self-imitation. Humanity is shown in the ability to connect one‟s own 
interests with respect for others‟ lives. This is also what the basic principle 
                                                             
304
 “Technischer Fortschritt und wirtschaftliches Wachstum verbürgen nicht mehr Arbeitsplätze für 
alle, die Arbeit suchen; vielmehr verbinden sie sich mit konstant hoher Erwerbslosigkeit. Technischer 
Fortschritt ist von einem „Restrisiko‟ begleitet, dessen bedrohlicher Charakter immer wieder verdrängt, 
aber doch nicht geleugnet werden kann. Vor welchen Zielen lassen sich diese ambivalenten 
Wirkungen verantworten? Oder ist die Umkehr in eine anderen Moderne angesagt?” 
305
 Cf. Huber‟s discussion of this Beliebigkeit in lectures such as “In Verantwortung vor Gott und den 
Menschen” (2002a), “Rückkehr zur Lehre vom gerechten Krieg? Aktuelle Entwicklungen in der 
evangelischen Friedensethik” (2004p), “Flugblätter der Freiheit. Verantwortliches Handeln aus 
christlichen Wurzeln” (2006b), “Gemeinschaft gestalten – Evangelisches Profil in Europa” (2006i), 
“Mündigkeit und Macht – Dietrich Bonhoeffers Anspruch an Kirche und Gesellschaft heute” (2006l) 
and “Verantwortlich im Sinne der Pressefreiheit” (2006q). 
306
 Here Huber‟s interpretation of Luther‟s double thesis is again relevant: One is never free until one 
is able to serve one‟s neighbour. 
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of Jewish and Christian ethics says: love for oneself and for others belong 
together (Huber, 1999:218–219).307 
 
Respecting human freedom means acknowledging that freedom can only be realised 
in community, and communicative freedom expresses the fact that freedom is 
dependent on a „responsible form of life‟ (verantwortete Lebensform) (Huber, 
1993a:12).  
 
In Kirche in der Zeitenwende Huber (1999:203ff) sketches possible ways in which 
freedom can be realised responsibly in the different areas of reference of modern 
societies.308 These suggestions illustrate how societal progress need not be divorced 
from self-limitation as this form of responsibility indeed contributes to the wellbeing of 
society.309 In the next section the researcher will therefore investigate communicative 
freedom as a goal for societal progress in economics, politics, cultural 
communication and personal life conduct.  
 
2.3.1 Communicative freedom as a goal for societal progress 
In the economic sphere Huber proposes economic freedom as a societal goal by 
which to measure societal progress (1999:203). In the light of the ambivalences of 
any economic system and the need for comprehensive economic freedom, Huber is 
of the opinion that the system of social market economy is the most dependable 
                                                             
307
 “Wer Selbstbestimmung – und das heißt: Freiheit – als Ziel und Sinn menschlichen Lebens 
anerkannt wissen will, der muß nicht nur sich selbst darum bemühen, sein eigenes Leben nach den 
Grundsätzen sittlicher Autonomie zu führen; er muß auch darauf verzichten, sich das 
Verfügungsrecht über fremdes Leben anzumaßen. Als universales Moralprinzip wird 
Selbstbestimmung nur dann anerkannt, wenn wir zur Selbstbegrenzung in der Lage sind. Humanität 
zeigt sich in der Fähigkeit, das Interesse am eigenen Leben und die Achtung vor fremdem Leben 
miteinander zu verbinden. Nichts anderes sagt der Grundsatz der jüdischen und christlichen Ethik, 
der die Liebe zum andern und die Liebe zum eigenen Leben auf eine Stufe stellt.” 
308
 As was seen in Chapter 2 and as Huber describes programmatically in his articles “Öffentliche 
Kirche in pluralen Öffentlichkeiten” (1994a) and “Christliche Freiheit in der freiheitlichen Gesellschaft” 
(1996c), he regards modern societies to consist of four principal areas of reference, namely a political 
sphere, an economic sphere, a cultural sphere and a sphere where personal interests are organised 
in civil society. 
309
 At this juncture it should be noted that Huber also balances his critique of progress, and indeed his 
critique of modernity, by acknowledging that the church should also be able and willing to learn from 
modernity. In a lecture delivered in Dietrich Bonhoeffer House in Münster (“Protestantismus – 
Abgesang oder Zukunftsmodell?”) Huber (2004c) e.g. stated, “Natürlich, auch die 
Reformationskirchen mussten immer wieder neu lernen, all die modernen Erfindungen wie Freiheit, 
Individualität und Autonomie, wie die Trennung von Staat und Kirche, von Politik und Religion, von 
Glaube und Bürgerrechten als ihre eigenen, selbstständig gewordenen Kinder zu erkennen.” 
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guarantor for economic freedom (Huber, 1996c:101; 1999:203). According to this 
view, the possibility to maximise the benefits of the privileged individuals should not 
be the sole standard for economic freedom but should be brought into balance by 
the way in which the economic freedom of society protects those in disadvantaged 
positions and the way in which it prevents the misuse of power (Huber, 1996c:101; 
1999:203).  
 
In his speech “Die Rolle der Kirchen als intermediärer Institutionen in der 
Gesellschaft” (2000a) delivered at the conference entitled “Die Zukunft der Soziale” 
Huber articulates his support for social capitalism in terms of this connection 
between freedom and responsibility:  
 
The social market economy is meaningful in the sense that it does not 
allow legitimate competition to degenerate into a social Darwinist jungle 
where [only] the toughest [can] assert themselves. It is much rather to be 
understood as a system of checks and balances where conflict and 
cooperation, self-interest and public interest, the quest for self-
preservation and consideration for others can be reconciled. The social 
market economy does not allow self-interest and the interests of society, 
self-realisation and respect for fellow human beings, individual freedom 
and social responsibility to contradict one another, and therein lies its 
ethical significance.310 
 
The economic sphere of modernity should therefore not simply be directed at 
ensuring that individual profit can be maximised but connects the freedom for 
individual initiative and creativity with a realism regarding society that protects those 
whom the system has failed. 
 
                                                             
310
 “[D]ie soziale Marktwirtschaft hat ihren Sinn gerade darin, dass sie den legitimen wirtschaftlichen 
Konkurrenzkampf nicht zu einem sozialdarwinistischen Dschungel verkommen lässt, in dem sich der 
Brutalste durchsetzt, sondern als ein System von „checks and balances‟ versteht, in dem Konflikt und 
Kooperation, Eigennutz und Gemeinsinn, Selbsterhaltungsstreben und Rücksichtnahme auf andere 
miteinander vereinbar sind. Der ethische Sinn dieser Ordnung besteht gerade darin, Eigennutz und 
den Nutzen der Allgemeinheit, Selbstverwirklichung und das Achten auf den Mitmenschen, 
individuelle Freiheit und soziale Verantwortung nicht zu unvereinbaren Gegensätzen werden zu 
lassen.” 
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Huber regards political freedom to be a meaningful aim for the political sphere, with 
civil and human rights forming the core of this freedom. On the one hand, these 
rights should safeguard all people against illegitimate uses of the power of the state; 
on the other hand, these rights should enable participation in political decision 
making and the responsible realisation of rights (Huber, 1996c:101; 1999:204). 
Huber (1996c:101; 1999:204) identifies three characteristics of the status of the 
individual that should serve as foundation for civil and human rights in a free society: 
the absence of illegitimate restrictions of freedom, the right to democratic 
participation in the formation of society and reciprocal respect based on the 
fundamental equality of all persons. 
 
Huber (1999:204) understands democracy as the political system that best 
corresponds with the societal aim of political freedom as it respects civil and human 
rights311 and by implication humanity‟s inalienable dignity.312 Democracy can be 
understood as a system that institutionalises the need for responsibility and self-
limitation. By means of majority rule, democracy can provide a meaningful way (der 
Königsweg) to facilitate societal pluralism (Huber, 1999:205).313 Huber adds that 
democracy is dependent on the ability and willingness of citizens to take part in 
democratic processes as a subsequent aim of political freedom (Huber, 1999:205). 
Political freedom can only be maintained when citizens are willing and able to 
participate in political processes on behalf of society. The aim of political freedom is 
therefore dependent on the transparency, visibility, possibility of participation and 
integrity of political processes (Huber, 1999:206).314 
                                                             
311
 Cf. Protestantismus und Protest (1987:74–79), “Protestantismus und Demokratie” (1990c), “Der 
christliche Glaube und die politische Kultur in Europa” (2004h) and “Religionsfreiheit und offene 
Gesellschaft – ein Prüfstein aktueller Dialoge in Europa” (2004l). 
312
 Cf. also Huber‟s book Rechtfertigung und Recht. Über die christlichen Wurzeln der europäischen 
Rechtskultur (2001h:12–18) in which Huber succinctly explains the relationship between the 
Reformation, human dignity and the role of human rights in current-day global society. 
313
 In constitutional democracies majority rule of course does not have the upper hand but is 
organised by a constitution. In this respect it should be noted that dictatorship of the majority also 
does not serve the peaceful co-existence of equal but different groups and individuals. Especially the 
way in which the difference between civil and human rights is realised and connected with political 
participation can lead to systemic exclusion of minority groups and can even result in a totalitarian 
type of majority rule. Although Huber at some points convincingly connects democracy with its 
sustaining pluralism (e.g. Huber, 1994a) Huber does not work out the implications of the protection 
and empowerment of minorities by democracy in depth. 
314
 This is of special relevance for contexts of developing democracies and especially for democracies 
still reeling from the effects of systemic injustices, as the case is in South Africa. When the process of 
normalising a society includes implementing a new political system and enabling the majority of the 
country‟s citizens to partake in this system at the same time, an extremely concerted and 
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One of the important ways to form and maintain the political sphere and to make it 
accessible to all citizens is the continued protection and realisation of cultural 
freedom. In a society that consists of different spheres, groups and individuals the 
ability and willingness of citizens to engage in dialogue in order to take responsibility 
is an important goal for societal progress, as well as a measure thereof (Huber, 
1999:206). These dialogues most often take place in symbolic terms, by means of 
the cultural resources of different groups, and are therefore dependent on the 
cultural freedom of society. Without cultural freedom the development, utilisation and 
articulation of the cultural resources will not be possible, and when citizens are not 
able or willing to engage in dialogue, the cohesion of society is endangered. When 
speaking of cultural freedom, therefore, one is not simply speaking of some 
additional societal resource but of “the decisive space of communication where the 
debates concerning society‟s future take place and where societal cohesion is 
shaped” (Huber, 1999:207).315  
 
For cultural freedom to be practised, society needs to be open to the participation of 
all the inhabitants of the public sphere. Not only the protection of the freedoms of 
religion, art, science and opinion is therefore important but also the independence of 
institutions of civil society (Huber, 1999:207). Societal discourse by means of cultural 
communication is consequently not simply communication between different 
individuals. Indeed, such a viewpoint may be based on an illusionary view of society. 
Huber believes that rather than understanding the public sphere as consisting of free 
and rational subjects and dialogue to take place between these subjects, it is 
meaningful to base societal discourse on the interpretation communities that 
individuals – willingly or not – belong to (Huber, 1994a:170): 
 
[T]he abilities to judge and to contribute to the responsible formation of the 
community are formed in the first instance in clear groupings, built on 
shared interpretations of reality, with their attention focused on specific 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
comprehensive effort is necessary to ensure continued political freedom (cf. Huber, 1999:205). Cf. in 
this regard Charles Villa-Vicencio and Erik Doxater (eds.), Pieces of the puzzle: Keywords on 
reconciliation and transitional justice (Cape Town: Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, 2004). 
315
 “Kultur bildet den entscheidenden Verständigungsraum, in dem die Debatten über das Zukunftsbild 
der Gesellschaft ausgetragen werden und in dem sich gesellschaftliche Kohäsionskräfte bilden.” 
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duties within this reality and in this sense contributing to a richer and a 
more profound understanding of shared public responsibilities.316 
 
Therefore, civil society is one of the most important factors in reaching the goal of 
cultural freedom. 
 
The fourth societal goal Huber formulates in terms of freedom is that of personal 
freedom. Despite criticism against individualism and the importance of supra-
individual conditions, the individual person is fundamentally the „carrier‟ of freedom 
and responsibility and modern societies should allow the unique abilities of the 
individual to be realised and put in service of the society itself (Huber, 1999:208).317 
As was seen in both Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, the question as to how personal 
freedom is to be realised can only be answered by having the freedom of other 
persons in view. Huber therefore strongly connects personal freedom with 
responsibility and argues for a society within which this connection is acknowledged 
and nurtured (Huber, 1996c:103; 1999:208). 
 
As to how a concept of freedom is to be utilised as societal goal that can correct trust 
in progress Huber‟s work on the structure of modern societies is relevant. Although it 
may seem otherwise, Huber suggests freedom as a societal goal from the ranks of 
the church as one of the many different actors of civil society (cf. Huber, 1994a:168–
172; 1996c:101–103; 1999:267–282). Suggesting societal goals in this way therefore 
does not imply an attempt at „controlling‟ the public sphere but is one of the 
convinced expressions of concern needed for the sustenance of constructive societal 
discourse. The pluralism of individuals, groups and opinions – as we have seen in 
Chapter 2 – does indeed require profiled contributions.  
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 “[D]ie Urteilsfähigkeit und damit auch die Fähigkeit zur verantwortlichen Mitgestaltung des 
Gemeinwesens [bildet sich] zuerst in überschaubaren Gruppierungen ..., die sich auf eine 
gemeinsame Interpretation der Wirklichkeit verständigen, die ihre Aufmerksamkeit auf bestimmte 
Aufgaben in dieser Wirklichkeit konzentrieren und gerade so zu einer reicheren und gehaltvolleren 
Wahrnehmung der allen gemeinsamen öffentlichen Aufgaben beitragen.” 
317
 Despite his defence of individual freedom Huber (1996c:112) regards the individual person to be 
faced with considerable challgenges when attempting to realise freedom responsibly. Most notably 
the diminished influence of institutions places pressure on the individual‟s ability to understand both 
societal reality and individual biography: “Mit der abnehmenden Bedeutung von Institutionen erhöht 
sich ... die Gestaltungsaufgabe der einzelnen. Die Integrationsleistung, die bisher in erheblichem 
Umfang von den Institutionen übrnommen wurde, muß nun von den Individuen selbst erbracht 
werden. Lebenslauf und Lebenssituation werden nun durch eine Abfolge individueller Entscheidungen 
bestimmt. ... Der einzelne wird zum Planungsbüro der eigenen Bastelbiographie.” 
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This concise discussion of how self-limitation and responsibility can form the basis 
for societal progress has made it possible to conclude the first of Huber‟s 
contributions to the renewal of modernity. In the following section, Huber‟s 
contribution to the restoral of comprehensive justice will be discussed as a second 
contribution. This will be done by investigating the way in which he reframes the 
tension between freedom and equality. The last section in this chapter will 
investigate the need for dialogue as an expression of responsible freedom in an 
interconnected world. 
 
 
3.  CONNECTING FREEDOM AND EQUALITY: MAKING 
 MODERNITY MORE JUST 
 
3.1  Introduction 
 
In the previous section, Huber‟s thought was used to argue that the progress of 
modernity was originally aimed at liberation from inhumane societal conditions and 
that this impulse needs to be renewed by connecting freedom and self-limitation. 
During the Enlightenment especially the political structures of the time needed to 
conform to the basic recognition of the equal dignity of all persons, and processes 
were set into motion to institutionalise the recognition of the equal dignity of all 
persons. However, despite this societal progression millions of people are still not in 
a position to experience these advances. The United Nations‟ Human Development 
Reports, especially the 2005 report, serve to illustrate this state of affairs (United 
Nations Development Programme, 2005:17–18).  
 
In 2003, for example, 18 countries‟ score on the human development index (HDI) 
weakened. These 18 countries have a combined population of 460 million people. 
Despite immense growth in some countries, 10.7 million children under the age of 
five still die yearly, more than one billion people have to survive on less than $1 a 
day and 2.5 billion people live on less than $2 a day. These 2.5 billion people 
account for 40% of the world‟s population but only contribute 5% of global income. 
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The global inequality these figures signify are alarming:  The 500 richest persons in 
the world earn more than the income of the world‟s 460 million poorest people. The 
world‟s richest 10% earn 54% of its income.318 Added to these figures one has to 
note that in 2003 alone three million people died of Aids and a further five million 
people were infected with HIV/Aids.  
 
These and other global challenges convince Huber (e.g. 1996b:155–156) that the 
discourse on justice is of profound importance for the renewal of modernity and that 
communicative freedom can contribute to making modernity more just (1999:189–
195). 
 
This is significant as „absolute‟ justice and „absolute‟ freedom are often understood 
as being mutually exclusive.319 Social justice, on the one hand, is often understood 
as a limitation of freedom, and as motivation for this line of argumentation ideologies 
such as National Socialism in Germany are used to illustrate how susceptible some 
conceptions of justice can be to being used for totalising equality (Huber, 
1999:189).320 This totalitarian implementation of the idea of equality that disregards 
individual freedom has consequently led to some of the greatest atrocities of modern 
times (Huber, 1999:190). Freedom, on the other hand, is again often understood as 
incompatible with justice as it promotes individual achievement instead of the 
fundamental equality of humanity. Even in those cases where justice and freedom 
are connected, the focus is mostly on the legal dimension of justice (Huber, 
1999:189) and freedom is understood in terms of Cicero‟s famous dictum Suum 
cuique („To each his own‟, taken up in German literature as the equally famous 
phrase Jedem das Seine). This expresses an individualised understanding of justice 
                                                             
318
 For a South African interpretation, cf. Jacklyn Cock, The war against ourselves: nature, power and 
justice (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2007).  
319
 For discussions on the relation between freedom and justice, especially in the German context, cf. 
Christian Schlüter, Gleichheit – Freiheit – Gerechtigkeit: Versuch einer Ortsbestimmung in praktischer 
Absicht (Dissertation written at the Humboldt University, 1999); Ulrich Steinvort, Gleiche Freiheit: 
politische Philosophie und Verteilungsgerechtigkeit (Berlin: Akademisches Verlag, 1999); Peter 
Fischer (ed.), Freiheit oder Gerechtigkeit: Perspektiven politischer Philosophie (Leipzig: Reclam, 
1995); and Ralph Dahrendorf, Die neue Freiheit: Überleben und Gerechtigkeit in einer veränderten 
Welt (Munich: Piper, 1975) 
320
 For a useful account of the process of restoring justice in South Africa after apartheid, cf. The 
Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, Truth, justice, memory: South Africa’s truth and reconciliation 
process (Cape Town: Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, 2008). 
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as the only understanding compatible with the individualism supposed to be 
associated with freedom (Huber, 1996b:157). 
 
In his magisterial Gerechtigkeit und Recht (1996b:149–198) Huber consequently 
identifies the basic tension responsible for hampering the discourse of modernity on 
justice as the tension between equality and freedom:321 “Real justice can only be 
realised to the extent that a balance between freedom and equality is made possible. 
It [justice] therefore aims at societal structures that allows for freedom and equality to 
nurture and define one another” (1996b:171).322 
 
In addressing the continued injustice of modernity, Huber (1999:168–170; 
1996c:104–106) proposes that the tension between freedom and equality should be 
reframed, and he suggests the connection between individuality and sociality made 
by communicative freedom to reframe this tension.323 The researcher will 
consequently investigate the reframing of the tension between freedom and equality 
as the second contribution to the renewal of modernity by communicative 
freedom.324  
 
This will be done by commencing with a discussion on the role of justice in modern 
societies. This will form the background for discussing Huber‟s suggestion that 
                                                             
321
 In this regard, cf. John de Gruchy‟s endeavour to introduce justice to the Reformed symbols by 
showing it as not incompatible with these symbols in “Auf dem Weg zu einer reformierten Theologie 
der Befreiung: Die Wiederaneignung der reformierten Symbole im Kampf um Gerechtigkeit” (in Zur 
Zukunft der Reformierten Theologie: Aufgaben, Themen, Traditionen, edited by Michael Welker and 
David Willis, Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1998:137–156). 
322
 “Wirkliche Gerechtigkeit kann also nur in dem Maß verwirklicht werden, in dem ein Gleichgewicht 
zwischen Freiheit und Gleichheit ermöglicht wird; sie zielt also auf gesellschaftliche Strukturen, in 
denen Freiheit und Gleichheit sich wechselseitig fördern und begrenzen.” 
323
 In some of his works Huber explicitly also mentions globalisation as a challenge to create 
structures within which freedom and equality can “nurture and define one another”. In the speech 
“Freiheit und soziale Gerechtigkeit – Sozialer Protestantismus in der globalisierten Welt” (2007n) 
Huber engages the structural challenges arising from economic globalisation: “Angesichts der 
zunehmenden globalen Vernetzung industrieller Produktionsprozesse und der sich ähnlich schnell 
verändernden Spielräume nationalstaatlicher Politik ist der Anpassungsdruck auf bestehende 
Strukturen in Wirtschaft, Staat und Gesellschaft spürbar. ... Es gibt nicht mehr den großen Gegensatz 
zwischen der „freien Marktwirtschaft‟ und den Planwirtschaften, sondern eine Vielfalt von 
unterschiedlichen Kapitalismen und damit verbundenen wirtschafts- und sozialpolitischen Pfaden in 
die Zukunft.” Cf. in this regard also Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and its discontents (London: 
Penguin, 2002). 
324
 For more on restoring the equality within the context of modern societies, see Michael Walzer‟s 
important book (originally in English) Sphären der Gerechtigkeit: Ein Plädoyer für Pluralität und 
Gleichheit (Frankfurt a.M: Fischer, 1998). Cf. also a book such as Solidarität in der modernen 
Gesellschaft (Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer, 1992) by Karl Otto Hondrich and Claudia Koch-Arzberger. 
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justice can be restored in modern societies by linking the connective character of 
justice and the communicative character of freedom. Although he thus reframes the 
tension between justice and equality Huber does not resolve the tension, for he is of 
the opinion that the tension should also be reframed in terms of the eschatological 
character of justice. In the last part of this section the role that eschatology plays in 
this reframed but unresolved tension will be investigated, and it will be concluded 
with Huber‟s suggestion for a criterion by which to measure justice. 
 
3.2  The dominance of iustitia commutativa in modern societies 
 
3.2.1  The development of justice 
In Gerechtigkeit und Recht (1996:151–156) Huber describes the role of justice in 
modern societies. His argument is that the Aristotelian division between different 
forms of justice was taken up in modernity and that one of these forms, namely that 
of iustitia commutativa, gained ascendancy.325 He illustrates this by tracing 
significant moments in the development of justice and argues that a more 
comprehensive understanding of justice is necessary for making modernity just 
(1996b:155–156). 
 
In Greek Antiquity already the meaning of justice was the subject of discussion and 
differing viewpoints. In the city states the standing of the citizen in society was the 
result of individual competencies and earnings, and justice meant the protection of 
this societal standing. The criterion by means of which these competencies and 
earnings should be measured gave rise to an important debate in which Plato and 
the Sophists represented the two important positions. Whereas Plato understood the 
realisation of the idea as the main criterion for measuring competencies and 
earnings, the Sophists understood achievement as the main criterion. In Plato‟s case 
the purpose (telos) was of primary importance, whereas the Sophist laid emphasis 
on usefulness (techne). It is noteworthy that in Greek Antiquity already equality was 
a fundamental element of justice but not to be equated with a totalitarian concept of 
equality (Huber, 1996b:151). 
                                                             
325
 For a more detailed description of Aristotle‟s concepts of justice, cf. John-Stewart Gordon, 
Aristoteles über Gerechtigkeit: das V. Buch der Nikomachischen Ethik (Freiburg: Alber, 2007). 
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Aristotle partly took over Plato‟s conception but also developed the Greek 
understanding of justice further and introduced new categories (Huber, 1996b:152). 
He distinguished between justice in a broad and in a narrow sense. Iustitia legalis 
refers to justice in the broad sense, and it describes the citizen‟s duty to respect the 
law. Iustitia legalis therefore organises both the citizen‟s relationship to the polis, as 
well as the public relationships citizens may have with one another. 
 
To refer to justice in the narrow sense Aristotle made use of two terms, namely what 
was later transcribed to Latin as iustitia distributiva (Greek: dianemetikon dikaion) 
and iustitia correctiva (Greek: diorthtikon dikaion) (Huber, 1996b:152). In terms of 
iustitia distributiva the citizen is assigned goods and positions according to the social 
order of society. In a democracy, for example, all citizens would theoretically be 
entitled to the same goods and positions, whereas in an oligarchy public positions 
are reserved for specific classes of people. For Huber this conception of justice is 
helpful in that it articulates an important question, namely according to which criteria 
societal goods and positions are to be distributed (1996b:151–152). 
 
Iustitia correctiva refers to the dimension of justice that organises the divergences 
from the given order in the relationships between citizens. These divergences can be 
the result of reciprocal consent, for which buying and selling or payment for a service 
rendered serve as classic examples. A divergence from the given order can also be 
the result of an action perpetrated against the will of the other person. In this case 
theft, libel and murder serve as classic examples.  
 
The fact that iustitia correctiva refers to both acceptable and unacceptable 
divergences from the given order have logically caused the concept to be difficult to 
use. Huber regards Thomas Aquinas‟s replacement of iustitia correctiva with iustitia 
commutativa as an attempt to address this ambiguity (Huber, 1996b:153). Iustitia 
commutativa includes not only the divergences in individual relationships but also 
those between groups and consequently included such relationships as those 
between husbands and wives and between children and parents.  
Aquinas‟s more detailed definition did not mean iustitia correctiva disappeared 
altogether but rather led to its retaining its corrective meaning and being moved to 
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the fringes of the different dimensions of justice. Aristotle‟s two senses of iustitia 
correctiva consequently developed into civil law and criminal law. Justice in its 
narrow sense therefore developed three dimensions: iustitia distributiva, iustitia 
commutativa and iustitia correctiva (Huber, 1996b:153). 
 
In his commentary on Aquinas‟s Summa Theologica Cardinal Thomas Cajetan 
connected the broad and narrow senses of justice in a way that is still of importance 
for modern societies (Huber, 1996b:154–155). According to Cajetan, iustitia legalis, 
iustitia distributiva and iustitia commutativa correspond with the three basic societal 
relationships. Iustitia legalis is decisive for the relation of the part to the whole of 
society; iustitia distributiva organises the relationship of the whole with the individual 
parts; and iustitia commutativa forms the standard for the relationship of the 
individual parts with one another. 
 
In modern societies iustitia legalis concerns the individual citizen‟s duty towards the 
constitutional state and this relationship is characterised by two points of reference: 
obedience to the law and – when the state is experienced to have disrespected the 
borders set by iustitia legalis – civil disobedience (Huber, 1996b:155).326 Iustitia 
distributiva again concerns the responsibility of the state towards its citizens.327 In 
this regard the extent to which the state needs to direct the understanding of societal 
justice or whether the state simply needs to fulfil a corrective function is of continued 
relevance (Huber, 1996b:155). It is clear, however, that the state has a definite 
responsibility towards its citizens, and iustitia distributiva serves to articulate this. 
Despite the continued relevance of the different dimensions of justice as Aristotle 
developed it, Huber is of the opinion that iustitia commutativa has developed into the 
dominant conception of justice in modern societies, which jeopardises its 
comprehensive character (1996b:155–156). 
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 In the light of globalisation justice is of course taking on increasingly transnational dimensions. For 
a discussion on the current trens of global justice, cf. Barry K. Gills (ed.), Globalization and the global 
politics of justice (London: Routlegde, 2007). 
327
 Cf. Ross Zucker, Democratic distributive justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
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3.2.2  Subjecting justice to the market 
Huber (e.g. in 1996b:151ff) interprets the dominance of iustitia commutativa as 
meaning that justice is realised primarily in the relationships between members of 
society at the marketplace. The autonomous self-control of the market is understood 
to be the most trustworthy protector of justice, as it is understood as the most 
trustworthy protector of freedom. According to this notion, the state should respect 
the autonomy of the market by interfering as little as possible. The state is in the first 
instance responsible for creating a fruitful institutional environment by ensuring 
stability of the law.  
 
At first glance it may therefore seem as if iustitia legalis and iustitia distributiva are 
subordinated to iustitia commutativa. Huber is of the opinion, however, that the 
supposed dominance of iustitia commutativa disguises the fact that it in effect means 
that justice itself is subordinated to the market mechanism.328 In terms of determining 
prices and wages Huber motivates his view as follows: 
 
The process of negotiating prices and wages is not determined by justice 
but by those who can force their way through. Price levels are not 
determined by how just they are but with which prices the supplier can 
compete on the market. Wage structures are not determined by asking 
which wages are fair but by the ability of employers or employees to get 
their way by means of force and by the incentives employers are willing to 
give in order to increase productivity. The classical concepts of a „fair 
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 Although formulating the challenge of making modernity more just in these terms is a decidedly 
Huberian contribution, a number of sources assist in elaborating on this theme and at the same time 
indicate how relevant it is for the current state of world politics and the world economy. Cf. e.g. Stuart 
L. Hart, Capitalism at the crossroads: The unlimited business opportunities in solving the world’s most 
difficult problems (Upper Saddle River: Wharton School, 2005); Colin C. Williams, A commodified 
world? Mapping the limits of capitalism (London: Zed Books, 2005); Alex Callinicos, An anti-capitalist 
manifesto (Cambridge: Polity, 2003); Anthony Giddens (ed.), The progressive manifesto: New ideas 
for the centre-left (Cambridge: Polity, 2003); Robert L. Heilbroner, The making of economic society 
(Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 2002); Leslie Sklair, Globalization: Capitalism and its alternatives 
(Oxford: Oxfrod University Press, 2002); Philip Brown, Capitalism and social progress: The future of 
society in a global economy (Basingstoke: Hampshire, 2001); Matthias Herfeld, Die Gerechtigkeit der 
Marktwirtschaft: eine wirtschaftsethische Analyse der Grundvollzüge moderner Ökonomie (Gütersloh: 
Gütersloher Verlagshaus/Kaiser, 2001); David Harvey, Spaces of capital: Towards a critical 
geography (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2001); and Michael S. Irving, The moral 
limitations of capitalism (Aldershot: Avebury, 1994). 
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price‟ and „fair wages‟ have largely lost their meaning (Huber, 1996b:155–
156).329 
 
Subordinating justice to the market mechanism and the assumed positive influence 
of an „invisible hand‟ or a „trickle-down effect‟ opens the possibility for new forms of 
exclusion and exploitation. Huber argues that those who find themselves in positions 
of structural exclusion, and therefore not in the position to bargain for better prices or 
wages, are made vulnerable to be “blackmailed by deprivation” (1996b:156). In 
situations of extreme poverty and high levels of unemployment – and millions of 
people find themselves in such situations – the market does not warrant justice but 
aggravates “the imbalance between power and powerlessness” (Huber, 
1996b:156).330 
 
This implies that in an unequal world a conception of justice built on the exchange of 
so-called equal goods and services requires more than measures of control but 
indeed measures to set societal aims. The United Nations Development 
Programme‟s Human Development Report 2005 articulates this illusionary moment 
in the perceived justice of the market model strikingly by illustrating how even the 
value of the same amount of money is relative: 
 
One-fifth of humanity lives in countries where many people think nothing 
of spending $2 a day on a cappuccino. Another fifth of humanity survives 
on less than $1 a day and lives in countries where children die for want of 
a simple anti-mosquito bed net (United Nations Development Programme, 
2005:17). 
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 “[D]er Prozeß des Aushandelns von Preisen und Löhnen am Markt wird nicht durch Maßstäbe der 
Gerechtigkeit, sondern durch die Frage der Durchsetzungsmacht bestimmt. Nicht welche Preise 
gerecht sind, sondern mit welchen Preisen ein Anbieter sich am Markt behaupten kann, entscheidet 
über die Höhe der Preise. Nicht welche Löhne gerecht sind, sondern welche Durchsetzungsmacht 
Arbeiterinnen und Arbeiter, sowie Angestellte für die Verwirklichung ihrer Forderungen mobilisieren 
können und welch Anreize Arbeitgeber zur Steigerung der Produktivität einsetzen wollen, entscheidet 
über die Lohnstruktur. Die klassischen Begriffe des gerechten Preises und des gerechten Lohns 
haben unter den Bedingungen der Marktwirtschaft ihren Sinn weitgehend eingebüßt.” 
330
 The sociologist Manuel Castells‟ theory of the „fourth world‟ serves to illustrate this imbalance. In 
End of Millennium (200b), the third volume of his trilogy The Information Age: Economy, society and 
culture, he describes this fourth world as “the exclusion of people and territories which, from the 
perspective of dominant interests ... shift to a position of structural irrelevance. This widespread, 
multiform process of social exclusion leads to the constitution of ... the black holes of informational 
capitalism” (Castells, 2000b:165). 
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According to Huber, the assumption that the market mechanism is conducive to 
creating a just society is in need of substantial criticism (1996b:156). The equal 
opportunity to realise freedom requires attentiveness to the unjust circumstances into 
which many people are forced. Huber‟s contribution concerns the connection he 
makes between the pursuit of freedom and the acknowledgement of the equality of 
all persons. This connection is, according to Huber, of determining importance in 
restoring the search for justice in modernity. In the next section this contribution to 
the renewal of modernity will be investigated. 
 
3.3  Reframing the tension between freedom and equality 
 
In order to address the subjugation of justice to the market in modern societies, 
Huber suggests that a comprehensive form of justice needs to be regained. In order 
to make modernity more just the perceived incongruity between equality and 
freedom needs to be overcome. Huber reframes this tension by employing the 
inalienable and personal character of communicative freedom to identify respect for 
human dignity as a goal shared by both the discourse on freedom as well as by the 
discourse on equality. He regards freedom and equality – and by implication justice – 
as two different perspectives on human dignity and he does not regard their 
realisation as goals in themselves. In Kirche in der Zeitenwende Huber therefore 
states, “The arbitrary use of the basic principles of justice is excluded only when the 
equal dignity of all human beings is acknowledged as the basic measure for a 
humane society. Freedom and justice should be connected using the concept of 
human dignity” (1999:193).331 
 
In order to express this connection Huber (cf. 1996b:149–183) develops the concept 
of „connective justice‟ as complement to communicative freedom, as both concepts 
have a relational understanding of human dignity as presupposition. According to 
Huber, both justice and freedom are based on God‟s initiative and can only be 
realised relationally within a concrete socio-historical context (cf. Huber 1999:168ff; 
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 “Ein willkürlicher Umgang mit den Grundsätzen der Gerechtigkeit ... ist nur dann ausgeschlossen 
wenn die gleiche Würde aller Menschen als grundlegender Maßstab einer humanen Gesellschaft 
anerkannt wird. Es kommt also darauf an, Freiheit und Gerechtigkeit im Begriff der Menschenwürde 
miteinander zu verbinden.” 
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1996b:158ff; 1996c:104ff).332 Huber reframes the tension by turning for an answer 
not to the Aristotelian tradition of justice, Marxist frames of reference,333 or the 
„liberal‟ intellectual tradition, but to the Christian resources of justice (1996b:160–
162) and freedom (cf. Chapter 1). 
 
In developing connective justice Huber draws on Jan Assmann‟s seminal study on 
the Egyptian understanding of justice, Ma’at. Gerechtigkeit und Unsterblichkeit im 
Alten Ägypten (Munich, 1990).334 According to Assmann (cited in Huber, 1996b:159), 
the ancient Egyptian view on justice was built on the concept of reciprocity. 
Relationships that are entirely reciprocal can therefore be described as also just. 
Assmann regards ma’at therefore not as referring to the transpersonal order of the 
universe but as anchored in interpersonal relationships. The three enemies of justice 
Assmann consequently identifies serve to illustrate its reciprocal character. The 
inertia of not remembering, being deaf for the voice of the other and greed exclude 
one from the community and disable justice (Huber, 1996b:159–160). 
 
Huber regards the relational character of justice that Assmann identifies as being 
transferrable to also the world of the Old Testament. One significant difference in the 
Old Testament places Assmann‟s research in perspective. In the Old Testament 
justice is, in the first place, connected to God as the giver of justice (Huber, 
1999:191).335 Justice is not, however, understood as a „characteristic‟ of God, but his 
actions are understood as being the quintessence of justice (Huber, 1996b:161).336 
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 On justice in the context of globalisation, cf. e.g Thom Brooks (ed.); The global justice reader 
(Malden: Blackwell, 2008); Per Pinstrup-Andersen and Peter Sandøe, Ethics, hunger and 
globalization: In search of appropriate policies (Dordrecht: Springer Verlag, 2007); Jean-Christophe 
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 On justice in Marx‟s work, cf. e.g. Elliot R. Pruzan, The concept of justice in Marx (New York: Lang, 
1989). 
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 Assmann‟s study fulfils a meaningful place in Gerechtigkeit und Recht (1996b:159–160) and in 
Kirche in der Zeitenwende (1999:191–192). Cf. also Assmann‟s Religion und kulturelles Gedächtnis: 
Zehn Studien (Munich: Beck, 2000), as well as Anna Mancini, Ma’at revealed: philosophy of justice in 
ancient Egypt (New York: Buenos Books, 2006). 
335
 Cf. Charles Marsh‟s description of justice based on Christian faith in The beloved community: How 
faith shapes social justice, from the civil rights movement to today (New York: Basic Books, 2005). 
336
 For an influential German work on God‟s righteousnees, cf. Eberhard Jüngel, Das Evangelium von 
der Rechtfertigung des Gottlosen als Zentrum des christlichen Glaubens, 1999:43–74; 221–234 
(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck). 
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Israel‟s knowledge of God‟s justice therefore has an existential character: Their 
experience of God‟s loving faithfulness orientates their knowledge of his justice.  
 
By means of his Torah God gives his people the possibility to participate in his just 
actions (Huber, 1990b:45; 1999:192).337 Huber regards the connection between 
God‟s justice, the Torah and human justice as one of the enduring themes of the Old 
Testament (1996b:161). The aim is a community where justice prevails, so as to 
have shalom restored (1996b:160).338 Huber (1987:27) describes shalom in 
relational terms, namely as the restored relationships between the diversity of groups 
and individuals who live in a certain society as well as the restoration of their 
relationship with God.339  
 
In Friedensethik (co-written by Hans-Richard Reuter) Huber (1990b:21) extends the 
frame of reference of shalom to international politics. A Christian understanding of 
peace should not be confined to one community but also includes relationships that 
transcend the border of a specific country. Moreover, not only violence should be 
understood as the opposite of peace (Huber, 1990b:21), but whenever the societal 
relationships do not correspond with the dignity of all of the members of society, 
shalom is endangered.340 Justice is therefore of fundamental importance for attaining 
societal wholeness.341 Huber (1990b:21) can therefore also pick up Gerhard von 
Rad‟s conviction that there is no concept in the Old Testament with such a central 
                                                             
337
 Huber furthermore establishes a close connection between the Torah and the identity that flows 
from this existential experience of God‟s righteousness: “[Die Torah] stellt das Volk vor die Frage, wie 
es sich selbst angesichts der ihm zugewandten göttlichen Gerechtigkeit verstehen und verhalten will. 
Sie bescreibt das Verhalten derer, die so in dem von Gott angebotenen und eröffneten 
Gemeinschaftsverhältnis bleiben ...” (Huber, 1996b:161). 
338
 In Protestantismus und Protest Huber (1987:27) calls for a council of peace between churches to 
contribute to the restoration of shalom. Even though he limits dialogue here to the Christian 
community, in 1987 already he regarded dialogue as prerequisite for a just society when he picked up 
on Bonhoeffer‟s suggestion for a council of peace: “Der Prozeß konziliarer Verständigung, in den 
christlichen Gruppen, Gemeinden und Kirchen eingetreten sind, umfaßt die Überwindung von 
Ungerechtigkeit, die Bändigung der Gewalt und die Versöhnung mit der Natur. ... Als ein „Konzil des 
Friedens‟ wird dasjenige Ereignis immer wieder bezeichnet, von dem viele hoffen, daß es die 
Verbindlichkeit ethischer Einsichten für politisches Handeln mit Vollmacht und Wirkung ausspricht.” 
339
 In terms of the New Testament Huber (1987:129) describes peace as “die Gnade der Versöhnung, 
al ein Geschenk, das die Liebe gegenüber dem Feind möglich macht”. For Huber, this means that 
peace is not to be achieved by means of projecting guilt onto one person or group of persons, as it is 
the Christian conviction that Christ already took the guilt on him. 
340
 For a South African interpretation of this theme, cf. Traggy Maepa (ed.), Beyond retribution: 
prospects for restorative justice in South Africa (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2005). 
341
 Cf. John de Gruchy‟s argument that the restoration of justice can also be described as 
reconciliation in Reconciliation: restoring justice (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2002). 
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place as that of justice: “It applies to all human relationships and signifies the 
foundation on which everything that lives depend on. Those who live up to the 
particular community‟s requirements are just.”342 
 
At this stage of the discussion it may already be clear how communicative freedom is 
complemented by the concept of connective justice, and how the tension between 
freedom and justice is thus reframed. In the first two chapters it has been shown that 
communicative freedom is to be understood as God‟s initiative (e.g. Huber, 
1985:211; 1999:171ff), which is also the case with connective justice. It was also 
shown that the diversity of abilities does not separate people from one another but 
requires being realised in community (Huber, 1999:167–175). It was shown that 
human beings are always “persons in relationship” (Huber, 1996c:106) and that it is 
the character of God‟s act of constituting freedom (Huber, 1999:172) that calls for its 
responsible realisation in relationships with fellow human beings (Huber, 
1990a:135ff). By means of Huber‟s argument in his book Rechtfertigung und Recht it 
was subsequently shown in Chapter 2 how the meaning and implications of the 
equal human dignity of all people form the basis for questions regarding the 
realisation of freedom (2001h:18–33).343  
 
Both communicative freedom and connective justice take the inalienability of human 
dignity and the Gleichursprünglichkeit of individuality and sociality as presupposition. 
Whereas communicative freedom views the connection between individuality and 
sociality from the perspective of humanity‟s diversity of gifts, connective justice views 
the connection from the perspective of humanity‟s fundamental equality. Whereas 
communicative freedom is especially attentive to the disregard for every person‟s 
inalienable dignity (e.g. Huber 1985:210), freedom of conscience (cf. e.g. Huber, 
1987:56; 1996c:108) and the responsible realisation thereof (cf. Huber, 1993b:70–
81; 1990a:193–194; 1990a:204-207), connective justice is attentive to the disregard 
for humanity‟s fundamental equality (cf. Huber, 1996b:225–267) and situations 
where people are isolated and exploited (cf. Huber, 1987:19; 1996b:161). 
                                                             
342
 “Er bezieht sich auf alle menschlichen Gemeinschaftsverhältnisse; er bezeichnet die Grundlage, 
auf der alles Leben ... beruht. Als gerecht gilt, wer den jeweiligen Anforderungen, die ein 
Gemeinschaftsverhältnis an ihn stellt, gerecht wird.” 
343
 Cf. in this regard also attempts to view injustice and inequality from the perspective of human 
rights, e.g. Evelyn Kallen in Social inequality and social injustice: a human rights perspective 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004). 
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At this juncture it should be noted that the reframed tension between freedom and 
equality does not mean that the tension is resolved (Huber, 1996b:167–183). 
Especially attempts at realising freedom and justice bring to the fore the persisting 
tension. In the next section Huber‟s suggestion that the remaining tension is not the 
result of inherent contradictions but of the imperfection of present reality will be 
investigated. 
 
3.4  Recognising the persisting tension 
 
3.4.1  The eschatological entrance point 
As we have seen in the previous section, Huber utilises Christian resources to 
reframe the tension between equality and freedom. This he does by making use of 
the concept of human dignity to connect equality and freedom. In this section it will 
be shown that this reframed relationship still does not imply that the tension is 
resolved. Huber regards the idea of complete justice as an eschatological idea and 
“the problem of historical realisation” (1996b:171) as the main reason why the 
tension between iustitia distributiva and iustitia commutativa, achievement (Leistung) 
and need (Bedürfnis), and freedom and equality should be seen in a broader 
perspective (1996b:170).  
 
Huber (1996b:173) regards eschatology as the „systematic entrance point‟ to the 
question to how justice is to be realised in a concrete historical situation,344 which 
corresponds with what was described in Chapter 1 as the „provisional character‟ of 
communicative freedom (cf. Huber, 1999:174ff). Justice as the relieved tension 
between freedom and equality is at most „a treasure in clay pots‟ and it can be 
nothing more than a parable of complete justice: 
 
                                                             
344
 Eschatology as the systematic point of entrance to the understanding of justice corresponds with 
the eschatological character Huber also regards the concept of peace to have. In Friedensethik Huber 
(1990b:46–47) explains this correspondence by means of the early Christians‟ experience: “Die 
frühen christlichen Gemeinden blieb die Spannung zwischen dem in ihrem Glauben enthaltenen 
Friedensverständnis und dem politischen Friedenskonzept ihrer Umwelt nicht verborgen. ... Dieser 
eschatologisch bestimmte Frieden wird als Maßstab für das Zusammenleben in der christlichen 
Gemeinde verstanden.” 
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History can be characterised as the search for provisional, imperfect and 
improvable forms of justice, as the search for parables of complete justice, 
which still is not realised. Historical actions that are orientated by the 
realisation of such parables are always aimed at lessening the tension 
between freedom and equality. [But] no historical epoch, culture or 
political program can claim to have found and realised a final solution.345 
 
Huber (1996b:167–168) understands justice in teleological rather than in 
deontological or utilitarian categories. For Huber, reducing justice to duty or 
usefulness or attempting to functionalise the concept contradicts its true intention. 
Any theory of justice is aimed at its realisation and in this very basic sense 
teleological. Eschatology can be understood as the Christian interpretation of the 
teleological character of justice. However, the eschatological access point places the 
teleology of justice in a significantly different frame of reference than the case would 
be in non-Christian interpretations. Rather than concerning the relative purposes 
inherent in persons and actions, eschatology interprets history as the gradual 
realisation of God‟s will within reality (Huber, 1996b:168).  
 
In the light of an eschatological access point, therefore, the continued tension 
between freedom and equality does not imply their incompatibility. Eschatology 
reinterprets the provisional realisation of justice as the continuing call to participate in 
God‟s realisation of his ultimate justice (Huber, 1996b:172). The eschatological view 
of justice therefore allows for human actions to realise justice as an answer to God‟s 
liberation and reconciliation that are already taking place: 
 
Eschatological visions start realising a future in which the individuality of 
everything that exists can unfold itself and where, at the same time, a 
comprehensive community can exist on the basis of complete equality. In 
this way an understanding of history is established where human actions 
                                                             
345
 “Die Prozeß der Geschichte läßt sich charakterisieren als die Suche nach vorläufigen, 
unvollständigen und verbesserungsfähigen Formen der Gerechtigkeit, als Suche also nach 
Gleichnissen der vollkommenen Gerechtigkeit, die als solche immer noch aussteht. Geschichtliches 
Handeln, das sich an der Verwirklichung solcher Gleichnisse orientiert, ist immer darauf aus, die 
Spannung zwischen Freiheit und Gleichheit zu vermindern; keine historische Epoche, keine Kultur, 
kein politisches Programm kann für sich in Anspruch nehmen, dafür eine endgültige Lösung gefunden 
und verwirklicht zu haben.” 
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are understood as an answer to the presence of God‟s liberating and 
reconciliatory Spirit (Huber, 1996b:171–172).346 
 
Huber views the church as the community where God‟s future is paradigmatically – 
albeit in a fragmentary manner – experienced.347 Following Paul, Huber understands 
the church as the community where the tension between freedom and equality is 
resolved in a fragmentary manner and where this partly resolved tension can already 
be experienced. The church is the body of Christ where each member‟s individuality 
is necessary for the functioning of the community. In the church freedom can already 
be experienced as a form of self-determination that is compatible with life in 
community (1996b:173). Indeed, life in community is shown to be dependent on the 
freedom for individuality and self-determination.348 
 
As community where justice and freedom are already partly experienced, the church 
is also able to contribute to the realisation thereof in society. This movement from the 
church as community of experienced justice to its duty to advocate for a just society 
characterises Huber‟s ecclesiology. In his article “Kirche als Raum und Anwalt der 
Freiheit” in Folgen christlicher Freiheit (1985:205–216) he describes the church as 
the space where freedom is experienced and consequently practised and that this 
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 “Eschatologische Visionen vergegenwärtigen eine Zukunft, in der Individualität alles Seienden sich 
entfaltet und zugleich eine umfassende Gemeinschaft auf der Basis vollständiger Gleichheit herrscht. 
So eröffnen sie ein Verständnis von Geschichte, in welchem menschliches Handeln als Antwort auf 
die Gegenwart von Gottes befreiendem und versöhnendem Geist aufgefasst wird.” 
347
 This corresponds with Huber‟s understanding of Christ being the primary Subject of the church and 
Christians being its secondary subjects: “Die Kirche kann nur wirkliche Kirche sein, wenn die 
Differenz zwischen Jesus Christus als ihrem primären Subjekt und den in der Kirche versammelten 
Menschen als dem sekundären Subjekt nicht geleugnet wird” (1985:148). This distinction is of the 
utmost importance in understanding how the church is the space within which God‟s future is 
experienced in a fragmentary manner but also paradigmatically.  
348
 The church, however, is not excluded from the provisional nature of the present. Already in Kirche  
Huber (1979:97–140) uses the term wirkliche Kirche to describe the ambiguity of the historical 
existence of the church. In Folgen christlicher Freiheit (1985) he then describes the wirkliche Kirche 
as “der Ort, an dem der Kampf zwischen wahrer und falscher Kirche ausgetragen wird; der Ort also, 
an dem der Kampf um Entsprechung oder Verfehlung der wahren Kirche immer wieder von neuen 
ansteht” (1985:148). Rather than disregarding the importance of historical existence, Huber 
nonetheless regards the wirkliche Kirche as a reminder of the relevance of the historical form of 
existence of the church: “Von der Sozialgestalt der Kirche kann nicht gesprochen werden, ohne daß 
zugleich von ihrem Wesen die Rede ist; von der erfahrenen Kirche kann nicht gesprochen werden, 
ohne daß zugleich von der geglaubten Kirche die Rede ist” (1983:169). 
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experience of liberation sharpens Christians‟ sensitivity to oppression in society and 
compels the church to advocate for a more just and free society (1996b:173).349  
 
The actions of the church should, however, be characterised by the conviction that 
its experience of equality and freedom still remains fragmentary and therefore is at 
most parables of justice (Huber, 1996b:173). Huber formulates this vision of God‟s 
realised future that allows for actions of solidarity strikingly: 
 
Where justice is realised the differences between people cease to 
separate them from one another. [These differences] can now be 
enriching diversity. Radical equality is realised. At the same time and in an 
equally radical way freedom is realised, namely freedom as the liberation 
from the power of sin, deception and death. ... Freedom is understood as 
a type of self-determination that complies with life in community without 
restraint. Freedom is intended as communicative freedom (1996b:172).350 
 
In this section it was shown that an eschatological perspective causes the 
fragmentary character of the realisation of justice to sharpen attentiveness to 
injustice as well as the willingness to advocate for a more just society. The double 
movement Huber introduces when understanding the church as both space and 
advocate of freedom was used to show how the fragmentary character of justice is 
not a reason for despair or doubting the necessity of keeping the connection 
between freedom and equality intact.  
 
Connective justice and communicative freedom were shown to be connected in 
terms of their fundamental movements but also to represent different perspectives 
on the connection between individuality and sociality. As an expression of the focus 
of justice on the equal dignity of all people, Huber consequently identifies a criterion 
                                                             
349
 In Protestantismus und Protest Huber (1987:54) reminds the reader that Christian freedom also 
has an important self-critical tendency. The implication of his description of the church as „space‟ and 
„advocate‟ for freedom is that the church is not excluded from the critical impulses of freedom. 
350
 “Dort, wo sie [Gerechtigkeit] sich durchsetzt, verlieren die Differenzen zwischen Menschen ... ihre 
trennende Bedeutung. Nun erst können sie als bereichernde Vielfalt zur Geltung kommen. Gleichheit 
in radikalem Sinn verwirklicht sich. Zugleich aber und in ebenso radikalem Sinn wird die Freiheit 
wirklich: die Freiheit nämlich als Befreiung von den Mächten der Sünde, der Täuschung und des 
Todes. ... Freiheit ist hier als diejenige Art der Selbstbestimmung verstanden, die zwanglos mit dem 
gemeinsamen Leben zusammenstimmt. Freiheit ist als kommunikative Freiheit gedacht.” 
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by means of which justice is to be measured. In opposition to the implicit assertion of 
iustitia commutativa that the market will maximise justice, Huber suggests that the 
position of the powerless should be used to gauge societal justice. 
 
3.4.2  A criterion by which to measure justice 
In identifying a criterion by means of which justice should be measured Huber 
initiates dialogue with especially John Rawls. In Gerechtigkeit und Recht he 
consequently also devotes a whole section to the theme „justice as fairness‟ 
(1996b:184–198) and in a subsection he investigates Rawls‟s theory of justice 
(1996b:186–190).351 In distinction to Rawls, however, Huber motivates the need for a 
criterion by which to measure justice in terms of the biblical witness.  
 
He recognises a criterion for justice already in the Old Testament’s accounts of the 
prophets of the eighth century (Huber, 1996b:161). If it is said that human justice 
participates in God‟s justice by means of the Torah, it cannot be ignored that God‟s 
just actions have a specific focus, namely taking the side of poor and the oppressed 
(Huber, 1987:19; 1996b:161).352 If the lesser members of society are granted the 
same dignity as its strongest members, one can regard a society as just (Huber, 
1999:192).353 Huber understands the situation of those members of society who find 
themselves in disadvantaged positions as touchstone for societal justice also in the 
New Testament (Huber, 1999:192). In the parable of the Last Judgement in Matthew 
25:31-46 the behaviour of Jesus‟ real followers will be measured by their treatment 
of the sick, lonely, hungry, thirsty and imprisoned. This criterion of justice requires a 
                                                             
351
 For recent discussions on Rawls‟s theory, cf. Chris Wyatt, The difference principle beyond Rawls 
(London: Continuum, 2008); Thom Brooks and Samuel Richard Freeman, Rawls (London: Routledge, 
2007); Rex Martin and David A. Reidy (eds.), Rawls’s law of peoples: a realistic utopia? (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2006); Fabian Freyenhagen (ed.), The legacy of John Rawls (London: Continuum, 2005); 
Eckard Romanus, Soziale Gerechtigkeit, Verantwortung und Würde: der egalitäre Liberalismus nach 
John Rawls und Ronald Dworkin (Freiburg/Munich: Alber, 2008); and Andrew Levine, Engaging 
Political Philosophy. From Hobbes to Rawls (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002). 
352
 Huber often chooses the parable of the Final Judgement to motivate this perspective, as he also 
did in “Kirche als Raum und Anwalt der Freiheit” from where this quote originates. The advocacy of 
the church should be characterised by its witness to God taking the side of “den Schwachen und 
Gedemütigen, den Leidenden und Entrechteten, denjenigen, die im neutestamentlichen Gleichnis 
vom Weltgericht als die geringsten Brüder Jesu bezeichnet werden” (1985:242). 
353
 Cf. in this regard Huber‟s (1980:54–61) discussion of „black theology‟ and „liberation theology‟ in 
Die Streit um Wahrheit und die Fähigkeit zum Frieden: Vier Kapittel ökumenische Theologie as taking 
in the position of the oppressed into acccount and presenting „Western‟ theology with a legitimate 
challenge. 
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change of perspective from the person who practices justice (or injustice) to those 
who are recipients of justice (or injustice) (Huber, 1996b:186).354  
 
Huber regards such a change of perspective as necessary for the struggle for justice 
within the concrete confines of reality‟s imperfection. When the position of those who 
are poor, oppressed or exploited is taken into consideration,  
 
[t]hen injustice appears to be not simply the absence of a virtue but the 
denial of recognition. Recognition is denied or revoked especially where 
there is no respect for human dignity, where the rights to life and respect 
for one‟s body are disregarded, where access to freedom, equality and 
participation in society is forcefully refused.355 
 
The position of the poor and oppressed as criterion of whether the reciprocity of 
justice is practised is therefore built on the question of whether or not the dignity of 
all members of society is respected. Respect for the dignity of all members of society 
can only be realised in reciprocal relationships, and therefore the exclusion of the 
weakest members of society implies a misbalance in societal relationships.356  
 
The relationality inherent in Huber‟s proposed concept of justice therefore does not 
contradict freedom but picks up on its relational character. He reframes the 
discussion on the tension between freedom and equality by showing how the 
inalienable equality of all persons forms the basis of communicative freedom and is 
understood as God‟s gracious bestowal of human dignity. The pursuit of both 
freedom and of justice is aimed at giving expression to the dignity bestowed by God.  
                                                             
354
 In Protestantismus und Protest Huber (1987:19) speaks of taking the „underside‟ (Kehrseite) of 
history as point of reference rather than the perspective of the victors (die Sieger). When the 
perspective of the disenfranchised is taken into account, protest is an expected reaction. 
355
 “Dann erscheint Ungerechtigkeit nämlich nicht als Abwesenheit einer Tugend, sondern als 
Verweigerung von Anerkennung. Vor allem dort wird Anerkennung vorenthalten oder entzogen, wo 
die Achtung vor der menschlichen Würde verleugnet, wo das Recht auf Leben und körperliche 
Unversehrtheit mißachtet, wo Menschen der Zugang zu Freiheit, Gleichheit und gesellschaftlicher 
Teilhabe durch Zwang verweigert wird.” 
356
 In this regard, cf. Huber‟s reference (1987:22) to the description of injustice by the USA‟s Bishops‟ 
Conference as “wenn Menschen oder Gruppen aktiv so behandelt oder passiv in einem Zustand 
gehalten werden, als ob sie nicht Glieder der menschlichen Gattung wären. Menschen so zu 
behandeln bedeutet, daß sie nicht als menschliche Wesen zählen. Das kann in vielen Formen 
geschehen; sie lassen sich alle beschreiben als unterschiedliche Arten der Marginalisierung oder des 
Ausschlusses vom Leben der Gesellschaft.” 
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It should be noted that this does not mean that the aim is that all members of society 
should fulfil the same roles or even take the same places in the societal structure. 
Huber regards the equal dignity of all persons to be the basis for legitimate 
inequality. According to him, legitimate inequality is expressed by the undeniable and 
important individuality of all people (1999:193). At the same time human dignity limits 
inequality: Only those inequalities that cultivate a culture of human dignity are 
acceptable (1999:193). In other words, connective justice can be understood as 
connecting the differentiation tendencies of freedom and the balancing tendencies of 
equality with one another on the grounds of the shared and inalienable dignity of all 
people. What connective justice aims at is contributing to a societal structure within 
which all are respected as bestowed with equal dignity.  
 
In order to contribute to more comprehensive justice in modern societies, the 
convictions nurtured and developed within Protestant Christianity cannot be confined 
to this community as modern societies are dependent on continuous repositioning 
brought about by societal discourse (cf. Huber, 1999:282; Welker, 2002:209ff). 
Huber therefore understands the crossing of Protestant, and indeed Christian, 
borders as necessary for making modernity more just (Huber, 1993a:171). At the 
same time Huber regards a world that is increasingly integrated357 and increasingly 
characterised by violence on the grounds of culture and religion in dire need of 
constructive dialogue that takes the other‟s freedom of conscience as seriously as 
one‟s own (see e.g. 2004l; 2005h). The concluding section of this chapter will 
investigate Huber‟s work on dialogue and tolerance as last contribution of 
communicative freedom to the renewal of modernity that will be investigated. 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
357
 Of the many available sources on the subject, an overview of globalisation such as that of Roland 
Robertson entitled Globalisation: Social theory and global culture (London: Sage, 1992) serves as an 
useful study to described increased global integration coupled with localising tendencies. 
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4.  PUTTING COMMUNICATIVE FREEDOM INTO PRACTICE: 
 DIALOGUE AS THE REFLEXIVE USE OF PRINCIPLES 
 
4.1  Introduction 
 
In Chapter 2 it was shown that Huber (e.g. 1990a:193–194; 1990a:204–207; 
1990b:243–246; 1999:210–215) regards responsibility and self-limitation to be forms 
of the expression of communicative freedom. By means of the work of Max Weber 
(Huber, 1990a:138ff), Dietrich Bonhoeffer (Huber, 1990a:144–145; 2006b; 2006m; 
2007k) and to a lesser extent Hans Jonas (Huber, 1990a:147; 1999:183) one then 
saw that communicative freedom is embedded in an ethic of responsibility, 
characterised by the reflexive use of ethical principles (Huber, 1990a:140ff; 
1993b:74). This expresses the fact that freedom can only be realised 
communicatively if others‟ freedom of conscience is taken as seriously as one‟s own 
(Huber, 2006aa; 1996c:108). 
 
Freedom of conscience therefore not only means that the own liberated conscience 
serves as hinge between the freedom of faith and freedom in society (cf. e.g. Huber, 
1987:62; 1996c:108) but also means that others‟ freedom of conscience should be 
respected and integrated into the process of ethical decision making (Huber, 
1991:672). In this regard Huber (1990a:151) suggests dialogue as a way to put 
communicative freedom into practice, for an ethic of responsibility should 
„necessarily‟ have a dialogical structure as it concerns the dialogue between 
“different interpretations of the situation” in order to enable a “shared analysis of the 
situation”.358 
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 Dialogue, and interreligious dialogue, is a very relevant theme in contemporary theological 
discussions and in particular in the German context. Cf. e.g. the many insightful books on the topic 
that have appeared the last few years, e.g. Reinhold Bernhardt and Perry Schmidt-Leukel (eds.), 
Kriterien interreligiöser Urteilsbildung (Zürich: Theologischer Verlag Zürich, 2005); Heinrich Bedford-
Strohm, “Konflikt oder Konsens? Zur sozialethischen Bedeutung „runder Tische‟” (in Reuter, H-R., 
Bedford-Strohm, H., Kuhlmann, H. & Lütcke, K-H., eds.); Freiheit verantworten: Festschrift für 
Wolfgang Huber zum 60. Geburtstag. Gütersloh: Kaiser, Gütersloher Verl. Haus, 2002:255–270); 
Joachim Zehner, Der notwendige Dialog: Die Weltreligionen in katholischer und evangelischer Sicht 
(Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus Gerd Mohn, 1992); Leonard Swidler, Die Zukunft der Theologie: 
Im Dialog der Religionen und Weltanschauungen (Regensburg/Munich: Pustet/Chr. Kaiser, 1992); 
Karl-Wolfgang Tröger (ed.), Weltreligionen und christlicher Glaube: Beiträge zum interreligiösen 
Dialog (Berlin: Wichern 1993); Werner Brändle and Gerhard Wegner (eds.), Unfervügbare Gewißheit: 
Protestantische Wege zum Dialog der Religionen (Hannover: Lutherisches Verlagshaus, 1997); and 
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It is the argument of this last section that by suggesting dialogue in order to realise 
freedom responsibly, Huber is – in accordance with Beck et al. in “Theorie reflexiver 
Modernisierung” (2001:11–62) – contributing to the „modernising of modernity‟, or in 
terms of the argument of this dissertation to the renewal of modernity. The basis for 
this contribution on dialogue is communicative freedom and in particular the fact that 
it is dependent on the reflexive use of principles for its realisation (cf. Huber, 
1991:672ff; 2005aa; 2006l). This renewal comprises also crossing the boundaries 
between those societies who choose to describe themselves as „modern‟ and those 
who do not choose to describe themselves as modern.359 Modernising modernity 
therefore will be shown not to harmonise differences but to accept, respect and 
integrate differences in dialogue.  
 
In 1993 already Huber (1993a:170–171) stated that dialogue between differing 
groups is necessary in order to realise human freedom responsibly: 
 
Human power is not restricted to certain regions anymore but now 
concerns the whole earth. Accordingly, human responsibility also grows. 
... An ethic of responsibility that sets itself the current challenge of the 
intensity and extent of human power I call a „planetary ethic‟. ... This 
theme cannot be clarified in closed regional, cultural or religious circles 
but requires dialogical understanding across the boundaries of regions, 
cultures and religions.360 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
Andreas Bsteh (ed.), Dialog aus der Mitte christlicher Theologie (Mödling: St Gabriel, 1987). For a 
specifically Catholic view, cf. Robert B. Sheard, Inter-religious dialogue in the Catholic Church since 
Vatican II: A historical and theological study (New York/Ontario: Edwin Mellen Press, 1987). 
359
 Beck et al. (2001:20) significantly identify the demarcation of borders by means of the logic of the 
nation-state as the first characteristic of first modernity and consequently regard globalisation as one 
of the primary reasons for the development of second modernity (Beck et al., 2001:22). 
360
 “Menschliche Macht ist nicht mehr auf einen engen Umkreis beschränkt, sondern betrifft die Erde 
im Ganzen. Entsprechend wächst die Reichweite menschlicher Verantwortung. ... Eine 
Verantwortungsethik, die sich der Intensität und Extensität menschlichen Machtsgebrauchs in der 
Gegenwart wirklich stellt, nenne ich „planetarische Ethik‟. ... Dieses Thema aber kann nicht mehr in 
regional, kulturell oder religiös geschlossenen Zirkeln geklärt werden; vielmehr erfordert es 
dialogische Verständigungen über die Grenzen von Regionen, Kulturen und Religionen hinweg.” 
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At that stage361 Huber could hardly have foreseen how relevant the communicative 
expression of freedom by means of dialogue would become. In the time after Huber 
wrote this book, global challenges changed to an extent that was hardly imaginable 
in 1993. In the light of increased global integration and the consequent increased 
global tension and violence the challenge of transcending „first modernity‟ (Beck) is 
burningly relevant. In the speech “Religionsfreiheit und offene Gesellschaft – ein 
Prüfstein aktueller Dialoge in Europa” Huber (2004l) delivered in Brussels in 2004 he 
articulated the continued need for dialogue in a radically changed world: 
 
The past years‟ shocking religiously motivated acts of violence cast a dark 
shadow over the [possibility of] peaceful co-existence of people and 
religions. ... Both big world religions [i.e. Christianity and Islam] should 
purposely oppose violence, and they should do everything in their power 
to contribute to society‟s inner peace. This includes dialogue among one 
another and the discourse with politics as to what the meaning and limits 
of religious freedom should be in the open society in which we live and 
want to live in.362 
 
On one level communicative freedom as it has been developed in this dissertation 
serves as the reason why dialogue should be engaged, for only by means of 
dialogue can freedom be realised responsibly. At the same time it is a critical 
concept and therefore serves as a contribution that can be made to peaceful co-
existence by means of dialogue. Instead of retreating into simplistic interpretations or 
directionless relativism (Huber & Graf, 1991), Huber (1993a:113) suggests relating 
the freedom of different people and groups with one another in order to be able to 
address the current (global) challenges: 
 
                                                             
361
 Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker‟s Der bedrohte Friede (3
rd
 edition, Munich: Hanser, 1982) serves as 
excellent background for Huber‟s earlier work on the need for dialogue, as does Christliche Ethik und 
Sicherheitspolitik (edited by Erwin Wilkens, Frankfurt a.M.: Evangelisches Verlagswerk, 1982). 
362
 “Die erschütternden religiös motivierten Gewaltakte der letzten Jahre werfen düstere Schatten auf 
das friedliche Miteinander von Menschen und Religionen. ... Beide großen Weltreligionen [d.h. 
Christentum und Islam] müssen daran arbeiten, der Gewalt entschlossen entgegen zu treten und 
alles zu tun, was in ihrer Macht steht, um einen Beitrag zur Stabilisierung des inneren Friedens in der 
Gesellschaft zu leisten. Dies schließt den Dialog unter ihnen und den Diskurs mit der Politik darüber 
ein, was Inhalt und Grenzen der Religionsfreiheit in der offenen Gesellschaft sind, in der wir leben 
und leben wollen.” 
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In a world that has coalesced into one world, whoever offers an escape 
into simple solutions does not serve new orientation but rather endangers 
freedom. … Those who want to avoid that must start to search for a form 
of coexistence that not only is in agreement with the freedom of every 
individual but that also helps to unfold their freedom. 
 
In this section, Huber‟s work on dialogue will be developed as an expression of 
communicative freedom in an increasingly integrated but also increasingly divided 
world (cf. Huber, 1991:672; 1993a:180). This will be done by investigating two of the 
most significant areas of focus in Huber‟s work on dialogue, namely the search for 
what is held in common and respecting what is not held in common. Throughout his 
work both of these themes are of importance, although it is possible to identify slight 
shifts in focus. In his work on ethos and dialogue in the early 1990s Huber makes 
use of the term „relative universalism‟ to denote the position necessary for 
constructive dialogue (1993a:179–182), which emphasises that which is held in 
common by different groups.363 In his more recent work, this term has gradually been 
replaced by the term „convinced tolerance‟,364 whereby the issue of the unique 
identity of those who engage in dialogue seems to receive more emphasis.365   
 
4.2  Searching for shared concern 
 
Huber‟s earlier work on dialogue focuses on how to address the challenge of 
increased responsibility in a world increasingly endangered by the arbitrary use of 
new technology and scientific progress (1993a:170–184; 1994b:32–46). He develops 
dialogue as the primary way by means of which extended forms of responsibility can 
                                                             
363
 Cf. also Ian S. Markham, Plurality and Christian Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996) for a discussion on the implications deep-seated societal differences have for Christian etical 
convictions. 
364
 Cf. e.g. Huber‟s lectures “Religionsfreiheit und offene Gesellschaft – ein Prüfstein aktueller Dialoge 
in Europa” (2004l), “Der Auftrag der Kirchen in einem Zusammenwachsenden Europa” (2005d) and 
“Unvereinbare Gegensätze? Scharia und säkulare Recht” (2005q). 
365
 Closer inspection reveals, however, that the slight changes in terminology are not the result of 
fundamental changes in Huber‟s thought but should rather be understood as a reflection of changed 
global circumstances. The difference between „relative universalism‟ and „convinced tolerance‟, for 
example, seems to represent two different perspectives on the same subject matter. Huber‟s 
fundamental question still concerns the contours of the realisation of communicative freedom in an 
increasingly integrated and complex world. This Huber does by searching for ways in which to enable 
the peaceful co-existence of different groups and people whilst at the same time respecting their 
freedom. 
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take form. This dialogue should be built on a shared perception of the relevant 
concerns and should be aimed at finding principles that are essential for the co-
existence of different individuals and groups who share the same living space 
(Huber, 1994b:37).366 
 
In developing an ethos built on mutual concern, Huber makes use of a number of 
different concepts, most notably „overlapping areas‟ (Überschneidungsbereiche), 
„basic conditions‟ (Minimalbedingungen) the „openness to different motivations‟ 
(Begründungsoffenheit) and the position of „relative universalism‟ (relative 
Universalismus). Together these concepts signify Huber‟s conviction that a shared 
perception of challenges forms the basis of finding shared principles necessary for 
taking corporate responsibility. In this part of the section these concepts will be 
related to one another and employed in Huber‟s critique of Hans Küng‟s Projekt 
Weltethos.367 
 
In searching for shared principles, the possibility of „overlapping areas‟ 
(Überschneidungsbereiche) between different ethical traditions and convictions is a 
first basic presupposition (Huber, 1993a:180). It is important to note, however, that 
Huber does not regard these overlapping areas as the result of harmonising the 
differences between different groups. They are to be borne from agreement on some 
of the most significant shared challenges faced by the respective community (Huber, 
1993a:171). Huber articulates this shared agreement in different ways.  
 
In Protestantismus und Protest Huber (1987:19) describes the agreement on shared 
challenges as the shared willingness to engage in protest actions against attempts to 
                                                             
366
 For a detailed discussion on the role of Christianity in a pluralist context where dialogue is 
necessary, see Hans-Joachim Jöhn, Postsäkular: Gesellschaft im Umbruch – Religion im Wandel 
(Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2007) and Christoff Schwöbel, Christlicher Glaube im Pluralismus 
(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003), in particular “Religiöser Pluralismus als Signatur unserer 
Lebenswelt” (2003:1-24), “Partikularität, Universalität und Religionen” (2003:133–156) and “Toleranz 
und Glauben. Identität und Toleranz im Horizont religiöser Wahrheitsgewißheiten” (2003:217–244). 
367
 A number of attempts to integrate different religions‟ convictions into one ethos exist. Cf. e.g. Anton 
Grabner-Haider (ed.), Ethos der Weltkulturen: Religion und Ethik (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht, 2006); Leonard Swindler (ed.), Toward a universal theology of religion (New York: Orbis, 
1987); Paul F. Knitter, Jesus and the other names: Christian mission and global responsibility (New 
York: Orbis, 1996); and Hans Kessler (ed.), Ökologisches Weltethos im Dialog der Kulturen und 
Religionen (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1996). 
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underplay the extent of the challenges.368 On the grounds of such an agreement it is 
possible to search for those basic conditions (Minimalbedingungen) that are shared 
and are necessary for humanity‟s survival, the conservation of nature and the 
protection of coming generations‟ right to life (Huber, 1993a:172). 
 
This implies, secondly, that these basic conditions should be characterised by the 
openness to different motivations by different groups (Huber, 1993:172–174; 
1994b:38–42). Huber uses the term Begründungsoffenheit to indicate that the basic 
conditions are not meant to replace the specific answers of respective communities 
to how to contribute to communal life in a pluralistic, secular and globalising 
community (1994b:39). The openness to different motivations is meant to respect the 
differences between different groups, whilst at the same time recognising that these 
principles, once agreed on, require a degree of commitment. 
 
The Begründungsoffenheit of the Minimalbedingungen, thirdly, creates the possibility 
of „relative universalism‟. Huber develops this position specifically in Die tägliche 
Gewalt: gegen den Ausverkauf der Menschenwürde (1993a:181ff) and with even 
more conceptual clarity in his article “Gewalt gegen Mensch und Natur – Die 
Notwendigkeit eines planetarischen Ethos” in the book Verantwortlich Leben in der 
Weltgemeinschaft. Zur Auseinandersetzung um das “Projekt Weltethos” edited by 
Rehm (1994b:30–46). This concept takes the possibility and necessity of shared 
principles as starting point for continued life on earth, but at the same time 
recognises that these principles can at most be „provisional‟ and „relative‟ (Huber, 
1993a:181; 1994b:43).369 He articulates this position as follows: 
                                                             
368
 Here Huber (1987:19), in accordance with Anthony Giddens in his book Runaway world: How 
globalisation is reshaping our lives (London: Profile, 2002), chooses to call modern society a „risk 
society‟, with protest consequently being an important form of taking responsibility for politics. At the 
time of writing Protestantimus und Protest Huber (1987:128) regarded especially three themes of 
importance in addressing the risk of society and contributing to lasting peace, namely “[B]ändigung 
der Gewalt”, “Förderung der Gerechtigket” and “Bewahrung der Natur”. In this regard, cf. also Ulrich 
Beck and Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim (eds.), Riskante Freiheiten (Frankfurt a.M: Suhrkamp, 1994); 
Ulrich Beck, Auf dem Weg in eine andere Moderne (Frankfurt a.M: Suhrkamp, 1986); and Niklas 
Luhmann, Soziologie des Risikos (Berlin/New York: De Gruyter, 1991). 
369
 In Huber‟s work the United Nations‟ Universal Declaration of Human rights of 1948 is one 
important example of how Überschniedungsbereiche can be found in order for different groups and 
individuals to develop certain begründungsoffene Minimalbedingungen necessary for peaceful co-
existence. In Friedensethik Huber (1990b:257–266; 340–342) emphasises the importance of the 
place of origin (Entstehungsort) of this document. In Menschenrechte: Prespektiven einer 
menschlichen Welt Huber and Tödt (1977:14–17; 124–130) also acknowledge the place of origin of 
the concept. Consensus concerning human rights grew from the experience of disregard for the 
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Only by means of the particularities and cultures – and not by passing it 
over – can consensus regarding ... elements of a planetary ethos be 
achieved. The [position of] relative universalism does not pretend that 
access to such an ethos can be gained directly and independently of its 
context. ... Such a planetary ethos cannot be implemented by means of 
abstract theory. It can only take on form when it is alive in those 
communities where people‟s moral convictions are formed and where they 
are passed on (1993a:181).370 
 
Huber‟s critique of Hans Küng‟s Projekt Weltethos illustrates how he understands the 
abovementioned concepts to be connected by utilising them in his critique against 
what he calls Küng‟s “ethical reductionism” (cf. Huber, 1993a:171). 
 
4.2.1  Huber’s critique of Projekt Weltethos 
Küng‟s project is directed by three convictions, namely (a) peace among nations is 
not possible without peace among religions, (b) peace among religions is not 
possible without dialogue between religions and (c) dialogue between religions is not 
possible without investigating the shared foundations of religions (Küng, 1994; 
2008). The importance of religion in world society and the extent to which religion 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
humanity of all people. Rather than founding the document on a specific philosophical or ethical 
tradition, the document was written in reaction to a shared perception of the challenge that was faced. 
Therefore this document is still especially relevant “[w]o immer Menschen verhungern oder gefoltert 
werden, wo immer ihnen die Freiheit des Glaubens und der Meinungsäußerung geraubt oder ein 
faires Verfahren vorenthalten wird, wo immer ihnen die Chancen verweigert werden mit eigener Arbeit 
für ihren Lebensunterhalt zu sorgen” (Huber, 1990b:340). In Gerechtigkeit und Recht, Huber 
(1996b:260) does concede, however, that the combined global effort to combat the disrespect for 
human dignity does not form its only place of origin but that the idea of human rights owes its origin to 
a “spezifische religiöse und kulturelle Tradtition”. He regards the concept nonetheless as 
Begründungsoffen in the sense that its places of origin need not be appreciated or subscribed to in 
order for people to adhere to its principles. For a different position, cf. e.g. Friedrich Wilhelm Graf‟s 
article “Die umstrittene Allgemeinheit der individuellen Menschrecht” in Unverfügbare Gewißheit: 
Protestantische Wege zum Dialog der Religionen (Hannover: Lutherisches Verlagshaus, 1997:72–
87). 
370
 “Nur durch die Besonderheiten von Kulturen und Religionen hindurch, nicht an ihnen vorbei, kann 
der Konsens über ... Elemente eines planetarischen Ethos entwickelt werden. Der relative 
Universalismus nimmt nicht an, daß es eine direkte, kontextunabhängige Einsicht in das alle 
Menschen verbindende Ethos gibt. ... Nicht auf dem Weg abstrakte Lehre wird sich ein planetarisches 
Ethos durchsetzen. Es wird nur Gestalt gewinnen, wenn es in den Gemeinschaften lebendig ist, in 
denen Menschen ihre moralischen Überzeugungen ausbilden und weitergeben.” 
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can activate commitment to shared principles are two elements regarded as of 
importance.  
 
According to Küng, in the development of a global ethic, the shared awareness of a 
God, primal reason, primal principal or transcendent aim371 should be used as the 
basis for the search for binding ethical principles. On the basis of the shared belief of 
religions in a transcendent entity Küng believes it is possible to combat “differing, 
contradictory or even ethics that fight one another” (cited in Huber, 1993a:171). It is 
at Küng‟s harmonising of cultural, religious and ethical differences, and even his 
attempt to raise suspicion of these differences, that Huber directs his criticism.372 
 
Huber is of the opinion that the differences between individuals and groups should 
be understood as resources that must be integrated rather than ignored in the 
search for dialogue (1993a:172). A pluralistic society is sustained by the diversity of 
its different constituting groups and the consequent and constant processes of 
repositioning this diversity leads to. Huber therefore regards the „ethical learning 
processes‟ that ethical diversity leads to as being necessary to gain a better 
understanding of the present and possible future (1993a:172). In this regard Michael 
Welker373 (1993b:528) quotes Huber: “Whoever attempts to reduce religions of 
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 Küng (1994) speaks of “Urgrund, Urhalt, Urziel”. 
372
 Huber himself suggests the following „perspective formulations‟ as a possible contribution to a 
planetary ethos (1993a:183–184): “Achte die gleiche Würde aller Menschen ebenso wie die Würde 
der Natur; Respektiere die Freiheit, die Gleichheit und die Teilhaberechte aller Menschen; Übe 
Toleranz gegenüber den Überzeugungen und Lebenformen der anderen; Nimm das Leben und das 
Lebensrecht der nächsten Generation so ernst wie das eigene; Tritt für die Rechte und die Zukunft 
der Schwächeren ein; Beteilige dich am Abbau von Benachteiligungen und Diskriminierungen; Trage 
persönliche, gesellschaftliche und politische Konflikte gewaltfrei aus; Nutze die Natur in einer mit ihrer 
Würde zu vereinbarenden Weise und trage zur Bewahrung der natürlichen Grundlagen des Lebens 
bei; Beteilige dich an gesellschaftlicher und politischer Verantwortung; Verantworte den Gebrauch 
deiner Freiheit.” 
373
 Welker is especially depreciatory in his criticism of Projekt Weltethos. Welker and Küng  
notoriously engaged one another in the German journal Evangelische Kommentare in 1993. See 
Welker in “Gutgemeint – aber ein Fehlschlag. Hans Küngs „Projekt Weltethos‟” (Welker, 1993a) and 
“Autoritäre Religion. Replik auf Hans Küng” (Welker, 1993b) and also. Küng in “Nicht gutgemeint – 
deshalb ein Fehlschlag. Zu Michael Welkers Reaktion auf „Projekt Weltethos‟” (Küng, 1993). Welker is 
of the opinion that Küng‟s project shows signs of a “one-sided concept of order” (Welker 1993a:356). 
According to Welker, Küng uses religion to solve the world‟s problems without truly integrating the 
deforming effects religious convictions have had. The result is that Küng makes use of a vague 
concept of religion that contradicts the self-understanding of different religions. Cf. e.g. Welker 
1993a:356: “Nachdem „Urgrund, Urhalt, Urziel‟ lebensförderlich oder dämonisch wirksam werken 
können, nachdem bloße Autonomie nicht unterscheiden kann zwischen „wahren und illusionären, 
objektiven und subjektiven, akzeptabeln und verwerflichen Interessen‟ ist das Rezept am Ende von 
der traurigen Ausgangslage nur unter einer einzigen Bedingung zu unterscheiden: Es muß die 
Bereitschaft bestehen, darauf zu hoffen und sich dem anzutrauen was ... „die Leiter und Lehrer‟ der 
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cultural traditions to what they share with one another would obstruct the only 
sources from which a planetary ethos can flow.”374 
 
Huber regards taking others‟ freedom of conscience as seriously as one‟s own as 
the presupposition for dialogue.375 The search for common concerns enables the 
search for the Überschneidungsbereiche (overlapping areas) that are necessary for 
the Minimalbedingungen (basic conditions) that can enable taking responsibility 
across regional, cultural and religious boundaries. Placing the focus on addressing 
specific challenges rather than looking for overlapping areas as an aim in itself 
provides the opportunity for the different groups to motivate their commitment in 
heterogeneous ways, making Begründungsoffenheit (the possibility for different 
motivations) possible without endangering the ethical project itself. Against the 
reductionist tendencies of Küng‟s Weltethos, Huber‟s planetary ethos incorporates 
the diversity in ethical convictions in his concept. 
 
After Huber has spent a number of years and many pages on motivating how shared 
convictions are possible, he currently focuses on the importance of the unique 
resources different groups bring to the dialogue. With increased tension and conflict 
especially between religious communities Huber increasingly emphasises the 
necessity of articulating diversity as first step in searching for shared basic 
convictions. In the following part of this section this development will be investigated. 
Whereas we have just seen that Huber regards global responsibility to be dependent 
on searching for basic conditions of agreement and that these conditions can only be 
reached by means of dialogue, the next part will approach dialogue from another 
perspective. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
großen Religionen mit ... „allen ihnen zur Verfügen stehenden Mitteln und Möglichkeiten‟ für die 
Propagierung und die Exekution des Projekts Weltethos tun und ansinnen werden.” 
374
 “Wer die Religionen oder kulturellen Traditionen auf das gemeinsam Aussagbare reduzieren 
würde, würde gerade die Quellen verstopfen, aus denen allein ein planetarisches Ethos fließen kann.” 
375
 Cf. e.g. “Religionsfreiheit und Toleranz – Wie aktuell ist der Augsburger Religionsfriede?” (Huber, 
2005aa) and “Religionsfreiheit und offene Gesellschaft – ein Prüfstein aktueller Dialoge in Europa” 
(Huber, 2004l). 
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4.3  Respecting differences 
 
Especially since the acts of terrorism in the United States of America on the 11th of 
September 2001, the contribution religious communities can make to the peace and 
stability but also the destabilisation of global society has become more relevant than 
ever before. Ever since the acts of 9/11376 it has become clear that attempts such as 
those by Küng to harmonise cultural and religious differences increasingly seem to 
be out of touch with global reality.377 In reaction to the changes in global politics, 
Huber‟s work on dialogue also started to reflect this change in focus.378  
 
Although Huber still regards the setting of shared aims as important, he currently 
devotes the bulk of his work on dialogue to how it should take place between 
religions. This is possibly the result of the need for deepened understanding 
developing into one of the Minimalbedingungen necessary for peaceful co-existence. 
Consequently, Huber‟s work on dialogue is now characterised by developing ways in 
which to recognise and respect differences between groups whilst contributing to the 
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 For the connection between current-day Islamic fundamentalism, cf. Faisal Devji‟s Landscapes of 
the Jihad: militancy, morality, modernity (London: Hurst & Co., 2005) and Tariq Ali, The clash of 
fundamentalisms: crusades, jihads and modernity (London: Verso, 2003). 
377
 However, Huber (e.g. in 2004l; 2005; 2005aa) regards critique as not excluded by the call for 
respect for the diversity of different groups. This is especially clear in his criticism towards Turkey‟s 
apparent unwillingness to subscribe to those Minimalbedinungen Huber regards as necessary for the 
peaceful co-existence of a plurality of groups: “Die Religionsfreiheit als individuelles Menschenrecht 
im eben dargestellten Sinne ist durch den Islam im Ganzen bisher nicht anerkannt worden. Zwar gibt 
es durchaus differenzierte Zugänge zu den Menschenrechten im Islam, die Religionsfreiheit 
eingeschlossen. ... Diese Trennung von Religion und staatlicher Rechtsordnung vollzieht der Islam 
aufs Ganze gesehen nicht. Das ist auch in der Türkei trotz ihrer besonderen Gestalt von Laizismus 
nicht der Fall.” 
378
 On the 26
th
 of September 2001 Huber delivered a speech at the Bremer Tabakskollegium in 
Augsburg (Germany), and already in this speech his changed focus was clear. The speech was aptly 
titled “Gerecht aus Glauben – die Gegenwartsbedeutung des christlichen Menschenbilds” (2001a), 
and although the theme was chosen even before 9/11, this theme provided Huber with an opportunity 
to consider the implications of the changes in world politics. He reacted by mentioning a theme that 
would characterise his work in the following years, namely appreciating the unique profile of Christian 
convictions: “Heute müssen wir zu beidem bereit sein, zur Verteidigung wie zur Erneuerung unserer 
Werte. Zur Verteidigung unserer Werte gehört die kritische und gegebenenfalls auch kämpferische 
Auseinandersetzung mit denen, die eine solche Kultur der Anerkennung zum Einsturz bringen wollen; 
zu ihr gehört deshalb auch die kritische und gegebenenfalls auch kämpferische Auseinandersetzung 
mit einem Islamismus, den wir nicht aus einem Geist multikultureller Schönfärberei verharmlosen 
dürfen.” Although this quotation sound unnecessarily harsh, Huber continues by qualifying what is 
meant with „our values‟: “Zur Erneuerung unserer Werte aber gehört, dass wir gerade heute bewusst 
eine Kultur der Anerkennung stärken, die auch den anderen, den Fremden einschließt. Deshalb 
sollten wir uns auch durch die Erschütterung dieser Wochen nicht dazu hinreißen lassen, dem Islam 
schlechterdings und im Ganzen die Teilhabe an Kultur und Zivilisation abzusprechen.” 
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peaceful and humane co-existence of different groups.379 In this part of this last 
section of Chapter 3, his focus on the profile of the participants in dialogue will be 
interpreted as his working out of the implications of the concept of „relative 
universalism‟ he developed in Die tägliche Gewalt (1993a).380 
 
Huber starts his argumentation for profiled interreligious dialogue with the character 
of the truth around which religious communities understand themselves to be 
orientated.381 He is convinced that there is no religion without implications for the 
lifestyle of its members as religions believe their founding truths to encompass the 
whole of reality (Huber, 2004l; 2005aa; 2007g).382 All religions consequently have a 
public character, as they believe that the all-encompassing character of their truth 
needs to be implemented wherever they should find themselves.383 
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 In the speech “Religion – Politik – Gewalt” (2005b) Huber used his introduction to a theological 
conference to explain the renewed relevance of interreligious dialogue in terms of the renewed 
connection between religion and politics: “Getrennt voneinander lassen sich Religion, Politik und 
Gewalt heute nicht mehr betrachten. Auch diese Themen werden hineingezogen in den Prozess der 
Globalisierung. ... Der wieder erstarkte Hindunationalismus in Indien ist dafür ebenso ein Beispiel wie 
die islamistische Verbindung zwischen Religion und Macht. Die neue Nähe zwischen Kirche und 
Staat in einigen orthodox geprägten Ländern weist ebenso in diese Richtung wie die neue Nähe 
zwischen Religion und Politik, die sich in den USA unbeschadet des von der Verfassung 
vorgesehenen wall of separation entwickelt hat. Religion, Politik und Gewalt – das ist nicht nur ein 
europäisches Thema; und die Frage danach, wie das Verhältnis der drei Begriffe bestimmt und 
geordnet werden kann, stellt sich nicht nur im Horizont des christlichen Glaubens.” 
380
 Concerning the importance and implications of identity in dialogue cf. e.g. Reinhold Bernhardt, 
Ende des Dialogs? Die Begegnung der Religionen und ihre theologische Reflexion (Zurich: TVC, 
2005); Gregor Maria Hoff, Ökumenische Passagen – zwischen Identität und Differenz: 
funndamentaltheologische Überlegungen zum Stand des Gesprächs zwischen römisch-katholischer 
und evangelisch-lutherischer Kirche (Innsbruck: Tyrolia, 2005); Jean C. Kapumba Akenda, Kulturelle 
Identität und interkulturelle Kommunikation: zur Problematik des ethischen Universalismus im 
Zeitalter der Globalisierung (Frankfurt a.M.: IKO, 2004); Heinrich Schmidinger (ed.), Identität und 
Toleranz: christliche Spiritualität im interreligiösen Spiegel (Innsbruck: Tyrolia, 2003); and Miroslav 
Volf, “Gerechtigkeit, kulturelle Heterogenität und christlicher Glaube” (in Evangelische Theologie 56 
1996:116–128). 
381
 Some of Huber‟s most important speeches in this regard are “Religionsfreiheit und offene 
Gesellschaft – ein Prüfstein aktueller Dialoge in Europa” (2004l), “Religionsfreiheit und Toleranz – 
Wie aktuell ist der Augsburger Religionsfriede?” (2005aa) and “Dialog der Religionen – Ansprache bei 
der Matthiae-Mahlzeit im Rathaus zu Hamburg” (2007g). 
382
 In a meaningful move Huber (e.g. 2005h) describes tolerance as exactly one of these founding 
truths of Christianity, as he understands it to be grounded on God‟s tolerance: “Toleranz dagegen 
muss jedenfalls in christlicher Perspektive in einer Glaubensgewissheit gründen, um deretwillen der 
Mitmensch als Nächster geachtet und in seiner abweichenden Glaubensweise respektiert wird. 
Reformatorisch geprägter Glaube stützt sich dafür auf eine göttlich zugesprochene Anerkennung der 
menschlichen Person, die unabhängig von ihren Taten und damit auch von ihren Überzeugungen gilt. 
Denn diese göttliche Anerkennung beruht gerade nicht auf den von Menschen erbrachten Leistungen, 
sondern auf einer göttlichen Toleranz, die den gottlosen Menschen als von Gott geliebtes Geschöpf 
annimmt.” 
383
 In this regard, cf. Raimon Panikkar, The intra-religious dialogue (New Jersey: Paulist Press, 1999, 
2
nd
 ed.) and specifically his “Rules of the game in the religious encounter” (1999:61–72). 
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This is also applicable to the Christian contribution to interreligious dialogue. In Der 
christliche Glaube (2008b:79–131) Huber lucidly expounds the central role that 
Jesus plays within Christianity and describes how the testimony to his exclusivity 
cannot be left out of interreligious dialogue as the belief in Jesus influences the 
whole of the Christian existence (2008b:128–131). He sketches especially two 
implications for interreligious dialogue. Firstly, respecting the unique profile and self-
understanding of different religions means that developing a general theory of 
religion and making it the basis for interreligious dialogue is incompatible with the 
essence of religions. According to Huber, a general theory of religion implies that the 
concept „religion‟ can exist apart from its content (2008b:128). This means that a 
central religious question, namely concerning truth and the commitment to truth, 
cannot be asked. This implies that the central question of religions cannot be asked, 
which raises questions about the legitimacy of the dialogue. 
 
Huber regards the focus on the assumed commonalities between the three 
monotheistic religions, secondly, as another way by means of which questions 
regarding truth are ignored (2008b:129). Especially the presence of Abraham in 
Christianity, Islam and Judaism is often used as link between these three 
religions.384 Apart from excluding other religions, Huber shows how this link diverts 
attention from Abraham‟s differing role in these different religions and causes central 
beliefs not to be discussed or to receive disproportionate attention.385 
                                                             
384
 For discussions on dialogue between Christianity and Islam, cf. Andreas Renz and Stephan 
Leimgruber (eds.), Christen und Muslime: Was sie verbindet, was sie untescheidet (Munich: Kösel, 
2005, 2
nd
 edition); Ludger Kaulig, Ebenen des christlich-islamitischen Dialogs: Beobachtungen und 
Analysen zu den Wegen einer Begegnung (Münster: Lit, 2002); Hansjörg Schmid, Andreas Renz and 
Juta Sperber (eds.), “Im Namen Gottes...”: Theologie und Praxis des Gebets in Christentum und 
Islam (Regensurg: Pustet, 2006); Hansjörg Schmid, Andreas Renz, Juta Sperber and Duran Terzi 
(eds.), Identität durch Differenz? Wechselseitige Abgreznungen in Christentum und Islam 
(Regensburg: Pustet, 2007); and Hansjörg Schmid, Andreas Renz, Juta Sperber and Abdullah Takim 
(eds.), Prüfung oder Preis der Freiheit: Leid und Leidbewältigung in Christentum und Islam 
(Regensburg: Pustet, 2008). 
385
 Interestingly, Huber recently also started to develop the concept of „profiled ecumenism‟ according 
to which ecumenical dialogue should also take the profile of different denominations seriously (cf. 
Günter Gloede, Oekumenische Profile: Brückenbauer der einen Kirche (Stuttgart: Evang. 
Missionsverlag, 1961). Although he does set some different accents when discussing dialogue 
between churches, the theme of a profiled access to dialogue is still present. In his speech “Was 
bedeutet Ökumene der Profile?” (2006p) Huber identifies five theses that should characterise profiled 
ecumenism, namely (a) “Uns verbindet mehr, als was uns trennt”; (b) “Die Herausforderung zum 
gemeinsamen ökumenischen Zeugnis wird nicht schwächer, sondern starker”; (c) “Das eigene 
kirchliche Profil zu leben und zu deuten, ist selbst eine ökumenische Aufgabe”; (d) “Wir müssen 
lernen, mit bleibenden Differenzen ökumenisch zu leben”; and (e) “Eine „Ökumene der Profile‟ 
entwickeln wir heute angesichts einer gemeinsamen missionarischen Aufgabe”. Although Huber‟s 
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Much rather than refraining from speaking about binding truth in public discourse, 
and in particular in interreligious dialogue, Huber regards the freedom to articulate 
convictions concerning binding truths as the presupposition for religious freedom 
(1999:187).386 Religious freedom serves as the acknowledgement of the importance 
of religion for society and the right of members of society to commit themselves to 
communities where a truth is taught that encompasses the whole of human 
existence. Huber is therefore of the opinion that real dialogue requires that the 
reticence to refer to truth be abandoned (1994a:175). Forms of communication 
whereby people are enabled to search for binding truth and respect differing views 
should be cultivated (1994a:175). This also the reason why Huber develops a theory 
on freedom explicitly from Christian resources, whilst staying within the parameters 
of the institutionalised freedom of modern societies. 
 
Huber therefore advocates a position of „convinced tolerance‟.387 Whereas tolerance 
itself is of central importance for the peaceful co-existence of different groups,388 
Huber warns against an empty understanding of tolerance. Tolerance without the 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
suggestion of profiled ecumenism has a strong focus on what is shared between churches, one might 
argue that this focus has weakened since he wrote Die Streit um die Wahrheit und die Fähigkeit zum 
Frieden: Vier Kapitel ökumensiche Theologie in 1980. One may argue that in 1980 Huber laid more 
emphasis on community than seems to be the case in his later work. Here Huber (1980:16) regards 
wechselseitige Besuch as of importance in ecumenism, as the first basic principle of ecumenism is 
„experienced community‟. He states unequivocally (1980:21–22) that real ecumenism exists only 
there where „community‟ and „reciprocal understanding‟ are real and therefore states, “Leibhaftes 
Miteinandersein ist der Lebensvollzug von Ökumene”. In this book Huber (1980:45–79) consequently 
develops ecumenical theology as “Theologie in der Begegnung”. Cf. in this regard also Konrad 
Raiser‟s article “Freiheit und wechselseitige Verantwortung der Kirchen in der ökumenischen 
Gemeinschaft” (in Reuter, H-R., Bedford-Strohm, H., Kuhlmann, H. & Lütcke, K-H. (eds.), Freiheit 
verantworten: Festschrift für Wolfgang Huber zum 60. Geburtstag, Gütersloh: Kaiser, Gütersloher, 
2002:66–75). 
386
 Cf. e.g. the religiously informed reaction from the Muslim community in Germany after Pope 
Benedict XVI delivered his now infamous speech in Regensburg on the 12
th
 of September 2006 in 
Haider Ali Zafar, Glaube und Vernunft aus islamischer Perspektive: Antwort auf die Regensburger 
Vorlesung vom Papst Benedikt XVI. (Frankfurt a.M.: Verlag der Islam, 2007). Cf. also Cäcilia Schmitt, 
Islamische Theologie des 21. Jahrhunderts: Der aufgeklärte Islam (Stuttgart: Basis Verlag, 2007). 
387
 Altough Huber makes use of this concept often in his recent work, see the following speeches for 
adequate accounts of his view in this regard: “Religionsfreiheit und offene Gesellschaft – ein Prüfstein 
aktueller Dialoge in Europa” (2004l), “Der Auftrag der Kirchen in einem Zusammenwachsenden 
Europa” (2005d), “evangelisch – profiliert – wertvoll” (2005h), “Unvereinbare Gegensätze? Scharia 
und säkulare Recht” (2005q) and “Religionsfreiheit und Toleranz – Wie aktuell ist der Augsburger 
Religionsfriede?” (2005aa). 
388
 Huber describes Toleranz as the „presupposition‟ for peaceful co-existence in a pluralistic society 
(2004l): “Sie [Toleranz] ist die Voraussetzung für das friedliche Zusammenleben in der pluralen 
Gesellschaft und für den Frieden zwischen Völkern, Kulturen und Religionen. Sie zu erhalten ist – um 
Gottes und der Menschen willen – Aufgabe jeder Religion.” 
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openness to truth is denigrated to indifference (Huber, 1999:187).389 When respect 
for the other‟s viewpoint is borne from the appreciation of one‟s own point of view, 
Huber chooses to speak of convinced tolerance390: 
 
Tolerance should not be equated with regarding everything or everybody 
as being right. Things [then] become indifferent and arbitrary and lose 
bonding force and legitimacy if everything is equally valid. Religious 
tolerance means to bear with differences and engage them. A free and 
open society is not sustained by leaving one another alone but needs 
astute and convinced tolerance that requires dialogue and engages in the 
struggle for freedom (2004l).391 
 
In his speech “Der Auftrag der Kirchen in einem Zusammenwachsenden Europa” 
(2005d) Huber elaborates the concept by identifying three areas where tolerance 
should be practised. Personal tolerance, in the first place, is understood to originate 
in the individual‟s freedom of conscience and it respects the other‟s freedom of 
conscience.  
 
The second area where tolerance should be practised flows from the first and is 
tolerance in society. Due to personal conviction and respect for others‟ freedom of 
conscience it is possible to respect the convictions and ways of living of other 
groups. Respect for others indeed does not mean indifference towards their way of 
life but means accepting the differences as necessary for the functioning of a 
pluralist society.392 The last area Huber identifies for tolerance is the political sphere. 
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 Cf. “Christian belief and respect for difference” in Kathryn Tanner‟s The politics of God 
(Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 1992:193–224). 
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 Cf. “Religionsfreiheit und offene Gesellschaft – ein Prüfstein aktueller Dialoge in Europa” (Huber 
2004l), “Religionsfreiheit und Toleranz – Wie aktuell ist der Augsburger Religionsfriede?” (Huber 
2005aa) and “Dialog der Religionen – Ansprache bei der Matthiae-Mahlzeit im Rathaus zu Hamburg” 
(Huber, 2007g). 
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 “Toleranz ist ... nicht gleichzusetzen mit: alles für richtig halten und jedem Recht geben. ... Wenn 
alles gleich gültig ist, wird alles gleichgültig, beliebig und verliert an Bindungskraft und Überzeugung. 
Religiöse Toleranz meint das Aushalten und Austragen von Differenzen in Anerkennung der 
Gleichrangigkeit. Die freiheitliche offene Gesellschaft lebt dabei nicht von einem sich gegenseitig in 
Ruhe lassen; sie braucht die wache, überzeugte Toleranz, die den Dialog einfordert und dem Streit 
um die Wahrheit nicht ausweicht.” 
392
 Cf. the relevance of questions regarding identity in Huber‟s discussion of convinced tolerance. Cf. 
e.g. Kathleen R. Arnold, Homelessness, citizenship, and identity: The uncanniness of late modernity 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004); Richard Madsen (ed.), Meaning and modernity: 
Religion, polity, and self (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002); Elisabeth Mudimbe-Boyi, 
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Political tolerance is aimed at creating spaces where differing convictions can be 
nurtured and can be put in dialogue. Freedom of religion does not simply mean the 
freedom from religion but also implies a freedom for religion and the consequent 
spaces for its articulation. 
 
 
5.  SUMMARY 
 
In this chapter the researcher investigated the ways in which communicative 
freedom contributes to the renewal of modernity. He discussed three dimensions of 
its contribution, namely its critique of progress, and its focus on justice and dialogue. 
 
In this first section it was shown that the way in which communicative freedom 
connects freedom and self-limitation forms the basis for Huber‟s critique against the  
trust in progress of modernity. It was shown, furthermore, that the trust in progress of 
contemporary modernity is at odds with its founding ideas as a blind trust in progress 
is based on a profound irrationality. The Enlightenment rather focused on liberated 
and mature persons‟ ability to make rational decisions for the betterment of 
humankind. Societal structures that correspond with human dignity and freedom 
were therefore the initial thrust of progress. It was shown how Huber consequently 
suggests the responsible realisation of freedom as aim for societal progress rather 
than an irrational trust in human abilities. 
 
In the second section the inequality and unjust structures that still characterise many 
modern societies formed the background for Huber‟s suggestion that modernity 
should be made more just. It was shown that Huber understands comprehensive 
justice in modern societies to depend on how the tension between freedom and 
equality is addressed. It was shown that the connection between sociality and 
individuality made by communicative freedom reframes this tension and that Huber 
develops the concept „connective justice‟ as the corresponding concept of justice. It 
was then shown that the reframed tension does not imply that the tension between 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
Beyond dichotomies: histories, identities, cultures, and the challenge of globalisation (Albany: State 
University of New York, 2002); and Anthony Giddens‟ well-known Modernity and self-identity: Self and 
society in the late modern age (Cambridge: Polity, 1991). 
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freedom and equality is resolved but that it persists. Huber interprets this persisting 
tension from an eschatological perspective and he regards it as the call to action. 
The section concluded with showing that the perspective of the powerless is to be 
understood as the criterion by which societal justice should be measured and that 
should direct the struggle for justice. 
 
In the third section the realisation of communicative freedom in the context of an 
increasingly integrated world was discussed. The need for corporate responsibility, 
especially in the light of cultural and religious conflict, formed the background of this 
section. As was seen in Chapter 2, the reflexive use of principles is necessary for the 
realisation of communicative freedom. In this section it was shown that the reflexive 
use of principles in an increasingly integrated and divided world is to be realised by 
means of dialogue. Huber‟s concepts of Überschneidungsbereiche, 
Minimalbedingungen, Begründungsoffenheit, relative Universalismus and 
überzeugte Toleranz were consequently discussed to outline his understanding of 
what kind of dialogue should ensue from communicative freedom. Huber rejects 
attempts to harmonise differences but is of the opinion that the freedom of 
conscience and the cultural and ethical particularities of others should be respected. 
Huber understands the search for shared convictions of less importance for 
corporate responsibility than the search for a shared perception of the challenges. In 
the concluding part of this section newer themes in his thought were investigated 
and it was seen that differences play an important role in dialogue and that the 
participation of groups should be based on their own, unique convictions. 
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CONCLUSION  
 
This study was an investigation into the role and place of the concept of freedom in 
the theology of Wolfgang Huber. It was done by investigating how communicative 
freedom engages modernity. In this concluding section the way in which this 
investigation was done and the role that freedom plays in Huber‟s work will be 
traced. The section will conclude with two sets of comments born from the context 
within which this study was conducted. 
 
 
1. COMMUNICATIVE FREEDOM AS ENGAGEMENT OF 
 MODERNITY 
 
In Chapter 1 the theological sources of communicative freedom were investigated. It 
was shown that Huber does not aim to develop a new concept of freedom but that he 
understands communicative freedom as a rearticulation of the concept of freedom 
the Reformation already testified to (cf. Huber, 1987:54; 1992a:115; 1996c:61; 
2007b). This was made clear by the important role Paul‟s theology and specifically 
Martin Luther‟s interpretation thereof plays in the concept of communicative freedom. 
In particular Luther‟s double thesis was shown to play a central role in understanding 
the connection between individuality and sociality in the concept of communicative 
freedom (cf. e.g. Huber, 1985:210). On another level, Luther‟s focus on the freedom 
of conscience as the hinge between individual freedom and social responsibility was 
shown to be a strong influence on the connection between freedom and societal 
responsibility made by communicative freedom (cf. e.g. Huber, 1987:62; 1996c:108). 
 
By means of the influence of Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Heinz Eduard Tödt it was 
shown, furthermore, how the Confessing Church movement plays a decisive role in 
Huber‟s understanding of how freedom should be rearticulated in a contemporary 
way. Bonhoeffer‟s focus on the church as „church for others‟ (cf. e.g. Huber, 
1985:173ff; 2007k) and the emphasis on responsibility and substitutionary action in 
his work (cf. e.g. Huber, 1990a:143ff; 2006m) were shown to be of importance for 
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the way in which Huber develops communicative freedom within an ethic of 
responsibility (cf. e.g. 1990a:136–157). 
 
Heinz Eduard Tödt‟s integration of Bonhoeffer into his own work on ethics was 
shown to have influenced Huber‟s work on freedom (cf. Schuhmacher, 2006:23ff). 
One of the first published uses of the concept communicative freedom was shown to 
be in Menschenrechte: Perspektiven einer menschlichen Welt (co-written by Huber 
and Tödt, 1977). As was seen in Chapter 2, Tödt‟s influence on Huber‟s work on 
human rights and their connection with freedom is also significant (cf. e.g. Huber, 
1996b:246ff; Huber &Tödt, 1977:163ff). 
 
In subsequent discussions of Huber‟s understanding of communicative freedom it 
became clear how he develops the concept in continuation of Reformational 
theological sources. Huber‟s systematisation of the theological content of 
communicative freedom consequently reflected classic Reformed emphases, namely 
freedom as grounded in God‟s grace (cf. e.g. Huber, 1985:211ff; 1996b:107ff; 
1999:171ff), to be realised in relationship with others (cf. e.g. Huber, 1999:168–170; 
1996c:104–106) within the context of sin (cf. e.g. Huber, 1996c:107ff; 1999:174ff). It 
was shown that Huber does not articulate communicative freedom as a goal in itself, 
but as a means by which to engage modernity, and consequently Chapter 2 and 
Chapter 3 were devoted to investigating how communicative freedom engages 
modernity. 
 
In Chapter 2 it was seen that Huber (cf. e.g. 1991:672; 1993b:71; 2004c; 2007b) 
strongly emphasises both the Protestant influence on the development of modernity 
as well as the duty of Protestantism to contribute to the societal discourse on 
freedom by means of the understanding of freedom by the Reformation. Huber 
(1990d:47) therefore regards attempts to depart from modernity as premature and 
proposes a critical alliance (1990d:50).  
 
In Chapter 2 the engagement by communicative freedom of modernity‟s structuring 
of human sociality was examined. In a first step the engagement by communicative 
freedom of the central place modernity attributes to the individual was investigated. It 
was shown that God‟s constitution of communicative freedom is experienced as the 
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inalienable character of human dignity (cf. e.g. Huber, 1985:211ff; 1999:171–176) 
and that it provides for a point of connection with the role of human rights in modern 
societies (cf. e.g. Huber, 1996b:136–137; 2001h:12ff). It was also shown that 
communicative freedom does not imply unqualified support for modern ideas 
concerning the role of the individual but takes on the form of a critical affirmation. 
Huber uses this concept of freedom to imbed the central role of the individual in an 
ethic of responsibility (cf. e.g. 1990a:136–157). In particular the personal character of 
communicative freedom and the way in which it connects human individuality with 
human sociality were shown to form the basis for imbedding human dignity in an 
ethic of responsibility. 
 
The second part of Chapter 2 concerned the engagement of the societal aspects of 
modernity by communicative freedom. Huber regards modernity as conducive to a 
form of societal organisation that allows for the peaceful and humane co-existence of 
a diversity of people and groups. It consequently became clear how communicative 
freedom also critically affirms and contributes to processes of secularisation, 
democracy and pluralism. Processes of secularisation were shown not to imply the 
disappearance of religion but indeed to provide the opportunity to engage political 
power and the space for religiously informed concepts such as communicative 
freedom (cf. e.g. Huber, 1999:62ff; 2004h; 2005i; 2007l). Communicative freedom 
was consequently described as a contribution to the maintenance of an enlightened 
form of secularity.  
 
With regard to democracy it was shown how both the belief of the Reformation in the 
inalienable freedom of all persons and the institutionalisation of freedom by 
democracy meet in the concept of human dignity (Cf. e.g. 1987:74–79m; 2004q; 
2004r; 2006x) and this serves as basis for the critical affirmation of democracy. It 
was shown, furthermore, how the concept of communicative freedom contributes to 
the sustenance of such an understanding of democracy by building trust in the 
system by means of its own sources (cf. e.g. Huber, 1987:74ff; 2006x). Lastly it was 
shown that Huber (1991:671ff) develops communicative freedom as a reaction to 
pluralism that transcends reactions such as fundamentalism, relativism and 
integrationalism. Communicative freedom is a position that respects societal 
pluralism but does not view pluralism as a goal in itself (Huber, 1994a:167–172). It 
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therefore supports the pluralisation of society as a way in which to enable the co-
existence of different people and groups.  
 
In Chapter 3 it was shown that communicative freedom also expresses Huber‟s 
contribution to the renewal of modernity. In the first section Huber‟s critique of the 
irrational trust in progress of modernity was shown to depend on the indissoluble 
connection between freedom and responsibility that communicative freedom 
expresses (Huber, 1990a:195–207). The ecological and societal challenges this trust 
in progress leads to were shown not to be the result of insufficient control of progress 
but to be due to the absence of goals by means of which progress can be directed 
(Huber, 1990a:204–205). This section then also concluded with suggesting a 
comprehensive understanding of freedom as basis for setting societal goals. 
 
The second section concerned the continued presence of injustice in modern 
societies, still present despite major advances. It was shown that Huber (cf. e.g. 
1996b:155–156) regards the tension between freedom and equality in need of 
reinterpretation in order to contribute to making modernity more just.  It was shown 
that this tension is the result of a reductionist understanding of both freedom and 
justice and that developing both of these concepts in terms of the connection 
between individuality and sociality leads to the tension being reframed (cf. e.g. 
Huber, 1996b:149–198). Huber (cf. e.g. 1996b:159ff; 1999:135ff) suggests the 
concept of connective justice to complement communicative freedom. It was also 
shown that reframing this tension does not imply that the tension is resolved and that 
eschatology serves as entrance point to the remaining tension.  
 
In the third section the realisation of communicative freedom in the context of an 
increasingly integrated world was examined. Communicative freedom can only be 
realised by means of responsibility and is dependent on the reflexive use of 
principles, as was seen in the previous chapters (cf. e.g. Huber, 1990a:193–194; 
1990a:204–207; 1990b:243–246; 1999:210–215). In this section Huber‟s work on 
dialogue as was investigated an expression of communicative freedom (1993a:170–
171). It was shown that dialogue should not be based on the harmonisation of 
differences but should be based on the shared perception of shared challenges (cf. 
e.g. 1993a:170–184; 1994b:32–46). The shared perception of challenges then forms 
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the basis for searching for principles by means of which responsibility can be taken. 
In this regard it was shown how Huber uses concepts such as 
Überschneidungsbereiche, Minimalbedingungen, Begründungsoffenheit (cf. e.g. 
Huber, 1993a:180ff; 1994b:38ff) and überzeugte Toleranz (cf. e.g. Huber, 2004l; 
2005aa; 2007g) to develop a model for dialogue where differences between groups 
serve as basis for shared responsibility. 
 
In the light of the above, it can therefore be said that this study has shown that the 
concept of communicative freedom in Wolfgang Huber‟s theology can be interpreted 
as a rearticulation of the rediscovery of freedom by the Reformation in order to 
engage modernity critically. The critical engagement has been shown to consist of 
two dimensions, namely a critical affirmation of principal characteristics and a 
contribution to its renewal. The dissertation is concluded with some comments 
concerning Huber‟s work on communicative freedom from a South African 
perspective. 
 
 
2.  SOME FURTHER REMARKS 
 
Although the primary aim of this study was investigating freedom in Huber‟s 
theology, it also serves a secondary aim, namely providing resources for contributing 
to the discourse on freedom in South Africa. The way in which the material was 
presented was intended to make Huber‟s work on freedom also accessible to 
contexts other than his native Germany, and in particular to South Africa. To 
conclude, however, two perspectives more obviously connected to the South African 
context will be considered. Each of these perspectives consists of an appreciatory 
and critical element.  
 
2.1 Complementing liberation with communicative freedom 
 
In the Introduction the relevance of freedom for the South African context was 
sketched in terms of the importance of the concept of freedom in the struggle against 
apartheid.  
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In post-apartheid South African major advances have been made in achieving 
freedom for all, and liberation in the narrow sense – namely the attainment of equal 
institutionalised freedoms for all – has been reached.393 The clearest example is the 
Bill of Rights in the South African Constitution. In this second chapter of the 
Constitution the institutionalisation of the basic equal freedoms of all South Africans 
is affirmed, as is illustrated also by the non-derogable rights, namely equality 
(Section 9), human dignity (Section 10), life (Section 11), freedom and security of the 
person (Section 12), freedom from slavery, servitude and forced labour (Section 13), 
children‟s freedom (Section 28) and the freedoms of arrested, detained and accused 
persons (Section 35).  
 
The fact that constitutionally guaranteed freedoms have been achieved for the whole 
of South African society does not mean, however, that the struggle for freedom has 
ended. In post-apartheid South Africa a new range of challenges requires public 
attention. Even only a passing glance over the current South African reality reveals 
some daunting challenges.  
 
Many South Africans, in terms of the Freedom Charter‟s programmatic statements, 
still do not have the opportunity to participate in government, they still do not have 
work and security, not all have opportunities for learning, many still do not have 
houses and many still do not experience peace and friendship.394 For example, the 
United Nations places South Africa only 121st of 177 countries on its Human Poverty 
Index (2007/2008), the country has one of the highest Gini-coefficients in the world 
(an indication that the South African society is one of the most unequal in the world), 
an HIV/Aids-pandemic is endangering a whole generation (estimations are that 5.5 
million of South Africa‟s inhabitants are HIV positive)395 and South Africa‟s crime 
statistics are of the worst in the world (according to official statistics396 for April 2006 
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 Concerning the reconstruction of the idea of being „South African‟, cf. T. Brinkel, Nation building 
and pluralism. Experiences and perspectives in state and society in South Africa (Den Haag: Sdu 
Uitgevers, 2006). 
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 Cf. Raymond Suttner (ed.), 50 years of the Freedom Charter (Pretoria: Unisa Press, 2006). 
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 http://www.unaids.org/en/KnowledgeCentre/HIVData/EpiUpdate/EpiUpdArchive/2007/default.asp. 
Adding to that, the WHO‟s Global TB Report 2006 placed South Africa 5
th
 out of the world‟s 22 high-
burden TB countries. 
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 These statistics are available at 
http://www.saps.gov.za/saps_profile/strategic_framework/annual_report/2006_2007/nat_crime_situati
on.pdf  
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to March 2007, 19 202 people were murdered, 52 617 were raped and 13 599 
motorcars were hijacked). 
 
In his last State of the Nation Address delivered on the 8th of February 2008 
President Thabo Mbeki stated the continuing challenges in an unprecedented 
manner, namely as „deeply troubling‟ to many South Africans: 
 
... I am aware of the fact that many in our society are troubled by a deep 
sense of unease about where our country will be tomorrow. They are 
concerned about the national emergency into which the country has been 
thrown by the unexpected disruptions in the supply of electricity. ... They 
are concerned about some developments in our economy.... They are 
worried about whether we have the capacity to defend the democratic 
rights and the democratic Constitution which were born of enormous 
sacrifices (Mbeki 2008). 
 
In this context it is significant that the African National Congress, the country‟s ruling 
party, still states its main objectives in terms of liberation, namely the creation of “a 
united, non-racial, non-sexist and democratic society”, as well as “the liberation of 
Africans in particular and black people in general from political and economic 
bondage. It means uplifting the quality of life of all South Africans, especially the 
poor”.397 
 
It is clear that the attainment of the goals of liberation as understood in its narrow 
sense by no means implies that the struggle for freedom has ended. A significant 
challenge within the South African context Huber‟s work addresses is 
complementing the discourse on liberation with a proactive discourse on freedom, 
which should be imformed by concepts such as communicative freedom. He has 
shown that freedom can function as a constructive concept that connects societal 
and individual concerns with the context of democratic societies. In this regard the 
concept of communicative freedom articulates the continued challenge of freedom in 
                                                             
397
 The self-description of the party is available at http://www.anc.org.za/about/anc.html.  
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a constructive manner. The challenge is not the struggle against unjust structures 
but how to connect individual freedom with societal freedom.  
 
In the study it was shown that the resources of the Reformation assist in showing 
how individuality and sociality presuppose one another and that self-limitation, 
responsibility, dialogue and justice are expressions of the inalienable freedom 
equally bestowed on all people.  
 
2.1.1 The relative significance of freedom 
In this regard also, however, qualifying remarks concerning the role of freedom 
should be made. It has been shown that Huber regards freedom as arguably the 
most important theological theme in Paul‟s work and indeed in the Bible as such. It 
was shown that Huber regards freedom as the „Protestant principle‟ (1990d:59), that 
ethics concerns the question how to best use one‟s freedom (1985:113), that the 
church is primarily the „space‟ and „advocate‟ for freedom (1985:205–216) and that 
he regards freedom as the major theme of the 21st century (2008c). 
 
However, even a relatively superficial view of Paul‟s theology and specifically his 
theology in Galatians reveals that identifying freedom as its main theme is not an 
incontestable interpretation. Concerning the „centre‟ of Paul‟s theology, Dunn 
(1998:722) regards the only identifiable „fulcrum‟ or „pivot point‟ of Paul‟s theology its 
Christ imagery. He regards the identification of this „living centre‟ (1998:730) the 
nearest one can come to the centre of Paul‟s theology, as Christ seems to be “the 
central criterion by which Paul made critical discrimination of what counted and what 
was of lesser moment” (1998:723). Moreover, when he identifies what he 
understands as the innovative features of Paul‟s theology, he fails to mention 
freedom as such, as he regards these features as „gospel‟, „grace‟ and „love‟ 
(1998:733), Paul‟s distinction between „body‟ and „flesh‟ (cf. 1998: 70–72), his 
coining of the term „charisma‟ (1998:733, 552–560), his analysis of the human 
condition in terms of Adam and the reality of sin and death (1998:734, 79–127), 
justification by faith (1998:334–389), salvation within eschatological tension 
(1998:735, 461–498), his focus on „paranesis‟, his ecclesiastical self-sufficiency and 
his method of writing letters (1998:736–737). Dunn rarely mentions freedom as a 
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significant theme in Paul‟s work, and its only significant place is as the fourth 
implication of Paul‟s view on the justification by faith alone (1998:388). 
 
In Marshall‟s New Testament Theology: Many witnesses, one Gospel (2004) the title 
already signifies the challenge when identifying a unifying theme in the New 
Testament (and by implication of the Bible as such). Marshall (2004:713), for 
example, again quotes Kümmel‟s view that the unifying theme of the New Testament 
as such can at most be described as the approaching kingdom of God as preached 
by Christ and the consequent connection between the presence of salvation and the 
person of Christ. 
 
That freedom is an important concept these researchers agree on (cf. also Wenham 
in Marshall, 2004:227 and Schüssler Fiorenza‟s interpretation of Galatians 5:28 in 
1997:224–230), but identifying it as the central theme of Christianity requires a fair 
amount of interpretative effort. A close reading of Paul‟s letter to the Galatians itself 
reveals the lack of consensus among scholars on its central theme. Jones (1987:86) 
shows, for example, that Bultmann‟s identification of Christian freedom as entailing 
freedom from the law, sin and the world and its deathly impulses is nothing less than 
a theologically informed interpretation (Jones, 1987:13). Researchers have also not 
reached consensus concerning the role of Paul‟s concept of freedom. Whereas 
Schmitz and Brandt are of the opinion that freedom plays no central role in Paul‟s 
theology, others such as Bultmann, Wedell and Cambier are of the opinion that 
freedom does play a central role (Jones, 1987:15). Concerning the meaning of 
freedom, scholarly opinions range from freedom as meaning union with Christ (e.g. 
Wedell), or as being closely connected to baptism (e.g. Reicke), or as fundamentally 
being freedom from the law (e.g. Grossouw) to freedom being an eschatological 
concept (e.g. Gulin) (Jones 1987:13–14). 
 
The legitimacy of Huber‟s conviction that the Bible gives reason enough to regard 
freedom as the most central theme in the Bible is not refuted by these scholars. It 
does focus one‟s attention on the fact that this is but one line of interpretation and 
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that other biblical themes may also be shown to contribute to constructive societal 
dialogue.398  
 
It should therefore be noted that the complexity and richness of the biblical witness 
reminds one that any one theme can only have relative significance as there are a 
number of biblical impulses that may be available for the participation of the church 
in the public sphere.399 The reception of communicative freedom in the South African 
context will therefore necessarily be accompanied by other theological impulses too, 
and may even have to be superseded in importance by other important biblical 
impulses. 
 
2.2 Conceptualising the place of the church in society 
 
In this dissertation we saw that Huber uses communicative freedom to show that the 
churches from the Reformation have an important role to play in modern societies to 
contribute to a humane society. It was shown that the Reformational understanding 
of freedom is a multidimensional concept that provides for many resources by means 
of which to engage modernity. It was also shown that concerning the structure of 
modern societies, this concept is of particular relevance to engage secularisation, 
democracy and pluralisation in a constructive manner.400 
 
As is the case in Germany, South Africa understands itself as a constitutional 
democracy within which the values of secularisation, continued democratisation and 
pluralism and pluralisation are of central importance. Huber‟s work on 
                                                             
398
 In this regard it is worthwhile to note that Huber in some instances does relativise his own 
conviction that freedom forms the basic thrust of Paul‟s theology and of indeed the whole Bible. In Die 
Streit um die Wahrheit und die Fähigkeit zum Frieden: Vier Kapitel ökumensiche Theologie Huber 
(1980:74–76) makes use of the work of Allan Boesak and Manas Buthelezi to identify Ganzheit des 
Lebens as a legitimate African interpretation of the thrust of the gospel. 
399
 This is illustrated, for example, by the South African theologian Russel Botman‟s suggestion 
(2006:72) that the „discourse of equality‟ and the „discourse of reconciliation‟ should currently 
characterise the church‟s public involvement in South Africa. 
400
 For more on modernity and politics in Africa, cf. in this regard also Peter Burnell and Vicky Randall 
(eds.), Politics in the developing world (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Negotiating 
modernity: Africa’s ambivalent experience (Dakar: Codesria Books, 2005) edited by Elísio Salvado 
Macamo; James Ferguson Global shadows: Africa in the neoliberal world order (Durham: Duke 
University, 2006); Manfred O. Hinz and F. Thomas Gatter (eds.), Global responsibility – local agenda 
:the legitimacy of modern self-determination and African traditional authority (Münster: Lit Verlag, 
2006); and Lennarth Wohlgemuth and Ebrima Sall, Human rights, regionalism and the dilemmas of 
democracy in Africa (Dakar: Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa, 2006). 
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communicative freedom is of special relevance, firstly, as it conceptualises the place 
of the church in society. It was shown how his work on communicative freedom is 
unambiguously done within the context of secularisation (cf. e.g. Huber, 1999:62ff; 
2004h; 2005i; 2007l), constitutional democracy (cf. e.g. 1987:74–79m; 2004q; 2004r; 
2006x) and pluralism (cf. e.g. 1991:671ff; 1994a:167–172) and how communicative 
freedom is developed as a Christian concept relevant for the public sphere whilst 
affirming the secularisation of society, democracy and pluralism. Huber (1996c:102–
103; 1999:273–275) showed that the church can only fulfil its duty in this regard by 
contributing to the diversity, independence and civil courage of civil society 
 
Huber‟s work on communicative freedom assists, secondly, in its assertion that the 
church has the responsibility to play a public role. In the South African context it 
means that the church should contribute to the maturing of democracy in South 
Africa. In their study Civil society, democratisation and foreign aid in Africa Robinson 
and Friedman show that the assumed set of democratic institutions, namely “free 
and fair elections, the freedom to participate in autonomous organisations outside 
the realm of the state, an elected legislature, an independent judiciary and an 
accountable political executive” (2005:41) are not necessarily present in all African 
democracies and also not in South Africa. “While South Africa ... [is a] functioning 
multi-party [democracy], [it] is [not] fully responsive to its citizens: liberal democratic 
norms may be present in some institutions and procedures, but absent in others 
because democratic institutions are still maturing ....” Indeed, in many cases the 
public space in Africa is characterised not by civil society‟s search for legitimacy, but 
indeed by the state‟s search for legitimacy. Diaw (2005:31) therefore holds that the 
public sphere in many Africans societies is characterised by their “backlash, their 
inventiveness in escaping the subjection that the post-colonial African state [tries] to 
impose on them in its slide into authoritarianism” (Diaw 2005:31). 
 
This reminds one of the fact that the structure of South African society – although 
broadly built on the same principles – differs from that in most Western liberal 
democracies. The state of democracy in South Africa is still not as such that one can 
assume that “all citizens enjoy the capacity to influence government decisions” in 
order for the influence of civil society to be “a function of how it is organised rather 
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than external constraints” (Robinson & Friedman, 2005:41). Robinson and Friedman 
(2005:7) cite Fatton and Kasfir to highlight the challenges civil society faces:  
 
Prevailing ethnic and kinship structures, the legacy of colonialism, the 
pattern of economic development, and authoritarian forms of political rule 
gave rise to civil societies that differ markedly from the voluntary 
associational form characteristic of the United States and Western 
Europe. 
 
In this context it is meaningful to have seen that secular and pluralist democracies 
not only provide religious communities with a place in which to practise their beliefs 
but that these societies are also dependent on religiously informed contributions by 
faith communities for their maintenance. Huber‟s understanding of Böckenförde‟s 
dictum (cf. Huber, 1987:74; 2005f; 2006x) served to illustrate how churches can 
contribute to societal cohesion by means of profiled contributions. 
 
2.2.1 Differing contexts for public theology 
In order to engage the public discourse, one should also note that South African 
churches are faced with some challenges not directly addressed by this study. Most 
notably the question regarding representation in the public sphere places South 
African churches before unique challenges. 
 
When viewed superficially, statistics seems to indicate that churches in South Africa 
should have an even greater opportunity than those in Germany to contribute to 
societal discourse. The Census of 2001 (SSA 2001) found, for example, that 79.77% 
(35 750 645) of South Africans are Christians, whereas in Germany 62.7% 
(52 455 348) of its inhabitants are Christians (EKD, 2006b). The breakdown of the 
different figures, however, reveals two very different contexts for public theology.  
 
Christians in Germany generally belong to one of two confessions, each with roughly 
the same number of members; either they are Lutheran (48%) or Roman Catholic 
(49%). In South Africa, the breakdown of the more than 35 million Christians 
illustrates a more complex situation. Of the mainline denominations the largest 
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groupings are the Reformed, Catholic and Methodist churches and each of these 
denominations has about 9% of all Christians as their members. By far the largest 
grouping is the Zionist African Independent Churches with nearly 20% of Christians 
belonging to this group. Calling the Zionist churches a denomination is of course 
misleading, as these churches are not organised in a larger representative structure 
such as the mainline denominations.401 When grouped together with other African 
churches, including the significant number of members of the Ethiopian churches402, 
this group represents nearly 25% of all South African Christians. When grouped 
together with Charismatic and Pentecostal churches, one realises that the majority of 
South African Christians, roughly 43%, belong to largely unaffiliated church 
groupings. For public theology this indeed creates interesting challenges as 
Christianity in South Africa is characterised by a multitude of voices and a great deal 
of apathy concerning its public role.  
 
This study is concluded with a thought that Huber (1979:44–58) already developed in 
his book Kirche and that might prove to be of help in understanding how freedom 
can be realised communicatively in the South African context. In this passage Huber 
reminds the reader that the church does not only exist as a denomination but that 
there are different forms in which the church exists, notably Ortsgemeinde, 
Initiativgruppe, Regionalkirche and Föderation. This differentiation can be developed 
further by acknowledging that the public theological responsibility of the church is not 
the task only of the denomination or only of individual members. 
 
In the light of many local challenges and the continued reality of local separation due 
to apartheid, South African churches might do well to develop local discourses on 
                                                             
401
 The Zionist Churches have their roots in the theology of John Alexander Dowie from Zion City 
(Illinois, USA). De Gruchy (1995:85) regards the first Zionist congregation to have been founded by 
DRC missionary Petrus le Roux in Johannesburg in 1895. He eventually was forced to leave the DRC 
but stayed with his congregation where traditional language, symbols, dress and worship developed. 
However, Le Roux became disenchanted with Dowie‟s teachings and left the congregation. He later 
contributed to the founding of the Apostolic Faith Mission in 1908. 
402
 The first church with „Ethiopian‟ in its name was founded on the Witwatersrand in 1892 (Kiernan, 
cited in De Gruchy & Prozesky, 1995:119). Ten years earlier, however, the Tembu Church was 
founded and it had features that are now associated with the Ethiopian churches. The concept 
„Ethiopian‟ comes from a reading of Psalm 68:31 as referring to Ethiopia. It is also connected to 
Ham‟s son Cush who settled in North Africa. By means of these roots the Ethiopian churches 
understand themselves to have access to the Bible independently from colonial influences and 
therefore the Ethiopian churches also have an important political dimension. 
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freedom as the expression of local public theologies.403 Communicative freedom is 
one such resource that can provide an impetus to initiate dialogue, build trust, 
engage local authorities, work for justice and support the responsible realisation of 
freedom also in local contexts. This may even be one of most meaningful ways in 
which to rearticulate the understanding of freedom by the Reformation in current-day 
South Africa.  
                                                             
403
 Cf. e.g. xenophobia as a problem that can foremostly be addressed in local context. Cf. Jonathan 
Crush (ed.) Immigration, xenophobia and human rights in South Africa (Cape Town: Southern African 
Migration Project/South African Human Rights Commission, 2001). 
214 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
1. Primary sources 
 
Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland. 2006a. Kirche der Freiheit. Perspektiven für die 
Evangelische Kirche im 21. Jahrhundert. Ein Impulspapier des Rates der EKD. 
Hannover: Kirchenamt der Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland. 
Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland. 2006b. Christen in Deutschland 2006. [Online]. 
Available: http://www.ekd.de/statistik/mitglieder.html.  [25 September 2008] 
Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland. 2006c. Barmer Theologische Erklärung. 
[Online]. Available: http://www.ekd.de/bekenntnisse/142.html [30 October 2008] 
 
Evangelische Kirche Berlin-Brandenburg-schlesische Oberlausitz. 2008. Bischof Dr. 
Wolfgang Huber. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekbo.de/landeskirche/bischof.php?nav_id=6661 [31 October 2008] 
 
Huber, W. 1973. Kirche und Öffentlichkeit. Stuttgart: Ernst Klett Verlag. 
 
Huber, W & Tödt, H. E. 1977. Menschenrechte: Perspektiven einer menschlichen 
Welt. Stuttgart, Berlin: Kreuz Verlag. 
 
Huber, W. 1979. Kirche. Stuttgart, Berlin: Kreuz Verlag. 
 
Huber, W. 1980. Die Streit um Wahrheit und die Fähigkeit zum Frieden. Vier Kapitel 
ökumenische Theologie. Munich: Chr. Kaiser. 
 
Huber, W. 1985. Folgen christlicher Freiheit: Ethik und Theorie der Kirche im 
Horizont der Barmer theologischen Erklärung. 2nd ed. Neukirchen-Vluyn: 
Neukirchener Verlag. 
 
Huber, W. 1987. Protestantismus und Protest. Reinbek b. Hamburg:  Rowohlt 
Taschenbuch Verlag. 
 
Huber, W. 1990a. Konflikt und Konsens. Studien zur Ethik der Verantwortung. 
Munich: Chr Kaiser Verlag. 
Huber, W & H-R Reuter. 1990b. Friedensethik. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer. 
Huber, W. 1990c. Protestantismus und Demokratie. In W. Huber (ed.) Protestanten 
in der Demokratie, Munich: Kaiser. pp. 11-36. 
215 
 
Huber, W. 1990d. Der Protestantismus und die Ambivalenz der Moderne. In J. 
Moltmann (ed.) Religion der Freiheit. Protestantismus in der Moderne, Munich: 
Kaiser. pp. 29-65. 
 
Huber, W and Graf, F. W. 1991. Konfessorische Freiheit oder relativistische 
Offenheit? Ein theologisches Streitgespräch. In Evangelische Kommentare 24: 669-
673.  
 
Huber, W. 1992a. Ökumensiche Situation und protestantisches Prinzip. Eine 
Problemanzeige. In Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche 89:98-120. 
Huber, W. 1992b. Strukturen verantwortlichen Lebens. Die Bedeutung Heinz Eduard 
Tödts für die theologische Ethik. Vortrag bei der Akademischen Gedenkfeier in 
Heidelberg am 6. Mai 1992. In Zeitschrift für evangelische Ethik 36:241-256. 
 
Huber, W. 1993a. Die tägliche Gewalt: gegen den Ausverkauf der Menschenwürde. 
Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder. 
Huber, W. 1993b. Die Verbindlichkeit der Freiheit. Über das Verhältnis von 
Verbindlichkeit und Freiheit in der evangelischen Ethik. In Zeitschrift für evangelische 
Ethik 37:70-81. 
 
Huber, W. 1994a. Öffentliche Kirche in pluralen Öffentlichkeiten. Evangelische 
Theologie, 54(2): 157-180. 
Huber, W. 1994b. Gewalt gegen Mensch und Natur – Die Notwendigkeit eines 
planetarischen Ethos. In Rehm, J., Verantwortlich Leben in der Weltgemeinschaft. 
Zur Auseinandersetzung um das “Projekt Weltethos”. Gütersloh: Kaiser. pp. 30-46. 
 
Huber, W. 1996a. Meine Hoffnung ist größer als meine Angst. Ein Bischof zu 
Glauben, Kirche und Gesellschaft (Interviews von Stefan Berg). Berlin: Wichern 
Verlag. 
Huber, W. 1996b. Gerechtigkeit und Recht. Grundlinien christlicher Rechtsethik. 
Gütersloh: Chr. Kaiser/Gütersloher Verlagshaus. 
Huber, W. 1996c. Christliche Freiheit in der freiheitlichen Gesellschaft. Evangelische 
Theologie 56 (2): 99-116. 
Huber, W. 1996d (translated by R. C. L. Gritsch). Violence. The unrelenting assault 
on human dignity. Minneapolis: Fortress Press. 
 
Huber, W. 1999. Kirche in der Zeitenwende: gesellschaftlicher Wandel und 
Erneuerung der Kirche. Gütersloh: Verl. Bertelsmann Stiftung. 
 
216 
 
Huber, W. 2000a. Die Rolle der Kirchen als intermediärer Institutionen in der 
Gesellschaft. [Online]. Available: http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/huber-v5.html. 
[15 January 2007] 
Huber, W. 2000b. Protestantismus und Kultur am Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts. 
[Online]. Available: http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber-v2.html.  [18 June 2008] 
Huber, W. 2000c. In Konflikten einen Weg finden – Beratung im Feld von Ehe, 
Familie, Schwangerschaft als Aufgabe der Kirche. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/2000/huber-v4.html.  [18 June 2008] 
Huber, W. 2000d. Hat das protestantische Arbeitsethos noch eine Zukunft? [Online]. 
Available: http://www.ekd.de/gesellschaft/huber-v1.html.  [18 June 2008] 
 
Huber, W. 2001a. Gerecht aus Glauben – die Gegenwartsbedeutung des 
christlichen Menschenbilds. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/vortraege_huber_010926.html. [15 January 2007] 
Huber, W. 2001b. Europa als Wertegemeinschaft – Seine christlichen Grundlagen 
Gestern, Heute, Morgen. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/1662.html. [15 January 2007] 
Huber, W. 2001c. Vom Nutzen und Nachteil von Traditionen für das Leben. Die 
Kirchenväter und die Kirche von morgen. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/5668.html. [15 January 2007] 
Huber, W. 2001d. “Krise der Kirche – Zukunft der Kirche” in Gott und Mensch: 
Theologische Gespräche mit Wolfgang Huber, Dorothee Sölle, Jürgen Gohde, 
Jacques Gaillot, Gerd Lüdemann, Norbert Greinacher, Rolf Koppe, Heinz Zahrnt, 11-
27. 
Huber, W. 2001e. Unantastbare Menschenwürde – Gilt sie von Anfang an? [Online]. 
Available: http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/Huber_011207.html. [15 January 2007] 
Huber, W. 2001f. Was ist vertretbar? Etische Probleme der Organplantation. 
[Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/vortraege_huber_010911.html. [15 January 2007] 
Huber, W. 2001g. Das Ende der Person? Zur Spannung zwischen Ethik und 
Gentechnologie. [Online]. Available: http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/5830.html. 
[15 January 2007] 
Huber, W. 2001h. Rechtfertigung und Recht: Über die christlichen Wurzeln der 
europäischen Rechtskultur. Baden-Baden: Nomos. 
Huber, W. 2001i. Das Ende der Person? Zur Spannung zwischen Ethik und 
Gentechnologie. Ulm: Universitätsverlag Ulm. 
 
Huber, W. 2002a. In Verantwortung vor Gott und den Menschen. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/021001_huber_verantwortung_vor_gott.html [15 
January 2007] 
Huber, W. 2002b. Kirche und Zivilgesellschaft. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/huber_020702_kirche_und_zivilgesellschaft.html 
[15 January 2007] 
217 
 
Huber, W. 2002c. Wissenschaft und Verantwortung in unserer Zeit. [Online]. 
Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/huber_020622_wissenschaftundverantwortung.ht
ml [15 January 2007] 
Huber, W. 2002d. Der gemachte Mensch: christlicher Glaube und Biotechnik. Berlin: 
Wichern-Verlag. 
 
Huber, W. 2003a. Ethischer Pluralismus? – Votum im Nationalen Ethikrat. [Online]. 
Available: http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/030327_huber_pluralismus.html [15 
January 2007] 
Huber, W. 2003b. Hat der Glaube noch Zukunft? [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/030325_huber.html [15 January 2007] 
Huber, W. 2003c. Welche Kirche braucht die Gesellschaft? [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/031119_huber_kmu4.html [15 January 2007] 
Huber, W. 2003d. Jenseits des Säkularismus? Zum Verhältnis von Religion und 
Recht. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/030529_huber_oekt.html [15 January 2007] 
Huber, W. 2003e. Der Schutz von Flüchtlingen als christliche Pflicht. [Online]. 
Available: http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/030529_huber_flucht_asyl.html [15 
January 2007] 
Huber, W. 2003f. Der Sport – ein Vehikel christlicher Werte? [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/030110_huber.html [15 January 2007] 
Huber, W. 2003g. Friedrich-Wilhelm Marqueardt – ein Lehrer der Kirche. [Online]. 
Available: http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/031206_huber_marquardt.html [15 
January 2007] 
Huber, W. 2003h. Die Zukunft der religiösen Blidung. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/030128_huber_religioese_bildung.html [15 
January 2007] 
 
Huber, W. 2004a. Die Rede von Gott und die Weltlichkeit der Welt. [Online]. 
Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/040222_huber_gott_und_weltlichkeit.html [15 
January 2007] 
Huber, W. 2004b. Perspektiven einer zukunftsfähigen Gesellschaft. [Online]. 
Available: http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/040513_huber_perspektiven.html [15 
January 2007] 
Huber, W. 2004c. Protestantismus – Abgesang oder Zukunftsmodell? [Online]. 
Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/040921_huber_muenster_protestantismus.html 
[15 January 2007] 
Huber, W. 2004d. Unsterblichkeit und Würde. Kant zu Ehren. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/030216_huber_kant.html [15 January 2007] 
218 
 
Huber, W. 2004e. Zehn Jahre Demokratie in Südafrika – zur Rolle der Kirchen in 
einer pluralen Gesellschaft. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/040504_huber_10_jahre_demokratie_suedafrika.
html [15 January 2007] 
Huber, W. 2004f. Der Tod – Grenze oder Macht? – Vortrag beim Tag der 
Geisteswissenschaften der Berlin-Brandenburgischen Akademie der Wissenschaften 
[Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/041112_huber_tag_der_geisteswissenschaften.h
tml [15 January 2007] 
Huber, W. 2004g. Der Protestantismus als Weltkulturerbe – Erbe und Verpflichtung. 
[Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/040327_huber_protestantismus.html [15 January 
2007] 
Huber, W. 2004h. Der christliche Glaube und die politische Kultur in Europa. 
[Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/040524_huber_glaube_und_politische_kultur.htm
l [15 January 2007] 
Huber, W. 2004i. Die Tugend des Glaubens – Eröffnungsvortrag im Rahmen der 
Vortragsreihe “Moralische Reden über Sünden und Tugenden” in der Marktkirche zu 
Hannover [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/2004_08_25_rv_marktkirche_moralische_reden.h
tml [15 January 2007] 
Huber, W. 2004j. Wissen – Werten – Handeln. Welches Orientierungswissen gehört 
zu Bildung? [Online]. Available: http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/38092.html [15 
January 2007] 
Huber, W. 2004k. Werte heute – Bausteine einer zukunftfähigen Gesellschaft. 
Vortrag bei der Jugendmedienschutztagung “Besonders WERTvoll. Fernsehen und 
Jugendmedienschutz zwischen Wirklichkeit und Vision” in Berlin. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/041115_huber_jugendmedienschutz.html [15 
January 2007] 
Huber, W. 2004l. Religionsfreiheit und offene Gesellschaft – ein Prüfstein aktueller 
Dialoge in Europa. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/041130_huber_religionsfreiheit.html [15 January 
2007] 
Huber, W. 2004m. Die jüdisch-christliche Tradition. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/040329_huber_tradition1.html [15 January 2007] 
Huber, W. 2004n. Festvortrag anlässlich des 100. Geburtstages von Friedrich 
Karrenberg und des 50jährigen Jubiläums der 1. Auflage des Evangelischen 
Soziallexikons. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/041117_huber_karrenberg.html [15 January 
2007] 
Huber, W. 2004o. Religion und Politik in Deutschland und den USA – ein Vergleich. 
[Online]. Available: http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/040609_huber_religion_politik.html 
[18 June 2008] 
219 
 
Huber, W. 2004p. Rückkehr zur Lehre vom gerechten Krieg? - Aktuelle 
Entwicklungen in der evangelischen Friedensethik. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/040428_huber_friedensethik.html [18 June 2008] 
Huber, W. 2004q. Ethik und Demokratie. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/04_06_19_huber_katholikentag.html [18 June 
2008] 
Huber, W. 2004r. Glaube und Macht - Aktuelle Dimensionen eines spannenden 
Themas, Vortrag in Wittenberg. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/040925_huber_wittenberg_glaube_und_macht.html [18 
June 2008] 
 
Huber, W. 2005a. Verleihung des Karl-Barth-Preises am 6. September 2005 in Berlin 
– Laudatio für Johannes Rau. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/050906_huber_laudatio_rau.html [15 January 
2007] 
Huber, W. 2005b. Religion – Politik – Gewalt – Erwartungen an den Kongress – 
Vortrag zur Eröffnung des Europäischen Theologenkongresses 2005, Berlin. 
[Online]. Available: http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/050918_huber.html [15 
January 2007] 
Huber, W. 2005c. Beheimatung im Eigenen – Respekt vor dem Anderen. Zum 
kulturellen Auftrag der Medien. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/050905_rv_geisendoerfer_preis.html [15 January 
2007] 
Huber, W. 2005d. Der Auftrag der Kirchen in einem Zusammenwachsenden Europa. 
[Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/051005_huber_warschau.html [15 January 2007] 
Huber, W. 2005e. Glauben in der Welt – Die Säkularisierung und Zukunft der 
Kirchen. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/051022_huber_maulbronn.html [15 January 
2007] 
Huber, W. 2005f. Fünfzig Jahre Loccumer Vertrag – Das öffentliche Wirken der 
Kirche und seine Wahrnehmung in den Verträgen zwischen Staat und Kirche. 
[Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/050616_huber_loccumer_vertrag.html [15 
January 2007] 
Huber, W. 2005g. Herausforderungen für die Zukunft – Laudatio zur vierzigsten 
Verleihung des Theodor-Heuss-Preises in Stuttgart. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/huber_laudatio_heuss_preis.html [15 January 
2007] 
Huber, W. 2005h. evangelisch – profiliert – wertvoll. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/050117_huber_braunschweig.html [15 January 
2007] 
Huber, W. 2005i. Zukunft gestalten. Das reformatorische Erbe und das Verhältnis 
zwischen Europa und den USA. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/051113_huber_ucc_uek.html [15 January 2007] 
220 
 
Huber. W. 2005j. Kirche als Zeichen in der Zeit – Kulturelles Erbe und 
Sinnvermittlung für das 21. Jahrhundert. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/050930_huber_kirchbautag.html [15 January 
2007] 
Huber, W. 2005k. Der Zukunft auf der Spur – Überlegungen zu Vergangenheit und 
Zukunft von Aktion Sühnezeichen Friedesdienste. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/050223_huber_suehnezeichen.html [15 January 
2007] 
Huber, W. 2005l. Unverzichtbare Theologie – Ihr Beitrag für Universität, Kirche, 
Gesellschaft. Vortrag anlässlich des vierzigjährigen Jubiläums der theologischen 
Fakultäten der Universität Bochum. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/051116_huber_bochum.html [15 January 2007] 
Huber, W. 2005m. Gute Theologie – zum Verhältnis von Theologie und Kirche. - 
Festvortrag zum 100jährigen Jubiläum der Kirchlichen Hochschule Bethel. [Online]. 
Available: http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/051027_huber_bethel.html [15 January 
2007] 
Huber, W. 2005n. Theologie und Kirchenleitung – Vortrag zu Ehren von Eberhard 
Jüngel, Tübingen. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/050204_huber_ehrung_juengel.html [15 January 
2007] 
Huber, W. 2005o. Zwei Generationen nach dem Tag von Hiroshima. [Online]. 
Available: http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/050806_huber_hiroshima.html [15 
January 2007] 
Huber, W. 2005p. Zur Hoffnung eingeladen – Vortrag bei den kirchlichen 
Begegnungstagen 2005 in Prag. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/050618_huber_salvatorkirche_prag.html [15 
January 2007] 
Huber, W. 2005q. Unvereinbare Gegensätze? Scharia und säkulare Recht. [Online]. 
Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/huber_scharia_und_saekulares_recht.html [15 
January 2007] 
Huber, W. 2005r. Glauben verstehen – Protestantismus und Theologie. [Online]. 
Available: http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/huber_glauben_verstehen.html [15 
January 2007] 
Huber, W. 2005s. In deinem Lichte schauen wir das Licht – Quellen und 
Perspektiven christlicher Spritualität, Festvortrag zum 25jährigen Jubiläum des Stifts 
Urach. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/051022_huber_urach.html [15 January 2007] 
Huber, W. 2005t. Die Religionen und der Staat – Vortrag auf Einladung der 
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in Bonn. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/050202_huber_friedrich_ebert_bonn.html [15 
January 2007] 
Huber, W. 2005u. Diakonisches Handeln zwischen Finanzdruck und christlicher 
Nächsteliebe – Festvortrag beim Brüdertag der Rummelsberger Brüderschaft. 
[Online]. Available: 
221 
 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/050607_huber_rummelsberg.html [15 January 
2007] 
Huber, W. 2005v. Familien in sozialer Schieflage? Sozialethische Orientierung – 
Vortrag beim sozialpolitischen Aschermittwoch der Kirchen, Essen. [Online]. 
Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/050209_huber_sozialethische_orientierungen.ht
ml [15 January 2007] 
Huber, W. 2005w. Der Beruf zur Politik – Zwanzig Jahre Demokratiedenkschrift der 
EKD. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/050630_huber_johannisempfang.html [15 
January 2007] 
Huber, W. 2005x. Junge Generation und Arbeit: Chancen erkennen – Potenziale 
nutzen – Festrede zur Verleihung des Carl-Bertelsmann-Preises 2005 in Gütersloh. 
[Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/050908_huber_bertelsmann_preis.html [15 
January 2007] 
Huber, W. 2005y. Herausforderungen des Sozialstaats – Rede auf dem 
Sozialstaatskongress der IG Metall in Berlin. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/050406_huber_ig_metall_berlin.html [15 January 
2007] 
Huber, W. 2005z. Bildung in der Informationsgesellschaft aus christlicher Sicht. 
[Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/050829_huber_informationsgesellschaft.html [15 
January 2007] 
Huber, W. 2005aa. Religionsfreiheit und Toleranz – Wie aktuell ist der Augsburger 
Religionsfriede? [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/050923_huber_religionsfriede.html [15 January 
2007] 
Huber, W. 2005bb. Demokratie wagen – Der Protestantismus im politischen Wandel 
1965 – 1985 – Festvortrag im Rahmen des 50jährigen Jubiläums der Evangelischen 
Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Kirchliche Zeitgeschichte, München. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/051024_huber_muenchen.html [15 January 
2007]  
 
Huber, W. 2006a. Christliche Moral und ökonomische Vernunft – ein Widerspruch? 
[Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/060125_huber_ihk_berlin.html [15 January 2007] 
Huber, W. 2006b. Flugblätter der Freiheit. Verantwortliches Handeln aus christlichen 
Wurzeln. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/060123_huber_weisse_rose.html [15 January 
2007] 
Huber, W. 2006c. Abraham lacht – Leben in Gegenwind. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/060902_huber_schwerin.html [15 January 2007] 
Huber, W. 2006d. Nachfolge heute – Vortrag bei der Jahrestagung der 
Internationalen Bonhoeffer-Gesellschaft, Deutsche Sektion, in Berlin. [Online]. 
222 
 
Available: http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/060915_huber_berlin.html [15 January 
2007] 
Huber, W. 2006e. Der Faktor Mensch – Wertorientierung und Ökonomisierung im 
Gesundheitswesen – Vortrag im Hanns-Lilje-Forum, Hannover. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/061005_huber_hannover.html [15 January 2007] 
Huber, W. 2006f. Barmherzigkeit mit den Zweiflern – Überlegungen zum Weg 
unserer Kirche, Vortrag in Offenburg. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/061007_huber_barmherzigkeit.html [15 January 
2007] 
Huber, W. 2006g. Kirche im Aufbruch – Eine Zeitansage zum Kongressthema der 
Arbeitsgemeinschaft Missionarische Dienste in Leipzig. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/060918_huber_leipzig.html [15 January 2007] 
Huber, W. 2006h. Gedenkrede anlässlich der Gedenkveranstaltung für 
evangelischen Opfer des Konzentrationslagers Sachsenhausen. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/060830_huber_sachsenhausen.html [15 January 
2007] 
Huber, W. 2006i. Gemeinschaft gestalten – Evangeliches Profil in Europa – Vortrag 
auf der 6. Vollversammlung der Gemeinschaft Evangelischer Kirchen in Europa. 
[Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/060913_huber_geke_budapest.html [15 January 
2007] 
Huber, W. 2006j. Die Religionen und der säkulare Staat – Vortrag beim 
Reformationsempfang in Wien. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/061030_huber_wien.html [15 January 2007] 
Huber, W. 2006k. Zukunft gestalten – Erwartungen an Religion und Glaube –  
Vortrag beim Advents – Empfang der Kirchenleitungen im Freistaat Sachsen in 
Dresden. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/061211_huber_dresden.html [15 January 2007] 
Huber, W. 2006l. Mündigkeit und Macht – Dietrich Bonhoeffers Anspruch an Kirche 
und Gesellschaft heute, Vortrag in Dessau. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/060307_huber_dessau.html [15 January 2007] 
Huber, W. 2006m. Dietrich Bonhoeffer – ein evangelischer Heiliger – 
Eröffnungsvortrag beim Internationalen Bonhoefferkongress in Breslau. [Online]. 
Available: http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/060203_huber_breslau.html [15 
January 2007] 
Huber, W. 2006n. Das Vermächtnis Dietrich Bonhoeffers und die Wiederkehr der 
Religion – Vortrag zum 100. Geburtstag von Dietrich Bonhoeffer in der Humboldt-
Universität zu Berlin. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/060204_huber_berlin.html [15 January 2007] 
Huber, W. 2006o. Tätiges Leben – Teilhabechancen für alle Lebensalter - Vortrag 
bei dem Symposion "Platz für Potenziale? Partizipation im Alter zwischen alten 
Strukturen und neuen Erfordernissen" in Hannover. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/060607_huber_hannover.html [15 January 2007] 
223 
 
Huber. W. 2006p. Was bedeutet Ökumene der Profile? Vortrag beim Symposion 
"Ökumene der Profile" der Evangelischen Kirche im Rheinland in Düsseldorf. 
[Online]. Available: http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/48728.html [15 January 2007] 
Huber, W. 2006q. Verantwortlich im Sinne der Pressefreiheit – Impulsvortrag beim 
Verband Deutscher Zeitschriftenverleger, Berlin. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/061103_huber_berlin.html [15 January 2007] 
Huber, W. 2006r. Von der Freiheit der Kinder Gottes – Plädoyer für eine 
selbstbewusste Kirche / Vortrag auf der Missionale / Köln. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/060401_huber_koeln.html [15 January 2007] 
Huber, W. 2006s. Renaissance des Glaubens – Die Säkularisierung und die Zukunft 
der Kirchen, Frankfurter Gesellschaft. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/060125_huber_renaissance_des_glaubens.html 
[15 January 2007] 
Huber, W. 2006t. evangelisch – profiliert – wertvoll – Vortrag in der Stadtkirche 
Bückeburg. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/060116_huber_bueckeburg.html [15 January 
2007] 
Huber, W. 2006u. Gott und Geld – Christliche Ethik und wirtschafliches Handeln – 
Festvortrag anlässlich der Eröffnung der KD Bank in Dortmund. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/060606_huber_dortmund.html [15 January 2007] 
Huber, W. 2006v. Integration – Zusammenleben – Zukunft gestalten: Perspektiven in 
Kirche und Gesellschaft – Vortrag in der Hessischen Landesvertretung in Berlin. 
[Online]. Available: http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/061024_huber_berlin.html [15 
January 2007] 
Huber, W. 2006w. Christliche Moral und ökonomische Vernunft – ein Wiederspruch? 
Festvortrag beim Dürnitz-Forum in Burghausen. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/060702_huber_burghausen.html [15 January 
2007] 
Huber, W. 2006x. Vertrauensberufe im Rechtsstaat. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/060526_huber_vertrauensberufe.html [15 
January 2007] 
Huber, W. 2006y. Future of the European Project – Zur Zukunft der Europäischen 
Union - Erwartungen an die deutsche Ratspräsidentschaft, Brüssel. [Online]. 
Available: http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/061213_huber_bruessel.html [15 
January 2007] 
Huber, W. 2006z. Lesen lernen – Zur Wiederentdeckung einer kulturellen 
Grundkompetenz aus evangelischer Perspektive. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/060523_huber_kulturelle_grundkompetenz.html 
[15 January 2007] 
Huber, W. 2006aa. Gesicht zeigen – Festrede anlässlich der Eröffnung der Woche 
der Brüderlichkeit im Münchener Rathaus. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/060305_huber_muenchen.html [15 January 
2007] 
224 
 
Huber, W. 2006bb. Familie haben alle – Für eine Zukunft mit Kindern - Rede in der 
Französischen Friedrichstadtkirche zu Berlin. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/060328_huber_berlin.html [15 January 2007] 
Huber, W. 2006cc. Gesellschaftlicher Wandel und seine Auswirkung auf Bildung und 
Erziehung – Vortrag auf dem Fachkongress "Schule in der Gesellschaft" in 
Hannover. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/061130_huber_hannover.html [15 January 2007] 
Huber, W. 2006dd. Die Herausforderungen für die Theologie in einem pluralistischen 
Europa aus ökumenischer Perspektive – Eine evangelische Stellungnahme – 
Vortrag bei der Zweiten Konsultation der Theologischen Fakultäten und 
Ausbildungsstätten in Europa in Graz. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/060707_huber_graz.html [6 December 2007] 
Huber, W. 2006ee. Bilden als Beruf – Lehrer sein in evangelischer Perspektive – 
Vortrag auf dem Tag der Lehrerinnen und Lehrer in der Evangelischen Kirche von 
Westfalen. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/060310_huber_dortmund.html [6 December 
2007] 
Huber, W. 2006ff. WCC 9th Assembly – Wolfgang Huber presentation. [Online]. 
Available: http://www.wcc-assembly.info/en/theme-issues/assembly-documents/2-
plenary-presentations/economic-justice/wolfgang-huber-presentation.html [30 
October 2008] 
 
Huber, W. 2007a. Woran du aber dein Herz hängst, das ist dein Gott. Vortrag auf 
dem Kongress christlicher Führungskräfte "Mit Werten in Führung gehen" in Leipzig. 
[Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/070118_huber_fuehrungskraeftekongress.html 
[17 July 2007] 
Huber, W. 2007b. Evangelisch im 21. Jahrhundert – Hauptvortrag beim 
Zukunftskongress in Wittenberg. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/070125_huber_hauptvortrag_zukunftskongress.h
tml [17 July 2007] 
Huber, W. 2007c. Glaube, Werte, Differenzen – Laudatio für Erhard Eppler in Berlin. 
[Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/070131_huber_laudatio_eppler.html [17 July 
2007] 
Huber, W. 2007d. Vor Gott und den Menschen – Der etische Auftrag der Kirche in 
unserer Zeit – Vortrag im Studium Generale der Universität Lübeck. [Online]. 
Available: http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/070208_huber_luebeck.html [17 July 
2007] 
Huber, W. 2007e. Globalisierung ohne Moral? Die Verantwortung eines 
Unternehmers – Vortrag in der WHU – Otto Beisheim School of Management, 
Vallendar. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/070209_huber_vallendar.html [17 July 2007] 
225 
 
Huber, W. 2007f. Grußwort zum Ökumenischen Filmepfang in der St. 
Matthäuskirche zu Berlin. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/070215_huber_berlin.html [17 July 2007] 
Huber, W. 2007g. Dialog der Religionen – Ansprache bei der Matthiae-Mahlzeit im 
Rathaus zu Hamburg. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/070223_huber_hamburg.html [17 July 2007] 
Huber, W. 2007i. Die Bedeutung christlicher Werte für die Zukunft der Gesellschaft – 
Vortrag in Nürtingen. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/20070427_huber_nuertingen.html [17 July 2007] 
Huber, W. 2007j. Der Mensch ist zur Arbeit geboren wie der Vogel zum Fliegen. Hat 
das protestantische Arbeitsethos noch eine Zukunft? Wittenberger 
Sonntagsvorlesung. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/070422_huber_wittenberg.html [17 July 2007] 
Huber, W. 2007k. Dietrich Bonhoeffer – ein evangelischer Heiliger? Vortrag im 
Ateneo Sant’Anselmo, Rom. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/070503_huber_rom.html [6 December 2007] 
Huber, W. 2007l. Das Christliche in unserem Land – Standort und Perspektiven – 
Eröffnungsvortrag zum Kongress Auf Sendung der Hauptamtlichen im Gnadauer 
Gemeinschaftsverband, Gunzenhausen. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/070507_huber_gunzenhausen.html [6 December 
2007] 
Huber, W. 2007m. Dass der Mensch mehr ist als seine Taten. Das christliche 
Menschenbild im Licht der Rechtfertigungsbotschaft – Vortrag bei der 
Bundeskonferenz der Gefängnisseelsorge in Berlin. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/070509_huber_berlin.html [6 December 2007] 
Huber, W. 2007n. Freiheit und soziale Gerechtigkeit – Sozialer Protestantismus in 
der globalisierten Welt. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/070510_huber_berlin_sozialer_protestantismus.h
tm [6 December 2007] 
Huber, W. 2007o. Impulsvortrag auf dem Kirchentag in Köln: Wie hältst du’s mit der 
Religionsfreiheit? - Podienreihe im "Zentrum Begegnung mit Muslimen. [Online]. 
Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/070607_huber_dekt_religionsfreiheit.html [6 
December 2007] 
Huber, W. 2007p. Solidarität oder Egoismus – die Verantwortung von Staat und 
Kirche. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/070608_huber_gesundheitswesen.html [6 
December 2007] 
Huber, W. 2007q. Dialog der Religionen in einer pluralen Gesellschaft - 
Überlegungen aus evangelischer Perspektive – Rede anlässlich der Verleihung der 
Ehrenmedaille des EAK zum Gedenken an Hermann Ehlers. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/070616_huber_eak.html [6 December 2007] 
Huber, W. 2007r. Freiheit und soziale Verantwortung. Eine sozialethische 
Perspektive – Festvortrag zum Symposion “Theologie des Wirklichen. 75 Jahre 
226 
 
Sozialethik in Marburg”. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/070704_huber_marburg.html [6 December 2007] 
Huber, W. 2007s. Reformatorischer Konsens und ökumenische Profile. [Online]. 
Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/070908_huber_oekumenische_profile.html [6 
December 2007] 
Huber, W. 2007t. Glaube und Vernunft – Vortrag in der XVI. Werner-Reihlen-
Vorlesung “Die Vernunft der Religion” Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. [Online]. 
Available: http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/071120_huber_berlin.html [6 
December 2007] 
Huber, W. 2007u. Soziale Verantwortung und unternehmerisches Handeln – eine 
evangelische Perspektive – Vortrag bei den Niedersächsischen 
Wirtschaftsgesprächen in Hannover. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/071119_huber_hannover.html [6 December 
2007] 
 
Huber, W. 2008a. “Identität und Religion. Gibt es ein zweites Leben?” – 
Impulsreferat bei der 19. Bamberger Hegelwoche. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/vortraege/huber/080612_huber_bamberg.html  [20 June 2008] 
Huber, W. 2008b. Der christliche Glaube. Eine evangelische Orientierung. Gütersloh: 
Gütersloher Verlagshaus. 
Huber, W. 2008c. Interview with Wolfgang Huber on Domradio Köln on 2 September 
2008. [Transcription available at www.ekd.de]  
Huber, W. 2008d. Informal interview with Wolfgang Huber in Bamberg on 12 June 
2008. 
Huber, W. 2008d. Kopftuch und Diskriminierung. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/aktuell/080911_huber_bz_kolumne.html  [30 October 2008] 
 
 
227 
 
2. Secondary sources 
 
Akenda, J. C. K. 2004. Kulturelle Identität und interkulturelle Kommunikation: zur 
Problematik des ethischen Universalismus im Zeitalter der Globalisierung. Frankfurt 
a.M.: IKO. 
 
Altena, B. & Van Lente D. 2008. Gesellschaftsgeschichte der Neuzeit. Vandenhoeck 
& Ruprecht: Göttingen. 
 
Althaus, P. 1965. Die Ethik Martin Luthers. Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus. 
 
Ariens, M. 2002. Religious liberty in a pluralistic society. Durham: Carolina Academic 
Press. 
 
Arnold, K. R. 2004. Homelessness, citizenship, and identity: The uncanniness of late 
modernity. Albany: State University of New York Press. 
 
Assmann, J. 2000. Religion und kulturelles Gedächtnis: Zehn Studien. Munich: Beck. 
 
Aus der Au, C. 2003. Achtsam wahrnehmen: Eine theologische Umweltethik. 
Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag. 
 
Bayer, O. 1995. Freiheit als Antwort. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck. 
 
Beck, U. 1997a. Was ist Globalisierung? Irrtümer des Globalismus – Antworten auf 
Globalisierung. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp. 
Beck, U. (ed.). 1997b. Kinder der Freiheit. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp. 
Beck, U. 1997c (ed.). Individualisierung und Integration: neue Konfliktlinien und 
neuer Integrationsmodus? Opladen: Leske & Budrich. 
Beck, U., Bonß, W. & Kieserling, A. (eds). 2001. Theorie reflexiver Modernisierung – 
Fragestellungen, Hypothesen, Forschungsprogramme. In Beck, U. & Bonß, W. 
(eds.), Die Modernisierung der Moderne. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp. pp. 11-62. 
 
Bedford-Strohm, H. 2002. Konflikt oder Konsens? Zur sozialethischen Bedeutung 
„runder Tische‟. In Reuter, H-R., Bedford-Strohm, H., Kuhlmann, H. & Lütcke, K-H. 
(eds.), Freiheit verantworten: Festschrift für Wolfgang Huber zum 60. Geburtstag. 
Gütersloh: Kaiser, Gütersloher Verl. Haus. pp. 255-270. 
 
228 
 
Bellah, R., Madsen, R., Sullivan, W. M., Swidler, A. & Tipton, S. M. 1985. Habits of 
the heart: Individualism and commitment in American life. New York: Harper & Row. 
 
Benn, S. & Dunphy, D. (eds.). 2007. Corporate governance and sustainability: 
Challenges for theory and practice. London: Routledge. 
 
Bentley, K. 2003. Whose right is it anyway? Equality, culture and conflicts of rights in 
South Africa. Cape Town: HSRC Publishers. 
 
Berger, P. (ed.). 1999. The desecularisation of the world: Resurgent religion and 
world politics. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans. 
 
Berlin, I. 1958. Two concepts of liberty. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Berlin, I. 2006. Political ideas in the Romantic Age. Their Rise and Influence on 
Modern Thought. London: Pimlico. 
 
Bernhardt, R. & Schmidt-Leukel, P. (eds.). 2005. Kriterien interreligiöser 
Urteilsbildung. Zürich: Theologischer Verlag Zürich. 
 
Bernhardt, R. 2005. Ende des Dialogs? Die Begegnung der Religionen und ihre 
theologische Reflexion. Zurich: TVC. 
 
Bieler, M. 1996. Befreiung der Freiheit: Zur Theologie der stellvertretenden Sühne. 
Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder. 
 
Birbaumer, A. (ed.). 2003. Der flexibilisierte Mensch: Subjektivität und Solidarität im 
Wandel. Heidelberg: Asanger. 
 
Bloom, I, Martin, J. P. & Proudfoot, W. L. (eds.). 1996. Religious diversity and human 
rights. New York: Columbia University Press. 
 
Böckenförde, E-W. 1976. Staat, Gesellschaft, Freiheit. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp. 
 
Böhler, D (ed.). 1994. Ethik für die Zukunft: Im Diskurs mit Hans Jonas. Munich: C. 
H. Beck. 
 
Böhler, D & Frewer, A. 1998. Verantwortung für das Menschliche: Hans Jonas und 
die Ethik in der Medizin. Erlangen: Palm & Enke. 
 
229 
 
Bonhoeffer, D. 1960. Sanctorum Communio. Eine dogmatische Untersuchung zur 
Soziologie der Kirche. Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag. 
 
Botman, H. R. 2003. A cry for life in a global economic era. In Welker, M. & Alston, 
W. M. (eds.), Reformed theology: Identity and ecumenicity. Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans. pp. 375-384. 
Botman, H. R. 2006. Covenantal anthropology. In Woodhead, L. & Soulen, R. K. 
(eds.), God and human dignity. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans. 
 
Brändle, W. & Wegner, G. (eds.). 1997. Unfervügbare Gewißheit: Protestantische 
Wege zum Dialog der Religionen. Hannover: Lutherisches Verlagshaus. 
 
Brandt, R. 1992. Die ermögliche Freiheit: Sprachkritische Rekonstruktion der Lehre 
vom unfreien Willen. Hannover: Luterisches Verlagshaus. 
 
Brooks, T. & Freeman, S. R. 2007. Rawls. London: Routledge. 
 
Brooks, T. (ed.). 2008. The global justice reader. Malden: Blackwell. 
 
Brinkel, T. 2006. Nation building and pluralism. Experiences and perspectives in 
state and society in South Africa. Den Haag: Sdu Uitgevers. 
 
Brinkman, M. 2003. The tragedy of human freedom: The failure and promise of the 
Christian concept of freedom in Western culture. Amsterdam: Rodopi. 
 
Brown, P. 2001. Capitalism and social progress: The future of society in a global 
economy. Basingstoke: Hampshire. 
 
Brubaker, R. 1984. The limits of rationality: An essay on the social and moral thought 
of Max Weber. London: Allen & Unwin. 
 
Bsteh, A. (ed.). 1987. Dialog aus der Mitte christlicher Theologie. Mödling: St 
Gabriel. 
 
Burnell, P & Randall, V. (eds.). 2008. Politics in the developing world. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Callinicos, A. 2003. An anti-capitalist manifesto. Cambridge: Polity. 
 
230 
 
Carter, A. & Stokes, G. (eds.). 2002. Democratic theory today: Challenges for the 
21st century. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 
Carter, T. 2002. Paul and the power of sin: Redefining “beyond the pale”. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Castells, M. 2000a. The rise of the network society. The information age: economy, 
society and culture, Volume I. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Castells, M. 2000b. End of millennium. The information age: economy, society and 
culture, Volume III. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Castells, M. 2004. The power of identity. The information age: economy, society and 
culture, Volume II. Oxford: Blackwell. 
 
Chalcraft, D. J. (ed.). 2001. The protestant ethic debate: Max Weber’s replies to his 
critics. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press. 
 
Chastel, A. 1963. The age of humanism: Europe 1480–1530. London: Thames and 
Hudson. 
 
Clayton, M. & Williams, A. 2004. Social justice. Malden: Blackwell. 
 
Clements, K. 1991. Freiheit wozu? Dietrich Bonhoeffer als ständige 
Herausforderung. Bonn: Paul Rugenstein. 
 
Cock, J. 2007. The war against ourselves: nature, power and justice. Johannesburg: 
Wits University Press. 
 
Compaan, A. 2002. Kreatiewe Pluralismes? ’n Kritiese analise van wet en evangelie 
in die denke van Michael Welker. Stellenbosch: Stellenbosch Univeristy. (DTh-
thesis.) 
 
Crush, J. (ed.). 2001. Immigration, xenophobia and human rights in South Africa. 
Cape Town: Southern African Migration Project/South African Human Rights 
Commission. 
 
Dahrendorf, R. 1975. Die neue Freiheit: Überleben und Gerechtigkeit in einer 
veränderten Welt. Munich: Piper. 
 
De Gruchy, J (ed.). 1997. Bonhoeffer for a new day: Theology in a time of transition. 
Grand Rapids: Eerdmans. 
231 
 
 
Diaw, A. 2005. New Contours of Public Space in Africa. Diogenes 206:29-36. 
 
Dierkken, J. 2005. Selbstbewußtsein individueller Freiheit. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck. 
 
Duchrow, U. 1983. Christenheit und Weltverantwortung. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer. 
 
Dunn, J. D. G. 1998. The theology of Paul the apostle. London/New York: T&T Clark. 
 
Essen, G. & Striet, M. (eds.). 2005. Kant und die Theologie. Darmstadt: 
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. 
 
Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland. 1985. Die evangelische Kirche und freiheitliche 
Demokratie: der Staat des Grundgesetzes als Angebot und Aufgabe; eine 
Denkschrift der Evangelischen Kirche in Deutschland. Gütersloh: Gütersloher 
Verlagshaus Mohn. 
 
Evangelischer Pressedienst. 2004. Huber: Kopftuch-Verbot ist mit Religionsfreiheit 
vereinbar. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ekd.de/aktuell_presse/news_2004_02_02_1_rv_kopftuchverbot.html.  [30 
October 2008] 
 
Ferguson, J. 2006. Global shadows: Africa in the neoliberal world order Durham: 
Duke University. 
 
Feil, E. 2002. Zur Frage nach der „Freiheit‟ und der „Religion‟ im Interesse der 
„Religionsfreiheit‟. Überlegungen im Anschluss an menschenrechtliche und 
verfassungsrechtliche Bestimmungen. In Reuter, H-R., Bedford-Strohm, H., 
Kuhlmann, H. & Lütcke, K-H. (eds.), Freiheit verantworten: Festschrift für Wolfgang 
Huber zum 60. Geburtstag. Gütersloh: Kaiser, Gütersloher Verl. Haus. pp. 421-432. 
 
Fischer, P. (ed.). 1995. Freiheit oder Gerechtigkeit: Perspektiven politischer 
Philosophie. Leipzig: Reclam. 
 
Floyd, W. W. 1997. Dietrich Bonhoeffer. In David F. Ford (ed.), The modern 
theologians: An introduction to Christian theology in the twentieth century. Oxford: 
Blackwell. pp. 43-61. 
 
Fowls, S. E. & Jones, L. G. 1991. Reading in communion: Scripture and ethics in 
Christian life. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans. 
232 
 
Frey, C. 1994. Die Ethik des Protestantismus von der Reformation bis zur 
Gegenwart. Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus. 
 
Freyenhagen, F (ed.). 2005. The legacy of John Rawls. London: Continuum. 
 
George, S. 2003. Globalisierung oder Gerechtigkeit? Politische Gestaltung und 
soziale Grundwerte. Hamburg: VSA-Verlag. 
 
Gestrich, C. 2001. Christentum und Stellvertretung. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck. 
Gestrich, C. 2002. Kirche, Säkularisierung, Ethik. In Reuter, H-R., Bedford-Strohm, 
H., Kuhlmann, H. & Lütcke, K-H. (eds.), Freiheit verantworten: Festschrift für 
Wolfgang Huber zum 60. Geburtstag. Gütersloh: Kaiser, Gütersloher Verl. Haus. pp. 
102-115. 
 
Giddens, A. 1990. The consequences of modernity. Oxford: Polity/Blackwell. 
Giddens, A. 1991. Modernity and self-identity: Self and society in the late modern 
age. Cambridge: Polity. 
Giddens, A. (ed.). 2003. The progressive manifesto: new ideas for the centre-left. 
Cambridge: Polity. 
 
Gills, B. K. (ed.). 2007. Globalization and the global politics of justice. London: 
Routlegde. 
 
Gloede, G. 1961. Oekumenische Profile: Brückenbauer der einen Kirche. Stuttgart: 
Evang. Missionsverlag. 
 
Gogarten, F. 1953. Verhängnis und Hoffnung. Die Säkularisierung als theologisches 
Problem. Stuttgart: Friedrich Vorwerk Verlag. 
 
Gollwitzer, H. 1967. Von der Stellvertretung Gottes: Christlicher Glaube in der 
Erfahrung der Verborgenheit Gottes. Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag. 
 
Gordon, J. 2007. Aristoteles über Gerechtigkeit: das V. Buch der Nikomachischen 
Ethik. Freiburg: Alber. 
 
Gould, C. C. 2004. Globalizing democracy and human rights. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
233 
 
Grabner-Haider, A. (ed.). 2006. Ethos der Weltkulturen: Religion und Ethik. 
Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. 
 
Graf, F. W. 1997. Unverfügbare Gewißheit: Protestantische Wege zum Dialog der 
Religionen. Hannover: Lutherisches Verlagshaus. 
 
Graham, P. & P. Coetzee. 2002. In the Balance? Debating the State of Democracy 
in South Africa. Cape Town: Idasa Publishing. 
 
Green, C. 2004. Freiheit zur Mitmenschlichkeit: Dietrich Bonhoeffers Theologie der 
Sozialität. Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus. 
 
Gröschner, R. (ed.). 2008. Des Menschen Würde – entdeckt und erfunden im 
Humanismus der italienischen Renaissance. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck. 
 
Grözinger, A. (ed.). 2003. Protestantische Kirche und moderne Gesellschaft: zur 
Interdepenz von Ekklesiologie und Gesellschaftstheorie in der Neuzeit. Zürich: ZVT. 
 
Gutiérrez, G. 1973. A Theology of Liberation. Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books. 
 
Hart, S. L. 2005. Capitalism at the crossroads: The unlimited business opportunities 
in solving the world’s most difficult problems. Upper Saddle River: Wharton School. 
 
Hartman, L. P. & DesJardins, J. 2008. Business ethics: Decision-making for personal 
integrity and social responsibility. McGraw-Hill/Irwin. 
 
Harvey, D. 2001. Spaces of capital: Towards a critical geography. Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press. 
 
Hayden, P. & El-Ojelli, C. (eds.). 2005. Confronting globalization: Humanity, justice, 
and the renewal of politics. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Heilbroner, R. L. 2002. The making of economic society. Upper Saddle River: 
Prentice Hall. 
 
Henkys, J. 2005. Geheimnis der Freiheit: Die Gedichte Dietrich Bonhoeffers aus der 
Haft. Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus. 
 
234 
 
Herfeld, M. 2001. Die Gerechtigkeit der Marktwirtschaft: eine wirtschaftsethische 
Analyse der Grundvollzüge moderner Ökonomie. Gütersloh: Gütersloher 
Verlagshaus/Kaiser. 
 
Heyns, C. & Stefiszyn, K. (eds.). 2006. Human rights, peace and justice in Africa: a 
reader. Pretoria: Pretoria University Press. 
 
Hinz, M. O. & Gatter, F. T. (eds.). 2006. Global responsibility – local agenda :the 
legitimacy of modern self-determination and African traditional authority. Münster: Lit 
Verlag. 
 
Höhn, H-J. 2006. Postsäkular: Gesellschaft im Umbruch – Religion im Wandel. 
Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh. 
 
Hondrich, K. A. & Koch-Arzberger, C. 1992. Solidarität in der modernen 
Gesellschaft. Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer. 
 
Honecker, M. 2002. Bioethik und Schöpfungsglaube. In Reuter, H-R., Bedford-
Strohm, H., Kuhlmann, H. & Lütcke, K-H. (eds.), Freiheit verantworten: Festschrift für 
Wolfgang Huber zum 60. Geburtstag. Gütersloh: Kaiser, Gütersloher Verl. Haus. pp. 
580-593. 
 
Honneth, A. 1995. Kommunitarismus: Eine Debatte über die moralischen 
Grundlagen moderner Gesellschaften. Frankfurt a.M/New York: Campus. 
 
Hoff, G. M. 2005. Ökumenische Passagen – zwischen Identität und Differenz: 
funndamentaltheologische Überlegungen zum Stand des Gesprächs zwischen 
römisch-katholischer und evangelisch-lutherischer Kirche. Innsbruck: Tyrolia. 
 
Imhof, K. 2006. Die Diskontinuität der Moderne: zur Theorie des sozialen Wandels. 
Frankfurt a.M: Campus.  
 
Institute for Justice and Reconciliation. 2008. Truth, justice, memory: South Africa’s 
truth and reconciliation process. Cape Town: Institute for Justice and Reconciliation. 
 
Irving, M. S. 1994. The moral limitations of capitalism. Aldershot: Avebury. 
 
Joas, H. 2002. Der Wert der Freiheit und die Erfahrung der Unfreiheit. In Reuter, H-
R., Bedford-Strohm, H., Kuhlmann, H. & Lütcke, K-H. (eds.), Freiheit verantworten: 
Festschrift für Wolfgang Huber zum 60. Geburtstag. Gütersloh: Kaiser, Gütersloher 
Verl. Haus. pp. 446-455. 
235 
 
Jöhn, H-J. 2007. Postsäkular: Gesellschaft im Umbruch – Religion im Wandel. 
Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh. 
 
Jonas, H. 1984 (translated by H. Jonas & D. Herr). The imperative of responsibility: 
In search of an ethics for the technological age. Chicago: Univesity of Chicago 
Press. 
Jonas, H. 1987. Der Gottesbegriff nach Auschwitz: eine jüdische Stimme. Franfurt a. 
M.: Suhrkamp. 
Jonas, H. 1988. Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die 
technologische Zivilisation. 8th ed. Frankfurt a. M.: Insel Verlag. 
 
Jones, F. S. 1987. “Freiheit” in den Briefen des Apostels Paulus. Eine historische, 
exegetische und religionsgeschichtliche Studie. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht. 
 
Jones, P & Stokke, K. (eds.). 2005. Democratising development: The politics of 
socio-economic rights in South Africa. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff. 
 
Junge, M. 2002. Individualisierung. Frankfurt a.M.: Campus. 
 
Jüngel, E. 1978. Zur Freiheit eines Christenmenschen. Eine Erinnerung an Luthers 
Schrift. Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag. 
Jüngel, E. 1990. Wertlose Wahrheit. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck. 
Jüngel, E. 1999. Das Evangelium von der Rechtfertigung des Gottlosen als Zentrum 
des christlichen Glaubens. Tübinen: Mohr Siebeck. 
Jüngel, E. 2000. Indikative der Gnade – Imperative der Freiheit. Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck. 
Jüngel, E. 2002. Entsprechungen: Gott – Wahrheit – Mensch. Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck. 
Jüngel, E. 2003. Zwei Schwerter – Zwei Reiche. Die Trennung der Mächte der 
Reformation. In Ganz Werden (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck). 
 
Kaiser, J-C. 1990. Christentum und politische Verantwortung: Kirchen im 
Nachkriegsdeutschland. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer. 
 
Kakabadse, A. & Morsing, M. (eds.). 2006. Corporate social responsibility: 
Reconciling aspiration with application. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Kant, I. 1784. Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung? Berlinische 
Monatsschrift 4:481-494. 
236 
 
Kaulig, L. 2002. Ebenen des christlich-islamitischen Dialogs: Beobachtungen und 
Analysen zu den Wegen einer Begegnung. Münster: Lit. 
 
Keller, A. 1994. Philosophie der Freiheit. Graz: Verlagshaus Styria. 
 
Kessler, H. (ed.). 1996. Ökologisches Weltethos im Dialog der Kulturen und 
Religionen. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. 
 
Keupp, H.,  Ahbe, T., Gmür, W., Höfer, R., Mitzscherlich, B., Kraus, W., Straus, F. 
1999. Identitätskonstruktionen: Das Patchwork der Identitäten in der Spätmoderne. 
Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt. 
 
Kim, S. H. 2004. Max Weber’s politics of civil society. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Knitter, P. F. 1996. Jesus and the other names: Christian mission and global 
responsibility. New York: Orbis. 
 
Knuth, A. 2005. Der Protestantismus als moderne Religion: historisch-systematische 
Rekonstruktion der religionsphilosophischen Theologie Kurt Leeses (1998–1965). 
Frankfurt a.M.: Peter Lang. 
 
Kron, T. & Heidi Jörges, H. 2008. Individualisierung. Bielefeld. 
 
Küng, H. 1993. Nicht gutgemeint – deshalb ein Fehlschlag. Zu Michael Welkers 
Reaktion auf „Projekt Weltethos‟. Evangelische Kommentare 27:486-489. 
Küng, H. 1994. Weltfrieden durch Religionsfrieden. In Rehm, J, Verantwortlich Leben 
in der Weltgemeinschaft. Zur Auseinandersetzung um das “Projekt Weltethos”. 
Gütersloh: Kaiser. pp. 15-29. 
Küng, H. 2008. Global Ethic Foundation | History and Aims. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.weltethos.org/dat-english/01-history.htm [14 September 2008] 
 
Leicht, R. 2002. Ohne Gott ist kein Staat zu machen. Von der öffentlicher Relevanz 
der Religion im säkularer Zeitalter. In Reuter, H-R., Bedford-Strohm, H., Kuhlmann, 
H. & Lütcke, K-H. (eds.), Freiheit verantworten: Festschrift für Wolfgang Huber zum 
60. Geburtstag. Gütersloh: Kaiser, Gütersloher Verl. Haus. pp. 243-254. 
 
Lenzig, U. 2006. Das Wagnis der Freiheit: Der Freiheitsbegriff im philosophischen 
Werk von Hans Jonas aus theologischer Perspektive. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer. 
 
237 
 
Levine, A. 2002. Engaging political philosophy. From Hobbes to Rawls. Oxford: 
Blackwell. 
 
Luhmann, N. 1971. Moderne Systemtheorien als Form gesamtgesellschaftlicher 
Analyse. In Luhmann, N. & Habermas, J. (eds.), Theorie der Gesellschaft oder 
Sozialtechnologie. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp Verlag. pp. 7-24. 
Luhmann, N. 1982 (translated by S. Holmes & C. Larmore). The differentiation of 
society. New York: Columbia University Press. 
 
Macamo, E. S. 2005. Negotiating modernity: Africa’s ambivalent experience. Dakar: 
Codesria Books.  
 
Marshall, H. I. 2004. New Testament theology: Many witnesses, one Gospel. 
Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press. 
 
Mancini, A. 2006. Ma’at revealed: philosophy of justice in ancient Egypt. New York: 
Buenos Books. 
 
Madsen, R. (ed.). 2002. Meaning and modernity: religion, polity, and self. Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 
 
Markham, I. S. 1996. Plurality and Christian Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Marsh, C. 2005. The beloved community: How faith shapes social justice, from the 
civil rights movement to today. New York: Basic Books. 
 
Martin, R & Reidy, D. A. (eds.). 2006. Rawls’s law of peoples: a realistic utopia? 
Oxford: Blackwell. 
 
Mbeki, T. M. 2006. Nelson Mandela Memorial Lecture. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/show.asp?type=sp&include=president/sp/2006/sp0
7291043.htm [7 July 2009] 
Mbeki, T. M. 2008. State of the Nation Address 2008. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/show.asp?type=sp&include=president/sp/2008/sp0
208136.htm [7 July 2008] 
 
McFayden, A. 2000. Bound to sin: Abuse, Holocaust, and the Christian doctrine of 
sin. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
238 
 
McInerny, R. 1994. Modernity and religion. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame 
Press. 
 
Mehlhausen, J. (ed.). 1995. Pluralismus und Identität. Gütersloh: Gütersloher 
Verlagshaus/Chr Kaiser. 
 
Merle, J. 2005. Globale Gerechtigkeit. Stuttgart: Frommann Holzboog. 
 
Miller, D. 2008. Grundsätze der sozialen Gerechtigkeit. Frankfurt a.M.: Campus. 
 
Mudimbe-Boyi, E. 2002. Beyond dichotomies: Histories, identities, cultures, and the 
challenge of globalisation. Albany: State University of New York. 
 
Müller, R. 2008. Aufklärung in Antike und Neuzeit. Berlin: Berliner 
Wissentschaftlicher Verlag.  
 
Nash-Marshall, S. 2003. What it takes to be free: Religion and the roots of 
democracy. New York: Crossroad. 
 
Nauert, C. G. 2006. Humanism and the culture of Renaissance Europe. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Neville, R. C. 2002. Religion in late modernity. New York: State University of New 
York Press. 
 
Noel, S. (ed.). 2005. From power sharing to democracy: Post-conflict institutions in 
ethnically divided societies. Montréal: McGill-Queen‟s University Press. 
 
Outhwaite, W. 2006. The future of society. Malden: Blackwell. 
 
Panikkar, R. 1999. The intra-religious dialogue. New Jersey: Paulist Press. 
 
Peters, T. 1994. Sin: radical evil in soul and society. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans. 
 
Pfürtner, S. H. 2002. Virtuelle Welt und Naturerfahrung. Zur ethischen und religiösen 
Seite eines Beziehungsverlustes. In Reuter, H-R., Bedford-Strohm, H., Kuhlmann, H. 
& Lütcke, K-H. (eds.), Freiheit verantworten: Festschrift für Wolfgang Huber zum 60. 
Geburtstag. Gütersloh: Kaiser, Gütersloher Verl. Haus. pp. 491-503. 
239 
 
 
Pinstrup-Andersen, P & Sandøe, P. 2007. Ethics, hunger and globalization: In 
search of appropriate policies. Dordrecht: Springer Verlag. 
 
Prozesky, M & De Gruchy, J (eds.). 1995. Living faiths in South Africa. London: 
Hurst & Company. 
 
Prüller-Jagenteufel, G. M. 2004. Befreit zur Verantwortung: Sünde und Versöhnung 
in der Ethik Dietrich Bonhoeffers. Münster: Lit. 
 
Pruzan, E. R. 1989. The concept of justice in Marx. New York: Lang. 
 
Punt, J. 1999. Paul and freedom: implications for hermeneutics and theology. 
Stellenbosch: Stellenbosch University. DTh-thesis. 
 
Race, A. & Shafer, I. 2002. Religions in dialogue: From theocracy to democracy. 
Aldershot: Ashgate. 
 
Raiser, K. 2002. Freiheit und wechselseitige Verantwortung der Kirchen in der 
ökumenischen Gemeinschaft. In Reuter, H-R., Bedford-Strohm, H., Kuhlmann, H. & 
Lütcke, K-H. (eds.), Freiheit verantworten: Festschrift für Wolfgang Huber zum 60. 
Geburtstag. Gütersloh: Kaiser, Gütersloher Verl. Haus. pp. 66-75. 
 
Raymond, L. & Ackerman, S. 2002. The challenge of religion after modernity: 
beyond disenchantment. Aldershot: Ashgate. 
 
Renz, A. & Leimgruber, S. (eds.). 2005. Christen und Muslime: Was sie verbindet, 
was sie untescheidet. Munich: Kösel. 
 
Robertson, R. 1992. Globalisation: Social theory and global culture. London: Sage. 
 
Robinson, M. & Friedman, S. 2005. Civil society, democratisation and foreign aid in 
Africa. IDS Discussion Paper 383. Brighton: Institute of Development Studies. 
 
Romanus, E. 2008. Soziale Gerechtigkeit, Verantwortung und Würde: der egalitäre 
Liberalismus nach John Rawls und Ronald Dworkin. Freiburg/Munich: Alber. 
 
Rudman, S. 1997. Concepts of person and Christian ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
240 
 
 
Sheard, R. B. 1987. Inter-religious dialogue in the Catholic Church since Vatican II: A 
historical and theological study. New York/Ontario: Edwin Mellen Press. 
 
Schluchter, W. (ed.). 1988. Max Webers Sicht des okzidentalen Christentums: 
Interpretation und Kritik. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp. 
 
Schlüter, C. 1999. Gleichheit – Freiheit – Gerechtigkeit: Versuch einer 
Ortsbestimmung in praktischer Absicht. Berlin: Humboldt University. (PhD-thesis.) 
 
Schmid, H., Renz, A. & Sperber, J. (eds.). 2006. “Im Namen Gottes...” Theologie und 
Praxis des Gebets in Christentum und Islam. Regensurg: Pustet. 
 
Schmid, H., Renz, A., Sperber, J. & Terzi, D. (eds.). 2007. Identität durch Differenz? 
Wechselseitige Abgreznungen in Christentum und Islam. Regensburg: Pustet. 
 
Schmid, H., Renz, A., Sperber, J. & Takim, A. (eds.). 2008. Prüfung oder Preis der 
Freiheit: Leid und Leidbewältigung in Christentum und Islam. Regensburg: Pustet. 
 
Schmidinger, H. (ed.). 2003. Identität und Toleranz: christliche Spiritualität im 
interreligiösen Spiegel. Innsbruck: Tyrolia. 
 
Schieder, R. 2008. Sind Religionen gefährlich? Berlin: Berlin University Press. 
 
Schlitt, M. 1992. Umweltethik. Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh. 
 
Schmitt, C. 2007. Islamische Theologie des 21. Jahrhunderts: Der aufgeklärte Islam. 
Stuttgart: Basis Verlag. 
 
Schroer, M. 2001. Das Individuum der Gesellschaft: synchrone und diachrone 
Theorieperspektiven. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp. 
 
Schubert, A. 2000. Das Ende der Sünde: Anthropologie und Erbsünde zwischen 
Reformation und Aufklärung. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. 
 
Schuhmacher, W.2006. Theologische Ethik als Verantwortungsethik. Leben und 
Werk Heinz Eduard Tödts in ökumenischer Perspektive. Gütersloh: Gütersloher 
Verlagshaus. 
 
241 
 
Schüssler Fiorenza, E. 1997. The praxis of coequal discipleship. In R. A. Horsely 
(ed.), Paul and empire: Religion and power in Roman imperial society. Harrisburg: 
Trinity Press. pp. 224-241. 
 
Schwager, R. 1994. Brauchen wir einen Sündenbock? Gewalt und Erlösung in den 
biblischen Schriften. Taur: Kulturverlag. 
 
Schwöbel, C. 2002. Gott in Beziehung. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck. 
Schwöbel, C. 2003. Christlicher Glaube im Pluralismus. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck. 
 
Sklair, L. 2002. Globalization: capitalism and its alternatives. Oxford: Oxfrod 
University Press. 
 
Smit, D. J. 2003. Can we still be Reformed? Questions from a South African 
perspektive. In Welker, M & Alston, W. M. (eds.), Reformed Theology. Identity and 
Ecumenicity. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans. pp. 20-35. 
Smit, D. J. 2006. Freedom in belonging? Calvin on human freedom and the Christian 
life. Lecture delivered at the Interdisciplinary and International Conference Concepts 
of Freedom in the Biblical Traditions, Düsseldorf. 
 
South Africa. 1996. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. 
 
South African Congress Alliance. 1955. The Freedom Charter. Document adopted 
by the Congress of People in Kliptown on the 26th of June 1955. 
 
Statistics South Africa. 2001. Census 2001. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.statssa.gov.za/census01/html/C2001Interactive.asp [24 September 2008] 
 
Stark, R. & Bainsbridge, W. S. (eds.). 1985. The future of religion: Secularisation, 
revival and cult formation. London/California: University of California Press. 
 
Steinvort, U. 1999. Gleiche Freiheit: politische Philosophie und 
Verteilungsgerechtigkeit. Berlin: Akademisches Verlag. 
 
Stevenson, W. 1999. Sovereign Grace: The Place and Significance of Freedom in 
John Calvin’s Political Thought. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Suttner, R. (ed.). 2006. 50 years of the Freedom Charter. Pretoria: Unisa Press. 
 
242 
 
Swidler, L. 1992. Die Zukunft der Theologie: Im Dialog der Religionen und 
Weltanschauungen. Regensburg/Munich: Pustet/Chr. Kaiser. 
 
Swindler, L. (ed.). 1987. Toward a universal theology of religion. New York: Orbis. 
 
Tanner, K. 1992. The politics of God. Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress. 
 
Teufel, E. (ed.). 1996. Was halt die moderne Gesellschaft zusammen? Frankfurt 
a.M.: Suhrkamp. 
 
Theunissen, M. 2002. Freiheit und Schuld – Freiheit und Sünde. In Reuter, H-R., 
Bedford-Strohm, H., Kuhlmann, H. & Lütcke, K-H. (eds.), Freiheit verantworten: 
Festschrift für Wolfgang Huber zum 60. Geburtstag. Gütersloh: Kaiser, Gütersloher 
Verl. Haus. pp. 343-356. 
 
Thiemann, R. F. 1996. Religion in public life: a dilemma for democracy. Washington: 
Georgetown University Press. 
 
Tietz-Steiding, C. 2004. Freiheit zu sich selbst: Entfaltung eines christlichen Begriffs 
von Selbstannahme. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck. 
 
Thomas, G & Schüle, A. (eds.). 2006. Luhmann und die Theologie. Darmstadt: 
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. 
 
Tödt, H. E. 1979. Der Spielraum des Menschen: Theologische Orientierung in den 
Umstellungskrisen der modernen Welt. Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus. 
Tödt, H. E. 1988. Perspektiven theologischer Ethik. Munich: Kaiser. 
Tödt, H. E. (red E. Scharffenorth). 1993. Theologische Perspektiven nach Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer. Gütersloh: Kaiser, Gütersloher Verlagshaus.  
 
Tröger, K. (ed.). 1993. Weltreligionen und christlicher Glaube: Beiträge zum 
interreligiösen Dialog. Berlin: Wichern. 
 
Trowitzsch, M. 1999. Über die Moderne hinaus. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck. 
 
Turner, S. P. 1984. Max Weber and the dispute over reason and value: a study in 
philosophy, ethics and politics. London: Routledge. 
 
243 
 
United Nations. 1948. Universal Declaration of Human Rights. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html [26 September 2008] 
 
United Nations Development Programme. 2005. Summary Human Development 
Report 2005: International cooperation at a crossroads: Aid, trade and security in an 
unequal world. New York: United Nations Development Programme. 
 
Villa-Vicencio, C & Doxater, E. (eds.). 2004. Pieces of the puzzle: Keywords on 
reconciliation and transitional justice. Cape Town: Institute for Justice and 
Reconciliation. 
 
Volf, M. 1996. Gerechtigkeit, kulturelle Heterogenität und christlicher Glaube. 
Evangelische Theologie 56 (2):116-128. 
 
Von Nussbaum, H. (ed.). 1973. Die Zukunft des Wachstums: Kritische Antworten 
zum “Bericht des Club of Rome”. Düsseldorf: Bertelsmann Universitätsverlag. 
 
Von Weizsäcker, C. F. 1982. Der bedrohte Friede. Munich: Hanser. 
 
Walzer, M. 1998. Sphären der Gerechtigkeit: Ein Plädoyer für Pluralität und 
Gleichheit. Frankfurt a.M: Fischer. 
 
Warren, M. A. 2004. Moral status: Obligations to persons and other living things. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Welker, M. 1992. Das Reich Gottes. Evangelische Theologie 52 (6): 497-512. 
Welker, M. 1993a. Gutgemeint – aber ein Fehlschlag. Hans Küngs „Projekt 
Weltethos‟. Evangelische Kommentare 26: 354-356. 
Welker, M. 1993b. Autoritäre Religion. Replik auf Hans Küng. Evangelische 
Kommentare 26: 528-529. 
Welker, M. 1995. Auf der theologischen Suche nach einem „Weltethos‟ in einer Zeit 
kurzlebiger moralischer Märkte. Küng, Tracy und die Bedeutung der neuen 
Biblischen Theologie. Evangelische Theologie 55 (5): 438-456. 
Welker, M. 1997. Die evangelische Freiheit. Evangelische Theologie 57 (1): 68-73. 
Welker, M. 2000. Kirche im Pluralismus. 2nd ed. Gütersloh: Kaiser Tachenbücher. 
Welker, M. 2002. Wovon der freiheitliche Staat lebt. Die Quellen politischer Loyalität 
im spätmodernen Pluralismus. In Reuter, H-R., Bedford-Strohm, H., Kuhlmann, H. & 
Lütcke, K-H. (eds.), Freiheit verantworten: Festschrift für Wolfgang Huber zum 60. 
Geburtstag. Gütersloh: Kaiser, Gütersloher Verl. Haus. pp. 225-242. 
 
244 
 
Wenham, D. 1995. Paul: Follower of Jesus or founder of Christianity? Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans. 
 
Wiese, C. 2004. Weiterwohnlichkeit der Welt: zur Aktualität von Hans Jonas. Berlin: 
Philo. 
 
 
Wilkens, E. (ed.). 1982. Christliche Ethik und Sicherheitspolitik. Frankfurt a.M.: 
Evangelisches Verlagswerk. 
 
 
Williams, C. C. 2005. A commodified world? Mapping the limits of capitalism. 
London: Zed Books. 
 
 
Wohlgemuth, L. & Sall, E. 2006. Human rights, regionalism and the dilemmas of 
democracy in Africa. Dakar: Council for the Development of Social Science 
Research in Africa. 
 
 
Wolf, E. 1984 (2nd ed.). Barmen: Kirche zwischen Versuchung und Gnade. Munich: 
Chr Kaiser. 
 
 
Wyatt, C. 2008. The difference principle beyond Rawls. London: Continuum. 
 
 
Zafar, H. A. 2007. Glaube und Vernunft aus islamischer Perspektive: Antwort auf die 
Regensburger Vorlesung vom Papst Benedikt XVI. Frankfurt a.M.: Verlag der Islam. 
 
 
Zehner, J. 1992. Der notwendige Dialog: Die Weltreligionen in katholischer und 
evangelischer Sicht. Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus Gerd Mohn. 
 
 
Ziedan, D. 2003. The resurgence of religion: A comparative study of selected themes 
in Christian and Islamic discourses. Leiden: Brill. 
 
 
Zucker, R. 2001. Democratic distributive justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
  
